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Chapter 1
Introduction
Both statistics and machine learning deal with the question of how humans
and computers can learn from data. In large amounts of data, we hope to find
patterns that express the data’s most important characteristics, and that can be
used to make predictions about future data, or to help us understand the process
that generated the data better.
To approach such a task, we usually need to draw a line between aspects of
reality that we will take into consideration and aspects we will ignore. Once
this is done, we canmake amodel: a simplified description of the part of reality
we are interested in. For example, a model used to predict how well a patient
will respond to a certain medicine might use that person’s age, gender, and
clinical measurements such as blood pressure. Then based on previous obser-
vations of other patients and how well they responded to the medicine (the
data), the model can be used to predict this for a new, previously unobserved
patient. To predict how well the same person will like a movie (such as done
by Netflix), we would likely employ a very different model. This model may
also use the person’s age and gender. But for such a model, information about
other movies that person likes will be very relevant, while white blood cell
count will not be so useful.
Ideally, the model includes all aspects of reality we believe might be rele-
vant for the questionwewant to answer. In practice, this is not always possible.
Further simplification may be necessary if the phenomenon under study is too
complex to capture entirely, or if with a biggermodel, it would take far too long
to compute the answer to our question of interest. This dissertation is about
understanding what it means for our learning effort if some relevant aspects
of reality are not included in the model, or are included in an overly simplified
manner.
We already mentioned that one task for which a model might be used is
prediction. In this dissertation, we will measure the success at our learning
task by our ability to predict new data coming from the same source. Let us
look at twomore examples illustrating how the ability to predict can be a good
measure of learning:
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As a first example, one way to understand how a program such as zip
can compress files is through prediction. While reading through the file to
be compressed, before seeing each character in the file, the program decides
for each possibility how it will be encoded (with what sequence of bits in the
compressed file). It makes this decision using a prediction of what characters
are more likely to occur next: these will be encoded using shorter sequences
of bits. If the character that actually appears was likely according to the com-
pressor’s prediction, this saves a few bits in the compressed file (Cover and
Thomas, 1991).
As a second, much more general example, the predictions of a good sci-
entific theory will correspond to observed data. If new data are observed that
differ significantly from the theory’s predictions, this is a motivation to find
improvements to the theory, or even altogether new theories, that predict the
data better. For example, Newton’s laws of gravitation can be used to pre-
dict the motion of the planets around the sun accurately. But for the planet
Mercury, which is closest to the sun, the predictions were very slightly off. In
1915, Einstein’s general theory of relativity provided new predictions, which
did match the observations of Mercury’s orbit; this theory has continued to
predict the effects of gravity in the century since then (Misner et al., 1973).
The models we consider in this dissertation are statistical models. Such
models give a description of part of reality in the language of mathematics, so
that the predictions we are interested in can be found by means of computa-
tion. A statistical model consists of several possible explanations, or hypotheses.
Each hypothesis is a probability distribution that describes one way in which the
data-generating process might work. (One reason for using probabilistic hy-
potheses is to account for measurement errors in the data.) A model is thus a
set of probability distributions.
In addition to the model, we need amethod that describes how the data and
the model should be used: what computations should be performed to find
our prediction?
Whenever a model does not incorporate all aspects of reality that are rele-
vant to our learning task, the model is wrong, underspecified, or both. By
wrong,1 we mean that the model does not contain a hypothesis which exactly
describes the true data-generating process (though it may contain hypotheses
that are, in some sense, good approximations to the truth). For example, a
medical model like the one we mentioned earlier may predict that a specific
medicine is more likely to be effective for patients with higher blood pres-
sures, when in fact this is true only up to a point, above which the medicine
becomes less effective again. By underspecified, we mean that the hypotheses in
the model describe the full process of data generation for only part of the data.
For example, the medical model predicts how well a medicine will work given
the characteristics of a new patient, but that same model might not predict the
characteristics of this patient.
In this dissertation, we discuss three scenarios involving models that are
wrong or underspecified. In each case, we find that standard methods for
1This is also called misspecified.
1.1. Regression 3
Figure 1.1: A simple example of a regression problem
learning from data and for predicting new data may fail, sometimes dramat-
ically, and we present different methods that continue to perform well at their
intended tasks even if the models are wrong or underspecified.
We now discuss these three scenarios in turn. The first two of these scen-
arios both involve regression problems, explained in Section 1.1. The third
scenario, introduced in Section 1.2, addresses a very different situation where
we must predict a variable of interest that we do not observe directly, but only
through the output of some unknown process.
1.1 Regression
A regression problem is a kind of learning problem in which the data consist
of two parts: the input X and the output Y (Hastie et al., 2001). The task at
hand is to predict the unknown value of Y given a known value of X. The
two examples from the beginning were regression problems: in the medical
example, X describes characteristics of a patient and Y is the effectiveness of
the medicine for that patient; in the Netflix example, X consists of different
characteristics of a user, and Y is the rating that user would assign to some
movie.
Figure 1.1 shows a much simpler but illustrative example where X and Y
are single numbers. We have observed 100 data points: the training data. For
learning from these data, two different models have been tried. Model 1, the
simpler of the two, considers all linear functions as possible explanations (hy-
potheses) of how Y is generated given X. The straight blue line is a hypo-
thesis from the model that might be used to predict Y for new data points (the
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test data).
Model 2 is more complex than model 1: it includes all hypotheses from
model 1, but also curved lines (quadratic functions). If we use this model to
predict new values of Y, we might use the red line in the figure.
In the regression problemswe consider, the output variable is a single num-
ber, and the input variable may be either a single number or a vector of num-
bers.
We will consider linear models. Each hypothesis in a linear model can be
described by a vector of parameters β. The hypothesis corresponding to β then
states that for a data point with input variable X consisting of the p numbers
X1,X2, . . . ,Xp, the output variable Y is given by
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + . . . + βpXp + e.
Here e is a random noise term, and the other terms on the right hand side define
the regression curve.
This type of model is much less restrictive than it may at first appear, be-
cause we still have a lot of freedom in choosing the values we put in the input
vector X. For example, if we believe some real-world quantity S should be
taken into account by the model but do not believe that S and Y are linearly re-
lated, wemay let Xi = Si for i ∈ 1, . . . , p: then the model contains a hypothesis
for each polynomial up to degree p. Model 2 from the figure is an example of
this, so it is also a linear model.
After observing a number of data points, we will see that some hypotheses
fit the data better than others. Thus we can learn the parameter vector β from
the data. One method that can be used for this task is to find the maximum
likelihood parameter: the value of β for which the probability of observing the
data would be largest. This is the main approach in the first of our two scen-
arios (and the lines shown in Figure 1.1 were found this way). In the second
scenario another approach is used, which will be explained in Section 1.1.2.
To fully specify a probability distribution of the output variable given the
input variable, the model must also describe the distribution from which the
noise term e is drawn. We may for example assume these follow a Gaussian
(also called normal) distribution. For this distribution, we still need to specify a
variance. Maybe we have a good idea of what this variance is; then we can just
let all hypotheses in the model use this fixed value. Alternatively, our model
may include a parameter for the variance in addition to the parameter vector
β that describes the regression curve; then we can learn the variance from the
data using our model.
Besides learning the parameterswithin amodel, wemay also face the prob-
lem of model selection. It is often impossible in practice to formulate and use a
model that incorporates all aspects of reality we think might be relevant, so
that any model we end up using must be a compromise. It may not be clear
in advance how to make this compromise: a model that is too ‘simple’ may
not contain any hypotheses that even resemble the data-generating distribu-
tion, while a model that is too ‘complex’ may contain so many hypotheses that
it may be nearly impossible to learn which ones are good. So we may want
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to consider a set of candidate models, and learn from the training data which
one to use tomake our predictions. (Alternatively, wemaywant to combine the
predictions from all these models into a single prediction, giving more weight
to some models and less weight to others.) Even with the help of the training
data, choosing a model can be a difficult task, as it is in Figure 1.1. The red line
was chosen from a larger set of options, and so could be chosen to fit the data
we have seen slightly better than the blue line. But how can we tell if model 2
will also be better for data points we have not seen yet?
Again, many different statistical methods exist that answer these questions
in as many different ways. In the two regression scenarios, two different meth-
ods take the spotlight: AIC in Chapter 2, and Bayesian model averaging in
Chapters 3 to 5. We introduce these scenarios in the next two sections.
1.1.1 Extra-sample prediction
You are given 100 data points (X,Y) as shown in Figure 1.1, and are asked to
predict y′ for a new point with x′ = 2.5 (marked by the dashed vertical line).
Do you base your prediction on the linear or the quadratic model? This is the
main question of Chapter 2.
The regressionmodels we consider may be regarded as underspecified, be-
cause they only describe how the output is generated given the input, but not
how the input is generated. This is enough to have each model give predic-
tions of Y given X (the behaviour of the inputs is not relevant for this task), so
this is not a failing of the models. But to assess which model might give the
best predictions on future ‘test’ data, we would need some information (for
example in the form of predictions from an auxiliary model, independent of
the other models) on the distribution of inputs (for this task, that information
is relevant). Standard methods for choosing a model or averaging over models
do not consider such information.
In Chapter 2, we take the classical method AIC (Akaike’s Information Cri-
terion;2 Akaike (1973)), and adapt it to take information on the inputs into con-
sideration. We call our modification XAIC.
When comparing AIC and XAIC, we see that AIC is based on an estimate
of the prediction error that would be obtained if the test inputs were randomly
chosen from the inputs already seen in the training sample (the in-sample error).
XAIC does not assume that the test inputs will be so alike the training inputs,
and computes the extra-sample error. (XAIC stands for eXtra-sample AIC.) If the
training and test inputs are drawn from the same probability distribution, the
difference between the two error measures becomes smaller and smaller as the
number of training data points grows. So in this case, AIC eventually performs
well. However, the difference between AIC and XAIC never vanishes entirely,
even in this case; in a different case where training and test inputs do not come
from the same distribution, it becomes very important to estimate the extra-
sample and not the in-sample error, and XAIC is strongly recommended over
AIC.
2According to Akaike himself, AIC stands for ‘An Information Criterion’.
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XAIC requires some information about test inputs. Predicting these with
an auxiliarymodelmay be hard (and is not the problemwe are really interested
in, namely predicting outputs given inputs). So one special case of XAIC is of
special interest: FAIC (Focused AIC), which does not require predictions of X,
but tailors its model selection choice to each possible value of the test input: for
the same training data but different test inputs X = x, a different model may
be selected. This makes FAIC radically different from most model selection
methods,3 which usually choose amodel (or aweighting overmodels) without
any knowledge of the task for which this model will then be used. If instead
we take the prediction task as fundamental and view model selection as part
of this task, then focused model selection is a natural approach.
For the data shown in Figure 1.1, AIC tells us to use the more complex
model 2 for all our predictions, even though the data were actually generated
according to the simpler model 1. FAIC will also use model 2 for test inputs
near 0 (where the red and blue regression curves are very similar), but will use
model 1 for test inputs farther away from 0, like x′ = 2.5.
The method AIC has existed for over forty years, and in that time, many
variations and improvements have been proposed: AICC (Hurvich and Tsai,
1989), BPIC (Ando, 2007), DIC (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), GIC (Konishi and
Kitagawa, 1996), NIC (Murata et al., 1994), TIC (see Burnham and Anderson,
2002), WAIC (Watanabe, 2010), . . . . Thus a reader might think that XAIC is just
another slight variation. However, none of these criteria address the issue that
XAIC and FAIC address. Thus XAIC is certainly not ‘yet another information
criterion’.4
Some more details on our approach are given in Section 1.1.3. In Chap-
ter 2, we compare XAIC and FAIC to other methods, both theoretically and
experimentally.
1.1.2 Bayesian inconsistency
The Bayesian approach to dealing with uncertainty is to represent it in terms
of a probability distribution. For example, if we think one of the models in a
regression problem is correct but we do not know which one, we may make
our uncertainty precise by specifying a prior distribution over themodels. This
prior may put the same amount of probability mass on each of the models to
represent that we think they are all equally likely to be the correct model, or it
may put more mass on some than on others.
After seeing data, we can use Bayes’ theorem to compute a posterior distribu-
tion over the models. This distribution tells us exactly what would be rational
to believe after seeing the data, if our initial beliefs corresponded to the prior
distribution (Bernardo and Smith, 1994).
3One exception is the Focused Information Criterion (FIC) of Claeskens andHjort (2003), which
shares the idea of ‘focus’ on a prediction task of interest, and hence gave FAIC its name; yet it works
out this idea in a completely different manner.
4That would be YAIC.
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Figure 1.2: Bayesian inconsistency in regression: When the training data con-
tain many ‘easy’ points (at (0, 0)), the Bayesian posterior assigns most of its
mass to the most complex models available, even though a much simpler
model is actually much closer (under a variety of distance measures) to being
correct.
Instead of using AIC or XAIC as in Chapter 2, wemay use the posterior dis-
tribution over the models to select a model for giving predictions, or a weight-
ing over themodels. The latter approach is a naturalway of taking into account
all the uncertainty over the choice of model represented by the posterior. This
approach is called Bayesian model averaging (BMA). This is the method for deal-
ing with multiple models we investigate in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Similarly to putting a prior on the models, we may put a prior on the hypo-
theses within each model. Then the posterior over the hypotheses can be used
to form the Bayesian predictive distribution, which can be used in place of the
prediction suggested by the maximum likelihood parameter. The predictive
distributions of all our models can be combined into a single overall predictive
distribution by BMA.
Instead of considering multiple models, we can also use a single complex
model, and use the prior on that model’s hypotheses to express that we find
‘simpler’ a hypothesis (that is, with parameter value β closer to 0) more likely.
This Bayesian ridge regression setting is also investigated in Chapters 3 to 5.
We conduct two kinds of experiments. In one kind, one of the models is
correct: the data are generated by a distribution in one of the models (in Fig-
ure 1.2 it is in fact generated by Y = 0+Gaussian noise, which corresponds to
the simplest model under consideration). As predicted by the theory, in these
experiments, Bayesian inference methods perform very well. This can be seen
in Figure 1.2, where the green line is always close to Y = 0.
In the other kind of experiment, half the data are generated by the same
model as before, but the other half are all in the same place: (0, 0). With the
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inclusion of these data points, all models are wrong, because the models pre-
dict that all data points will have the same noise level regardless of the input.
However, the point (0, 0) is on the same regression curve as the other data (the
black line at Y = 0 in Figure 1.2) and has no noise, so it would seem that these
data points should only make the problem easier. It turns out this is not the
case for Bayesianmodel averaging: it severely overfits, which essentially means
that it gives far too much attention to other, complex models, as the red line in
Figure 1.2 shows.
It is known from other work that Bayesian inference can be made robust
against this kind of misbehaviour by selecting a small enough learning rate
(Walker andHjort, 2002; Zhang, 2006a; Grünwald, 2012), and using the general-
ized Bayesian posterior with this learning rate (instead of the standard Bayesian
posterior, which corresponds to a learning rate of 1). With a properly chosen
learning rate, Bayes learns to predict as well as the best5 hypothesis in the
model (if appropriate conditions hold). By comparison, under weak condi-
tions, standard Bayes learns to predict as well as the true distribution if it is in
themodel, but cannot be guaranteed to find a good hypothesis in general if the
model is wrong.
Toput this theory into practice, we needmethods that candetermine a good
value for the learning rate, tuned for the data and themodel. In Chapters 3 to 5,
we consider several related methods for this task and evaluate them experi-
mentally in regression problems. We use the name SafeBayes for these meth-
ods. The blue line in Figure 1.2 shows that SafeBayes predicts very well (close
to the true Y = 0) in the wrong-model experiment.
1.1.3 Details on XAIC and SafeBayes
In a regression problem, there are infinitely many possible outcomes for Y.
No matter how good a prediction method is, it cannot be expected to predict
the true outcome exactly. So we cannot measure the quality of predictions by
simply counting the number of mistakes. Instead, we need other loss functions
to compare different predictions.
We distinguish two types of predictions. A point prediction simply states a
value for the outcome. The closer the predicted value yˆ is to the actual value y,
the better the prediction is, and the smaller the loss. A standard loss function
is squared error loss, which assigns a loss of (y− yˆ)2 to this prediction.
The alternative to a point prediction is a probabilistic prediction, which takes
the form of a probability distribution over all possible outcomes. Such pre-
dictions allow the predictor to express his degree of uncertainty over different
possible outcomes. For example, a Gaussian prediction with a small variance
represents that the actual outcome is expected to be very close to the mean of
the distribution, while a large variance means that the predictor would not be
surprised if the outcome turns out to be far away.
A loss function that is commonly used to evaluate probabilistic predictions
is logarithmic loss (Bernardo and Smith, 1994). If the prediction is given by a
5In the sense of KL divergence (see Section 1.1.3).
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density function fˆ and y is the actual outcome, this loss function assigns a loss
of− log fˆ (y) to the prediction. Thus the larger the probability density that the
predictor gave to the actual outcome, the smaller the loss. (Loss functions for
probabilistic predictions are often called scoring rules, but we will usually just
call them loss functions.)
For Gaussian predictions with mean yˆ and fixed variance, logarithmic loss
behaves verymuch like squared error loss: logarithmic loss is then also a quad-
ratic function of y and yˆ, minimizedwhen y = yˆ, so that a prediction thatmini-
mizes (an expectation over) one of these two loss functions alsominimizes (the
same expectation over) the other. This holds for arbitrary expectations: the
true density does not need to be a Gaussian. If we consider Gaussian prob-
abilistic predictions with different variances, or even altogether different dis-
tributions, the two loss functions become less closely related.
Logarithmic loss arises as a natural choice of loss function for comparing
probabilistic predictions in several settings. For example, it is a fundamental
quantity in data compression (Cover and Thomas, 1991). It is also related to
the information-theoretic concept of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. The KL
divergence between true density f ∗ and predicted density fˆ is
D( f ∗‖ fˆ ) := EY∼ f ∗ [log f ∗(Y)− log fˆ (Y)]
= EY∼ f ∗ [− log fˆ (Y)]− EY∼ f ∗ [− log f ∗(Y)]. (1.1)
This can be thought of as a distance measure between distributions. We see
that the first term in (1.1) is the expected logarithmic loss of fˆ , and the second
term does not depend on fˆ . Thus the smaller the expected logarithmic loss of
fˆ , the closer it is to the ‘truth’ f ∗ in terms of KL divergence.
Logarithmic loss and KL divergence play a central role in both of our re-
gression scenarios. We discuss this role in more detail now.
AIC and XAIC Given a set of models, each a parameterized set of densities
Mi = { fθ | θ ∈ Θi}, AIC (Akaike, 1973) tells us to compute
−2 log fθˆ(X,Y)(Y | X) + 2k (1.2)
for eachmodel, and select themodel that minimizes this value. Here θˆ denotes
the maximum likelihood estimator and k is the number of free parameters in
the model. Under some regularity conditions, the quantity (1.2) is an asymp-
totically unbiased estimator of the KL divergence from the maximum likeli-
hood estimate to the truth, up to a constant (the second term in (1.1)) that is
the same for all models.
XAIC replaces the estimator (1.2) by an estimator of the KL divergence at a
given set of (or distribution over) test inputs:
−2 log fθˆ(X,Y)(Y | X) + k+ κX′ , (1.3)
where κX′ is a quantity that depends on the model, the training data, and the
test input(s) X′ or some prediction thereof, arrived at by other means. We refer
10 Chapter 1. Introduction
to Theorem 2.1 for the definition of κX′ . In the special case where the set of
test inputs is exactly identical to the set of training inputs, κX′ = k and XAIC
reduces to AIC; if X′ contains only one point, we find the special case FAIC.
Bayes and SafeBayes For a prior on Θwith density pi relative to measure ρ,
the standard Bayesian posterior has density
pi(θ | xn, yn) = fθ(y
n | xn)pi(θ)∫
fθ(yn | xn)pi(θ)ρ(dθ)
. (1.4)
(HereΘmay be the parameter space of a singlemodel; or, regarding themodel
index as another parameter,Θmay represent all models combined.) If the pos-
terior converges to a hypothesis in the model, then, under weak conditions, it
is to a hypothesis that minimizes the KL divergence to the true distribution. In
this case, the Bayesian predictive distribution in our regressionmodels will be-
comemore andmore similar to a Gaussian distributionwith the same variance
as the noise, and as a result, logarithmic loss and squared error loss behave
similarly.
In the wrong-model experiments of Chapter 3 (of which we saw one ex-
ample in Figure 1.2), however, the posterior does not concentrate, and Bayes’
predictions do not start to resemble Gaussian distributions with a fixed vari-
ance. While these predictions still perform well when evaluated by logarithmic loss,
they prove inadequate for other tasks, such as point prediction under squared error loss.
(See Section 3.2 and the rest of Chapters 3 to 5 for details.)
The generalized Bayesian posterior with learning rate η has density
pi(θ | xn, yn, η) = ( fθ(y
n | xn))ηpi(θ)∫
( fθ(yn | xn))ηpi(θ)ρ(dθ)
. (1.5)
SafeBayes considers different values of η and chooses one for which Bayes still
performs well when constrained to a probabilistic prediction corresponding to
a hypothesis in the model (evaluated using logarithmic loss). Two of the ver-
sions of SafeBayes discussed in Chapter 3 may also be interpreted as choosing
η by evaluating Bayes’ point predictions (using squared error loss).
While AIC and Bayes can both be understood as optimizing KL divergence,
they do so in very different ways. AIC usually converges to the KL-optimal
predictions more quickly than Bayes. On the other hand, if one of the mod-
els contains the true data-generating distribution, AIC may continue to try
more complexmodels instead, regardless of the amount of training data (Yang,
2007a).
In their respective chapters, XAIC and SafeBayes are considered as solu-
tions to two different problems appearing in regression. XAIC (or, more spe-
cifically, FAIC) addresses the problem that the accuracy of predictions of a lin-
ear regression model may vary with the test input, and introduces the quan-
tity κx to measure this effect. SafeBayes addresses the problem of potential
Bayesian inconsistency on wrong models; one of several explanations of how
this inconsistency may occur in regression involves the way in which the vari-
ance of the Bayesian predictive distribution depends on x (see Figure 4.4).
1.2. Probability updating with underspecified distributions 11
In Section 2.6.1, we see that the variance of the Bayesian predictive dis-
tribution in a linear regression model is linearly related to κx. Looking fur-
ther, in Section 3.4.2 we find that κx also appears in the versions of SafeBayes
that randomize over the posterior (κx occurs as the last term in (3.23), and the
second to last in (3.24)), but not in the versions that pick a single parameter
value in the model. This is remarkable, but it is not clear what conclusions can
be drawn from this fact: there are significant differences between the ways in
which FAIC and SafeBayes use κx. Also, our experiments in Chapters 3 to 5 do
not conclusively answer the question which version of SafeBayes is better: one
that includes κx, or one that excludes it.
So, although the methods we develop bear similarities, we cannot draw
hard conclusions from that, and we will consider these methods separately in
the chapters to come.
1.2 Probability updating with underspecified dis-
tributions
And now for something completely different:
1.2.1 The Monty Hall problem
Monty Hall was the host of the TV show Let’s Make a Deal (Selvin (1975); see
also vos Savant (1990)). He used to play games like the following with the
contestants.
The contestant faces three closed doors. Behind one of the doors, a great
prize is hidden (say, a car), while the other doors hide less appealing objects
(say, goats). After the contestant has picked one of the doors, Monty Hall does
not simply tell the contestant whether he won the prize or not. Instead, he
opens one of the other two doors, revealing a goat behind it. (He knows what
is behind each door, so he never accidentally reveals where the car is.) Now
he asks the contestant if he would like to change his mind and switch doors.
What should the contestant do?
Most people’s first impression is that switchingdoes not change the chances
of winning the car. Both doors were equally likely to hide the car beforeMonty
Hall opened a door, so why would one be more likely than the other now?
However, this is not the right answer. The location of the car does not
change when Monty Hall opens a door, and so the probability6 that it is be-
hind the initially chosen door remains 1/3, so the probability for the other
closed door must be 2/3, and it is wise to switch.
The situation becomes easier to understand intuitively when we consider
a game with 100 doors. After the contestant’s initial pick, Monty Hall opens
98 doors, revealing 98 goats. Two doors remain shut: the door the contestant
6To be precise: this is the unconditional probability, which does not take into accountwhich door
the quizmaster opened.
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picked, and another door Monty Hall chose to leave shut. However, the con-
testant picked his door without knowing where the prize is, while Monty Hall
does know where the prize is. Clearly, the two doors are not symmetric, and
it would be wise to switch. (This is the explanation given by vos Savant in the
article (1990) on the Monty Hall game that made this problem famous.)
1.2.2 Generalizing the problem
In the Monty Hall game, the contestant has an initial probability distribution
of where the car is hidden. After seeing a goat behind one of the doors, he
may (if he is a probabilist or statistician) want to update his probabilities. The
standard way to update probabilities after receiving such information is by
conditioning on the set of remaining options. This would tell us that if the car
was equally likely to be behind the two remaining doors initially, then it is still
equally likely to be behind those doors now.7
As the Monty Hall problem shows, this is not always the right answer. The
fact that this does not always work correctly motivates us to study a more gen-
eral question: how should we update our probabilities in similar situations?
The problems we study correspond to the second half of the Monty Hall
game: the car has already been hidden (at random) behind one of the three
doors, and the contestant has already made an initial guess. How does the
quizmaster now decide which door to open, and how can the contestant inter-
pret this new information? We generalize this problem in the following ways:
we allow the set of possible outcomes to contain any number of values (instead
of just three doors as possible locations of the car in the Monty Hall game); we
allow any number of messages that may be received by the contestant (corres-
ponding to the two doors the quizmaster may choose to open); and the initial
distribution on the outcomes may be any probability distribution.
We are thus looking at a generalization of conditioning where a set y is re-
vealed containing true outcome x. In standard situations, the different sets y
that may be revealed are disjoint. (For example, in regression we condition
on the precise value of the input variable; these different values do not ‘over-
lap’). But here, the sets y can overlap: calling the doors {a, b, c}, assuming the
contestant’s initial pick is a, Monty Hall reveals either {a, b} or {a, c}.
We can also cast the contestant’s problem into the form of the regression
problem / statistical models. Some process generates the outcome X, and an-
other (the quizmaster) generates the message Y given X; this is very similar to
the regression setting. Now the contestant observes Y (instead of X), and has
to predict X (instead of Y). Another important difference with the regression
setting is that in the probability updating problem, there is no previous data
for the contestant to learn from.
7This is the answer we get by ‘naive conditioning’ (Grünwald and Halpern, 2003). As we will
see below (and in detail in Chapter 6), if we had access to additional information and would form-
alize the problem in a larger space inwhich this information can be represented, then conditioning
would give the right answer. The problem is thus not with conditioning per se, but with the choice
of space: in the naive space, conditioning is not right, while in the right space, we do not have
sufficient information to condition.
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We assume the contestant knows the process generating X. However, the
process generating Y given X is unknown to him. The only thing he knows
about this process is that some pairs of outcomes and messages cannot occur
together: the quizmaster could not reveal a goat behind the door that has the
car behind it. The set of all distributions satisfying these constraints form a
model. However, with no previous data, we have no way to learn which of
these distributions to prefer, as we could in the regression setting. The model
only tells us what is possible and what is not. Thus we may say the model is
underspecified.
1.2.3 Our approach
We do not know how the quizmaster in the Monty Hall game chooses which
door to open; or, in the general setting, how the message Y is generated. We
need to know this if we want to know the conditional probability that the con-
testant should assign to each outcome given somemessage. To do this, we take
a worst-case approach: we assume that the contestant and the quizmaster are
two players, playing the game against each other. (In the Monty Hall problem,
this may very well be what is actually going on.) The contestant wants to pre-
dict as well as possible, while the quizmaster’s goal is to make the contestant’s
task as hard as he can.
This worst-case approach is standard in game theory, and has been previ-
ously applied to theMontyHall problem byGill (2011); Gnedin (2011). But the
applicability of this theory is not restricted to games between two opponents.
If we do not believe the data-generating process is fully adversarial, butmerely
want to be careful about the conclusions we draw, a worst-case approach can
ensure that our predictions will not be terrible, no matter what happens.
In order to make this approach precise, we need to assign numeric scores
to the contestant’s predictions. For this purpose, we again use loss functions,
which were introduced in the beginning of Section 1.1.3. In the probability
updating problem, a loss function takes a prediction and the actual outcome,
based on which it assigns a loss to the contestant. A smaller loss means the
contestant predicted well; a higher loss makes the quizmaster happy. In the
terminology of game theory, our game is zero-sum: the amount that one player
wins always equals the amount that the other player loses.
There are many loss functions that we could choose to use, and in general
the players may want to play this game differently for different loss functions.
For example, if we use 0-1 loss as our loss function, then the contestant must
pick a single outcome; if this was the actual outcome, his loss is 0, otherwise
his loss is 1. (This is essentially the original Monty Hall problem. We did not
consider this loss function in the regression setting, because there it would
almost surely give loss 1 to every prediction.)
We can also allow the contestant to give a probabilistic prediction, allowing
him to express his uncertainty over the true outcome. Then we may again use
logarithmic loss to judge these predictions. In terms of Kelly gambling (Cover
and Thomas, 1991), this can be thought of as the contestant betting money
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on each of the possible outcomes, and winning an amount of money depend-
ing on the amount he bet on the true outcome. Many other loss functions are
possible. We explore their implications for the probability updating game in
Chapter 6.
We wish to find a ‘worst-case optimal’ strategy in such a game. But what
do such strategies look like? To answer this, consider a different game: rock-
paper-scissors. If you know your opponent is going to play rock next, you
play paper and you win. We say that always playing rock is not a worst-case
optimal strategy, because if player A is using this strategy and player B figures
it out, player B will have a huge advantage. Now consider a different strategy:
your opponent plays rock, paper or scissors each with probability 1/3. Then
even if he tells youwhat his strategy is, this would not give you any advantage.
A strategy like this will be called worst-case optimal: it gives a player the best
possible result against an opponent with the exact opposite goal, even if the
opponent figures out what strategy the player is using and then picks his own
strategy to exploit this information as much as possible (the worst case).
Similarly, in the Monty Hall game, if the car happens to be behind the door
the contestant guessed, then the quizmaster will have a choice of which door
to open. It is a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster to make this de-
cision at random, choosing either doorwith probability 1/2. If he uses another
strategy, such as always opening the leftmost door out of his two options, then
this might give an advantage to a contestant who figures this out: if the quiz-
master ever opens the rightmost door, then the contestant can bet all his money
that the car is behind the leftmost door; depending on the loss function, this
may improve (decrease) his loss on average. (In the Monty Hall game with 0-1
loss, it does not make a difference if the contestant tells the quizmaster before-
hand that he will always switch doors. However, it does make a difference in
other instances of the generalized game we consider. So in general, we want
both players’ strategies to be worst-case optimal.)
Formany loss functions, worst-case optimal strategies for both players have
the property that neither the quizmaster nor the contestant can benefit from
knowing the other’s strategy. Such a pair of strategies is called a Nash equilib-
rium (Nash, 1951).
Worst-case optimal strategiesmay be difficult to compute. In particular, it is
not always a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster to pick a message
uniformly at random, as is sometimes assumed in solutions to the Monty Hall
game (when the marginal is also uniform). For example, in the Monty Hall
game with a nonuniformmarginal (that is, some doors have a larger probabil-
ity of containing the prize), the worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmas-
ter may require him to open one of the doors with a higher probability than
the other. How hard it is to find a worst-case optimal strategy in a probabil-
ity updating game depends in large part on the arrangement of the possible
messages, as we will see in Chapter 7. For some message structures, efficient
methods exist that allow aworst-case optimal strategy to be computed quickly.
This is the topic of Chapter 8.
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1.3 Overview of this dissertation
In Chapter 2, we investigate the problem of model selection for extra-sample
prediction. Based on a novel, unbiased expression for KL divergence, we pro-
pose XAIC and its special case FAIC as versions of AIC intended for this task,
and show that both may significantly improve predictive performance com-
pared to standard methods, including AIC and Bayesian model averaging.
Chapters 3 to 5 concern inconsistency of Bayesian inference forwrongmod-
els. Experiments with linear models exhibiting such inconsistency are shown
in Chapter 3, both in a model averaging/selection and in a Bayesian ridge re-
gression setting. To remedy the problem, we equip the likelihood in Bayes’
theorem with an exponent called the learning rate, and we propose the Safe-
Bayesian method to learn the learning rate from the data. SafeBayes tends to
select small learning rates as soon the standard posterior is not ‘cumulatively
concentrated’, and its results on our data are quite encouraging.
In Chapter 4, we give several explanations of how this inconsistency may
occur under ‘bad’ misspecification, and why SafeBayes provides a solution to
this problem. We also discuss how our inconsistency example and the Safe-
Bayes method relate to other work.
Chapter 5 provides additional regression experiments to test whether the
results of Chapter 3 also holdwith different priors, models, methods, and data-
generating distributions. We find that three versions of SafeBayes consistently
perform well, while other methods, including Bayes and AIC, perform badly.
The final three chapters of this dissertation deal with worst-case optimal
probability updating, an alternative to conditioning that may be used when
the distribution is not fully specified. In Chapter 6, we introduce the problem,
and find how optimal solutions may be recognized for different loss functions;
our main tool is convex analysis. We find that for logarithmic loss, optimality
is characterized by the elegant RCAR (reverse coarsening at random) condition.
In Chapter 7, we analyse the combinatorial aspect of the probability up-
dating problem, and present some theoretical tools that may help us compute
worst-case optimal solutions to a probability updating problem, as opposed
to merely recognizing such solutions. Further, we see that the applicability of
the RCAR condition is not restricted to the cases discovered in Chapter 6, and
explore the consequences.
In Chapter 8, we give algorithms that automate the task of finding worst-
case optimal solutions, for restricted classes of probability updating problems.
Section 8.3 in Chapter 8 is an intermezzo that investigates a notion of fair-
ness in the theory of maximum flows. While needed to understand the sub-
sequent developments of Chapter 8, it may also be of independent interest.

Chapter 2
Extra-Sample Prediction in
Linear Models
Methods for combining predictions from a number of models in a supervised
learning setting must somehow estimate/predict the quality of a model’s pre-
dictions at unknown future inputs. Many of these methods (often implicitly)
make the assumption that the test inputs are identical to the training inputs,
which is seldom reasonable. By failing to take into account that prediction will
generally be harder for test inputs that did not occur in the training set, this can
sometimes lead to the selection of too complex models.
Based on a novel, unbiased expression forKLdivergence, we propose XAIC
and its special case FAIC as versions of AIC intended for prediction that use
different degrees of knowledge of the test inputs. Both methods substantially
differ from and may outperform all the known versions of AIC even when the
training and test inputs are i.i.d., and are especially useful for deterministic in-
puts and under covariate shift. Our experiments on linear models suggest that
if the test and training inputs differ substantially, then XAIC and FAIC pre-
dictively outperform AIC, BIC and several other methods including Bayesian
model averaging.
Terminology In this chapter we freely use machine learning terminology;
let us quickly compare the main notions to their counterpart in statistics. By
supervised learning problems, wemean problems such as regression and classi-
fication in which we observe a training set (i.e. a sample) of (X,Y) pairs, where
X are inputs (covariates) and Y is the output variable, and we are interested in
learning, based on the sample, a (set of) probability distribution(s) or a (set of)
decision rule(s) that can help us to make predictions of Y given test input X.
2.1 Introduction
In the statistical problemofmodel selection, we are given a set ofmodels {Mi |
i ∈ I}, each of the formMi = {gi(· | θ) | θ ∈ Θi}, where the gi(· | θ) are
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density functions on (sequences of) data. We wish to use one of these models
to explain our data and/or tomake predictions of future data, but do not know
which model explains the data best. It is well known that simply selecting the
model containing the maximum likelihood distribution from among all the
models leads to overfitting, so any expression of the quality of a model must
somehow avoid this problem. Oneway to do this is by estimating eachmodel’s
ability to predict unseen data (this will be made precise below). This approach
is used by many methods for model selection, including cross-validation, AIC
(Akaike, 1973) and its many variants, Gelfand and Ghosh’s Dk (1998), BPIC
(Ando, 2007), and WAIC (Watanabe, 2010). However, none of these methods
takes into account that for supervised learning problems, the generalization
error being estimated will vary with the test input variables. Instead, they
implicitly assume that the test inputs will be identical to the training inputs.
In this chapter, we derive an estimate of the generalization error that does
take the input data into account, and use this to define a new model selection
criterion XAIC, its special case FAIC, and the variants XAICC and FAICC (small
sample corrections). We use similar assumptions as AIC, and thus our meth-
ods can be seen as relatives of AIC that are adapted to supervised learning
when the training and test inputs differ. Our experiments show that our meth-
ods have excellent predictive performance, better even than Bayesian model
averaging in some cases. Also, we show theoretically that AIC’s unawareness
of input variables leads to a bias in the selected model order, even in the seem-
ingly safe case where the test inputs are drawn from the same distribution as
the training inputs. No existing model selection method seems to address this
issue adequately, making XAIC and FAIC more than “yet another version of
AIC”.
It is in fact quite surprising that, more than forty years after its original in-
vention, all the forms of AIC currently in use are biased in the above sense, and
in theoretical analyses, conditional model selection methods are often even
compared on a new point x constrained to be one of the x values in the train-
ing data (see e.g. Yang, 2005), even though in most practical problems, a new
point x will not be drawn from this empirical training data distribution, but
rather should be regarded as falling in one of the three cases considered in this
chapter: (a) it is drawn from the same distribution as the training data (but not
necessarily equal to one of the training inputs); (b) it is drawn from a different
distribution (covariate shift); (c) it is set to a fixed, observable value, usually
not in the training set, but the process that gave rise to this value may not be
known.
2.1.1 Goals of model selection
When choosing among or combining predictions from different models, one
can have different goals in mind. Whereas BIC and BMS (Bayesian model se-
lection) focus on finding the most probable model, methods like AIC, cross-
validation and SRM (structural risk minimization; Vapnik, 1998) aim to find
themodel that leads to the best predictions of future data. While AIC and cross-
2.1. Introduction 19
validation typically lead to predictions that converge faster to optimal in the
sense of KL divergence than those of BIC and BMS, it is also well-known that,
unlike BIC and BMS, such methods are not statistically consistent (i.e. they
do not find the smallest submodel containing the truth with probability 1 as
n→ ∞); there is an inherent conflict between these two goals, see for example
Yang (2007a); Van Erven et al. (2007, 2012). LikeAIC, the XAIC and FAICmeth-
ods developed here aim for predictive optimality rather than consistency, thus,
if consistency is the main concern, they should not be used. We also stress at
the outset that, unlike most other model selection criteria, the model selected
by FAIC may depend on the new x whose corresponding y value is to be pre-
dicted; for different x, a different model may be selected based on the same
training data. Since — as in many other model selection criteria — our goal
is predictive accuracy rather than ‘finding the true model’, and since the de-
pendence on the test x helps us to get substantially better predictions, we are
not worried by this dependency.
FAIC thus cannot be said to select a ‘single’ model for a given training set
— it merely outputs a function from x values to models. As such, it is more
comparable with BMA (Bayesian model averaging) rather than BMS (selection).
BMA is of course a highly popular method for data prediction; like FAIC, it
adapts its predictions to the test input x (as we will see, FAIC tends to select a
simpler model if there are not many training points near x; BMA predicts with
a larger variance if there are notmany training points near x). BMA leads to the
optimal predictions in the idealized setting where one takes expectation under
the prior (i.e., in frequentist terms, we imagine nature to draw a model, and
then a distribution within the chosenmodel, both from the prior used in BMA,
and then data from the drawn distribution), and usually performs very well in
practice as well. It is of considerable interest then that our XAIC and FAIC
outperform Bayes by a fair margin in some of our experiments in Section 2.5.
2.1.2 In-sample and extra-sample error
Many methods for model selection work by computing some estimate of how
well each model will do at predicting unseen data. This generalization error
may be defined in various ways, and methods can further vary in the assump-
tions used to find an estimate. AIC (Akaike, 1973) is based on the expression
for the generalization error
−2EU EV log gi(V | θˆi(U)), (2.1)
for modelMi = {gi(· | θ) | θ ∈ Θi}, where θˆi(U) denotes the element of
Θi which maximizes the likelihood of data U, and where both random vari-
ables are independent samples of n data points each, both following the true
distribution of the data. (In this chapter, we use capitals to denote sequences
of data points, and boldface for random variables. Throughout this chapter,
log denotes the natural logarithm.) Up to an additive term which is the same
for all models, the inner expectation is the KL divergence from the true dis-
tribution to gi(· | θˆi(U)). An interpretation of (2.1) is that we first estimate
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the model’s parameters using a random sample U, then judge the quality of
this estimate by looking at its performance on an independent, identically dis-
tributed sample V. AIC then works by estimating (2.1) for each model by the
asymptotically unbiased estimator
−2 log gi(U | θˆ(U)) + 2k (2.2)
where k is the number of parameters in the model, and selecting the model
minimizing this estimate. Thus AIC selects the model whose maximum likeli-
hood estimate is expected to be closest to the truth in terms of KL divergence.
In the sequel, we will consider only one model at a time, and therefore omit
the model index.
In supervised learning problems such as regression and classification, the
data points consist of two parts ui = (xi, yi), and the models are sets of distri-
butions on the output variable y conditional on the input variable x (which may
or may not be random). We call these conditional models. The conditionality
expresses that we are not interested in explaining the behaviour of x, only that
of y given x. Then (2.1) can be adapted in two ways: in the terminology of
Hastie et al. (2001), as the extra-sample error
−2EY|X EY′ |X′ log g(Y′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y)), (2.3)
and, replacing both X and X′ by a single variable X, as the in-sample error
−2EY|X EY′ |X log g(Y′ | X, θˆ(X,Y)), (2.4)
where capital letters again denote sequences of data points. Contrary to (2.1),
these quantities capture that the expected quality of a prediction regarding y
may vary with x.
An example of a supervised learning setting is given by linear models. In
a linear model, an input variable x is represented by a design vector and a se-
quence of n inputs by an n× p design matrix; with slight abuse of notation, we
use x and X to represent these. Then the densities g(Y | X, β) in the model
are Gaussian with mean Xβ and covariance matrix σ2 In for some fixed σ2. Be-
cause g is of the form e−squared error, taking the negative logarithm as in (2.1)
produces an expressionwhosemain component is a sumof squared errors; the
residual sum of squared errors RSS(Y) is the minimum for given data, which
is attained by the maximum likelihood estimator. Alternatively, σ2 may be an-
other parameter in addition to β if the true variance is unknown.
It is standard to apply ordinary AIC to supervised learning problems. For
example, for linearmodelswith fixed variance, (2.2) takes thewell-known form
1
σ2
RSS(Y) + 2k. (2.5)
But because the standard expression behind AIC (2.1) makes no mention of
X or X′, this corresponds to the tacit assumption that X = X′, so that the in-
sample error is being estimated.
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However, the extra-sample error is more appropriate as a measure of the
expected performance on new data. AIC was intended to correct the bias that
results from evaluating an estimator on the data fromwhich itwas derived, but
because it uses the in-sample error, AIC evaluates estimators on new output
data, but old input data. So we see that in supervised problems, a bias similar
to the one it was intended to correct is still present in AIC.
2.1.3 Contents
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we de-
velop our main results about the extra-sample error and propose a newmodel
selection criterion based on this. It involves κX′ , a termwhich can be calculated
explicitly for linear models; we concentrate on these models in the remainder
of the chapter. Special cases of our criterion, including a focused variant, are
presented in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we discuss the behaviour of our esti-
mate of the extra-sample error, and find that without our modification, AIC’s
selected model orders are biased. Several experiments on simulated data are
described in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains some further theoretical discus-
sion regarding Bayesian prediction and covariate shift. Finally, Section 2.7 con-
cludes. Technical regularity conditions and proofs are in the appendix.
2.2 Estimating the extra-sample error
In this section, we will derive an estimate for the extra-sample error. Our as-
sumptions will be similar to those used in AIC to estimate the in-sample error;
therefore, we start with some preliminaries about the setting of AIC.
2.2.1 Preliminaries
In the setting of AIC, the data points are independent but not necessarily iden-
tically distributed. The number of data points in Y and Y′ is n. We define the
Fisher information matrix I(θ) as − EY′ ∂2∂θ2 log g(Y′ | θ), and define the condi-
tional Fisher informationmatrix I(θ | X′) analogously. Wewrite Cov(θˆ(X,Y) |
X) for the conditional covariance matrix EY|X [θˆ(X,Y)− EY|X θˆ(X,Y)][θˆ(X,Y)
− EY|X θˆ(X,Y)]>.
Under standard regularity assumptions, there exists a unique parameter
value θo that minimizes the KL divergence from the true distribution, and this
is what θˆ(Y) converges to. Under this and other (not very restrictive) regularity
assumptions (Shibata, 1989), it can be shown that (Burnham and Anderson,
2002)
−2 log g(Y | θˆ(Y)) + 2t̂r {I(θo)Cov(θˆ(Y))} (2.6)
(where t̂r represents an appropriate estimator of that trace) is an asymptotic-
ally unbiased estimator of (2.1). The model selection criterion TIC (Takeuchi’s
information criterion) selects the model which minimizes (2.6).
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The estimator of the trace term that TIC requires has a large variance, mak-
ing it somewhat unreliable in practice. AIC uses the very simple estimate 2k for
TIC’s trace term. This estimate is generally biased except when the true data-
generating distribution is in the model, but obviously has 0 variance. Also,
if some models are more misspecified than others, those models will have a
worse log-likelihood. This term in AIC grows linearly in the sample size, so
that asymptotically, thosemodels will be disqualified byAIC. Thus AIC selects
good models even when its penalty term is biased due to misspecification of
the models.
This approach corresponds to making the following assumption in the de-
rivation leading to AIC’s penalty term:
Assumption 2.1. The model contains the true data-generating distribution.
It follows that θo specifies this distribution. We emphasize that this assump-
tion is only required for AIC’s derivation and does not mean that AIC neces-
sarily works badly if applied to misspecified models. Under this assumption,
the two matrices in (2.6) cancel, so the objective function becomes (2.2), the
standard formula for AIC (Burnham and Anderson, 2002).
We nowmove to supervised learning problems, where the true distribution
of the data and the distributions g in the models are conditional distributions
of output values given input values. In this setting, the data are essentially
i.i.d. in the sense that g(Y | X, θ) = ∏ni=1 g(yi | xi, θ). That is, the outputs
are independent given the inputs, and if two input variables are equal, the
corresponding output variables are identically distributed. Also, the definition
of θo would need to be modified to depend on the training inputs, but since
Assumption 2.1 now implies that g(y | x, θo) defines the true distribution of y
given x for all x, we can take this as the definition of θo for supervised learning
when Assumption 2.1 holds.
For supervised learning problems, AIC and TIC silently assume that X′
either equals X or will be drawn from its empirical distribution. We want to
remove this assumption.
2.2.2 Main results
We will need another assumption:
Assumption 2.2. For training data (X,Y) and (unobserved) test data (X′,Y′),
− 1
n
EY|X log g(Y | X, θo) = −
1
n′ EY′ |X′ log g(Y
′ | X′, θo),
where n and n′ denote the number of data points in X and X′, respectively.
This assumption ensures that the log-likelihood on the test data can be es-
timated from the training data. If X and X′ are random and mutually i.i.d.,
this is automatically satisfied when the expectations are taken over these in-
puts as well. While this assumption of randomness is standard in machine
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learning, there are other situations where X and X′ are not random and As-
sumption 2.2 holds nevertheless. For instance, this is the case if g(y | x, θ) is
such that yi = fθ(xi) + zi, where the noise terms zi are zero-mean and i.i.d.
(their distribution may depend on θ). This additive noise assumption is com-
mon in regression-like settings. Then Assumption 2.1 implies that Assump-
tion 2.2 holds for all X,X′.
To get an estimator of the extra-sample error (2.3), we do not make any
assumptions about the process generating X and X′ but leave the variables
free. We allow n 6= n′.
Theorem 2.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and some standard regularity con-
ditions (detailed in Assumption 2.3 in the appendix), and for n′ either constant or
growing with n,
− 2 n
n′ EY|X EY′ |X′ log g(Y
′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y))
= −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y)) + k+ κX′ + o(1), (2.7)
where κX′ = nn′ tr
{
I(θo | X′)Cov(θˆ(X,Y) | X)
}
.
Moreover, if the true conditional distribution of Y given X is Gaussian with fixed
variance and the conditional distributions in the models are also Gaussian with that
same variance (as is the case in linear models with known variance), then the above
approximation becomes exact.
Wewish to use (2.7) as a basis for model selection. To do this, first note that
(2.7) can be estimated from our training data using
−2 log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y)) + k+ κX′ . (2.8)
Theorem 2.1 expresses that this is an asymptotically unbiased estimator of the extra-
sample error. We see that the difference with standard AIC (2.2) is that the pen-
alty 2k has been replaced by k + κX′ . We propose to use (2.8) as the basis for
a new model selection criterion extra-sample AIC (XAIC), which chooses the
model that minimizes an estimator of (2.8). What remains for this is to eval-
uate κX′ , which may depend on the unknown true distribution, and on the
test set through X′. This is done below for the case of linear models; further
intuition about κx′ for linear models and a single test input x′ is given in Sec-
tion 2.4 (where it is related to a norm of x′) and Section 2.6.1 (where it is given
a Bayesian interpretation).
2.2.3 The κX′ and o(1) terms for linear models
If the densities g are Gaussian, then κX′ does not depend on the unknown θo
because the Fisher information is constant, so no additional estimation is ne-
cessary to evaluate it. Thus for a linear model with fixed variance, κX′ becomes
κX′ =
n
n′ tr
{[
1
σ2
X′>X′
] [
σ2(X>X)−1
]}
=
n
n′ tr
[
X′>X′(X>X)−1
]
.
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If the variance is also to be estimated, it can be easily seen that κX′ will become
this value plus one. In that case, the approximation in Theorem 2.1 is not ex-
act (as it is in the known variance case), but the o(1) term can be evaluated
explicitly:
Theorem 2.2. For a linear model with unknown variance,
− 2 n
n′ EY|X EY′ |X′ log g(Y
′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y))
= −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y)) + k+ κX′ +
(k+ κX′)(k+ 1)
n− k− 1 ,
where κX′ can be computed from the data and equals (n/n′) tr(X′
>X′(X>X)−1) + 1,
and k is the number of parameters including σ2.
Theorem 2.2 presents an extra-sample analogue of the well-known small
sample correction AICC (Hurvich and Tsai, 1989), which is derived similarly
and uses a penalty of 2k + 2k(k + 1)/(n − k − 1). We define XAICC accord-
ingly. Though the theorem holds exactly only in the specific case described,
we believe that the extra penalty term will lead to better results in much more
general settings in practice, as is the case with AICC (Burnham and Anderson,
2002).
2.3 Model selection for extra-sample prediction
In this section, we discuss several concrete model selection methods, all based
on the XAIC formula (2.8) and thus correcting AIC’s bias.
2.3.1 Nonfocused versions of XAIC
Except in trivial cases, the extra-sample error (2.3) and its estimate (2.8) depend
on the test inputs X′, so some knowledge of X′ is required when choosing a
model appropriate for extra-sample prediction. In a semi-supervised learning
setting where X′ itself is known at the time of model selection, we could eval-
uate (2.8) directly for each model. However, X′ might not yet be known when
choosing a model.
If X′ is not known but its distribution is, we can replace κX′ by its expecta-
tion; for i.i.d. inputs, computing this reduces to computing Ex′ I(θo | x′).
If the distribution of X′ is also unknown, we need to estimate it somehow.
If it is believed that X and X′ follow the same distribution, the empirical distri-
bution of X could be used as an estimate of the distribution of X′. Then AIC is
retrieved as a special case. Section 2.4 will show that this is a bad choice even if
X andX′ follow the samedistribution, so a smoothed estimate is recommended
instead.
Of course, we are not restricted to the case where X and X′ follow similar
distributions. In the setting of covariate shift (Sugiyama and Kawanabe, 2012),
the distributions are different but known (or can be estimated). This variant of
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XAIC is directly applicable to that setting, yielding an unbiased analogue of
AIC.
2.3.2 Focused model selection
It turns out there is a way to apply (2.8) even when nothing is known about the
processes generating X and X′. If our goal is prediction, we can set X′ to the
single point x′ for which we need to predict the corresponding y′. Contrary
to standard model selection approaches, we thus use x′ already at the stage
of model selection, rather than only inside the models. We define the model
selection criterion Focused AIC (FAIC) as this special case of XAIC, and FAICC
as its small sample correction.
A focused model selection method implements the intuition that those test
points whose input is farther away from the training inputs should be pre-
dicted with more caution; that is, with less complex models. As discussed in
Section 2.1.1, methods that optimize predictive performance often are not con-
sistent; this hurts in particular for test inputs far away from the training inputs.
We expect that extra-sample adaptations of such methods (like XAIC) are also
inconsistent, but that using the focused special case helps to guard against this
small chance of large loss.
Choosing a model specifically for the task at hand potentially lets us end
up with a model that performs this task much better than a model found by a
non-focused model selection method. However, there are situations in which
focus is not a desirable property: the mapping from input values to predic-
tions given by a focused model selection method will be harder to interpret
than that of a non-focused method, as it is a combination of the models un-
der consideration rather than a single one of them. Thus, if the experimenter’s
goal is interpretation/transparency, a focused model selection method is not
recommended; these methods are best applied when the goal is prediction.
Evaluating the x′-dependent model selection criterion separately for each
x′ leads to a regression curve which in general will not be from any one of the
candidate models, but only piecewise so. It will usually have discontinuities
where it switches betweenmodels. If themodels contain only continuous func-
tions and such discontinuities are undesirable, Akaike weights (Akaike, 1979;
Burnham and Anderson, 2002) may be used to get a continuous analogue of
the FAIC regression curve.
2.4 AIC vs. XAIC (k vs. κx) in linear models
Intuitively, the quantity κx that appears as a penalty term in the XAIC for-
mula (2.8) expresses a measure of dissimilarity between the test input x and
the training inputs X. This measure is determined fully by the models and
does not have to be chosen some other way. However, its properties are not
readily apparent. Because κx can be computed exactly for linear models, we
investigate some of its properties in that case.
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One useful characterization of κx is the following: if we express the design
vector x of the test point in a basis that is orthonormal to the empirical measure
of the training set X, then κx = ‖x‖2.
For given X, x may exist such that κx is either greater or smaller than the
number of parameters k. An example of κx < k occurs for the linear model
consisting of all linear functions with known variance (so k = 2). Then κx will
be minimized when x lies at the mean of the input values in the training set,
where κx = 1.
We will now consider the case where X and x are random and i.i.d. We
showed that the XAIC expression (2.8) is an unbiased estimator of the extra-
sample error. AIC uses k in place of κx, and the above suggests the possibility
that maybe the instances where κx > k and those where κx < k cancel each
other out, so that AIC would also be approximately unbiased as an estimate
of the extra-sample error. However, the following proposition shows that, ex-
cept in a trivial case, κx is on average greater than k. This means that in those
settings, AIC underestimates the model’s extra-sample error.
(We should mention here that if X and x are random and mutually i.i.d.,
then as n → ∞, AIC’s bias goes to 0. The bias we show below concerns all
finite n; additionally, without focus, an extreme x could result in a very biased
AIC value even for large n.)
Proposition 2.3. Consider a linear modelM with training inputs X and test input
x i.i.d. such that X>X is almost surely invertible. LetM′ be the submodel obtained by
removing the final entry from every design vector. Then these models are related by
E κx ≥ E κx′ + 1, with strict inequality if x has at least two entries.
It follows by induction on k that for random input data, AIC is biased as an
estimate of the extra-sample error except in a special case with k = 1. Also, the
bias becomes worse for larger models. This last fact is distressing, as it shows
that when AIC assesses a sequence of nested models, the amount by which it
overestimates their generalization ability grows with the model order. Thus
the biases in the AIC scores lead to a bias in the selected model order, which
was not evident from earlier work.
The XAIC formula (2.8) contains two terms that depend on the data: minus
two times the log-likelihood, and the penalty term κX′ . The log-likelihood
measures distances between output values and is independent of X′, while κX′
expresses a property of input values and is largely unaffected by output val-
ues; in fact, in linear models its computation does not involve any (estimates
based on) output values. Hence the variance of XAIC is no greater than that
of AIC when comparing the two on fixed X,X′, so that XAIC’s reduction in
bias does not come at the price of an increase in variance. However, focused
model selection demands that X′ is not held fixed, so that FAIC may have a
larger variance than AIC. Similarly, if the distribution of X′ is being estimated
as part of applying XAIC, the used estimator’s quality will affect the accuracy
of the estimated generalization error.
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2.5 Experiments
Wewill now experimentally compare XAIC and FAIC (or more precisely, their
small-sample corrected versions XAICC and FAICC) to several other model se-
lection methods, in univariate and multivariate problems.
2.5.1 Description of experiments
In the univariate experiments, linear modelsM1, . . . ,M7 with unknown vari-
ance were considered. ModelMi contained polynomials of degree i− 1 (and
so had i+ 1 parameters). The input values x of the training data were drawn
from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 1, while the output
values were generated as yi = f (xi) + z with zi i.i.d. Gaussians with mean 0
and variance 0.1, and f some unknown true function. Given 100 training data
points, each of the eight model selection methods under consideration had to
select a model. The squared risk (yˆ− f (x))2 of the chosen model’s prediction
yˆ was computed for each of a range of values of the test point’s x, averaged
over 100 draws of the training data. This experiment was performed for two
different true functions: f1(x) = x+ 2 and f2(x) = |x|.
In the multivariate experiments, each input variable was a vector (u1, . . . ,
u6), and the models corresponded to all possible subsets of these 6 variables.
Each model also included an intercept and a variance parameter. The true
function was given by f (u) = 2 + u1 + 0.1u2 + 0.03u3 + 0.001u4 + 0.003u5,
and the additive noise was again Gaussian with variance 0.1. A set of n′ = 400
test inputs was drawn from a standard Gaussian distribution, but the training
inputs were generated differently in each experiment: from the same Gauss-
ian distribution as the test inputs; from a uniform distribution on [−√3,√3]6;
or from a uniform ‘spike-and-slab’ mixture of two Gaussians with covariance
matrices (1/5)I6 and (9/5)I6. Note that all three distributions have the same
mean and covariance as the test input distribution, making these mild cases of
covariate shift. For the Gaussian training case, we report the results for n = 60
and, after extending the same training set, for n = 100. Squared risks were
averaged over the test set and further over 50 repeats of these experiments.
The experiments used the version of XAIC that is given a distribution of the
test inputs, but not the test inputs themselves. In themultivariate experiments,
XAIC used the actual (Gaussian) distribution of the test inputs. In the univari-
ate case, two instances of XAICwere evaluated: one for test inputs drawn from
the same distribution as the training inputs (standard Gaussian), and another
(labelled XAICC2) for a Gaussian test input distribution with mean 0 and vari-
ance 4.
Bayesian model averaging (BMA) differs from the other methods in that it
does not select a single model, but formulates its prediction as a weighted av-
erage over them; in our case, its prediction corresponds to the posterior mean
over all models. Weighted versions exist of other model selection methods as
well, such as Akaike weights (Akaike, 1979; Burnham and Anderson, 2002) for
AIC and variants. In our experiments we saw that these usually perform sim-
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ilar to but somewhat better than their originals. In our univariate experiments,
we decided against reporting these, as they are less standard. However, in the
multivariate experiments, the weighted versions were all better than their se-
lection counterparts, so both are reported separately to allow fair comparisons.
In our experiments, BMAused a uniformprior over themodels. Within the
models, Jeffreys’ noninformative prior (for which the selected βwould corres-
pond to the maximum likelihood βˆ used by other methods) was used for the
variable selection experiments; for the polynomial case, it proved too numer-
ically unstable for the larger models, so there BMA uses a weakly informative
Gaussian prior (variance 102 on β2, . . . , β7 with respect to the Hermite polyno-
mial basis, and Jeffreys’ prior on σ2).
Of the model selection methods included in our experiments, AIC was ex-
tensively discussed in Section 2.2.1; as with XAIC and FAIC, we use here the
small sample correctionAICC (see Section 2.2.3). BIC (Schwarz, 1978) and BMS
werementioned in Section 2.1.1 asmethods that attempt to find themost prob-
able model given the data rather than aiming to optimize predictive perform-
ance; both are based on BMA, which computes the Bayesian posterior prob-
ability of eachmodel. Three othermethodswere evaluated in our experiments;
these are discussed below.
Like AIC, the much more recent focused information criterion (FIC; Claes-
kens and Hjort, 2003) is designed to make good predictions. Unlike other
methods, these predictions are for a focus parameterwhichmay be any function
of the model’s estimate, not just its prediction at some input value (though we
only used the latter in our experiments). Unlike FAIC, it uses this focus not
just for estimating a model’s variance, but also its bias; FAIC on the other hand
uses a global estimate of a model’s bias based on Assumption 2.2. A model’s
bias for the focus parameter is evaluated by comparing its estimate to that of
the most complex model available.
Another more recent method for model selection is the subspace informa-
tion criterion (SIC; Sugiyama and Ogawa, 2001), which is applicable to super-
vised learning problemswhen ourmodels are subspaces of someHilbert space
of functions, and our objective is to minimize the squared norm. Like FIC, SIC
estimates the models’ biases by comparing their estimates to that of a larger
model, but it includes a term to correct for this large model’s variance. In our
experiments, we used the corrected SIC (cSIC) which truncates the bias esti-
mate at 0.
Generalized cross-validation (GCV;Golub et al., 1979) can be seen as a com-
putationally efficient approximation of leave-one-out cross-validation for lin-
ear models. We included it in our experiments because Leeb (2008) shows that
it performs better than othermodel selectionmethodswhen the test input vari-
ables are newly sampled.
2.5.2 Results
Results from the two univariate experiments are shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2
(squared risks) and in Table 2.1 (selected models). Squared risk results for the
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Figure 2.1: Squared risk of different model selection methods as a function of
x when the true function is f1(x) = x+ 2
Figure 2.2: Squared risk of different model selection methods as a function of
x when the true function is f2(x) = |x|
multivariate experiments are given in Table 2.2 for the model selection meth-
ods, and in Table 2.3 for the model weighting/averaging variants.
XAIC and FAIC The characteristic behaviours of ourmethods are clearly vis-
ible in the univariate experiments. Both instances of XAIC perform well over-
all in both experiment. Of the two, XAICC2 was set up to expect test inputs
farther away from the centre. As a result, it selectsmodelsmore conservatively,
and obtains smaller risk at such off-centre test inputs. Its selections were very
stable: in both experiments, XAICC2 selected the same model in each of the
100 runs.
We see that in the centre of Figure 2.2, the simple model chosen by XAICC2
was outperformed by more complex models. FAIC exploits this by choosing a
model adaptively for each test input. This resulted in good risk performance
at all test inputs.
In the multivariate experiments, FAIC was the best method for the spike-
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Table 2.1: Average selectedmodel index permethod for f1 and f2, at test inputs
x′ = 0 and 4 (if different)
x′ f1 f2
XAICC 2.10 4.57
XAICC2 2.00 3.00
0 2.94 6.56FAICC 4 2.00 1.54
AICC 2.33 6.38
BIC 2.02 5.70
BMS 2.00 4.05
cSIC 2.94 4.70
GCV 2.38 6.49
0 2.66 5.29FIC 4 3.12 5.35
and-slab training data, where there are pronounced differences in training
point density surrounding different test points, so that selecting a different
model for each pays off. The performance of XAIC was more reliable overall,
comparing very favourably to each of its competitors.
AIC Our methods XAIC and FAIC were derived as adaptations of AIC, and
share its tendency to go for complex models as soon as there is some indica-
tion that their predictionsmight beworthwhile. This leads to good predictions
on average, but also to inconsistency: when a simpler model contains the true
distribution, AIC will continue to select more complex models with positive
probability, no matter how large n grows. This may sometimes hurt predictive
performance, because the accuracy of the estimated parameter will be smaller
for more complex models; for details, we refer to Yang (2007a); Van Erven et al.
(2007, 2012). XAIC makes a better assessment of the generalization error, even
when the training and test inputs follow the same distribution, so that it over-
fits less than AIC and may achieve much better risks. FAIC differs from AIC
in another way: its tendency to choose more complex models is strengthened
in areas where many data points are available (so that the potential damage of
picking an overly complex model is smaller), while it is suppressed when few
data points are available (and the potential damage is much greater).
This tendency is also apparent in Table 2.1. In the first experiment, where
a small model contains the true distribution, it causes FAIC to perform worse
than AIC near x = 0. However, note that the vertical axis is logarithmic, so
the difference appears larger than it is: when we average over the training in-
put distribution, we find that FAIC performs better by a factor 20 in terms of
squared risk.
In the multivariate experiments, XAIC again performs better than AIC,
though the difference eventually disappears as n grows. With the notable ex-
2.5. Experiments 31
Table 2.2: Multivariate: squared risk for different training sets; model selection
spike-
Gaussian uniform and-slab Gaussian
(n = 60) (n = 60) (n = 60) (n = 100)
XAICC 0.0119 0.0123 0.0144 0.0070
FAICC 0.0123 0.0127 0.0133 0.0077
AICC 0.0125 0.0126 0.0156 0.0070
BIC 0.0113 0.0128 0.0140 0.0073
BMS 0.0120 0.0126 0.0138 0.0075
cSIC 0.0119 0.0134 0.0138 0.0074
GCV 0.0129 0.0131 0.0153 0.0072
FIC 0.0196 0.0189 0.0241 0.0111
Table 2.3: Multivariate: squared risk for different training sets; model weight-
ing/averaging
spike-
Gaussian uniform and-slab Gaussian
(n = 60) (n = 60) (n = 60) (n = 100)
XAICCw 0.0099 0.0108 0.0114 0.0063
FAICCw 0.0100 0.0110 0.0110 0.0066
AICCw 0.0101 0.0108 0.0119 0.0063
BICw 0.0096 0.0106 0.0111 0.0062
BMA 0.0100 0.0107 0.0113 0.0061
ception of the spike-and-slab experiment, FAIC does not perform well here:
in two of the experiments, it does worse than AIC. Part of the reason must be
our observation at the end of Section 2.4: FAIC’s estimate of the generalization
error, while unbiased, may potentially have a larger variance than (X)AIC’s
estimate, and this is not always a good trade-off.
BIC and BMS/BMA BIC and BMS do not try to identify the model that will
give the best predictions now, but instead attempt to find the most probable
model given the data, which usually amounts to the simplest model contain-
ing the true distribution. This leads them to be conservative about selecting
complex models. For similar reasons, Bayesian model averaging (BMA) puts
only small weight on complex models. We see this in Figure 2.1, where BIC
and BMA have good performance because they most often select the optimal
second model (or in the case of BMA, give it the largest weight). However, for
f2 in Figure 2.2, it may be outperformed by FAIC or XAIC for test inputs away
from the centre. In the multivariate experiments, XAIC often performs better
than BMS/BMA, and rarely much worse; the only instance of the latter is for
the spike-and-slab data, where FAIC outperforms both. (See Section 2.6.1 for
further discussion of BMA.)
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FIC In all our experiments, FIC obtained large squared risks, and we see in
Table 2.1 that its selection behaviour was the opposite of FAIC: for extreme
x, FIC often selects a more complex model than near x = 0. This seems to
happen because FIC uses the most complex model’s prediction at a given x to
estimate each othermodel’s bias. Because themost complexmodelwill usually
have a significant variance, this resulted in FIC being misled in many of the
experiments we examined. In particular, in areas with few training inputs, FIC
apparently usually believes the simpler models will perform badly because it
attributes to them a large bias, so that the same model as elsewhere (or even a
more complex one) is selected. Conversely, FIC was often observed to switch
to an overly simple model near some input value where this model’s estimate
happened to coincide with that of the most complex model.
SIC SIC obtained large risks in the univariate experiments due to underfit-
ting. Its results in three of the four multivariate experiments were competitive,
however.
GCV Based on Leeb (2008), we expected GCV might be one of the strongest
competitors to XAIC. This was not clearly reflected in our experiments, where
its performance was very similar to that of AIC.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Relation to the Bayesian predictive distribution
The quantity κx′ that occurs in FAIC has an interpretation in the Bayesian
framework. If we do linear regression with known variance and a noninfor-
mative prior on β, then after observing X, Y and x′, the predictive distribu-
tion of y′ is y′ | Y,X, x′ ∼ N (x′>βˆ, σ2(1 + x′>(X>X)−1x′)). We see that κx′
and the variance of this predictive distribution obey a linear relation. Thus if
BMA is allowed to give a distribution over output values as its prediction, then
this distribution (a mixture of Gaussians with different variances) will reflect
that some models’ predictions are more reliable than others. However, if the
predictive distribution must be summarized by a point prediction, then such
information is likely to be lost. For instance, if the point prediction yˆ′ is to be
evaluated with squared loss and yˆ′ is chosen to minimize the expected loss
under the predictive distribution (as in our experiments in Section 2.5), then
yˆ′ is a weighted average of posterior means for y′ given x′ (one mean for each
model, weighted by its posterior probability). The predictive variances are not
factored into yˆ′, so that in this scenario, BMA does not use the information
captured by κX′ that XAIC and FAIC rely on.
This is not to say that BMA should use this information: the consideration of
finding the most probable model (BMS, BIC) or the full distribution over mod-
els (BMA) is not affected by the purpose for which the model will be used, so
it should not depend on the input values in the test data through κX′ . This
suggests that there is no XBIC analogue to XAIC. For Bayesian methods that
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aim for good predictions, such as DIC (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), BPIC (Ando,
2007) and WAIC (Watanabe, 2010), on the other hand, extra-sample and fo-
cused equivalents may exist. Gelman et al. (2014) give a theoretical and ex-
perimental comparison between AIC, DIC and WAIC.
2.6.2 Relation to covariate shift methods
We observed at the end of Section 2.4 that of the two data-dependent terms in
XAIC, the log-likelihood is independent of X′, while κX′ is (largely) unaffected
by output values. An important practical consequence of this split between
input andoutput values is that XAIC andFAIC look formodels that give a good
overall fit, not just a good fit at the test inputs. X′ is then used to determine
how well we can expect these models to generalize to the test set. So if we
have two models and believe each to be able to give a good fit in a different
region of the input space, then FAIC is not the proper tool for the task of finding
these regions: FAIC considers global fit rather than local fit when evaluating
a model, and within the model selects the maximum likelihood estimator, not
an estimator specifically chosen for a local fit at input point x.
In this respect, ourmethods differ from those commonly used in the covari-
ate shift literature (see Sugiyama and Kawanabe (2012); Pan and Yang (2010);
some negative results are in Ben-David et al. (2010)), where typically a model
(and an estimator within that model) is sought that will perform well on the
test set only, using for example importance weighting. This is appropriate if
we believe that no availablemodel can give satisfactory results on both training
and test inputs simultaneously. In situations where such models are believed
to exist, our methods try to find them using all information in the training set.
2.7 Conclusions and future work
We have shown a bias in AIC when it is applied to supervised learning prob-
lems, and proposed XAIC and FAIC as versions of AICwhich correct this bias.
We have experimentally shown that these methods give better predictive per-
formance than other methods in many situations.
We see several directions for future work. First, the practical usefulness of
ourmethods needs to be confirmed by further experiments. Other futurework
includes considering other model selection methods: determining whether
they are affected by the same bias that we found for AIC, whether such a
bias can be removed (possibly leading to extra-sample and focused versions of
those methods), and how these methods perform in simulation experiments
and on real data. In particular, BPIC (Ando, 2007) is a promising candidate,
as its derivation starts with a Bayesian equivalent of (2.1). (The same may be
true for WAIC (Watanabe, 2010).) An XBPICmethod would also be better able
to deal with more complex models that a variant of AIC would have difficulty
with, such as hierarchical Bayesian models, greatly increasing its practical ap-
plicability.
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Appendix 2.A Regularity conditions and proofs
Assumption 2.3 (Regularity conditions). Items 1–4 correspond to the regularity
assumptions behind AIC given by Shibata (1989), but rewritten to take the input vari-
ables into account. Item 5 is the assumption of asymptotic normality of the maximum
likelihood estimator, which is also standard.
1. Θ ⊆ Rk is open, and for sufficiently large n the gradient and Hessian of the
log-likelihood function `(θ) = log g(Y | X, θ) are well-defined for all θ ∈ Θ
with probability 1, and both are continuous;
2. For sufficiently large n, EY|X | ∂∂θ `(θ)| < ∞ and EY|X | ∂
2
∂θ2
`(θ)| < ∞;
3. For sufficiently large n, there exists a unique θo ∈ Θ such that EY|X ∂∂θ `(θo) =
0. For all e > 0, it satisfies
inf
θ:‖θ−θo‖>e
`(θo)− `(θ)→ ∞ almost surely
as n→ ∞;
4. For all e > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that for sufficiently large n,
sup
‖θ−θo‖<δ
∣∣∣EY|X [θˆ(Y | X)− θo]>I(θ | X)[θˆ(Y | X)− θo]
− tr
[
J(θo | X)I(θo | X)−1
]∣∣∣ < e,
where I(θ | X) = − EY|X ∂
2
∂θ2
`(θ) and J(θo | X) = EY|X
[
∂
∂θ `(θo)
][
∂
∂θ `(θo)
]>
are continuous and positive definite.
5.
√
n(θˆ(Y | X)− θo) D−→ N (0,Σ) for some Σ.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. This proof is adapted from the one in Burnham and
Anderson (2002), withmodifications to take X and X′ into account. Derivation
of an estimator for (2.3) starts with a Taylor expansion:
− 2 log g(Y′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y))
= −2 log g(Y′ | X′, θo)− 2
[
∂
∂θ
log g(Y′ | X′, θo)
]>
[θˆ(X,Y)− θo]
− [θˆ(X,Y)− θo]>
[
∂2
∂θ2
log g(Y′ | X′, θo)
]
[θˆ(X,Y)− θo] + r(θˆ),
where r(θˆ)/‖θˆ(X,Y)− θo‖2 → 0 as θˆ(X,Y)→ θo.
Next, we take the expectation EY′ |X′ . Given the regularity conditions on
the model, θo minimizes EY′ |X′ log g(Y′ | X′, θ), so the linear term vanishes.
(Note that we need this vanishing to hold for any X′ (or equivalently, for any
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single point x); this follows from the assumption that θo represents the true
conditional data-generating distribution.) The coefficient of the quadratic term
now becomes the conditional Fisher information at θo given X′, so we have
− 2EY′ |X′ log g(Y′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y)) = −2EY′ |X′ log g(Y′ | X′, θo)
+ [θˆ(X,Y)− θo]>I(θo | X′)[θˆ(X,Y)− θo] + r(θˆ).
Rearranging the quadratic term and taking the other expectation, we obtain
− 2EY|X EY′ |X′ log g(Y′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y)) = −2EY′ |X′ log g(Y′ | X′, θo)
+ tr
{
I(θo | X′)
[
EY|X [θˆ(X,Y)− θo][θˆ(X,Y)− θo]>
]}
+ EY|X r(θˆ). (2.9)
The other matrix in the trace is the conditional covariance matrix of θˆ(X,Y).
To proceed with the first term on the right hand side, we use Assump-
tion 2.2. Then we have
−2 n
n′ EY′ |X′ log g(Y
′ | X′, θo) = −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θo)
for a sample (X,Y) of size n. (Here X still represents the values of the input
variable in the training set, but Y conceptually represents a new sample.) Now
only one X remains, so the rest of the derivation corresponds to that of stand-
ard AIC, which gives us
−2EY|X log g(Y | X, θo) = −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y)) + k+ o(1). (2.10)
Multiplying (2.9) by n/n′ and plugging in the above, we get
− 2 n
n′ EY|X EY′ |X′ log g(Y
′ | X′, θˆ(X,Y)) = −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y))
+ k+
n
n′ tr
{
I(θo | X′)Cov(θˆ(X,Y) | X)
}
+ EY|X
n
n′ r(θˆ) + o(1).
The term with the trace is what we called κX′ .
By the assumed asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estima-
tor, EY|X n‖θˆ(X,Y)− θo‖2 converges to a constant, so that the first remainder
term EY|X(n/n′)r(θˆ) = (1/n′)o(1); because we additionally assumed the test
set is either fixed or grows with the training set, this is again o(1). This proves
(2.7).
In the case of a linearmodel with fixed variance σ2, the second-order Taylor
approximation and the approximation in (2.10) are actually exact.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. This proof follows a different path from the one above.
It is adapted from the derivation of AICC in Burnham and Anderson (2002,
Section 7.4.1). We first consider the case where the training set size n′ = 1.
Then X′ becomes a vector (we choose to make it a column vector) and Y′ a
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scalar; we write x and y for these. Hats denote maximum likelihood estimates.
For Gaussian densities, we get
T = −2EY|X Ey|x log g(y | x, θˆ(X,Y))
= EY|X Ey|x
[
log 2piσˆ2(X,Y) +
1
σˆ2(X,Y)
(
y− x>βˆ(X,Y)
)2]
= EY|X log 2piσˆ2(X,Y) + EY|X
1
σˆ2(X,Y)
Ey|x
(
y− x>βˆ(X,Y)
)2
.
We will call the final term T′. Writing yo for Ey|x y and σ2o for y’s unknown
variance, the inner expectation becomes
Ey|x
(
y− x>βˆ(X,Y)
)2
= Ey|x(y− yo)2 + 2
(
yo − x>βˆ(X,Y)
)
Ey|x(y− yo) +
(
yo − x>βˆ(X,Y)
)2
= σ2o + x
>(βo − βˆ(X,Y))(βo − βˆ(X,Y))>x.
Using the fact that βˆ(X,Y) and σˆ2(X,Y) are independent in this setting,
T′ =
[
EY|X
1
σˆ2(X,Y)
]
·
[
σ2o + x
>Cov(βˆ(X,Y) | X)x
]
.
The covariance matrix equals σ2o (X>X)−1. Then we use that nσˆ2/σ2o follows a
chi-squared distribution with n− k+ 1 degrees of freedom (k is the number of
free parameters in themodel, which includes σ2), and that E 1/χ2n−k = 1/(n−
k− 1):
T′ =
[
EY|X
1
σˆ2(X,Y)
] [
σ2o + σ
2
o x
>(X>X)−1x
]
=
[
EY|X
σ2o
nσˆ2(X,Y)
] [
n+ nx>(X>X)−1x
]
=
n+ nx>(X>X)−1x
n− k− 1
= 1+
n+ nx>(X>X)−1x− (n− k− 1)
n− k− 1 = 1+
k+ κx
n− k− 1 ,
where κx = nx>(X>X)−1x + 1. The reason for splitting off the 1 from the
fraction is that n(EY|X log 2piσˆ2(X,Y) + 1) is −2 times the maximized log-
likelihood. Then we multiply by n and get the result in the stated form:
nT = −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y)) +
n(k+ κx)
n− k− 1
= −2EY|X log g(Y | X, θˆ(X,Y)) + k+ κx +
(k+ 1)(k+ κx)
n− k− 1 .
The result for n′ > 1 now follows by taking the average over all sample
points in the test set on both sides.
2.A. Regularity conditions and proofs 37
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Assume without loss of generality that the variance
is known (as its inclusion does not affect the statement of the theorem) and
that the basis is orthonormal with respect to the measure underlying x (that is,
that Ex xx> = Ik). Then
Ex κx = n Ex x>(X>X)−1x
= n tr(X>X)−1 = tr( 1
n
X>X)−1,
where orthonormality was used in the second equality. To compare the κx for
this model with that of a submodel with one fewer entry in its design vectors,
write
1
n
X>X =
[
A v
v> d
]
.
Note that by orthonormality, the expected value of this matrix is the identity
matrix. We require that its inverse exists. Then for d′ = (d− v>A−1v)−1,
E κx = E tr
[
A v
v> d
]−1
= E tr
[
A−1 +A−1vd′v>A−1 −A−1vd′
−d′v>A−1 d′
]
= E trA−1 + E v
>A−2v+ 1
d− v>A−1v
≥ E trA−1 + E 1
d− v>A−1v
≥ E trA−1 + 1
1− E v>A−1v
≥ E trA−1 + 1.
This shows that adding an element to the design vector increases E κx by at
least one. For k = 1 (so that A is a 0× 0 matrix), we have equality if and only
if d = 1 almost surely, which means that for x1 (the first and only entry of
design vector x), we must have x1 = ±1 almost surely. For k ≥ 2, because A−1
is positive definite, equality requires that v is the zero vector almost surely
(in addition to the same requirement as above on all xi). But this can only be
satisfied if xixk = 0 almost surely for all i < k, which is incompatible with the
conditions on x1 and xk.

Chapter 3
Bayesian Inconsistency under
Misspecification
We empirically show that Bayesian inference can be inconsistent under mis-
specification in simple linear regression problems, both in a model averaging/
selection and in a Bayesian ridge regression setting. We use the standard linear
model, which assumes homoskedasticity, whereas the data are heteroskedastic
(though significantly, there are no outliers), and observe that the posterior puts
its mass on ever more high-dimensional models as the sample size increases.
To remedy the problem, we equip the likelihood in Bayes’ theorem with an
exponent called the learning rate, and we propose the SafeBayesian method to
learn the learning rate from the data. SafeBayes tends to select small learning
rates as soon the standard posterior is not ‘cumulatively concentrated’, and its
results on our data are quite encouraging.
In this chapter, we focus on introducing both the problem and the solution
we propose, and we provide our main experiments with Bayes and SafeBayes.
The discussion of Bayesian inconsistency will be continued in Chapters 4 (ana-
lysing the underlying reasons for the behaviour of Bayes and SafeBayes) and 5
(providing several additional experiments to check the generality of our find-
ings). An overview of these three chapters is provided in Section 3.1.1, and an
‘executive summary’ of all the experiments in Chapters 3 and 5 combined is
provided in Section 3.5.5 at the end of Chapter 3.
3.1 Introduction
The problem We empirically demonstrate the inconsistency of Bayes factor
model selection, model averaging and Bayesian ridge regression under model
misspecification on a simple linear regression problem with random design.
We sample data (X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . . i.i.d. from a distribution P∗, where Xi =
(Xi1, . . . ,Xipmax) are high-dimensional vectors, and we allow pmax = ∞. We
use nested modelsM0,M1, . . . whereMp is a standard linear model, consist-
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ing of conditional distributions P(· | β, σ2) expressing that
Yi = β0 +
p
∑
j=1
β jXij + ei (3.1)
is a linear function of p ≤ pmax covariates with additive independent Gauss-
ian noise ei ∼ N(0, σ2). We equip each of these models with standard priors
on coefficients and the variance, and also put a discrete prior on the models
themselves. M := ⋃p=0,...,pmaxMp does not contain the conditional ‘ground
truth’ P∗(Y | X) (hence the model is ‘misspecified’), but it does contain a P˜
that is ‘best’ in several respects: it is closest to P∗ in KL (Kullback-Leibler) di-
vergence, it represents the true regression function (leading to the best squared
error loss predictions among all P ∈ M) and it has the true marginal variance
(explained in Section 3.2.3). Yet, while P˜ ∈ M0 andM0 receives substantial
priormass, as n increases, the posterior putsmost of its mass on complexMp’s
with higher and higher p’s, and, conditional on theseMp’s, at distributions
which are very far from P∗ both in terms of KL divergence and in terms of L2
risk, leading to bad predictive behaviour in terms of squared error. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 illustrate a particular instantiation of our results, obtained when Xij
are polynomial functions of Si and Si ∈ [−1, 1] uniformly i.i.d. We also show
comparably bad predictive behaviour for various versions of Bayesian ridge
regression, involving just a single, high-but-finite dimensional model. In that
case Bayes eventually recovers and concentrates on P˜, but only at a sample size
that is incomparably larger than what can be expected if the model is correct.
These findings contradict the folk wisdom that, if the model is incorrect,
then “Bayes tends to concentrate on neighbourhoods of the distribution(s) in
M that is/are closest to P∗ in KL divergence.” Indeed, the strongest actual
theorems to this end that we know of, (Kleijn and Van der Vaart, 2006; De Blasi
and Walker, 2013; Ramamoorthi et al., 2013), hold, as the authors emphasize,
under regularity conditions that are substantially stronger than those needed
for consistency when the model is correct (as by e.g. Ghosal et al. (2000) or
Zhang (2006a)), and our example shows that consistency may fail to hold even
in relatively simple problems.
The solution: Generalized posterior and SafeBayes Bayesian updating can
be enhanced with a learning rate η, an idea put forward independently by sev-
eral authors (Vovk, 1990;McAllester, 2003; Barron andCover, 1991;Walker and
Hjort, 2002; Zhang, 2006a) and suggested as a tool for dealing with misspeci-
fication by Grünwald (2011; 2012). η trades off the relative weight of the prior
and the likelihood in determining the η-generalized posterior, where η = 1 cor-
responds to standard Bayes and η = 0means that the posterior always remains
equal to the prior. When choosing the ‘right’ η, which in our case is signifi-
cantly smaller than 1 but of course not 0, η-generalized Bayes becomes com-
petitive again. In general, the optimal η depends on the underlying ground
truth P∗, and the problem has always been how to determine the optimal η
empirically, from the data.
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Figure 3.1: The conditional expectation E[Y | X] according to the full Bayesian
posterior based on a prior on models M0, . . . ,M50 with polynomial basis
functions, given 100 data points sampled i.i.d. ∼ P∗ (about 50 of which are
at (0, 0)). Standard Bayes overfits, not as dramatically as maximum likelihood
or unpenalized least squares, but still enough to show dismal predictive be-
haviour as in Figure 3.2. In contrast, SafeBayes (which chooses learning rate
η ≈ 0.4here) and standardBayes trained only at the points forwhich themodel
is correct (not (0, 0)) both perform very well.
Figure 3.2: The expected squared error risk (defined in (3.3)), obtained when
predicting by the full Bayesian posterior (brown curve), the SafeBayesian pos-
terior (red curve) and the optimal predictions (black dotted curve), as a func-
tion of sample size for the setting of Figure 3.1. SafeBayes is the R-log-version
of SafeBayes defined in Section 3.4.2. Precise definitions and further explana-
tion in Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2.
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Recently, Grünwald (2012) proposed the SafeBayesian algorithm for learn-
ing η, and theoretically showed that it achieves good convergence rates in
terms of KL divergence on a variety of problems. Here we show empirically
that SafeBayes performs excellently in our regression setting, being competi-
tive with standard Bayes if the model is correct and very significantly outper-
forming not just standard Bayes, but also cross-validation and approaches such
as AIC when the model is incorrect. We do this by providing a wide range of
experiments, varying parameters of the problem such as the priors and the
true regression function and studying various performance indicators such as
the squared error risk, the posterior on the variance etc.
We note that a Bayesian’s (and our) first instinct would be to learn η itself
in a Bayesian manner instead. Yet this does not solve the problem, as we show
in Section 3.5.4, where we consider a setting in which 1/η turns out to be ex-
actly equivalent to the λ regularization parameter in the Bayesian Lasso and
ridge regression approaches. We find that selecting η by (empirical) Bayes, as
suggested by e.g. Park and Casella (2008), does not nearly regularize enough in
ourmisspecification experiments. In the Bayesian ridge regression settingwith
fixed variance, the SafeBayesian algorithm becomes very similar to learning λ
by cross-validation with squared-error loss, as is standard in frequentist ridge
regression (cross-validation with a logarithmic score does not work however).
In the varying variance case, there is no such straightforward interpretation of
SafeBayes.
The type of misspecification The models are misspecified in that they make
the standard assumption of homoskedasticity — σ2 is independent of X —
whereas in reality, under P∗, there is heteroskedasticity, there being a region
of X with low and a region with (relatively) high variance. Specifically, in our
simplest experiment the ‘true’ P∗ is defined as follows: at each i, toss a fair
coin. If the coin lands heads, then sample Xi from a uniform distribution on
[−1, 1], and set Yi = 0+ ei, where ei ∼ N(0, σ20 ). If the coin lands tails, then set
(Xi,Yi) = (0, 0), so that there is no variance at all. The ‘best’ conditional dens-
ity P˜, closest to P∗(Y | X) in KL divergence, representing the true regression
function Y = 0 and reliable in the sense of Section 3.2.3, is then given by (3.1)
with all β’s set to 0 and σ˜2 = σ20 /2. In a typical sample of length n, we will thus
have approximately n/2 points with Xi uniform and Yi normal with mean 0,
and approximately n/2 points with (Xi,Yi) = (0, 0). These points seem ‘easy’
since they lie exactly on the regression function one would hope to learn; but
they really wreak severe havoc.
The in-liers cause the problem While it is well-known that in the presence
of outliers, Gaussian assumptions on the noise lead to problems, both for fre-
quentist and Bayesian procedures, in the present problem we have ‘in-liers’
rather than outliers. Also, if we slightly modify the setup so that homoske-
dasticity holds, standard Bayes starts behaving excellently, as again depicted
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Finally, while the figure showswhat happens for polyno-
mials, we used independent multivariate X’s rather than nonlinear basis func-
tions in the main experiments below, getting essentially the same results. All
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this indicates that the inconsistency is really caused bymisspecification, in par-
ticular the presence of in-liers, and not by anything else. The setup is inspired
by the work of Grünwald and Langford (2004, 2007), who gave a mathemat-
ical proof that Bayesian inference can be inconsistent under misspecification
in a related but much more artificial classification setting. Here we show that
this can also happen in a much more natural regression setting. The setting
being more natural, it is also harder to analyse, and we only demonstrate the
inconsistency empirically.
3.1.1 Overview of Chapters 3 to 5
KL-associated inference tasks Section 3.2 introduces our regression setting
and the main concepts needed to understand our results. A crucial point here
is that, if Bayesian (or other likelihood-based methods) converge at all to a dis-
tribution in the modelM, this distribution (often called the ‘pseudo-truth’) is
the P˜ ∈ M that minimizes KL divergence to the true distribution P∗. While
the minimum KL divergence point is often not of intrinsic interest, for some
(not all) models, P˜ can be of interest for other reasons as well (Royall and Tsou,
2003): there may be associated inference tasks for which P˜ is suitable as well.
For standard linear models with fixed σ2, the main associated task is squared
error prediction: the KL-optimal P˜ is also optimal, among all P ∈ M, in terms
of squared error prediction risk. If additionally σ2 becomes a free parameter,
then it is also reliable, which roughly means that it is optimal in determining
its own squared error prediction quality (Section 3.2.3; we have a lot more to
say about associated inference tasks in Section 4.3). Thus, whenever one is pre-
pared to work with linear models and one is interested in squared error risk
or reliability, then Bayesian inference would seem the way to go, even if one
suspects misspecification. . . at least if there is consistency.
The SafeBayesian algorithm Section 3.3 introduces the η-generalized pos-
terior and instantiates it to the linear model. Section 3.4 introduces the ‘Safe-
Bayesian’ algorithm, which learns η from the data. This is done via Dawid’s
(1984) prequential view on Bayesian inference. We then provide four instanti-
ations of the SafeBayes method to linear models.
Section 3.5 discusses our experiments. We first provide the necessary pre-
paration in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. Section 3.5.3 gives the results of our first
experiment, a comparison of Bayesian and SafeBayesian model averaging and
selection in two settings, one with a correct model and one with a model cor-
rupted by 50% easy points as above, but with independent Gaussian rather
than polynomial inputs. Section 3.5.4 repeats these experiments for a Bayesian
ridge regression setting, Section 3.5.5 provides an ‘executive summary’. In all
experiments SafeBayesianmethods behavemuch better in terms of squared er-
ror risk and reliability than standard Bayes if themodel is incorrect, and hardly
worse (sometimes still better) than standard Bayes if the model is correct.
Good vs. bad misspecification: Nonconcentration and hypercompression
In and of itself, the fact that one obtains inconsistency with homoskedastic
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models and heteroskedastic data may not be very surprising; indeed, whether
similar phenomena occur in real-world data needs further study. The main
strength of our example is rather that it clearly shows what can happen in
principle, and indicates how one may go about solving it. We explain this
in Section 4.1 in Chapter 4, in particular on the basis of Figure 4.1 on page 74,
the essential picture to understand the phenomenon. Inconsistency can only arise
under a ‘bad’ form of misspecification, depicted by the figure. Under bad mis-
specification, the posterior may fail to concentrate, and this causes trouble. As
a theoretical contribution of this chapter, we show in this section that, under
some conditions, a Bayesian strongly believes that her posterior will, in some
sense, concentrate fast. Indeed, SafeBayeswill only select η  1 if the standard
posterior is nonconcentrated, and may thus be (loosely) viewed as a particular
‘prior predictive check’.
Posterior nonconcentration in turn can lead to ‘hypercompression’, the phe-
nomenon that the Bayes predictive distribution behaves substantially better un-
der a logarithmic scoring rule than the best distribution P˜ ∈ M; this can
happen because the Bayes predictive distribution — a mixture of elements
of M — behaves substantially differently from any of the elements of M.
Somewhat paradoxically (Section 4.1.3), Bayes’ overly good log-loss behaviour
is exactly what causes it to perform badly for the associated inference tasks
(squared error prediction and reliability, in our case). Thus, there can be an
inherent tension between behaviour under log-loss and behaviour under its
associated tasks, a discrepancy which one can measure by the mixability gap
(Section 4.1.4), a theoretical concept introduced by Van Erven et al. (2011) and
Grünwald (2012). If one is interested in log-loss, standard Bayes is just fine;
the SafeBayesian algorithm should be used if one wants to optimize behaviour
against the associated tasks. Of course, whether such a task-dependent modi-
fication of Bayes is desirable needs discussion, whichwe provide in Section 4.3.
Additional experiments In Chapter 5 we provide a battery of experiments to
check the robustness of our results. Specifically, we investigate what happens
if we vary ourmodels and priors (using e.g. a fixed σ2 and standard priors used
in the regression literature), our methods, and if we vary the data-generating
distribution using e.g. ‘easy’ points that are close to, but not exactly (0, 0). Our
main conclusion here is that, of the four versions of SafeBayes which we pro-
pose, one is uncompetitive and among the other three, there is no clear winner
— although they consistently outperform Bayes under misspecification. Fur-
thermore we show that AIC, BIC and cross-validation also have serious prob-
lems in our regression setup.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Setting, logarithmic risk, optimal distribution
In this chapter we consider data Zn = Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zn ∼ i.i.d. P∗, where each
Zi = (Xi,Yi) is an independently sampled copy of Z = (X,Y), X taking val-
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ues in some set X , Y taking values in Y and Z = X ×Y . We are given amodel
M = {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ} parameterized by (possibly infinite-dimensional) Θ, and
consisting of conditional distributions Pθ(Y | X), extended to n outcomes by
independence. For simplicity we assume that all Pθ have corresponding con-
ditional densities fθ , and similarly, the conditional distribution P∗(Y | X) has
a conditional f ∗, all with respect to the same underlying measure. While we
do not assume P∗(Y | X) to be in (or even ‘close’ to)M, we want to learn, from
given data Zn, a ‘best’ (in a sense to be defined below) element ofM, or at least,
a distribution on elements ofM that can be used to make predictions about
future data. While our experiments focus on linear regression, the discussion
in this section holds for general conditional density models. The logarithmic
score, henceforth abbreviated to log-loss, is defined in the standard manner:
the loss incurred when predicting Y based on density f (· | x) and Y takes on
value y, is given by − log f (y | x). A central quantity in our setup is then the
expected log-loss or log-risk, defined as
risklog(θ) := E(X,Y)∼P∗ [− log fθ(Y | X)],
where here as in the remainder of this chapter, log denotes the natural loga-
rithm.
We let P∗X be the marginal distribution of X under P∗. The Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergenceD(P∗‖Pθ) between P∗ and conditional distribution Pθ is defined
as the expectation, under X ∼ P∗X , of the KL divergence between Pθ and the
‘true’ conditional P∗(Y | X): D(P∗‖Pθ) = EX∼P∗X [D(P∗(· | X) ‖ Pθ(· | X))]. A
simple calculation shows that for any θ, θ′,
D(P∗‖Pθ)− D(P∗‖Pθ′) = risklog(θ)− risklog(θ′),
so that the closer Pθ is to P∗ in terms of KL divergence, the smaller its log-risk,
and the better it is, on average, when used for predicting under the log-loss.
Now suppose thatM contains a unique distribution that is closest, among
all P ∈ M to P∗ in terms of KL divergence. We denote such a distribution, if it
exists, by P˜. Then P˜ = Pθ for at least one θ ∈ Θ; we pick any such θ and denote
it by θ˜, i.e. P˜ = Pθ˜ , and note that it also minimizes the log-risk:
risklog(θ˜) = min
θ∈Θ
risklog(θ) = min
θ∈Θ
E(X,Y)∼P∗ [− log fθ(Y | X)]. (3.2)
We shall call such a θ˜ (KL-)optimal.
Since, in regions of about equal prior density, the log Bayesian posterior
density is proportional to the log likelihood ratio, we hope that, given enough
data, with high P∗-probability, the posterior puts most mass on distributions
that are close to Pθ˜ in KL divergence, i.e. that have log-risk close to optimal.
Indeed, all existing consistency theorems for Bayesian inference under mis-
specification express concentration of the posterior around Pθ˜ .
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3.2.2 A special case: The linear model
Fix some pmax ∈ {0, 1, . . .} ∪ {∞}. We observe data Z1, . . . ,Zn where Zi =
(Xi,Yi), Yi ∈ R and Xi = (1,Xi1, . . . ,Xipmax) ∈ Rpmax+1. Note that this is as in
(3.1) but from now on we adopt the standard convention to take X0i ≡ 1 as a
dummy random variable. We denote byMp = {Pp,β,σ2 | (p, β, σ2) ∈ Θp}
the standard linear model with parameter space Θp := {(p, β, σ2) | β =
(β0, . . . , βp)> ∈ Rp+1, σ2 > 0}, where the entry p in (p, β, σ2) is redundant but
included for notational convenience. We let Θ =
⋃
p=0,...,pmax Θp. Mp states
that for all i, (3.1) holds, where e1, e2, . . . ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2). When working with
linear modelsMp, we are usually interested in finding parameters β that pre-
dict well in terms of the squared error loss function (henceforth abbreviated to
square-loss): the square-loss on data (Xi,Yi) is (Yi−∑pj=0 β jXij)2 = (Yi−Xiβ)2.
We thus want to find the distributionminimizing the expected square-loss, i.e.
squared error risk (henceforth abbreviated to ‘square-risk’) relative to the under-
lying P∗:
risksq(p, β) := E(X,Y)∼P∗(Y− Ep,β,σ2 [Y | X])2 = E(X,Y)∼P∗(Y−
p
∑
j=0
β jXj)2,
(3.3)
where Ep,β,σ2 [Y | X] abbreviates EY∼Pp,β,σ2 |X [Y]. Since this quantity is inde-
pendent of the variance σ2, σ2 is not used as an argument of risksq.
3.2.3 KL-associated prediction tasks for the linear model
Suppose that an optimal P˜ ∈ M exists in the regression model. We denote by
p˜ the smallest p such that P˜ ∈ Mp, and define σ˜2, β˜ such that P˜ = Pp˜,β˜,σ˜2 . A
straightforward computation shows that for all (p, β, σ2) ∈ Θ:
risklog((p, β, σ2)) = 1
2σ2
risksq((p, β)) + 1
2
log(2piσ2), (3.4)
so that the (p, β) achieving minimum log-risk for each fixed σ2 is equal to the
(p, β) with the minimum square-risk. In particular, ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) must minimize
not just log-risk, but also square-risk. Moreover, the conditional expectation
EP∗ [Y | X] is known as the true regression function. It minimizes the square-
risk among all conditional distributions for Y | X. Together with (3.4) this
implies that, if there is some (p, β) such that E[Y | X] = ∑pj=0 β jXj = Xβ, i.e.
(p, β) represents the true regression function, then ( p˜, β˜) also represents the
true regression function. In all our examples, this will be the case: the model
is misspecified only in that the true noise is heteroskedastic; but the model
does invariably contain the true regression function.
Moreover, for each fixed (p, β), the σ2 minimizing risklog is, as follows by
differentiation, given by σ2 = risksq(p, β). In particular, this implies that
σ˜2 = risksq( p˜, β˜), (3.5)
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or in words: the KL-optimal model variance σ˜2 is equal to the true expected
(marginal, not conditioned on X) square-risk obtained if one predicts with the
optimal ( p˜, β˜). This means that the optimal ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) is reliable in the sense of
Grünwald (1998, 1999): its self-assessment about its square-loss performance
is correct, independently of whether β˜ is equal to the true regression function
or not. In other words, ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) correctly predicts how well it predicts.
Summarizing, for misspecified models, ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) is optimal not just in KL/
log-risk sense, but also in terms of square-risk and in terms of reliability; in
our examples, it also represents the true regression function. We say that, for
linear models, square-risk optimality, square-risk reliability and regression-
function consistency are KL-associated prediction tasks: if (as we hope Bayes will
do, but as we will see sometimes does not) we can find the KL-optimal θ˜, we
automatically behave well in these associated tasks as well.
3.3 The generalized posterior
General losses The original generalized posterior is a concept going back
at least to Vovk (1990) and has been developed mainly within the so-called
(frequentist) PAC-Bayesian framework (McAllester, 2003; Seeger, 2002; Catoni,
2007; Audibert, 2004; Zhang, 2006b; see also Bissiri et al. (2013) and the dis-
cussion in Section 4.3). It is defined relative to a prior on predictors rather
than probability distributions. Depending on the decision problem at hand,
predictors can be e.g. classifiers, regression functions or probability densities.
Formally, we are given an abstract space of predictors represented by a set Θ,
which obtains its meaning in terms of a loss function ` : Z ×Θ → R, writing
`θ(z) as shorthand for `(z, θ). Following e.g. Zhang (2006b), for any priorΠ on
Θ with density pi relative to some underlying measure ρ, we define the gener-
alized Bayesian posterior with learning rate η relative to loss function `, denoted as
Π | Zn, η, as the distribution on Θ with density
pi(θ | zn, η) := e
−η∑ni=1 `θ(zi)pi(θ)∫
e−η∑ni=1 `θ(zi)pi(θ)ρ(dθ)
=
e−η∑ni=1 `θ(zi)pi(θ)
Eθ∼Π[e−η∑
n
i=1 `θ(zi)]
. (3.6)
Thus, if θ1 fits the data better than θ2 by a difference of e according to loss
function `, then their posterior ratio is larger than their prior ratio by an amount
exponential in e, where the larger η, the larger the influence of the data as
compared to the prior.
If zi = (xi, yi) with yi ∈ R and xi = (1, xi1, . . . , xip), and the goal is to
predict yi given xi, then we may take as our prediction model e.g. the set of
linear predictors that predict yi by ∑ β jxij = xiβ, and as our loss function the
squared error loss, `β(xi, yi) = (yi − xiβ)2. We may then study the behaviour
of such a procedure in its own right, irrespective of a Bayesianmisspecification
interpretation; the experiments we perform in Section 5.1.1 can be interpreted
in this manner.
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Log-loss and likelihood Now if the setΘ represents amodel of (conditional)
distributions M = {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ}, we may set, for zi = (xi, yi), `θ(zi) =
− log fθ(yi | xi) to be the log-loss as defined above. In this special case, the
definition of η-generalized posterior specializes to the definition of ‘general-
ized posterior’ as known within the Bayesian literature (Walker and Hjort,
2002; Zhang, 2006a):
pi(θ | zn, η) = ( f (y
n | xn, θ))ηpi(θ)∫
( f (yn | xn, θ))ηpi(θ)ρ(dθ) =
( f (yn | xn, θ))ηpi(θ)
Eθ∼Π[( f (yn | xn, θ))η ] . (3.7)
Again, the larger η, the larger the influence of the likelihood. Obviously η = 1
corresponds to standard Bayesian inference, whereas if η = 0 the posterior is
equal to the prior and nothing is ever learned. Our algorithm for learning η
will usually end up with values in between. It has long been known that in
model selection and nonparametric settings, there is an issue with consistency
proofs for full Bayes, Bayes MAP and MDL if we take the standard η = 1, and
indeed, this is part of the reason why the generalized posterior in the form
(3.7) was derived in the first place: for example, Barron and Cover (1991) give
general consistency theorems for 2-part MDL (closely related to Bayes MAP)
and note that they hold for any η < 1; but for η = 1, additional assumptions
must be made. Zhang (2006a) gives an explicit example in which the posterior
shows anomalous behaviour at η = 1. A connection to misspecification was
first made by Grünwald (2011) (see Section 4.3.1) and Grünwald (2012).
Generalized predictive distribution We also define the predictive distribu-
tion based on the η-generalized posterior (3.7) as a generalization of the stand-
ard definition as follows: for m ≥ 0,m′ ≥ m, we set
f¯ (yi, . . . , yi+m | xi, . . . , xi+m′ , zi−1, η)
:= Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [ f (yi, . . . , yi+m | xi, . . . , xi+m′ , θ)]
= Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [ f (yi, . . . , yi+m | xi, . . . , xi+m, θ)]. (3.8)
where the first equality is a definition and the second follows by our i.i.d. as-
sumption. We always use the bar-notation f¯ to indicate marginal and predict-
ive distributions, i.e. distributions on data that are arrived at by integrating out
parameters. If η = 1 then f¯ and pi become the standard Bayesian predictive
density and posterior, and if it is clear from the context that we consider η = 1,
we leave out the η in the notation.
The generalized posterior is created by exponentiating the likelihood ac-
cording to individual elements θ ∈ Θ = ⋃p Θp in the model and renor-
malizing, which is not the same as exponentiating marginal likelihoods
and renormalizing. In particular, pi(p | zn, η) as given by (3.10) is in gen-
eral not proportional to ( f¯ (yn | xn, p))ηpi(p). Similarly, for generalized
marginal distributions, as soon as η 6= 1, we have that in general
f¯ (yi, yi+1 | xi, xi+1, zi−1, η) 6= f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, η) · f¯ (yi+1 | xi+1, zi, η),
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unlike for the standard Bayesian marginal distribution for which equality
holds (in Section 4.2we encounter a furthermodification of the generalized
posterior whose marginals do satisfy this product rule).
3.3.1 Instantiation to linear model selection and averaging
Now consider again a linear modelMp as defined in Section 3.2.3. We instan-
tiate the generalized posterior and its marginals for this model. With prior
pi(β, σ2 | p) taken relative to Lebesgue measure, (3.7) specializes to:
pi(β, σ | zn, p, η) = (2piσ
2)−nη/2e−
η
2σ2
∑ni=1(yi−xiβ)2pi(β, σ | p)∫
(2piσ2)−nη/2e−
η
2σ2
∑ni=1(yi−xiβ)2pi(β, σ | p) dβ dσ
.
Note that in the numerator 1/σ2 and η are interchangeable in the exponent, but
not in the factor in front: their role is subtly different. For Bayesian inference
with a sequence ofmodelsM = ⋃p=0,...,pmaxMp, withpi(p) a probabilitymass
function on p ∈ {0, . . . , pmax}, we get:
pi(θ | zn, η) = f (y
n | xn, θ)ηpi(θ)∫
θ∈Θ f (yn | xn, θ)ηpi(θ)ρ(dθ)
with θ = (β, σ2, p)
=
(2piσ2)−nη/2e−
η
2σ2
∑ni=1(yi−xiβ)2pi(β, σ | p)pi(p)
∑
pmax
p=0
∫
(2piσ2)−nη/2e−
η
2σ2
∑ni=1(yi−xiβ)2pi(β, σ | p)pi(p) dβ dσ
(3.9)
The total generalized posterior probability of modelMp then becomes:
pi(p | zn, η) =
∫
pi(β, σ, p | zn, η) dβ dσ. (3.10)
Analogously to (3.8), for given p, we define the η-generalized Bayesian predict-
ive distribution as:
f¯ (yi+mi | xi+m
′
i , z
i−1, p, η) := Eβ,σ2∼Π|zi−1,p,η [ f (y
i+m
i | xi+m
′
i , β, σ
2, p)]
= Eβ,σ2∼Π|zi−1,p,η [ f (y
i+m
i | xi+mi , β, σ2, p)] (3.11)
(writing aji as shorthand for ai, . . . , aj). The previous displays held for gen-
eral priors. The experiments in this chapter adopt widely used priors (see e.g.
Raftery et al., 1997): normal priors on the β’s and inverse gamma priors on the
variance. These conjugate priors allow explicit analytical formulas for all rele-
vant quantities for arbitrary η, provided below. We only consider the simple
case of a fixedMp here; the more complicated formulas with an additional
prior on p will be given in Appendix 4.A.1 in the next chapter.
Fixed p and σ2 Let Xn = (x>1 , . . . , x>n)> be the design matrix. For a linear
model Mp with fixed variance σ2 and initial Gaussian prior on β given by
N(β¯0, σ2Σ0), the generalized posterior on β is again Gaussian with mean
β¯n,η := Eβ∼Π|zn ,p,η β = Σn,η(Σ−10 β¯0 + ηX
>
ny
n) (3.12)
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and covariance matrix σ2Σn,η , where Σn,η = (Σ−10 + ηX
>
nXn)−1.
Fixed p, varying σ2 Now consider linear models with a Gaussian prior on β
conditional on σ2 as above, and a conjugate (inverse gamma) prior on σ2, i.e.
pi(σ2) = Inv-gamma(σ2 | a0, b0) for some a0 and b0. Here we use the following
parameterization of the inverse gamma distribution:
Inv-gamma(σ2 | a, b) = σ−2(a+1)e−b/σ2ba/Γ(a). (3.13)
The posterior pi(σ2, zn, p) is then given by Inv-gamma(σ2 | an,η , bn,η) where
an,η = a0 + ηn/2 ; bn,η = b0 +
η
2
n
∑
i=1
(yi − xi β¯n,η)2. (3.14)
The posterior expectation of σ2 can be calculated as
σ¯2n,η :=
bn,η
an,η − 1 . (3.15)
Note that the posterior mean of β given σ2 does not depend on σ2.
3.4 The SafeBayesian algorithm
3.4.1 Introducing SafeBayes via the prequential view
We introduce SafeBayes via Dawid’s prequential interpretation of Bayes factor
model selection. As was first noticed by Dawid (1984) and Rissanen (1984),
we can think of Bayes factor model selection as picking the model with in-
dex p that, when used for sequential prediction with a logarithmic scoring
rule, minimizes the cumulative loss. To see this, note that for any distribution
whatsoever, we have that, by definition of conditional probability,
− log f (yn) = − log
n
∏
i=1
f (yi | yi−1) =
n
∑
i=1
− log f (yi | yi−1).
In particular, for the standard Bayesian marginal distribution f¯ (· | p) = f¯ (· |
p, η = 1) as defined above, for each fixed p, we have
− log f¯ (yn | xn, p) =
n
∑
i=1
− log f¯ (yi | xn, yi−1, p) =
n
∑
i=1
− log f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, p),
(3.16)
where the second equality holds by (3.11). If we assume a uniform prior on
model index p, then Bayes factor model selection picks the model maximiz-
ing pi(p | zn), which by Bayes’ theorem coincides with the model minimizing
(3.16), i.e. minimizing cumulative log-loss. Similarly, in ‘empirical Bayes’ ap-
proaches, one picks the value of some nuisance parameter ρ that maximizes
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the marginal Bayesian probability f¯ (yn | xn, ρ) of the data. By (3.16), which
still holds with p replaced by ρ, this is again equivalent to the ρ minimizing
the cumulative log-loss. This is the prequential interpretation of Bayes factor
model selection and empirical Bayes approaches, showing that Bayesian in-
ference can be interpreted as a sort of forward (rather than cross-) validation
(Dawid, 1984; Rissanen, 1984; Hjorth, 1982).
We will now see whether we can use this approach with ρ in the role of
the η for the η-generalized posterior that we want to learn from the data. We
continue to rewrite (3.16) as follows (with ρ instead of p that can either stand for
a continuous-valued parameter or for a model index but not yet for η), using
the fact that the Bayes predictive distribution given ρ and zi−1 can be rewritten
as a posterior-weighted average of fθ :
ρ˘ := arg max
ρ
f¯ (yn | xn, ρ) = arg min
ρ
n
∑
i=1
(
− log f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, ρ)
)
= arg min
ρ
n
∑
i=1
(
− logEθ∼Π|zi−1,ρ[ f (yi | xi, θ)]
)
. (3.17)
This choice for ρ˘ being entirely consistent with the Bayesian approach, our first
idea is to choose ηˆ in the sameway: we simply pick the η achieving (3.17), with
ρ substituted by η. However as Figure 4.5 will show (the blue line there depicts
(3.17) for one of our experiments), this will tend to pick η close to 1 and does
not improve predictions under misspecification. Indeed, we introduced η to
deal with the case in which the Bayesian model assumptions are violated, so
we cannot expect that learning it in a Bayes-like way such as (3.17) will resolve
the issue. But it turns out that a slightmodification of (3.17) does the trick: we
simply interchange the order of logarithm and expectation in (3.17) and pick
the η minimizing
n
∑
i=1
Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [− log f (yi | xi, θ)] . (3.18)
Inwords, we pick the ηminimizing the Posterior-Expected Posterior-Random-
ized log-loss, i.e. the log-loss we expect to obtain, according to the η-general-
ized posterior, if we actually sample from this posterior. This modified loss
function has also been called Gibbs error (Cuong et al., 2013), and while the
abbreviation PEPR-log-loss would be more correct, we simply call it the η-R-
log-loss from now on.
A detailed explanation of why this works will be given in Sections 4.1.3
and 4.2; for now we just notice that by Jensen’s inequality, for any fixed η, for
every sequence of data we must have
Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [− log f (yi | xi, θ)] ≥ − logEθ∼Π|zi−1,η [ f (yi | xi, θ)] , (3.19)
yet, the difference between both sides is small if the posterior is concentrated for
(xi, yi), i.e. for small e and small positive δ, it puts 1− δ of its mass on distribu-
tions which assign the same density to yi given xi up to a factor 1+ e—clearly,
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if δ = e = 0 then both sides are the same. Thus, at values for η at which the
generalized posterior is ‘cumulatively concentrated’, i.e. concentrated at most
sample points, the objective function will be similar to the standard Bayesian
one. This is the clue to further analysis of the algorithm to follow later.
In practice, it is computationally infeasible to try all values of η and we
simply have to try out a number of values. For convenience we give a detailed
description of the resulting algorithm below, copied fromGrünwald (2012). In
this chapter, we will invariably apply it with zi = (xi, yi) as before, and `θ(zi)
set to the (conditional) log-loss as defined before, although it sometimes also
has a second interpretation with `θ as square-loss.
Algorithm 3.1: The (R-)SafeBayesian algorithm
Input: data z1, . . . , zn, modelM = { f (· | θ) | θ ∈ Θ}, prior Π on Θ,
step-size κstep, max. exponent κmax, loss function `θ(z)
Output: Learning rate ηˆ
Sn := {1, 2−κstep , 2−2κstep , 2−3κstep , . . . , 2−κmax};
for all η ∈ Sn do
sη := 0;
for i = 1 . . . n do
Determine generalized posterior Π(· | zi−1, η) of Bayes with
learning rate η.
Calculate “posterior-expected posterior-randomized loss” of
predicting actual next outcome:
r := `Π|zi−1,η(zi) = Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [`θ(zi)] (3.20)
sη := sη + r;
end
end
Choose ηˆ := arg minη∈Sn{sη} (if min achieved for several η ∈ Sn, pick
largest);
Variation As we will see in Section 4.1.4, the crucial property to make infer-
ence about η work is that the expression inside the sum in (3.17) is replaced
by
Eθ∼Π′ [− log fθ(Yi | Xi)], (3.21)
where Π′ should be chosen such that the resulting log-loss is as small as pos-
sible. In (3.18) we setΠ′ = Π, butΠ′ is allowed to be any distribution on θ un-
der which the expected log-loss is small. The heuristic analysis of Section 4.1.4
suggests that the smaller the loss that can be formed thisway (see also the open
problems, Section 4.3.3), the better the resulting method is expected to work.
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Now the η-in-model-log-loss (or just η-I-log-loss), defined as
n
∑
i=1
[
− log f (yi | xi,Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [θ])
]
, (3.22)
is (by Jensen’s inequality) always smaller than (3.18) for the linear models that
we consider. This means that, instead of finding the η minimizing (3.18), we
may want to find the η minimizing (3.22), which is of the form (3.21) with Π′
equal to a point mass on θ¯i,η := Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η fθ . We call the version of SafeBayes
which minimizes the alternative objective function (3.22) in-model SafeBayes,
abbreviated to I-SafeBayes, and from now on use R-SafeBayes for the original
version based on the R-log-loss. We did not realize the potential benefits of
using in-model SafeBayes at the time of writing Grünwald (2012), and while
the theoretical results of Grünwald can be adjusted to deal with suchmodifica-
tions, we cannot get any better theoretical convergence bounds as yet, but this
may be an artefact of our proof techniques. A secondary goal of the experi-
ments in this chapter is thus to see whether one can really improve SafeBayes
by using the ‘in-model’ version.
3.4.2 Instantiating SafeBayes to the linear model
Our experiments concern four instantiations of SafeBayes: R-SafeBayes and
I-SafeBayes for models with fixed variance, denoted R-square-SafeBayes and I-
square-SafeBayes for reasons that will become clear below, are the topic of ex-
periments in Section 5.1.1. The main text instead investigates, in Section 3.5,
R-SafeBayes and I-SafeBayes for models with varying variance, denoted R-log-
SafeBayes and I-log-SafeBayes. Below we give explicit formulas for each when
conditioned on a fixed modelMp; the case with a posterior on p itself can
easily be derived from these.
Fixed σ2: R-square- and I-square-SafeBayes When conditioned on a fixed
p and σ2 (a situation with which we experiment in Section 5.1.1.2), SafeBayes
tries to minimize the R-log-loss, which, as an easy calculation shows, is just
the sum, from i = 0 to n− 1, of
Eβ∼Π|zi ,p,η
[
− log f (yi+1 | xi+1, β, σ2)
]
=
1
2
log(2piσ2) +
1
2σ2
(yi+1 − xi+1 β¯i,η)2 + 12xi+1Σi,ηx
>
i+1, (3.23)
where β¯i,η and Σi,η are given as in and below (3.12). Note that β¯i,η depends on
η but not on σ, and note also that, since X>nXn (as in (3.12)) tends to increase
linearly in n and p, the final term is of order p/(nη).
In the corresponding in-model version of SafeBayes, we use the in-model-
loss as given by − log f (yi+1 | xi+1, β¯i,η , σ2), which is equal to (3.23) without
the final term. Since the first term of (3.23) does not depend on the data, this
version of SafeBayes thus amounts to picking the ηˆ minimizing just the sum
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of square-loss prediction errors, which does not depend on the chosen σ2. It thus
becomes a standard version of ‘prequential model selection’ as based on the
square-loss, which in turn is similar to (though having different asymptotics
than) leave-one-out cross validation based on the square-loss.
Indeed, the fixed σ2 versions of SafeBayes can be interpreted in two ways:
first, as we did until now, in terms of SafeBayes with `θ in (3.20) set to the
log-loss, i.e. as a tool for dealing with misspecification; and second, with `θ
in (3.20) set proportionally to the square-loss, as a generic tool to learn good
square-loss predictors (not distributions) in a pseudo-Bayesianway. More pre-
cisely, I-SafeBayes with the log-loss for fixed σ2 is equivalent to the version of
I-SafeBayes we would get if we set `β,σ2(x, y) := C(y− xβ)2, for any constant
C > 0. Similarly, R-SafeBayes with the log-loss for fixed σ2 is equivalent to
the version of R-SafeBayes we would get if we set `β,σ2(x, y) := C(y − xβ)2,
although now equivalence only holds if we set C = 1/2σ2. For this reason we
will now refer to themas I-square-SafeBayes and R-square-SafeBayes, respectively.
Varying σ2: R-log- and I-log-SafeBayes Next consider the situation with
fixed p and varying σ2, with posterior on σ2 an inverse gamma distribution
with parameters an,η and bn,η as given by (3.14). Then the R-log-loss is given
by
Eσ2,β∼Π|zi ,p,η
[
− log f (yi+1 | xi+1, β, σ2)
]
=
1
2
log 2pibi,η − 12ψ(ai,η) +
1
2
(yi+1 − xi+1 β¯i,η)2
bi,η/ai,η
+
1
2
xi+1Σi,ηx>i+1
=
1
2
log 2piσ¯2i,η +
1
2
(yi+1 − xi+1 β¯i,η)2
σ¯2i,η
+
1
2
xi+1Σi,ηx>i+1 + r(i, η), (3.24)
where ψ is the digamma function, σ¯2i,η is the η-posterior expectation of σ
2 as
given by (3.15) and r(i, η) is a remainder function which is O(1/i) whenever
∑ni=1(yi − xiβn,η)2 increases linearly in i. This final approximation follows by
(3.15) and because we have ψ(x) ∈ [log(x− 1), log x]. R-SafeBayes for varying
σ2 minimizes (3.24), and, because there is now only a log-loss and not a direct
square-loss interpretation, we will call it R-log-SafeBayes from now on.
To calculate the corresponding in-model version of SafeBayes, I-log-Safe-
Bayes, note that it minimizes the sum of
− log f (yi+1 | xi+1, β¯i,η , σ¯2i,η) =
1
2
log 2piσ¯2i,η +
1
2
(yi+1 − xi+1βi,η)2
σ¯2i,η
. (3.25)
Comparing the four versions of SafeBayes, we see that both R-SafeBayeses have
an additional term which decreases in η, increases in model dimensionality p
(via the size of the matrix Σi,η), but becomes negligible for n p.
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3.4.3 SafeBayes learns to predict as well as the optimal distri-
bution
We first define the Cesàro-averaged posterior given data Zn by setting, for any
subset Θ′ ⊂ Θ,
ΠCes(Θ′ | Zn, η) := 1n
n
∑
i=1
Π(Θ′ | Zi, η) (3.26)
to be the posterior probability of Θ′ averaged over the n posterior distribu-
tions obtained so far. Predicting based on Cesàro-averaged posteriors was in-
troduced independently by several authors (Barron, 1987; Helmbold andWar-
muth, 1992; Yang, 2000; Catoni, 1997) and has received a lot of attention in the
machine learning literature in recent years, also under the name “on-line to
batch conversion of Bayes” or progressive mixture rule (Audibert, 2007) ormirror
averaging (Juditsky et al., 2008; Dalalyan and Tsybakov, 2012), but is of course
unnatural from a Bayesian perspective.
The main result of Grünwald (2012) essentially states the following: sup-
pose that, under P∗, the density ratios are uniformly bounded, i.e. there is a
finite v such that for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, P∗( fθ(Y | X)/ fθ′(Y | X) ≤ v) = 1. Sup-
pose further that the prior Π assigns ‘sufficient mass’ in KL-neighbourhoods
of Pθ˜ . Then ΠCes applied with the ηˆ learned by the SafeBayesian algorithm
concentrates on the optimal Pθ˜ . That is, let Θδ be the subset of all θ ∈ Θ
with D(P∗‖Pθ) ≥ D(P∗‖Pθ˜) + δ. Then for all δ > 0, with P∗-probability 1,
as n → ∞, we have that ΠCes(Θδ | Zn, ηˆ) goes to 0. Grünwald goes on to
show that in several settings, one can design priors such that the rate at which
the posterior concentrates is minimax optimal, i.e. no algorithm can do better
in general. On the negative side, the requirement of bounded density ratio
is strong, and the replacement of the standard posterior by the Cesàro one is
awkward. On the positive side, the theorem has no further conditions and can
be applied to parametric and nonparametric cases alike.
In recent, as yet unpublished work, Grünwald (2014) extends the result to
deal with unbounded density ratios as in the regression setting considered
here, and to the ‘standard’ η-generalized rather than the Cesàro-averaged η-
generalized posterior. In both cases, convergence can still be proved but the
bounds given on the concentration rate worsen by a log n factor. We suspect
that in many situations, this is an artefact of the proof technique, and to see
whether there is any practical difference, below we include experimental res-
ults both for the Cesàro-averaged η-generalized posterior ΠCes(· | Zn, ηˆ) and
for the standard η-generalized posterior Π(· | Zn, ηˆ).
3.5 Main experiment: Varying σ2
In this sectionwe provide ourmain experimental results, based on linearmod-
elsMp as defined in Section 3.2.2 with a prior on both the mean and the vari-
ance. Figures 3.3–3.6 depict, and Section 3.5.3 discusses the results of model
selection and averaging experiments, which choose or average between the
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models 0, . . . , pmax, where we consider first an incorrectly and then a correctly
specified model, both with pmax = 50 and later with pmax = 100. Section 3.5.4
contains and interprets additional experiments on Bayesian ridge regression,
with a fixed p; a multitude of additional experiments is provided in Chapter 5.
Section 3.5.5 at the end of this chapter summarizes the relevant findings of
these additional experiments.
3.5.1 Preparing themain experiments: Model, priors, method,
‘truth’
In this subsection we prepare the experiments: Section 3.5.1.1 describes our
priors pi; Section 3.5.1.2 concerns the sampling (‘true’) distributions P∗ with
whichwe experiment; and finally, Section 3.5.2 describes the data statistics that
we will report.
3.5.1.1 The priors
Prior on models In our model selection/averaging experiments, we use a
fat-tailed prior on the models given by
pi(p) ∝
1
(p+ 2)(log(p+ 2))2
.
This prior was chosen because it remains well-defined for an infinite collection
of models, even though we only use finitely many in our experiments.
Variation As a sanity check we did repeat some of our experiments with
a uniform prior on 0, . . . , pmax instead; the results were indistinguishable.
Prior on parameters givenmodels Each modelMp has parameters β, σ2, on
which we put the standard conjugate priors as described in Section 3.3.1. We
set the mean of the prior on β to β¯0 = 0, and its covariance matrix to σ2Σ0.
Our main experiments below are based on an informative instantiation of Σ0,
using the identity matrix Σ0 = Ip+1; this prior equals the posterior we would
get by starting with an improper Jeffreys’ prior on β and then observing, for
each coefficient β j, one extra point z = (x, 0) with xj = 1 and xi = 0 for i 6= j.
Variations We also ran experiments with a ‘slightly informative’ Σ0, where
we set Σ0 = 1000 · Ip+1, comparable to observing points z = (x, 0) with xj =
1/
√
1000. Finally, following the standard reference Raftery et al. (1997), we
also used a prior with a level of informativeness depending on the submodel,
described in more detail in Section 5.1.
As to the prior on σ2: Jeffreys’ prior is obtained for the choice a0 = b0 = 0
in (3.13). We do not use this improper prior, because of the well-known issues
with Bayes factors under improper priors (O’Hagan, 1995). Moreover, to calcu-
late the posterior’s reliability (defined in Section 3.5.2 and shown in Figure 3.3)
and also for the I-log-loss, we need to calculate the posterior expectation of the
variance σ2 quantity as given by (3.15), which is onlywell-defined and finite for
an > 1. We want to make pi(σ2) as uninformative as possible while ensuring
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that (for any positive learning rate) this variance exists for the posterior based
on at least one sample. This is accomplished by choosing a0 = 1: for standard
Bayes, the posterior after one observation has a1 = a0 + 1/2; for generalized
Bayes, a1 = a0 + η/2. To set b0, we use that b0/a0 represents the sample vari-
ance of a virtual initial data sequence (Gelman et al., 2013, Section 14.8). We
choose b0 = 1/40 so that b0/a0 = 1/40, the true variance of the noise in our
data, as we describe next.
3.5.1.2 The “truth” (sampling distribution)
Our experiments fall into two categories: correct-model and wrong-model ex-
periments.
Correct-model experiments HereX1,X2, . . . are sampled i.i.d., with, for each
individualXi = (Xi1, . . . ,Xipmax), Xi1 . . . ,Xipmax i.i.d.∼ N(0, 1). Given eachXi,
Yi is generated as
Yi = .1 · (Xi1 + . . . + Xi4) + ei, (3.27)
where the ei are i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ∗2) with variance σ∗2 = 1/40.
Wrong-model experiments Now at each time point i, a fair coin is tossed
independently of everything else. If the coin lands heads, then the point is
‘easy’, and (Xi,Yi) := (0, 0). If the coin lands tails, then Xi is generated as
for the correct model, and Yi is generated as (3.27), but now the noise random
variables have variance σ20 = 2σ∗2 = 1/20. Thus, Zi = (Xi,Yi) is generated as
in the true model case but with a larger variance; this larger variance has been
chosen so that the marginal variance of each Yi is the same value σ∗2 in both
experiments.
From the results in Section 3.2.3 we immediately see that, for both experi-
ments, the optimal model isM p˜ for p˜ = 4, and the optimal distribution in
M andM p˜ is parameterized by θ˜ = ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) with p˜ = 4, β˜ = (β˜0, . . . β˜4) =
(0, .1, .1, .1, .1), σ˜2 = 1/40 (in the correct model experiment, σ˜2 = σ∗2; in the
wrong model experiment, since σ˜2 must be reliable, it must be equal to the
square-risk obtained with ( p˜, β˜), which is (1/2) · (1/20) = 1/40). f (x) := xβ˜
is then equal to the true regression function EP∗ [Y | X].
Variations We have already seen a variation of these two experiments de-
picted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In the correct-model version of that experiment,
P∗ is defined as follows: set Xj = Pj(S), where Pj is the Legendre polynomial
of degree j and S is uniformly distributed on [−1, 1], and set Y = 0+ e, where
e ∼ N(0, σ∗2), with σ∗2 = 1/40; (X1,Y1), . . . are then sampled as i.i.d. copies
of (X,Y). Note that the true regression function is 0 here. In Section 5.3 we
briefly consider this and several other variations of these ground truths.
3.5.2 The statistics we report
Figure 3.3 reports the results of the wrong-model, p = 50 experiment; Fig-
ure 3.4 shows correct-model, p = 50; Figure 3.5 is about wrong-model, p =
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100; and Figure 3.6 depicts the correct-model, p = 100 setting. For all four
experiments we measure three aspects of the performance of Bayes and Safe-
Bayes, each summarized in a separate graph. First, we show the behaviour of
several prediction methods based on SafeBayes relative to square-risk; second,
we measure whether the methods provide a good assessment of their own
predictive capabilities in terms of square-loss, i.e. whether they are reliable
and not ‘overconfident’. Third, we check a form of model identification con-
sistency. Below we explain these three performance measures in detail. We
postpone all experiments with log-loss rather than square-loss to Section 4.1.4.
We also provide a fourth graph in each case indicating what ηˆ’s are typically
selected by the two versions of SafeBayes.
Square-risk For a given distribution W on (p, β, σ2), the regression function
based onW, a function mapping covariate X to R, abbreviated to EW [Y | X], is
defined as
EW [Y | X] := E(p,β,σ)∼W EY∼Pp,β,σ |X [Y] = E(p,β,σ)∼W
[
p
∑
j=0
β jXj
]
. (3.28)
If we takeW to be the η-generalized posterior, then (3.28) is also simply called
the η-posterior regression function. The square-risk relative to P∗ based on pre-
dicting byW is then defined as an extension of (3.3) as
risksq(W) := E(X,Y)∼P∗(Y− EW [Y | X])2. (3.29)
In the experiments below we measure the square-risk relative to P∗ at sample
size i− 1 achieved by, respectively, (1), the η-generalized posterior, (2), the η-
generalized posterior conditioned on theMAP (maximum a posteriori) model,
and, (3), the η-generalized Cesàro-averaged posteriors, i.e.
EZi−1∼P∗ [risk
sq(W)], with
W = Π | Zi−1, η ; W = Π | Zi−1, η, p˘map(Zi−1,η) ; W = ΠCes | Zi−1, η, (3.30)
respectively, where the MAP model p˘map(Zi−1,η) is defined as the p achieving
maxp∈0,...,pmax pi(p | Zi−1, η), with pi(p | Zi−1, η) defined as in (3.10), and
ΠCes is the Cesàro-averaged posterior as defined as in (3.26). We do this for
three values of η: (a) η = 1, corresponding to the standard Bayesian pos-
terior, (b) η := ηˆ(Zi−1) set by the R-log SafeBayesian algorithm run on the
past data Zi−1, and (c) η set by the I-log SafeBayesian algorithm. In the fig-
ures of Section 3.5.3, 1(a) is abbreviated to Bayes, 1(b) is R-log-SafeBayes, 1(c)
is I-log-SafeBayes, 2(a) is Bayes MAP, 2(b) is R-log-SafeBayes MAP, 2(c) is I-log-
SafeBayes MAP, and results with Cesàro-averaging are discussed but not ex-
plicitly shown. In Section 3.5.4, additionally 3(a) is Bayes Cesàro, 3(b) is R-log-
SafeBayes Cesàro, and 3(c) is I-log-SafeBayes Cesàro.
Concerning the three square-risks that we record: The first choice is the
most natural, corresponding to the prediction (regression function) accord-
ing to the ‘standard’ η-generalized posterior; the second corresponds to the
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situation where one first selects a single submodel p˘map and then bases all
predictions on that model; it has been included because such methods are of-
ten adopted in practice. The third choice, the Cesàro-averaged generalized pos-
terior is included because, when η = ηˆ is set by SafeBayes, this is the choice
that Grünwald (2012) provides theoretical convergence results for (as we dis-
cussed, Grünwald (2014) provides results for the non-averaged η-generalized
posterior as well, but these are worse by a log-factor). But we are also inter-
ested in the results for the Cesàro-average for η = 1, because this has been
proposed earlier — albeit somewhat implicitly and with different models —
to stabilize Bayesian predictions in adversarial circumstances (Helmbold and
Warmuth, 1992), so we include these as well.
In Figure 3.3 and subsequent figures below, we depict these quantities by
sequentially sampling data Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zmax i.i.d. from a P∗ as defined above
in Section 3.5.1.2, where max is some large number. At each i, after the first
i− 1 points Zi−1 have been sampled, we compute the three square-risks given
above. We repeat the whole procedure a number of times (called ‘runs’); the
graphs show the average risks over these runs.
MAP-model identification / Occam’s razor When the goal of inference is
model identification, ‘consistency’ of a method is often defined as its ability
to identify the smallest modelM p˜ containing the ‘pseudo-truth’ (β˜, σ˜2). To
see whether standard Bayes and/or SafeBayes are consistent in this sense, we
check whether the MAP model p˘map(Zi−1,η) is equal to p˜.
Reliability vs. overconfidence Does Bayes learn how good it is in terms of
squared error? To answer this question, we define, for a predictive distribution
W as in (3.29) above, U[W]i (a function of Xi,Yi and (throughW) of Z
i−1), as
U[W]i = (Yi − EW [Yi | Xi])2.
This is the error we make if we predict Yi using the regression function based
on prediction method W. In the graphs in the next sections we plot the self-
confidence ratio EXi ,Yi∼P∗ [U
[W]
i ]/ EXi∼P∗ EYi∼W|Xi [U
[W]
i ] as a function of i for the
three prediction methods / choices ofW defined above. We may think of this
as the ratio between the actual expected prediction error (measured in square-
loss) one gets by using a predictor who based predictions on W and the mar-
ginal (averaged overX) subjectively expected prediction error by this predictor.
We previously, in Section 3.2.3, showed that the KL-optimal ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) is reliable:
this means that, if we would take W the point mass on ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) and thus, ir-
respective of past data Zi−1, would predict by E( p˜,β˜,σ˜2)[Yi | Xi] = ∑ p˜j=0 β˜ jXij,
then the ratio would be 1. For the W learned from data considered above, a
value larger than 1 indicates thatW does not implement a ‘reliable’ method in
the sense of Section 3.2.3, but rather overconfident: it predicts its predictions
to be better than they actually are, in terms of square-risk.
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3.5.3 Main model selection/averaging experiment
We run the SafeBayesian algorithmof Section 3.4with zi = (xi, yi) and `θ(zi) =
− log fθ(yi | xi) is the (conditional) log-loss as described in that section. As
to the parameters of the algorithm (page 52), in all experiments we set the
step-size κstep = 1/3 and κmax := 8, i.e. we tried the following values of η:
1, 2−1/3, 2−2/3, . . . , 2−8. The result of the wrong-model and correct-model ex-
periment as described above with pmax = 50 and pmax = 100, respectively, are
given in Figures 3.3–3.6.
Conclusion 1: Bayes performswell inmodel-correct, and dismally inmodel-
incorrect experiment The four figures show that standard Bayes behaves ex-
cellently in terms of all quality measures (square-risk, MAP model identific-
ation and reliability) when the model is correct, and dismally if the model is
incorrect.
Conclusion 2: If (and only if) model incorrect, then the higher pmax, the
worse Bayes gets We see from Figures 3.4 and 3.6 that standard Bayes be-
haves excellently in terms of all quality measures (square-risk, MAP model
identification and reliability) when the model is correct, both if pmax = 50 and
if pmax = 100, the behaviour at pmax = 100 being essentially indistinguish-
able from the case with pmax = 50. These and other (unreported) experiments
strongly suggests that, when the data are sampled from a low-dimensional
model, then, when the model is correct, standard Bayes is unaffected (does
not get confused) by adding additional high-dimensional models to the model
space. Indeed, the same is suggested by various existing Bayesian consistency
theorems, such as those by Doob (1949); Ghosal et al. (2000); Zhang (2006a).
At the same time, from Figures 3.3 and 3.5 we infer that standard Bayes be-
haves very badly in all three quality measures in our (admittedly very ‘evilly
chosen’) model-wrong experiment. At very large sample sizes, Bayes eventu-
ally recovers, but the main point here to notice is that the n at which a given
level of recovery (measured in, say, square-loss) takes place is much higher for
the case pmax = 100 (Figure 3.5) than for the case pmax = 50 (Figure 3.3). This
strongly suggests that, when the model is incorrect but the best approxima-
tion lies in a low-dimensional submodel, then standard Bayes gets confused
by adding additional high-dimensional models to the model space — recov-
ery takes place at a sample size that increases with pmax. Indeed, the graphs
strongly suggest that in the case that pmax = ∞ (with which we cannot ex-
periment), Bayes will be inconsistent in the sense that the risk of the posterior
predictive will never ever reach the risk attainable with the best submodel.
Grünwald and Langford (2007) showed that this can indeed happen with a
simple, but much more unnatural classification model; the present result in-
dicates (but does not prove) that it can happen with our standard model as
well.
Conclusion 3: R-log-SafeBayes and I-log-SafeBayes generally perform well
Comparing the four graphs for SafeBayes and I-log-SafeBayes, we see that
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they behave quite well for both themodel-correct and themodel-wrong experi-
ments, being slightly worse than, though still competitive to, standard Bayes
when the model is correct and incomparably better when the model is wrong.
Indeed, in the wrong-model experiments, about half of the data points are
identical and therefore do not provide very much information, so one would
expect that if a ‘good’ method achieves a given level of square-risk at sample
size n in the correct-model experiment, it achieves the same level at about 2n
in the incorrect-model experiment, and this is indeed what happens. Also, we
see from comparing Figures 3.5 and 3.6 on the one hand to Figures 3.3 and 3.4
on the other that adding additional high-dimensional models to the model
space hardly affects the results — like standard Bayes when the model is cor-
rect, SafeBayes does not get confused by the additional, larger model space.
Secondary conclusions We see that both types of SafeBayes converge quickly
to the right (pseudo-true) model order, which is pleasing since they were not
specifically designed to achieve this. Whether this is an artefact of our setting
or holdsmore generallywould, of course, require further experimentation. We
note that at small sample sizes, when both types of SafeBayes still tend to se-
lect an overly simple model, I-log-SafeBayes has significantly more variability
in the model chosen-on-average; it is not clear though whether this is ‘good’
or ‘bad’. We also note that the η’s chosen by both versions are very similar for
all but the smallest sample sizes, and are consistently smaller than 1. When
instead of the full η-generalized posteriors, the η-generalized posterior con-
ditioned on the MAP p˘map is used, the behaviour of all method consistently
deteriorates a little, but never by much.
For lack of space in the graphs, we did not show the Cesàro-versions of
Bayes, R-log-SafeBayes and I-log-SafeBayes (methods 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) in Sec-
tion 3.5.2). Briefly, the curves look as follows: Cesàro-Bayes performs signifi-
cantly better than standard Bayes in all three quality measures in the wrong-
model experiments, but is still far from competitive with the two (full-pos-
terior) SafeBayes versions. When Cesàroified, the SafeBayes methods become
a bit smoother but not necessarily better. Very similar behaviour of Cesàro
(making bad methods significantly better but still not competitive, and good
methods smoother, sometimes a bit worse and sometimes a bit better) has been
explicitly depicted in the ridge regression with varying σ2 in Section 3.5.4 be-
low.
3.5.4 Second experiment: Ridge regression, varying σ2
We repeat the model-wrong andmodel-correct experiments of Figures 3.3 and
3.4, with just one major difference: all posteriors are conditioned on p :=
pmax = 50. Thus, we effectively consider just a fixed, high-dimensional model,
whereas the best approximation θ˜ = (50, β˜, σ˜2) viewed as an element ofMp
is ‘sparse’ in that it has only β1, . . . , β4 not equal to 0. We note that the MAP
model index graphs of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 aremeaningless in this context (they
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Figure 3.3: Four graphs showing respectively the square-risk, MAP model or-
der, overconfidence (lack of reliability), and selected ηˆ at each sample size, each
averaged over 30 runs, for the wrong-model experiment with pmax = 50, for
the methods indicated in Section 3.5.2. For the selected-ηˆ graph, the pale lines
are one standard deviation apart from the average; all lines in this graph were
computed over ηˆ indices (so that the lines depict the geometric mean over the
values of ηˆ themselves).
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Figure 3.4: Same graphs as in Figure 3.3 for the correct-model experiment with
pmax = 50
64 Chapter 3. Bayesian Inconsistency under Misspecification
Figure 3.5: Same four graphs as in Figure 3.3, for the wrong-model experiment
with pmax = 100
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Figure 3.6: Same graphs as in Figure 3.3 for the correct-model experiment with
pmax = 100
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would be equal to the constant 50) so they are left out of the new Figures 3.7
and 3.8.
Instantiating SafeBayes Since we noticed in preliminary experiments that
some versions of SafeBayes now have a tendency to select much smaller values
of η than in the previous experiments, we now set κmax = 16 (large enough so
that in no experiment the optimal η < 2−κmax ); for computational reasons we
also increased the step size and set κstep = 1.
Connection to Bayesian (b)ridge regression From (3.12) we see that the pos-
terior mean parameter β¯i,η is equal to the posterior MAP parameter and de-
pends on η but not on σ2, since σ2 enters the prior in the same way as the like-
lihood. Therefore, the square-loss obtained when using the generalized pos-
terior for prediction is always given by (yi− xi β¯i,η)2 irrespective ofwhetherwe
use the posterior mean, orMAP, or the value of σ2. Interestingly, if we fix some
λ and perform standard (nongeneralized) Bayeswith amodified prior, propor-
tional to the original prior raised to the power λ := η−1, then the prior becomes
normal N(β¯0, σ2Σ′0) where Σ′0 = ηΣ0 and the standard posterior given zi is
then (by (3.12)) Gaussian with mean((
Σ′0
)−1
+ X>nX
)−1 · ((Σ′0)−1 β¯0 + X>nyn) = β¯i,η . (3.31)
Thus we see that in this special case, the (square-risk of the) η-generalized
Bayes posterior mean coincides with the (square-risk of the) standard Bayes
posterior mean with prior N(β¯0, σ2ηΣ0). But this means that the square-loss
obtained by η-generalized Bayes on a data sequence is precisely equal to the
square-loss obtained by Bayesian ridge regression with penalty parameter λ =
η−1, as defined, by, e.g., Park and Casella (2008) (to be precise, they call this
method Bayesian ‘bridge’ regression with q = 2; the choice of q = 1 in their
formula gives their celebrated ‘Bayesian Lasso’). It is thus of interest to see
what happens if η (equivalently, λ) is determined by empirical Bayes, which is
one of the methods Park and Casella (2008) suggest. In addition to the graphs
discussed earlier in Section 3.5.2, we thus also show the results for η set in this
alternative way. Whereas this empirical-Bayesian ridge regression is usually a
very competitive method (indeed in our model-correct experiment, Figure 3.8,
it performs best in all respects), we will see in Figure 3.7 (the green line) that,
just like other versions of Bayes, it breaks down under our type of misspecifi-
cation.
We hasten to add that the correspondence between the η-generalized pos-
terior means and the standard posterior means with prior raised to power 1/η
only holds for the β¯i,η parameters. It does not hold for the σ¯2i,η parameters,
and thus, for fixed η, the self-confidence ratio of both methods may be quite
different.
Conclusions for model-wrong experiment For most curves, the overall pic-
ture of Figure 3.7 is comparable to the corresponding model averaging experi-
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Figure 3.7: Bayesian ridge regression: Model-wrong experiment conditioned
on p := pmax = 50. The graphs (square-risk, self-confidence ratio and chosen
η as function of sample size) are as in Figures 3.3–3.6, except for the third
graph there (MAP model order), which has no meaning here. The meaning
of the curves is given in Section 3.5.2 except for empirical Bayes, explained in
Section 3.5.4.
ment, Figure 3.3: when the model is wrong, standard Bayes shows dismal
performance in terms of risk and reliability up to a certain sample size and
then very slowly recovers, whereas both versions of SafeBayes perform quite
well even for small sample sizes. We do not show variations of the graph for
p = pmax = 100 (i.e. the analogue of Figure 3.5), since it relates to Figure 3.7
in exactly the same way as Figure 3.5 relates to Figure 3.3: with p = 100, bad
square-risk and reliability behaviour of Bayes goes on for much longer (recov-
ery takes place at much larger sample size) and remains equally good as for
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Figure 3.8: Bayesian ridge regression: Same graphs as in Figure 3.7, but for the
model-correct experiment conditioned on p := pmax = 50.
p = 50 with the two versions of SafeBayes.
The results for the Cesàro-versions of our methods are exactly as discussed
at the end of Section 3.5.3.
We also see that, as we already indicated in the introduction, choosing the
learning rate by empirical Bayes (thus implementing one version of Bayesian
bridge regression) behaves terribly. This complieswith our general theme that,
to ‘save Bayes’ in general misspecification problems, the parameter η cannot be
chosen in a standard Bayesian manner.
Conclusions for model-correct experiment The model-correct experiment
for ridge regression (Figure 3.8) offers a surprise: we had expected Bayes to
perform best, andwere surprised to find that the SafeBayeses obtained smaller
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risk. Some followup experiments (not shown here), with different true regres-
sion functions and different priors, shed more light on the situation. Consider
the setting in which the coefficients of the true function are drawn randomly
according to the prior. In this setting standard Bayes performs at least as good
in expectation as any othermethod including SafeBayes (the Bayesian posterior
now represents exactly what an experimenter might ideally know). SafeBayes
(still in this setting) usually chooses η = 1/2 or 1/4, and the difference in
risks compared to Bayes is small. On the other hand, if the true coefficients
are drawn from a distribution with substantially smaller variance than a pri-
ori expected by the prior (a factor 1000 in the ‘correct’-model experiment of
Figure 3.8), then SafeBayes performs much better than Bayes. Here Bayes can
no longer necessarily be expected to have the best performance (the model is
correct, but the prior is “wrong”), and it is possible that a slightly reduced
learning rate gives (significantly) better results. It seems that this situation,
where the variance of the true function is much smaller than its prior expect-
ation, is not exceptional: for example, Raftery et al. (1997) suggest choosing
the variance of the prior in such a way that a large region of parameter values
receives substantial prior mass. Following that suggestion in our experiments
already gives a variance that is large enough compared to the true coefficients
that SafeBayes performs better than Bayes even if the model is correct.
A joint observation for the model-wrong and model-correct experiments
Finally we note that we see an interesting difference between the two Safe-
Bayes versions here: I-log-SafeBayes seems better for risk, giving a smooth de-
creasing curve in both experiments. R-log-SafeBayes inherits a trace of stand-
ard Bayes’ bad behaviour in both experiments, with a nonmonotonicity in the
learning curve. On the other hand, in terms of reliability, R-log-SafeBayes is
consistently better than I-log-SafeBayes (but note that the latter is undercon-
fident, which is arguably preferable over being overconfident, as Bayes is). All
in all, there is no clear winner between the two methods.
3.5.5 Executive summary: Joint conclusions from main and
additional experiments
Standard Bayes In almost all our experiments (both here and in Chapter 5),
standard Bayesian inference fails in its KL-associated prediction tasks (squared
error risk, reliability) when the model is wrong. Adopting a different prior
(such as the g-prior) does not help, with two exceptions in model averaging:
(a) when Raftery’s prior (Section 5.1.3) is used, then Bayes works quite well,
but there it fails dramatically again (in contrast to SafeBayes) once the percent-
age of easy points is increased; (b) when it is run with a fixed variance that
is significantly larger than the ‘best’ (pseudo-true) variance σ˜2. Moreover, in
the ridge regression experiment with fixed σ2, we find that standard Bayes can
even performmuchworse than SafeBayeswhen themodel is correct— so all in
all we tentatively conclude that SafeBayes is safer to use for linear regression.
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SafeBayes R-square-SafeBayes is not competitive with the other SafeBayes
methods and can even get worse than Bayes sometimes; this is due to an un-
wanted dependence on the specified scale σ2 as explained in Section 5.1. The
other three SafeBayes methods behave reasonably well in all our experiments,
and there is no clear winner among them. I-square-SafeBayes usually behaves
excellently for the square-risk, but cannot directly be used to assess its ownper-
formance. I-log-SafeBayes usually behaves excellently in terms of square-risk
as well but is underconfident about its own performance (which is perhaps
acceptable, overconfidence being a lot more dangerous). R-log-SafeBayes is
usually good in terms of square-risk though not as good as I-log-SafeBayes,
yet it is highly reliable. However, in Section 5.2.1, we describe an initial idea
for discounting the importance of the first few outcomes and explain why this
might improve performance. When combined with this discounting idea, R-
log-SafeBayes may actually always be competitive with the other twomethods
in terms of square-risk as well.
Learning η in Bayes- or likelihood way fails Despite its intuitive appeal,
fitting η to the data by e.g. empirical Bayes fails both in the model-wrong ridge
experiment with a prior on σ2, where it amounts to Bayesian ridge regression
(Figure 3.7) and in the model-wrong fixed-variance ridge experiment (where
it amounts to a method for learning the variance, see Section 5.1.1.2).
Robustness of experiments It does not matter whether the Xi1,Xi2, . . . are
independent Gaussian, uniform or represent polynomial basis functions: all
phenomena reported here persist for all choices. If the ‘easy’ points are not
precisely (0, 0), but have themselves a small variance in both dimensions, then
all phenomena reported here persist, but on a smaller scale.
Centring We repeated several of our experiments with centred data, i.e. pre-
processed data so that the empirical average of theYi is exactly 0 (Raftery et al.,
1997; Hastie et al., 2001). In none of our experiments did this affect any results.
We also looked at the case where the true regression function has an intercept
far from 0, and data are not centred. This hardly affected the SafeBayes meth-
ods.
Other methods We also repeated the wrong-model experiment for several
other model selection methods: AIC, BIC, and various forms of cross-valid-
ation. Briefly, we found that all these have severe problems with our data as
well. experiments, the mentioned methods were used to identify a model in-
dex p and η played no role, but in our final experiment we used leave-one-out
cross-validation to learn η itself. With the squared error loss it worked fine,
which is not too surprising given its close similarity to I-square-SafeBayes.
However, when we tried it with log-loss (as a likelihoodist or information-
theorist might be tempted to do), it behaved terribly.
Chapter 4
Bayesian Inconsistency:
Explanations and Discussion
In this chapter, we give several explanations of how the Bayesian inconsistency
seen in Chapter 4 may occur under ‘bad’ misspecification, and why SafeBayes
provides a solution to this problem. We also discuss how our inconsistency
example and the SafeBayes method relate to other work.
4.1 Bayes’ behaviour explained
In this section we explain how anomalous behaviour of the Bayesian posterior
may arise, taking a frequentist perspective. Section 4.1.1 is merely provided to
give some initial intuition and may be skipped. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is
given in Appendix 4.A.2.
4.1.1 Explanation I: Variance issues
Example 4.A. [Bernoulli] Consider the following very simple scenario: our
‘model’ consists of two Bernoulli distributions,M = {Pθ | θ ∈ {0.2, 0.8}},
with Pθ expressing that Y1,Y2, . . . ∼ i.i.d. Ber(θ). We perform Bayesian infer-
ence based on a uniform prior onM. Suppose first that the data are, in fact,
sampled i.i.d. from Pθ∗ , where θ∗ is the ‘true’ parameter. The model is mis-
specified, in particular we will take a θ∗ 6∈ {0.2, 0.8}. The log-likelihood ratio
between the two distributions for dataYn with n1 ones and n0 = n− n1 zeroes,
measured for convenience in bits (base 2), is given by
L = log2
f0.8(Yn)
f0.2(Yn)
= log2
(0.8)n1(0.2)n0
(0.2)n1(0.8)n0
= 2(n1 − n0). (4.1)
With uniform priors, the posterior will prefer θ = 0.2 as soon as L < 0.
First suppose θ∗ = 1/2. Then both distributions inM are equally far from
θ∗ in terms of KL divergence (or any other commonly used measure). By the
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central limit theorem, however, we expect that the probability that |L| > √n/2
is larger than a constant for all large n; in this particular case we numerically
find that, for all n, it is larger than 0.32.
This implies that, at each n, minθ∈{0.2,0.8} pi(θ | Yn) ≈ 2−
√
n/2 with ‘true’
probability at least 0.32. Thus, there is a nonnegligible ‘true’ probability that
the posterior on one of the two distributions is negligibly small, and a naive
Bayesian who adopted such a model would be strongly convinced that the
other distribution would be better even though both distributions are equally
bad. While this already indicates that strange things may happen under mis-
specification, we are of course more interested in the situation in which θ∗ 6=
1/2, so that one of the two distributions inM is truly ‘better’. Now, if the
‘true’ parameter θ∗ is within O(1/
√
n) of 1/2, then, by the central limit the-
orem, the probability that L < 0 is nonnegligible. For example, if θ∗ is exactly
1/2 + 1/
√
n, then this probability is larger than 0.16 for all n. Thus, for val-
ues of θ∗ this close to 1/2, there is no way we can even expect Bayes to learn
the ‘best’ value. For fixed (independent of n), larger values of θ∗, like 0.6, the
posterior will concentrate at 0.8 at an exponential rate, but the sample size at
which concentration starts is considerably larger than the sample sized needed
when the true parameter is in fact 0.8. For example, at n = 50, P0.6(L < 0) ≈
0.1, P0.8(L < 0) ≈ 2 · 10−5; both probabilities go to 0 exponentially fast but their
ratio increases exponentially with n. So, under a fixed θ∗, with increasing n,
Bayes may take longer to concentrate on the best θ˜ if θ˜ 6= θ∗ (misspecification)
than if θ˜ = θ∗, but it eventually ‘recovers’ (this was seen in the ridge experi-
ments of Section 3.5.4). Now, for largermodels, the consequence of slower con-
centration of the log-likelihood ratio L is that the probability that some ‘bad’ Pθ
happens to ‘win’ is substantially larger than with a correct model. Grünwald
and Langford (2007) showed that, in a classification context with an infinite-
dimensional model, there are so many of such ‘bad’ Pθ that Bayes does not
recover any more, and the posterior keeps putting most of its mass on a bad
model for ever (although the particular bad model on which it puts its mass
keeps changing). In Chapter 3 we empirically showed the same in a regression
problem.
Now one might conjecture that the issues above are caused by the fact that
the modelM is ‘disconnected’. In the Bernoulli example above, the problem
indeed goes away if instead of the model M, we adopt its ‘closure’ M′ =
{Pθ | θ ∈ [0.2, 0.8]}. However, high-dimensional regression problems exhibit
the same phenomenon, even if their parameter spaces are connected. It turns
out that in general, to get concentration at the same rates as if the model were
correct, themodel must be convex, i.e. closed under taking any finite mixture of
the densities, which is a much stronger requirement thanmere connectedness.
For standard Gaussian regression problems with Y | X ∼ N(0, σ2), this would
mean that wewould have to adopt amodel inwhichY | X can be anyGaussian
mixture with arbitrarily many components — which is clearly not practical
(note that ‘convex’ refers to the space of densities, not the space of regression
functions (Grünwald and Langford, 2007, Section 6.3.5)).
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4.1.2 Explanation II: Good vs. bad misspecification
Barron (1998) showed that sequential Bayesian prediction under a logarithmic
score function shows excellent behaviour in a cumulative risk sense; for a re-
lated result see (Barron et al., 1999, Lemma 4). Although Barron (1998) focuses
on the well-specified case, this assumption is not required for the proof and
the result still holds even if the modelM is completely wrong. For a precise
description and proof of this result emphasizing that it holds undermisspecifi-
cation, see (Grünwald, 2007, Section 15.2). At first sight, this leads to a paradox,
as we now explain.
A paradox? Let θ˜ index the KL-optimal distribution in Θ as in Section 3.2.1.
The result of Barron (1998) essentially says that, for arbitrary models Θ, for all
n,
EZn∼P∗
[
n
∑
i=1
risklog(Π | Zi−1)− risklog(θ˜)
]
≤ redn, (4.2)
where risklog(W), for a distributionW onΘ, is defined as the log-risk obtained
when predicting by theW-mixture of fθ , i.e.
risklog(W) = EX,Y∼P∗ [− logEθ∼W fθ(Y | X)]. (4.3)
In (4.2), this coincides with log-risk of the Bayes predictive density f¯ (· | Zi−1),
as defined by (3.8). Here, as in the remainder of this section, we look at the
standard Bayes predictive density, i.e. η = 1. redn is the so-called relative ex-
pected stochastic complexity or redundancy (Grünwald, 2007), which depends on
the prior and for ‘reasonable’ priors is typically small. The result thus means
that, when sequentially predicting using the standard predictive distribution
under a log-scoring rule, one does not losemuch compared towhen predicting
with the log-risk optimal θ˜.
WhenM is a union of a finite or countably infinite number of parametric
exponential families and p˜ < ∞ is well-defined, then, under some further reg-
ularity conditions, which hold in the regression example of Chapter 3 (Grün-
wald, 2007), the redundancy is, up to O(1), equal to the BIC term (k˜/2) log n,
where k˜ is the dimensionality of the smallest model containing θ˜. In the regres-
sion case,M p˜ has p˜+ 2 parameters (β0, . . . , βp, σ2), so in the two experiments
of Section 3.5, k˜ = 6. Thus, in our regression example, when sequentially pre-
dicting with the standard Bayes predictive f¯ (· | Zi−1), the cumulative log-risk
is at most n · risklog(θ˜) which is linear in n, plus a logarithmic term that be-
comes comparatively negligible as n increases. This is confirmed by Figure 4.2
on page 77. Now, for each individual θ = (p, β, σ2)we know from Section 3.2.3
that, if its log-risk is close to that of θ˜, then its square-risk must also be close to
that of θ˜; and θ˜ itself has the smallest square-risk among all θ ∈ Θ. Hence, one
would expect the reasoning for log-risk to transfer to square-risk: it seems that
when sequentially predicting with the standard Bayes predictive f¯ (· | Zi−1),
the cumulative square-risk should atmost be n times the instantaneous square-
risk of θ˜ plus a term that hardly grows with n; in other words, the cumulative
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Figure 4.1: Benign vs. bad misspecification: P˜ = arg minP∈M D(P∗‖P) is the
distribution in modelM that minimizes KL divergence to the ‘true’ P∗, but,
since the model is nonconvex, the Bayes predictive distribution P¯ may hap-
pen to be very different from any P ∈ M. When this happens, we can have
‘bad misspecification’ and then it may be necessary to decrease the learning
rate (in this simplistic drawing P¯ is a mixture of just two distributions; in
our regression example it mixes infinitely many). Yet if P∗ were such that
infP∈M D(P∗‖P) does not decrease if the infimum is taken over the convex
hull ofM (e.g. if Q rather than P˜ reached the minimum), then any learning
rate η < 1 is fine (‘benign’ misspecification). In the picture, we even have
D(P∗‖P¯) < D(P∗‖P˜); in this case we can get hypercompression.
square-risk from time 1 to n, averaged over time by dividing by n, should rap-
idly converge to the constant instantaneous risk of θ˜. Yet the experiments of
Section 3.5 clearly show that this is not the case: Figure 3.3 shows that, until
n = 100, it is about 3 times as large.
This ‘paradox’ is resolved oncewe realize that the Bayesian predictive dens-
ity f¯ (· |i−1) is a mixture of various fθ , and not necessarily similar to fθ for any
individual θ — the link between log-risk and square-risk (3.4) only holds for
individual θ = (p, β, σ2), not for mixtures of them. Indeed, if at each point in
time i, f¯ (· | Zi) would be very similar (in terms of e.g. Hellinger distance) to
some particular fθi with θi ∈ Θ, then there would really be a contradiction.
Thus, the discrepancy between the good log-risk and bad square-risk results
in fact implies that at a substantial fraction of sample sizes i, f¯ (· | Zi) must
be substantially different from every θ ∈ Θ. In other words, the posterior is not
concentrated at such i. A cartoon picture of this situation is given in Figure 4.1:
the Bayes predictive achieves small log-risk because it mixes together several
distributions into a single predictive distribution which is very different from
any particular single fθ ∈ M. By Barron’s bound, (4.2), the resulting f¯ (· | Zi)
must, averaged over i, have atmost a risk almost as small as the risk of θ˜. We can
thus, at least informally, distinguish between “benign” and “bad” misspecifi-
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cation. Bad misspecification occurs if there is a nonnegligible probability that
for a range of sample sizes, the predictive distribution is substantially different
from any of the distributions inM. As Figure 4.1 suggests, ‘bad’ misspecifica-
tion cannot occur for convex modelsM— and indeed, the results by Li (1999)
suggest that for such models consistency holds under weak conditions for any
η < 1, even under misspecification.
4.1.3 Hypercompression
The picture suggests that, if, as in our regression model, the model is non-
convex (i.e. the set of densities { fθ | θ ∈ Θ} is not closed under taking mix-
tures), then f¯ (· | Zi) might in fact be significantly better in terms of log-risk
than the best θ˜, and its individual constituents might even all be substantially
worse than θ˜. If this were indeed the case then, with high P∗-probability, we
would also get the analogous result for an actual sample (and not just in ex-
pectation): the cumulative log-risk obtained by the Bayes predictive should be
significantly smaller than the cumulative log-risk achieved with the optimal f˜ .
Figure 4.2 below shows that this indeed happens with our data, until n ≈ 100.
The no-hypercompression inequality In fact, Figure 4.2 shows a phenom-
enon that is virtually impossible if the Bayesian’s model and prior are ‘correct’
in the sense that data Zn would behave like a typical sample from them: it eas-
ily follows from Markov’s inequality (for details see Grünwald, 2007, Chapter
3) that, letting Π denote the Bayesian’s joint distribution on Θ×Zn, for each
K ≥ 0,
Π
{
(θ,Zn) :
n
∑
i=1
(
− log f¯ (Yi | Xi,Zi−1)
)
≤
n
∑
i=1
(
− log fθ(Yi | Xi,Zi−1)
)
− K
}
≤ e−K,
i.e. the probability that the Bayes predictive f¯ cumulatively outperforms fθ ,
with θ drawn from the prior, by K log-loss units is exponentially small in K.
Figure 4.2 below thus shows that at sample size n ≈ 90, an a priori formu-
lated event has happened of probability less than e−30, clearly indicating that
something about our model or prior is quite wrong.
Since the difference in cumulative log-loss between f¯ and fθ can be inter-
preted as the amount of bits saved when coding the data with a code that
would be optimal under f¯ rather than fθ , this result has been called the no-
hypercompression inequality by Grünwald (2007). The figure shows that for our
data, we have substantial hypercompression.
The SafeBayes error measure As seen from (3.18), SafeBayes measures the
performance of η-generalized Bayes not by the cumulative log-loss, as stand-
ard Bayes does, but instead by the cumulative posterior-expected error when
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predicting by drawing from the posterior. Oneway to interpret this alternative
error measure is that, at least in expectation, we cannot get hypercompression.
Defining (compare to (4.3)!)
riskR-log(W) = EX,Y∼P∗ Eθ∼W [− log fθ(Y | X)], (4.4)
we get by Fubini’s theorem,
riskR-log(W)− risklog(θ˜)
= Eθ∼W EX,Y∼P∗ [[− log fθ(Y | X)]− [− log fθ˜(Y | X)]] ≥ 0, (4.5)
where the inequality follows by definition of θ˜ being log-risk optimal among
Θ. There is thus a crucial difference between riskR-log and risklog — for the
latter we just argued that, under misspecification, risklog(W)− risklog(θ˜) ≤ 0
is very well possible. Thus, in contrast to predicting with the mixture density
Eθ∼W fθ , prediction by randomization (first sampling θ ∼W and then predict-
ing with the sampled fθ) cannot ‘exploit’ the fact that mixture densities might
have smaller log-risk than their components. Thus, if the difference (4.5) is
small, thenW must put most of its mass on distributions θ ∈ Θ that have small
log-risk themselves. For individual θ, we know that small log-risk implies small
square-risk. This implies that if (4.5) is small, then the (standard) posterior is
concentrated on distributions with small square-risk.
Experimental demonstration of hypercompression for standard Bayes Fig-
ure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the predictive capabilities of standard Bayes in
the wrong model example in terms of cumulative and instantaneous log-loss on
a simulated sample. The graphs clearly demonstrate hypercompression: the
Bayes predictive cumulatively performs better than the best single model / the
best distribution in the model space, until at about n ≈ 100 there is a phase
transition. At individual points, we see that it sometimes performs a little
worse, and sometimes (namely at the ‘easy’ (0, 0) points) much better than
the best distribution. We also see that, as anticipated above, randomized and
in-model Bayesian prediction do not show hypercompression and in fact per-
form terribly on the log-loss until the phase transition at n = 100, when they
become almost as good as standard Bayes. We see that for η = 1, they per-
form much worse. An important conclusion is that if we are only interested in
log-loss prediction, it is clear that we just want to use Bayes rather than randomized
or in-model prediction with different η.
As an aside, we note that the first few outcomes have a dramatic effect on
cumulative R- and I-log-loss (it disappears from Figure 4.2); this may be
due to the fact that our densities — other than those considered by Grün-
wald (2012) — have unbounded support so that there is no v such that
Theorem 4.1 below holds. This observation inspired the idea described in
Section 5.2.1 about ignoring the first few outcomes when determining the
optimal η. Also, we emphasize that the hypercompression phenomenon
takes placesmore generally, not just in our regression setup— for example,
the classification inconsistency noted by Grünwald and Langford (2007)
can be understood in terms of hypercompression as well.
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative standard, R-, and I-log-loss as defined in (3.18) and
(3.22) respectively of standard Bayesian prediction (η = 1) on a single run for
the model-averaging experiment of Figure 3.3. We clearly see that standard
Bayes achieves hypercompression, being better than the best single model. And,
as predicted by theory, randomized Bayes is never better than standard Bayes,
whose curve has negative slope because the densities of outcomes are > 1 on
average.
Figure 4.3: Instantaneous standard, R- and I-log-loss of standard Bayesian pre-
diction for the run depicted in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.4: Variance of standard Bayes predictive distribution conditioned on
a new input S as a function of S after 50 examples for the polynomial model-
wrong experiment (Figure 3.1), shown both for the predictive distribution
based on the full, model-averaging posterior and for the posterior conditioned
on the MAP modelM p˘map . For both posteriors, the posterior mean of Y is in-
correct for x 6= 0, yet f¯ (Y | Z50,X) still achieves small risk because of its small
variance at X = 0.
How hypercompression arises in regression Figure 4.4 gives some clues as
to how hypercompression is achieved: it shows the variance of the predictive
distribution f¯ (· | Z50) as a function of S ∈ [−1, 1] for the polynomial example
of Figure 3.1 in the introduction, at sample size n = 50, where hypercompres-
sion takes place. Figure 3.1 gave the posterior mean (regression function) at
n = 100; the function at n = 50 looks similar, correctly having mean 0 at S = 0
but, incorrectly, mean far from 0 at most other S. The predictive distribution
conditioned on the MAP modelM p˘map(Z50) is a t-distribution with approxim-
ately p˘map(Z50) ≈ 50 degrees of freedom, which means that it is approximately
normal. Figure 4.4 shows that its variance ismuch smaller than the variance σ˜2
at S = 0; as a result, its log-risk conditional on U = 0 is smaller than that of
θ˜ = ( p˜, β˜, σ˜2) by some large amount A. Conditioned at S 6= 0, its conditional
mean is off by some amount, and its variance is, on average, slightly (but not
much) smaller than σ˜2, making its conditional log-risk givenU 6= 0 larger than
that of θ˜ by an amount A′ where, it turns out, A′ is smaller than A. Both events
S = 0 and S 6= 0 happen with probability 1/2, so that the final, unconditional
log-risk of f¯ (· | Z50) is smaller than that of θ˜.
Summarizing, hypercompression occurs because the variance of the pre-
dictive distribution conditioned on past data and a new X is much smaller
than σ˜2 at X = 0. This suggests that, if instead of a prior on σ2 we use models
Mp with a fixed σ2, we can only get hypercompression (and correspondingly
bad square-risk behaviour) if σ2  σ˜2, because the predictive variance based
on linear modelsMp with fixed variance σ2 given X = x is, for all x, lower
bounded by σ2. Our experiments in Section 5.1.1 confirm that this is indeed
what happens.
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4.1.4 Explanation III: Themixability gap& theBayesianbelief
in concentration
Aswe indicated at the end of Section 4.1.2, badmisspecification can occur only
if the standard (η = 1) posterior is nonconcentrated.1 Intriguingly, by formal-
izing ‘concentration’ in the appropriate way, we will now show, under some
conditions on the prior, that a Bayesian a priori always believes that the posterior
will concentrate very fast. Thus, if we observe data Zn, and for many n′ ≤ n,
the posterior based on Zn′ is not concentrated, then we can view this as an in-
dication of bad misspecification. In the next section we will see that SafeBayes
selects a ηˆ  1 iff we have such nonconcentration at η = 1. Thus, SafeBayes
can partially be understood as a prior predictive check, i.e. a test whether the
assumptions implied by the prior actually hold on the data (Box, 1980).
The mixability gap We express posterior nonconcentration in terms of the
mixability gap (Grünwald, 2012; De Rooij et al., 2014). In this section we only
consider the special case of η = 1 (standard Bayes), for which the mixability
gap δi is defined as the difference between 1-R-log-loss (3.18) and standard
log-loss as obtained by predicting with the posterior predictive, at sample size
i:
δi := Eθ∼Π|zi−1 [− log f (yi | xi, θ)]−
(
− logEθ∼Π|zi−1 [ f (yi | xi, θ)]
)
= Eθ∼Π|zi−1 [− log fθ(yi | xi)]−
(
− log f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1)
)
, (4.6)
Straightforward application of Jensen’s inequality as in (3.19) gives that δi ≥ 0.
δi, which depends on z1, . . . , zi, is ameasure of the posterior’s concentratedness
at sample size i when used to predict yi given xi: it is small if fθ(yi | xi) does
not vary much among the θ that have substantial η-posterior mass; by strict
convexity of − log, it is 0 iff there exists a set Θ0 with Π(Θ0 | Zi−1) = 1 such
that for all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ0, fθ(yi | xi) = fθ′(yi | xi).
We set the cumulative mixability gap to be ∆n := ∑ni=1 δi.
The Bayesian belief in posterior concentration As a theoretical contribu-
tion of this chapter, we now show that, under some conditions on model and
prior, if the data are as expected by the model and prior, then the expected
mixability gap goes to 0 as O((log n)/n), and hence a Bayesian automatically
a priori believes that the posterior will concentrate fast. For simplicity we re-
strict ourselves to a modelM = {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ} where Θ is countable, and we
let all θ ∈ Θ represent a conditional distribution for Y given X, extended to n
outcomes by independence. We let pi be a probability mass on Θ, and define
the joint Bayesian distribution Π on Θ×Yn | X n in the usual way, so that for
measurable A ⊂ Yn, Π((θ∗,A) | Xn = xn) = pi(θ∗) · Pθ∗(A | Xn = xn).
The random variable θ∗ refers to the θ chosen according to density pi. We will
1Things would simplify if we could say ‘bad misspecification can occur if and only if there is
hypercompression’, but we do not know whether that is the case; see Section 4.3.3.
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look at the Bayesian probability distribution of the θ∗-expectedmixability gap,
δ¯n := Eθ∗ [δn].
Theorem 4.1. Consider a countable model with prior Π as above. Suppose that the
density ratios in Θ are uniformly bounded, i.e. there is a v > 1 such that for all x, y ∈
X × Y , all θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, fθ(y | x)/ fθ′(y | x) ≤ v. Suppose that for some η < 1 we
have ∑θ pi(θ)η < ∞. Then for every a > 0 there are constants C0 and C1 such that,
for all n,
Π
(
δ¯n ≥ C0 · log nn
)
≤ C1 · 1na . (4.7)
Moreover, for any 0 < a′ ≤ 1, there exist C2 and C3 such that
Π
(
∆n ≥ C2 · na′
)
≤ C3 · (log n)
2
na′
, (4.8)
i.e. the Bayesian believes that the mixability gap will be small on average and that the
cumulative mixability gap will be small with high probability.
Thus, even though ∆n is the difference between two quantities that are typ-
ically linear in n, with high probability it grows only polylogarithmically. This
means that observing a large value of ∆n strongly indicates misspecification.
We hasten to add that the regularity conditions for Theorem 4.1 do not
hold in the regression problem of Chapter 3; the theorem is merely meant
to show that ∆n is believed to be small in idealized circumstances that have
been simplified so as to make mathematical analysis easier. Note however,
that the regularity conditions do not constrainΘ in the most important re-
spect: by allowing countably infinite Θ, we can approximate nonparamet-
ric models arbitrarily well by suitable covers (Cover and Thomas, 1991).
In particular we do allow sets Θ for which maximum likelihood methods
would lead to disastrous overfitting at all sample sizes. Also the condition
that ∑pi(θ)η < ∞ is standard in proving Bayesian and MDL convergence
theorems (Barron and Cover, 1991; Zhang, 2006a). In fact, since the con-
stants C0 and C1 scale logarithmically in v, we expect that Theorem 4.1 can
be extended to the regression settingwe are dealingwith here as long as all
distributions in the model have exponentially small tails, using methods
similar to those in Grünwald (2014).
Example 4.B. [Cumulative nonconcentration can (andwill) go together with
momentary concentration: Example 4.A, Bernoulli, cont.] Consider the first
instance of the Bernoulli Example 4.A again, where we again look at what hap-
pens if both distributions are equally bad:M = {P0.2, P0.8}, whereas Y1,Y2, . . .
are i.i.d. ∼ Pθ∗ with θ∗ = 1/2. As we showed in that example, at any given n,
with Pθ∗ -probability at least 0.32, minθ∈{0.2,0.8} pi(θ | Yn) ≈ 2−
√
n/2: the pos-
terior puts almost all mass on one θ. Lemma 6 of Van Erven et al. (2011) shows
that in such cases δn is small; in this case, δn ≤ 2(e− 2)minθ∈{0.2,0.8} pi(θ | Yn)
≈ 1.42 · 2−
√
n/2. Thus, the posterior looks exceedingly concentrated at time
n, with nonnegligible probability (this unwarranted confidence is a simplified
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version of what was called the fair balance paradox by Yang (2007b), who conjec-
tured it is the underlying reason for the problem of ‘overconfident posteriors’
in Bayesian phylogenetic tree inference). However, SafeBayes detects misspe-
cification by looking at cumulative concentration, i.e. the sum of the δ’s: L as
in (4.1) can be interpreted as a random walk on Z starting at the origin, with
equal probabilities to move to the left and to the right. By the central limit
theorem, the random walk crosses the origin at time n with probability about
1/
√
npi/2 = O˜(n−1/2), so that we may conjecture that, with high probability,
it crosses the origin O˜(n · n−1/2) = O˜(n1/2) times. Each time it crosses the ori-
gin, the posterior is uniform and hence as nonconcentrated as it can be, and ∆n
is increased by at least a fixed constant. Onewould therefore expect (under the
‘true’ θ∗) that ∆n is of order
√
n, which by Theorem 4.1 is much larger than a
Bayesian a priori expect it to be— the model fails the ‘prior predictive check’.2
4.2 How SafeBayes works
In its simplest form, the in-model fixed variance case, SafeBayes finds the ηˆ
that minimizes cumulative square-loss on the sample and thus can simply be
understood as a pragmatic attempt to find a ηˆ that achieves small risk. How-
ever, the other versions of SafeBayes do not have such an easy interpretation.
To explain them further, we need to generalize the notion of mixability gap in
terms of the η′-flattened η-generalized Bayesian predictive density. The latter
is defined, for η, η′ ≤ 1, as:
f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, 〈η′〉; η) :=
(
Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η
[
f η
′
θ (yi | xi)
])1/η′
. (4.9)
By Jensen’s inequality, we have f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, 〈η′〉; η) ≤ f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, η) for
any η′ ≤ 1 and any (xi, yi). Indeed, intentionally, f¯ (· | 〈η′〉; η) is a ‘defect-
ive’ density in the sense that
∫
R f¯ (y | xi, zi−1, 〈η′〉; η)dy < 1. The log-loss
achieved by η-generalized, η′-flattened Bayesian prediction is called (η, η′)-
mix-loss from now on, following terminology from De Rooij et al. (2014). For
0 < η ≤ η′ ≤ 1, the mixability gap δi,η,η′ is defined as the difference between
the η-R-log-loss and the η′-mix-loss:
δi,η,η′ := Eθ∼Π|Zi−1,η [− log fθ(Yi | Xi)]−
(
− log f¯ (Yi | Xi,Zi−1; 〈η′〉; η)
)
.
(4.10)
We once again define a cumulative version ∆n,η,η′ = ∑ni=1 δi,η,η′ , and note that
the definitions are compatible with the special cases δi := δi,1,1 and ∆n := ∆n,1,1
defined in the previous subsection. Nowwe can rewrite the cumulative R-log-
2This heuristic argument can actually be formalized: if data are i.i.d. Bernoulli(1/2), then the
expected regret for every absolute loss predictor is of order O˜(n1/2) (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,
2006), which implies, via the connections between regret and ∆n given by De Rooij et al. (2014),
that ∆n must also be of order n1/2; we omit further details.
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loss achieved by Bayes with the η-generalized posterior as
n
∑
i=1
Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [− log fθ(yi | xi)] = ∆n,η,η′ +CMLn,η,η′ , (4.11)
where
CMLn,η,η′ =
(
n
∑
i=1
− log f¯ (yi | xi, zi−1, 〈η′〉; η)
)
is the cumulative (η, η′)-mix-loss. (4.11) holds for all 0 < η ≤ η′ ≤ 1. Consider
first η′ = 1. As was seen, if ∆n,1,1 is large, then this indicates potential bad
misspecification. But (4.11) still holds for smaller η′ < 1; by Jensen’s inequality,
for any fixed η, decreasing η′ will make ∆n,η,η′ smaller as well. Indeed, for any
fixed P∗, defining
δ¯η′ := sup
W
EX,Y∼P∗
[
Eθ∼W [− log fθ(Y | X)]−
(
− 1
η′ logEθ∼W [ fθ(Y | X)
η′ ]
)]
,
where the supremum is over all distributions on Θ, we have
lim
η′↓0
δ¯η′ = 0,
so we have an upper bound on the expectation of ∆n,η,η′ independent of the
actual data that, for small enough η′, will become negligibly small. But the
left-hand side of (4.11) does not depend on η′, so if, by decreasing η′, we de-
crease ∆n,η,η′ , CMLn,η,η′ must increase by the same amount — so as yet we
have gained nothing. Indeed, not surprisingly, Barron’s bound does not hold
any more for CMLn,η,η′ with η = 1 and η′ < 1 (and in general, it does not
hold for η, η′ whenever η′ < η). But, it turns out, a version of Barron’s bound
still holds for CMLn,η′ ,η′ , for all η′ > 0: the cumulative log-risk of η′-flattened,
η′-generalized Bayes is still guaranteed to be within a small redn of the cu-
mulative log-risk of θ˜, although redn does monotonically increase as η′ gets
smaller — simply because the prior becomes more important relative to the
data (standard results in learning theory show that CMLn,η,η is monotonically
decreasing in η, and can be upper bounded asO(1/η); see e.g. (De Rooij et al.,
2014, Lemma 1). Thus, it makes sense to consider the special case η′ = η, and
think of SafeBayes as finding the η minimizing
n
∑
i=1
Eθ∼Π|zi−1,η [− log fθ(yi | xi)] = ∆n,η,η +CMLn,η,η , (4.12)
since we have clear interpretations of both terms: the second indicates, by Bar-
ron’s bound, how much worse the η-generalized posterior predicts in terms
of log-loss compared to the optimal θ˜; the first indicates how much is addi-
tionally lost if one is forced to predict by distributions inside the model. The
second term decreases in η, the first has an upper bound which increases in
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η. SafeBayes can now be understood as trying to minimize both terms at the
same time.
Now broadly speaking, the central convergence result of Grünwald (2012)
states that ∆n,η,η will be ‘sufficiently small’ for all η < 1, and under some fur-
ther conditions even for η = 1, if the model is correct or convex; and it will
also be ‘sufficiently small’ if the model is incorrect, as long as η is smaller than
some ‘critical’ value ηcrit (which may depend on n though). Here ‘sufficiently
small’ means that it is not the dominating term in (4.12). Intuitively, we would
like the ηˆ determined by SafeBayes to be the largest η that is smaller than ηcrit.
Grünwald (2012) shows that SafeBayes indeed finds such an η, and that predic-
tion based on the generalized posterior with this η achieves good frequentist
convergence rates.
Experimental illustration Consider the main wrong-model experiment of
Section 3.5. Figure 4.5 shows, as a function of η, in red, the cumulative η-
R-log-loss measured by SafeBayes, averaged over 30 runs of the wrong-model
experiment of Figure 3.3. In each individual run, SafeBayes picks the ηˆminim-
izing this quantity; we thus get that onmost runs, ηˆ is close to 0.4. In contrast to
η-R-log-loss, and as predicted by theory, the η-mix-loss (in purple) decreases
monotonically and coincides with the standard Bayesian log-loss at η = 1 and
with the η-R-log-loss as η ↓ 0. We also see hypercompression again: near
η = 1, both the Bayesian log-loss and the mix-loss are smaller than the log-
loss achieved by the best θ˜ in the model. At η = 0.5, there is a sudden sharp
rise in ∆n,η,η (the difference between the red and purple curves). We can think
of SafeBayes as trying to identify this ‘critical’ ηcrit.
Theorem 4.1 shows that, if both model and prior are well-specified, then
the Bayesian posterior cumulatively concentrates in a very strong sense.
More generally, if the model is correct but also if there is ‘benign’ misspe-
Figure 4.5: Cumulative losses up to sample 100 (where the posterior has not
converged yet) as a function of η, averaged over 30 runs, for the experiment of
Figure 3.3. η-B-log-loss is the cumulative log-loss achieved by standard Bayes
with the η-generalized posterior.
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cification, then, under some conditions on the prior, by the results of Grün-
wald (2012), the Bayesian posterior eventually cumulatively concentrates
at η = 1. One might thus be tempted to interpret ηcrit (the learning rate
which SafeBayes tries to learn) as ‘largest learning rate at which the pos-
terior cumulatively concentrates’. However, this interpretation works only
if ηcrit = 1. If ηcrit < 1, we can only show that, for every η < ηcrit, ∆n,η,η
is small; true cumulative concentration would instead mean that ∆n,η,1 is
small for such η (note we must have ∆n,η,η ≤ ∆n,η,1 by Jensen). The fig-
ure shows that ∆n,η,1 (the difference between the red and blue curve) may
indeed be large even at small η. A better interpretation is that, for every
fixed η, with decreasing η′, the geometry of the (η, η′)-mix-loss changes,
so that the loss difference between themix loss and the R-log-loss obtained
by randomization gets smaller. By then further using the generalized pos-
terior for the same η′, we guarantee that a version of Barron’s bound holds
for the (η′, η′)-mix-loss.
Replacing R- by I-loss Although the proofs of Grünwald (2012) are op-
timized for R-SafeBayes, the same story as above can be told for any fixed
transformation from the posterior to a possibly randomized prediction, i.e.
anything of the form (3.21); in particular for the most extreme transforma-
tion where we replace the posterior predictive by the distribution indexed
by the posterior mean parameters so that instead of R-SafeBayes we end
up with I-SafeBayes. In fact, the importance of the distinction between
‘in-model’ and ‘out-model’ prediction under model misspecification has
been emphasized before (Grünwald, 2007; Barron and Hengartner, 1998;
Kotłowski et al., 2010). In general, althoughwe do not know how to exploit
this intuition to strengthen the convergence proofs of Grünwald (2012), it
seems more natural to replace the randomized predictions by determin-
istic, in-model predictions.
4.3 Discussion, open problems and conclusion
“If a subjective distributionΠ attaches probability zero to a non-ignorable
event, and if this event happens, then Π must be treated with suspicion,
and modified or replaced” (emphasis added)
— A.P. Dawid (1982).
“Some models are obviously wrong, yet evidently useful”
— (very freely paraphrasing Box, 1979).
We already discussed the theoretical significance of the inconsistency result
in the introduction. Extensive further discussion on Bayesian inference under
misspecification is given byWalker (2013) and Grünwald and Langford (2007).
For us, it remains to discuss the place of both the inconsistency result and our
solution in Bayesian methodology.
Following the well-known Bayesian statisticians Box (1980), Good (1983),
Dawid (1982, 2004) and Gelman (2004) (see also Gelman and Shalizi, 2012),
we take the stance that model checking is a crucial part of successful Bayesian
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practice. When there is a large discrepancy between amodel’s predictions and
actual observations, it is not merely sufficient to keep gathering data and up-
date one’s posterior: something more radical is needed. In many such cases,
the right thing to do is to go back to the drawing board and try to devise a
more realistic model. However, we think this story is incomplete: in machine
learning and pattern recognition, one often encounters situations in which the
model employed is obviously wrong in some respects, yet there is a model
instantiation (parameter vector) that is pretty adequate for the specific predic-
tion task one is interested in. Examples of such obviously-wrong-yet-pretty-
adequate models are, like in Chapter 3, assuming homoskedasticity in lin-
ear regression when the goal is to approximate the true regression function
and the true noise is heteroskedastic,3 but also the use of N-grams in lan-
guage modelling (is the probability of a word given the previous three words
really independent of everything that was said earlier?), logistic regression
in e.g. spam filtering, and every single successful data compression method
that we know of (see Bayes and Gzip (Grünwald, 2007, Chapter 17, page 537)).
The difference with the more standard statistical (be it Bayesian or frequent-
ist) mode of reasoning is eloquently described in Breiman’s (2001) the two cul-
tures.4 Bayesian inference is among the most successful methods currently
used in the obviously-wrong-yet-pretty-adequate-situation (to witness, state-
of-the-art data compression methods such as Context-Tree-Weighting (Wil-
lems et al., 1995) have a Bayesian interpretation). Yet our results show that
there is a danger: even if the employed model is pretty adequate (in the sense
of containing a pretty good predictor), the Bayesian machinery might not be
able to find it. The SafeBayesian algorithm can thus be viewed as an attempt
to provide an alternative for the data-analysis cycle (Gelman and Shalizi, 2012)
to this, in some sense, less ambitious setting: just like in the standard cycle, we
do a model check, albeit a very specific one: we check whether there is ‘cu-
mulative concentration of the posterior’ (see Section 4.1.4). If there is not, we
know that wemay not be learning to predict as well as the best predictor in our
model, so we modify our posterior. Not in the strong sense of ‘going back to
the drawing board’, but in the much weaker sense of making the learning rate
smaller —we cannot hope that our model of reality has improved, because we
still employ the same model — but we can now guarantee that we are doing
the best we canwith our givenmodel, somethingwhichmay be enough for the
task at hand and which, as our experiments show, cannot always be achieved
with standard Bayes.
3As long as, as in Chapter 3, the tails of the conditional distribution of Y given X = x are sub-
Gaussian, for each x; if they are not, there may be real outliers and then one cannot say that the
model is ‘pretty adequate’ any more.
4The ‘two cultures’ does not refer to the Bayesian-frequentist divide, but to the modelling vs.
prediction-divide. We certainly do not take the extreme view that statisticians should only be
interested in prediction tasks such as classification and square-error prediction rather than dens-
ity estimation and testing; our point is merely that in some cases, the goal of inference is clearly
defined (it could be classification, but it could also be determination whether some random vari-
ables are (conditionally) (in)dependent), whereas part of our model is unavoidably misspecified;
and in such cases, one may want to use a generalized form of Bayesian inference.
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Benign vs. badmisspecification Onemight argue that the example of Chap-
ter 3 is rather extreme, and that in practical situations, choosing a learning rate
different from 1 may never be a useful thing to do. A crucial point here is that
one can have ‘benign’ and ‘bad’ misspecification (Section 4.1.2). Under benign
misspecification, standard Bayes with η = 1 will behave nicely under weak
assumptions on the prior. While in our particular example, after ‘eyeballing’
the data one would probably have chosen a different, less misspecified model,
it may be the case that ‘bad’ misspecification (as in Figure 4.1) also occurs, at
least to some extent, in general, real-world data and is then not so easily spot-
ted. Since we simply do not knowwhether such situations occur in practice, to
be on the safe side, it seems desirable to have a theory about when we can get
away with using standard Bayesian inference for a given prediction task even
if the model is wrong, and how we can still use it with little modification if
there is badmisspecification. Our work (esp. (Grünwald, 2014), the theoretical
counterpart to Chapters 3–5) is a first step in this direction.
Towards a theory of Bayesian inference under misspecification What we
have inmind is a theory of Bayesian inference undermisspecification, inwhich
the goal of learning plays a crucial role. The standard Bayesian approach is very
ambitious: it can be used to solve every conceivable type of prediction or in-
ference task. Every such task can be encoded as a loss or utility function, and,
given the data and the prior, onemerely has to calculate the posterior, and then
makes an optimal decision by taking the act that minimizes expected loss or
maximizes expected utility according to the posterior. Crucially, one uses the
same posterior, independently of the utility function at hand, implying that
one believes that one’s own beliefs are correct in every possible respect. We en-
vision a more modest approach, in which one acknowledges that one’s beliefs
are only adequate in some respects, not in others; how one proceeds then de-
pends on how one’s model and loss function interact. For example, if one is
interested in data compression then, this problem being essentially equivalent
to cumulative log-loss prediction, by Barron’s (1998) bound one can simply use
the standard (η = 1) Bayesian predictive distribution — even under misspe-
cification, this will guarantee that one predicts (at least!) as well as one could
with the best element of one’s model. If, on the other hand, one is interested in
any of the KL-associated inference tasks (for linear models, these are square-
loss and reliability, Section 3.2.3), then using η = 1 is not sufficient any more,
and one may have to learn η from the data, e.g. in the SafeBayesian manner.
Finally, if we are interested in an inference task that is not KL-associated un-
der our model (i.e., a model instance can be good in the KL sense but bad in
the task of interest), then a more radical step is needed: either go back to the
drawing board and design a newmodel after all; or perhaps, the model can be
changed in a more pragmatic way so that, for the right η, η-generalized Bayes
once againwill find the best predictor for the task at hand. Let us outline such a
procedure for the case that the inference talk is simply prediction under some
loss function ` : Y × Yˆ → R. In this case, if the `-risk is not KL-associated
this simply means that, for some data, the log likelihood is not a monotonic
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function of the loss `. To get the desired association, we may associate each
conditional distribution Pθ(Y | X) in the model with its associated Bayes act
δθ : δθ(x) is defined as the act yˆ ∈ Yˆ which minimizes Pθ | X = x-expected loss
EY∼Pθ |X=x[`(y, yˆ)]. We can then define a new set of densities
f newθ,γ (y | x) =
1
Z(γ)
e−γ`(y,δθ(x)), (4.13)
and perform (generalized) Bayesian inference based on these. Note that this
effectively replaces, for each θ, the full likelihood by a ‘likelihood’ in which
some information has been lost, and is thus reminiscent of what is done in
pseudo-likelihood (Besag, 1975), substitution likelihood (Jeffreys, 1961; Dunson and
Taylor, 2005), or rank-based likelihood (Gu and Ghosal, 2009) approaches (as a
Bayesian, one may not want to lose information, but whether this still applies
in nonparametric problems (Robins andWasserman, 2000) let alone undermis-
specification (Grünwald and Halpern, 2004) is up to debate).
(4.13) can be made precise in two ways: either one just sets γ and Z(γ) to
1, and allows the f newθ to be pseudo-densities, not necessarily integrating to
1 for each x. This is a standard approach in learning theory (Zhang, 2006b;
Catoni, 2007). One could then learn η by, e.g., the basic SafeBayes algorithm
with `θ(x, y) := `(y, δθ(x)) instead of log-loss. Or, one could define Z(γ) so
that the densities normalize (how to achieve this if
∫
y e
−γ`(y,δθ(x))dy depends
on x is explained by Grünwald (2008)) and put a prior on γ as well (for linear
models, this is akin to putting a prior on the variance). Thiswill make the loss `
KL-associated and the KL-optimal θ˜ will also have the reliability property, see
again (Grünwald, 2008) for details. In this case we will get, with zi = (xi, yi),
`θ(zi) := `(yi, δθ(xi)), and using a prior onΘ and the scaling parameter γ, that
the η-generalized posterior becomes
pi(θ,γ | zn, η) ∝ 1
Z(γ)ηn
e−ηγ∑
n
i=1 `θ(zi) · pi(θ,γ). (4.14)
This idea was, in essence, already suggested by (Grünwald, 1998, Example 5.4)
(see also Grünwald (1999)) under the name of entropification (however, Grün-
wald’s papers wrongly suggest that, by introducing the scale parameter γ, it
would be sufficient to only consider η = 1); see also (Lacoste-Julien et al., 2011;
Quadrianto and Ghahramani, 2014).
Now both ‘pure’ subjective Bayesians and ‘pure’ frequentists might dis-
miss this programme as severe ad-hockery: the strict Bayesian would claim
that nothing is needed on top of the Bayesian machinery; the strict frequentist
would argue that Bayesian inference was never designed to ‘work’ under mis-
specification, so in misspecified situations it might be better to avoid Bayesian
methods altogether rather than trying to ‘repair’ them. We strongly disagree
with both types of purism, the reason being the ever-increasing number of
successful applications of Bayesian methods in machine learning in situations
in which models are obviously wrong. We would like to challenge the pure
subjective Bayesian to explain this success, given that the statistician is using
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a priori distributions that reflect beliefs which she knows to be false, and are
thus not really her beliefs. We would like to challenge the pure frequentist to
come up with better, non-Bayesian methods instead. In summary, we would
urge both purists not to throw away the Bayesian baby with the misspecified
bath water!
Moreover, from a prequential (Dawid, 1984), learning theory (citations see
below) andMinimumDescription Length (MDL (Barron et al., 1998)) perspect-
ive, the extension from Bayes to SafeBayes is perfectly natural. From the pre-
quential perspective, SafeBayes seeks to find the largest η at which the gener-
alized Bayesian predictions have a predictive interpretation in terms of the loss
of interest rather than the log-loss. The learning theory andMDL perspectives
are further explained in the next section.
4.3.1 Related work I: Learning theory and MDL
Learning theory From the learning theory perspective, generalized Bayesian
updating as in (4.14) with Z(γ) set to 1 can be seen as the result of a simple reg-
ularized loss minimization procedure (this was probably first noted by Willi-
ams (1980); see in particular (Zhang, 2006b)), which means that it continues
to make sense if exp(−γ`θ) as in (4.13) does not have a direct probabilistic in-
terpretation. Variations of such generalized Bayesian updating are known as
“aggregating algorithm”, “Hedge” or “exponential weights”, and often have
good worst-case optimality properties in nonstochastic settings (Vovk, 1990;
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) — but to get these the learning rate must of-
ten be set as small as O(1/
√
n). Similarly, PAC-Bayesian inference (Audibert,
2004; Zhang, 2006b; Catoni, 2007) (for a variation, see (Freund et al., 2004)) is
also based on a posterior of form (4.13) and can achieve minimax optimal rates
in e.g. classification problems by choosing an appropriate η, usually also very
small. From this perspective, SafeBayes can be understood as trying to find a
larger η than the worst-case optimal one, if the data indicate that the situation
is not worst-case and faster learning is possible. Finally, Bissiri et al. (2013) give
a motivation for (4.14) (with Z(γ) ≡ 1) based on coherence arguments that are
more Bayesian in flavour.
MDL Of particular interest is the interpretation of the SafeBayesian method
in terms of the MDL principle for model selection, which views learning as
data compression. When several models for the same data are available, MDL
picks the model that extracts the most ‘regularity’ from the data, as measured
by the minimum number of bits needed to code the data with the help of the
model. This is an interpretation that remains valid even if amodel is completely
misspecified (Grünwald, 2007). The resulting procedure (based on so-called
normalized maximum likelihood codelengths) is operationally almost identical
to Bayes factor model selection. Thus, it provides a potential answer to the
question ‘what does a high posterior belief in a model really mean, since one
knows all models under consideration to be incorrect in any case?’ (asked by,
e.g., Gelman and Shalizi (2012)): even if all models arewrong, the information-
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theoretic MDL interpretation stands. However, our work implies that there is
a serious issue with these NML codes: note that any distribution P in a model
M can be mapped to a code (the Shannon-Fano code) that would be optimal in
expectation if data were sampled from P. Now, our work shows that if the data
are sampled from some P∗ 6∈ M, then the codes based on Bayesian predictive
distributions can sometimes compress substantially better in expectation than
can be done based on any P ∈ M—this is the hypercompression phenomenon
of Section 4.1.3. The same thing then holds for the NML codes, which assign
almost the same codelengths as the Bayesian ones. Our work thus invalidates
the interpretation of NML codelengths as ‘compression with the help of (and
only of!) the model’, and suggests that, similarly to in-model SafeBayes one
should design and use ‘in-model’ versions of the NML codes instead — codes
that are guaranteed not to outperform, at least in expectation, the code based
on the best distribution in the model.
4.3.2 Related work II: Analysis of Bayesian behaviour under
misspecification
Consistency theorems The study of consistency and rate of convergence un-
der misspecification for likelihood-based and specifically Bayesian methods
go back at least to Berk (1966). For recent state-of-the-art work on likelihood-
based, non-Bayesian methods see e.g. Dümbgen et al. (2011) and the very gen-
eral Spokoiny (2012). Recent work on Bayesian methods includes Kleijn and
Van der Vaart (2006), De Blasi andWalker (2013) and Ramamoorthi et al. (2013)
who obtained results in quite general, i.i.d. nonparametric settings, non-i.i.d.
settings (Shalizi, 2009), and more specific settings (Sriram et al., 2013); see also
Grünwald (2014). Yet, as explicitly remarked by De Blasi and Walker (2013),
the conditions on model and prior needed for consistency under misspecifi-
cation are generally stronger than those needed when the model is correct.
Essentially, if the data are i.i.d. both according to the model and the sampling
distribution P∗, then Theorem 1 (in particular its Corollary 1) of De Blasi and
Walker (2013) implies the following: if, for all e > 0, the model can be covered
by a finite number of e-Hellinger balls, then the Bayesian posterior eventu-
ally concentrates: for all δ,γ > 0, the posterior mass on distributions within
Hellinger distance δ of the Pθ˜ that is closest to P∗ in KL divergence will be-
come larger than 1− γ for all n larger than some nγ. This implies that both in
the ridge regression (finite p) and in the model averaging experiments (finite
pmax), Bayes eventually ‘recovers’ — as we indeed see in our experimental res-
ults. However, if pmax = ∞, then the model has no finite Hellinger cover any
more for small enough e and indeed the conditions for Theorem 1 of De Blasi
andWalker (2013) do not apply anymore. Our results show that in such a case
we can indeed have inconsistency if the model is incorrect. On the other hand,
even if pmax = ∞, we do have consistency in the setup of our correct-model
experiment for the standard Bayesian posterior, as follows from the results by
Zhang (2006a).
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The limiting η = 1 Like several earlier results (Barron and Cover, 1991;
Walker and Hjort, 2002), Zhang’s consistency results for correct models hold
under very weak conditions for generalized Bayes with any η < 1, and only
under much stronger conditions for η = 1. Zhang provides an example of
inconsistency-like behaviour in the well-specified case with η = 1 that auto-
matically disappears as soon as one picks η < 1, leading Zhang (2006a) to
claim that in general, generalized Bayesian methods (η < 1) are more stable
than standard Bayesian ones. Zhang’s example, and the example of Bayesian
model selection inconsistency in awell-specifiedmodel by Csiszár and Shields
(2000) are closely related to ours, in that the Bayes predictive distribution for
η = 1 becomes significantly different from any distribution in the model (see
Figure 4.1). In their examples, the problem is resolved by taking any η < 1; in
our misspecification case, η should even be taken much smaller.
Anomalous behaviour and modifications of Bayesian posterior under mis-
specification Anomalous behaviour of Bayesian inference under misspecifi-
cation was, of course, observed before, e.g. (less dramatically than here) by
Yang (2007b); Müller (2013) and (as dramatically, but involving a very artificial
model) Grünwald and Langford (2007). Presumably also related is the ‘brit-
tleness’ of Bayesian inference that has been observed by Owhadi and Scovel
(2013). Not surprisingly then, we are not the first to suggest modification
of likelihood-based estimators (see e.g. White, 1982; Royall and Tsou, 2003;
Kotłowski et al., 2010) and posteriors (Royall and Tsou, 2003; Hoff and Wake-
field, 2012; Doucet and Shephard, 2012; Müller, 2013). The latter three ap-
proaches (that extend the first) employ the so-called sandwich posterior, inwhich
the covariance matrix of the posterior is changed based on a ‘sandwich for-
mula’ involving the empirical variance; Müller (2013) provides extensive ex-
planation and experimentation. Compared to the sandwich approach, our
proposal, besides being applicable in fully nonparametric contexts, seems sub-
stantially more radical. This can be seen from the regression applications in
Müller (2013), which involve a noninformative Jeffreys’ prior on the regression
coefficient vector β. With such a prior (as well as any normal prior scaled by
variance σ2), the posterior mean of β, and thus also the frequentist square-risk
(which only depends on the posterior mean) remains unaffected by the sand-
wich modification, so for square-risk the method would perform like stand-
ard Bayes in our model-wrong experiments. Thus Müller (2013, Section 2.4)
demonstrates its usefulness on other loss functions. Nevertheless, both the
sandwich and the SafeBayesian methods can be thought of as methods for
measuring the spread of a posterior, and it would be useful to compare the
two in detail, both in theory and practice.
4.3.3 Future work and open problems
The results of these chapters raise several issues and prompt the following re-
search agenda:
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1. Themisspecification in our examplewould presumably be easily spotted
in practice. This raises the question whether ‘bad’ misspecification also
arises for data sets that occur in practice and for which it would not be
easily spotted. Currently, we know only of one experiment in this direc-
tion: Jansen (2013) applied the Bayesian Lasso (Park and Casella, 2008) to
several real-world data sets, where the λ (i.e. 1/η) is taken thatminimizes
the cumulative square-losswhereas at the same time σ2 is a free parameter.
Thus it is a hybrid of I-square-SafeBayes and I-log-SafeBayes, but equal
to neither; the method was (somewhat) outperformed by standard Bayes
onmost data sets tried. However, we also tried this hybridmethod in the
model-wrong experiment of Chapter 3 and found that it is not competi-
tive with either of the two ‘true’ in-model SafeBayes methods either; so
the experiment does not ‘really’ test SafeBayes; more precise experiments
are needed.
2. Our method has one major disadvantage: even if the data do not have a
natural ordering, the ηˆ selected by SafeBayes will, in general, be order-
dependent. Grünwald (2011) suggested a very different (and in fact, the
first) method to learn ηˆ, that does not have this problem. However, it
is only applicable to countable models, and has no obvious computa-
tionally efficient implementation, so we do not know whether it has a
future. Another method that is clearly related to I-square-SafeBayes is to
determine η using leave-one-out cross-validation based on the squared
error. This method is also order-independent and behaves comparably
to I-square-SafeBayes (Section 5.1.1), but it is not clear how to extend
it to general misspecified models. While we show in the same section
that cross-validation based on log-loss of the Bayes predictive distribu-
tion fails dramatically, it may be that cross-validation based on log-loss
of the Bayes posterior mean would generally work fine, and this method
can be applied to general misspecifiedmodels, not just linear ones. Com-
pared to I-log-SafeBayes this in-model log-loss cross-validationwould have
the advantage that it is order independent, and the disadvantage that it
cannot (at least not straightforwardly) be used in an online setting and/or
for non-i.i.d. models. Also, we suspect that if the number of models is
exponential in the covariates (as in variable selection), cross-validation
may be prone to overfitting whereas SafeBayes would not be, but this
is just extrapolation from the well-specified case: it would be useful to
investigate “in-model cross-validation” further.
3. What exactly are relations between the sandwich posterior (see above)
and our approach? It would be good to test SafeBayes on the data sets
used by Müller (2013).
4. It would be useful to establish exactlywhat properties of Bayesian updat-
ing remain valid for generalized Bayesian updating, andwhat properties
do not hold anymore. For example, telescoping (Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,
2006) holds for the standard posterior, for the η-flattened, η-generalized
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posterior, but not for the (nonflattened) η-generalized posterior.
5. As discussed at the end of Section 4.2, the final term in (3.23) is lack-
ing in the in-model versions of SafeBayes, and this does suggest that
they should work better than the randomization versions — the corres-
ponding ∆η,η is always smaller. Yet we have no theoretical results to this
end, and our empirical results confirm this to some extent (R-square-
SafeBayes is not competitive), but not fully (R-log-SafeBayes is competi-
tive), so more research is needed here.
6. As we indicated in Section 4.1.3, hypercompression implies nonconcen-
tration, but we do not know whether the reverse implication holds as
well, sowemay perhaps have badmisspecification yet no hypercompres-
sion. It would give significant insight if we knew whether this indeed
could happen.
7. In light of the discussion underneath (4.13), one would like to formu-
late a general theory of substitution likelihoods so that likelihoods can
be determined based on the inference task of interest, so that this task
becomes KL-associated, for arbitrary prediction tasks. Ideally, (4.13) and
approaches such as pseudo-likelihood and rank-based likelihood would
all become a special case. If this can be done, we would have a truly
generalized Bayesian method.
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Appendix 4.A More on mix loss
4.A.1 Implementing SafeBayes
To implement the SafeBayesian algorithm (page 52), generalized posteriors
must be computed for different values of η, and the randomized loss (3.18)
must be computed for each sample size. For linear models with conjugate pri-
ors as considered in our experiments, all required quantities can be computed
analytically. We have already seen how to do this for modelsMp with fixed
dimension p. For unions of such models, it turns out that the mix-loss is a
helpful tool.
Role of mix loss in generalized posterior over models The generalized pos-
terior across a discrete set ofmodels is given by (3.7), which, writing τ = (β, σ2),
is, via (3.10) and (3.9), equivalent to
pi(p | zn, η) =
∫
Θp
pi(p, τ | zn, η) dτ
∝
∫
( f (yn | xn, τ, p))ηpi(τ | p) dτ pi(p). (4.15)
Here ∝ means ‘proportional to’ when p is varied and zn and η are fixed. In
practice we prefer to calculate this quantity incrementally: the posterior for
zn+1 with prior Π is equal to the posterior for a single data point zn+1 when
the posterior for zn is used as prior (in this sense the generalized posterior
behaves like the standard posterior): using this to further rewrite the second
line of (4.15) gives
pi(p | zn, η)
∝
∫
( f (yn | xn, τ, p))ηpi(τ | p) dτ pi(p)
=
∫
( f (yn | xn, τ, p))η · ( f (yn−1 | xn−1, τ, p))ηpi(τ | p) dτ pi(p)
=
∫
( f (yn | xn, τ, p))η
·
(
pi(τ | zn−1, p, η) ·
∫
( f (yn−1 | xn−1, τ′)ηpi(τ′ | p)dτ′
)
dτ pi(p)
∝
∫
( f (yn | xn, τ, p))η · pi(τ | zn−1, p, η) dτ · pi(p | zn−1, η),
where in the third inequality we used the definition of the generalized pos-
terior and in the last we used (4.15).
The integral appearing in both the cumulative and the step-wise expression
equals the expectation in (4.9) from the η-flattened η-generalized Bayesian pre-
dictive density for n and 1 outcome respectively; − log[(·)1/η ] of this quantity
is the mix loss of model p. We will now derive formulas for this quantity.
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Model with fixed variance Use the notation of Section 3.3.1. Write σ2mix =
σ2(1/η + xn+1Σnx>n+1). Then the mix loss for predicting one new data point
yn+1 is
− log f¯ (yn+1 | xn+1, zn, 〈η〉; η) = 1η
[
1
2
(η − 1) log(2piσ2)
+
1
2
log η +
1
2
log(2piσ2mix) +
1
2σ2mix
(yn+1 − xn+1βn)2
]
.
Model with conjugate prior on variance Using the notation of Section 3.3.1,
the mix loss is given by
− log f¯ (yn+1 | xn+1, zn, 〈η〉; η) = 1η
[
1
2
η logpi +
1
2
log(1+ ηxn+1Σnx>n+1)
+ an+1 log(2bn +
(yn+1 − xn+1βn)2
1/η + xn+1Σnx>n+1
)− an log 2bn − log Γ(an+1)Γ(an)
]
.
4.A.2 Belief in concentration (proof of Theorem 4.1)
For simplicity, we only give the proof for the unconditional case, in which
the θ represent distributions Pθ on z ∈ Z ; extension to the conditional case
is straightforward. For 0 < η < 1, let dη(θ∗‖θ) denote the Rènyi di-
vergence of order 1 − η (Van Erven and Harremoës, 2014), i.e. dη(θ∗‖θ) =
− 1η logEZ∼θ∗
(
fθ(Z)
fθ∗ (Z)
)η
. We first state a lemma, proved further below. In the
lemma, as in the remainder of the proof, (θ∗,Zn) is the random variable dis-
tributed according to the Bayesian distribution Π.
Lemma 4.2. Let Θ,Π and pi be as in the statement of Theorem 4.1. For every 1/2 ≤
η < 1, e > 0, let Θ¯η,e := {θ ∈ Θ | dη(θ∗‖θ) > e}. For every b > 0 and every
sample size n and setting e := (b log n)/(nη) and cη = (1− η)/(1 + η(1− η)),
we have:
Π
(
Π(Θ¯η,e | Zn) ≥ n−bcη
)
≤ 2
(
∑
θ∈Θ
pi(θ)η
)
· n−bcη .
In particular, if pi is summable for some η < 1, then using b = 1/cη , we get
that the Bayesian probability that the posterior probability of the set of θ farther than
b(log n)/n from θ∗ exceeds 1/n, is O(1/n).
We proceed to prove Theorem 4.1 using this lemma. By the information
inequality (Cover and Thomas, 1991), we have for every probability density
f 6= fθ∗ that
D(θ∗‖θ) = EZn∼Pθ∗ [− log fθ(Zn) + log fθ∗(Zn)]
≥ EZn∼Pθ∗ [− log fθ(Zn) + log f (Z)].
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In particular this holds with f = f¯ | Zn, the Bayes predictive distribution
based on the sample seen so far. It then follows from (4.6) that
δ¯n ≤ Eθ∼Π|Zn [D(θ∗‖θ)] (4.16)
Since piη is decreasing in η, we may without loss of generality assume that the
η mentioned in the theorem statement is at least 1/2. Now note (Van Erven
and Harremoës, 2014, Theorem 16) that for every 1/2 < η < 1, d1/2(θ∗‖θ) ≤
(η/(1− η)) · dη(θ∗‖θ). We also know from (Yang and Barron, 1999, Lemma
4) that the KL divergence D(θ∗‖θ) satisfies D(θ∗‖θ) ≤ (2 + log v)d1/2(θ∗‖θ).
Since trivially dη(θ∗‖θ) ≤ log v, we have, withC = η1−η · (2+ 2 log v), for every
e > 0, using (4.16),
δ¯n ≤ C · Eθ∼Π|Zn [dη(θ∗‖θ)]
≤ CΠ (dη > e | Zn) log v+ C (1−Π (dη > e | Zn)) e
≤ C (Π (dη > e | Zn) log v+ e) ,
so thatΠ
(
dη > e | Zn
) ≥ (C−1δ¯n − e)/(log v) and by Lemma 4.2, we have for
e = b(log n)/(nη) as in the lemma, that
Π
(
C−1δ¯n − e
log v
≥ n−bcη
)
≤ 2
(
∑
θ∈Θ
pi(θ)η
)
· n−bcη .
Rewriting this expression, plugging in the value of e and using η ≥ 1/2, gives
Π
(
δ¯n ≥ C
(
(log v)n−bcη + 2b(log n)
n
) )
≤ 2
(
∑
θ∈Θ
pi(θ)η
)
· n−bcη . (4.17)
The first part of the result follows by setting b = a/cη . For the second res-
ult, note that the first result implies (take a = 2), by the union bound over
sample sizes 1, . . . , n, that the Bayesian probability that EZn∼θ∗ [∆n] exceeds
C0 ∑ni=1(log i)/i  (log n)2 is O(1/n). Thus there exists C′,C′0 such that the
Bayesian probability that EZn∼θ∗ [∆n] exceeds C′0(log n)2 is bounded by C′/n.
Thus for the probability in (4.8) we have
Π
(
∆n ≥ C2 · na′
)
= Π
(
∆n ≥ C2 · na′ ,EZn∼θ∗ [∆n] ≥ C′0(log n)2
)
+Π
(
∆n ≥ C2 · na′ ,EZn∼θ∗ [∆n] < C′0(log n)2
)
≤ Π
(
EZn∼θ∗ [∆n] ≥ C′0(log n)2
)
+Π
(
∆n ≥ C2 · na′ ,EZn∼θ∗ [∆n] < C′0(log n)2
)
≤ C
′
n
+
C′0(log n)2
C2na
′ ,
where in the final stepwe usedMarkov’s inequality. The second result follows.
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Proof of Lemma 4.2 Fix A > 0 and γ > 0. We have
Π
(
Π(Θ¯η,e | Zn) ≥ A
)
= Π
(
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
∑θ∈Θ pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
≥ A
)
= Π
(
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
fθ∗(Zn)
· fθ∗(Z
n)
∑θ∈Θ pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
≥ A
)
≤ Π
(
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
fθ∗(Zn)
≥ A1+γ
)
+Π
(
fθ∗(Zn)
∑θ∈Θ pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
≥ A−γ
)
,
(4.18)
where we used the union bound. The first term is equal to, and can be further
bounded as
= Π

(
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ) · fθ(Zn)
)η
( fθ∗(Zn))η
≥ Aη(1+γ)

≤ Π
(
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ)
η · ( fθ(Zn))η
( fθ∗(Zn))η
≥ Aη(1+γ)
)
=∑
θ∗
pi(θ∗)Pθ∗
(
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ)
η · ( fθ(Zn))η
( fθ∗(Zn))η
≥ Aη(1+γ)
)
≤ ∑
θ∗∈Θ
pi(θ∗) EZn∼Pθ∗
[
∑θ∈Θ¯η,e pi(θ)
η · ( fθ(Zn))η
( fθ∗(Zn))η
]
· A−η(1+γ)
= ∑
θ∗∈Θ
pi(θ∗) ∑
θ∈Θ¯η,e
pi(θ)η ·
(
EZ∼Pθ∗
[
( fθ(Z))η
( fθ∗(Z))η
])n
· A−η(1+γ)
≤
 ∑
θ∈Θ¯η,e
pi(θ)η
 e−nηe · A−η(1+γ).
where the first inequality follows by differentiation to η (or equivalently, by
monotonicity of `p-norms), the second is Markov’s, and the third is the defin-
ition of Rènyi divergence.
The second term in (4.18) can be bounded as
≤ Π
(
fθ∗(Zn)
pi(θ∗) · fθ∗(Zn) ≥ A
−γ
)
= Π(pi(θ∗)−1+η ≥ A−(1−η)γ)
≤ Eθ∗∼Π[pi(θ∗)−1+η ]Aγ(1−η) =∑
θ∗
pi(θ∗)ηAγ(1−η).
Combining the upper bounds on the two terms on the right in (4.18), we get:
Π
(
Π(Θ¯η,e | Zn) ≥ A
) ≤
 ∑
θ∈Θ¯η,e
pi(θ)η
(e−nηe · A−η(1+γ) + Aγ(1−η)) .
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Now we plug in the chosen value of e = (b log n)/(nη) and we set A =
n−b/(γ+η). With these values the second factor on the right becomes
e−nηe · A−η(1+γ) + Aγ(1−η)
= n−bnb(η(1+γ))/(γ+η) + n−bγ(1−η)/(γ+η) = 2n−b·γ·
1−η
γ+η .
Since this holds for all γ > 0, it also holds for γ = 1/(1− η), and the result
follows.

Chapter 5
Bayesian Inconsistency:
More Experiments
This chapter provides additional linear regression experiments to test whether
the results of Chapter 3 also hold with different priors, models, methods, and
data-generating distributions. We find that three versions of SafeBayes consist-
ently perform well, while other methods, including Bayes and AIC, perform
badly.
5.1 Experiments on variations of the prior and the
model
Apart from the priors on parameters given the models we used in our main
experiments, we tried several alternative prior distributions, described in the
subsections below. The first subsection describes experiments with fixed (i.e.,
a degenerate prior on) σ2.
5.1.1 Experiments with fixed σ2
When models with fixed σ2 are used, our two SafeBayes methods become R-
square- and I-square-SafeBayes, as defined in Section 3.4.2. These also have a
direct interpretation as trying to find the best η for predicting with a square-
loss function, as was explained in that section. In this context, the value η = 1
has no special status, so we now also tried values η > 1 (we did experiment
with varying η in the previous varying σ2 experiments as well, but there it did
not make any substantial difference in the results). Specifically, we set Sn in
the SafeBayesian algorithm to {2κmax , 2κmax−κstep , 2κmax−2κstep , . . . , 2−κmax}, with
κstep = 1/2 and κmax = 6. All priors on the regression coefficients β remain as
described in Section 3.5.1.
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5.1.1.1 Model averaging experiment, fixed σ2
The model-correct experiment showed no surprises (all methods performed
well), so we only show results for the model-wrong experiment, as described
in Section 3.5.1, testing each of Bayes, R-square- and I-square-SafeBayes twice:
once based on a model with variance σ2 overly large (3 times σ˜2), and once
with σ2 overly small (1/3 times σ˜2) variance. To allow precise comparisonwith
the results in the main text, we also show behaviour of R-log-SafeBayes with
varying variance (defined precisely as in Figure 3.3) in Figure 5.1.
5.1.1.2 Ridge regression experiments, fixed σ2
Again we only show results for the model-wrong experiment.
Note that here standard Bayes — as can be seen from plugging η = 1 into
(3.12) — does not depend on σ2 and thus coincides in terms of square-risk
behaviour with standard Bayes in the variable σ2 case as in Figure 3.7. Also
(see below (3.12)) I-square-SafeBayes for fixed σ2 does not itself depend on σ2
and simply minimizes the cumulative sum of squared errors.
Just as for ridge regression with variable σ2, one may equivalently inter-
pret the η-generalized-posterior means β¯i,η as the standard, nongeneralized
Bayesian posterior means that one would get with a modified prior on β, pro-
portional to the original prior raised to the power η−1 (see above (3.31), Sec-
tion 3.5.4). Itmay then once again seem reasonable to learn η itself in a Bayesian
or likelihood-based way such as empirical Bayes.1 Indeed, this was suggested
implicitly as early as 1999 by one of us (Grünwald, 1999). The procedure de-
scribed in Section 3.4.3 (‘hierarchical loss’) of Bissiri et al. (2013) also arrives,
via a different derivation, at a similar prescription for finding η (we immedi-
ately add that the authors describe many ways for determining η, of which
this is just one). Unfortunately, just as for the empirical Bayes learning of η
with varying σ2, the figures below indicate that it does not perform well at all.
Conclusion Standard Bayes again performs comparably badly in both ex-
periments (note the difference in scale in the first graphs of Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
I-square-SafeBayes behaves excellently in both experiments. But now in the
ridge experiment R-square-SafeBayes becomes a highly problematic method
for small samples, worse even than standard Bayes. The reason is its depend-
ence on the specified σ2 as can be clearly seen from (3.23). If σ2 was set to be
much larger than the actual average prediction error on the sample, then the
third term in (3.23) dominates. This term decreaseswith η and thus automatic-
ally pushes ηˆ ‘upward’ by an arbitrary amount. The term also decreases with
n, so that the problem disappears at a large enough sample size. The prob-
lem did not occur in the model averaging experiment; we suspect that this is
because in this experiment, there is substantial prior mass on a small model
1In the present setting, learning η by empirical Bayes has a second interpretation: if one fixes
the variance σ2 appearing in the prior on β, uses the linear model with a different variance σ′2,
and then learns σ′2 by empirical Bayes, the result is identical to fixing σ′2 = σ2 and learning η by
empirical Bayes.
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Figure 5.1: Bayesian model averaging, fixed σ2, for the model-wrong experi-
ment of Figure 3.3 with pmax = 50. The second graph is a scaled version of
the first. Since fixed σ2 implies fixed self-confidence ratio, the self-confidence
graph is not shown. For clarity in the η-graph we do not show standard devi-
ations of the η’s.
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Figure 5.2: Bayesian ridge regression: Same graphs as in Figure 3.7, for fixed
σ2 and the model-wrong experiment conditioned on p := pmax = 50. Note the
difference in scale for the risk in this figure and Figure 5.1.
(p = 4) containing the pseudo-truth, and for this submodel, the final term in
(3.23) (which is approximately linear in p) is much smaller than for p = 50 and
does have not such a strong influence.
5.1.2 Slightly informative prior
Again we only consider model-wrong experiments. Within each model, we
now use the following prior parameters: β¯0 = 0 and Σ0 = 103I for the mul-
tivariate normal distribution on β; and a0 = 1 and b0 = σ∗2a0 (as before) for the
inverse gamma distribution on σ2 (where σ∗2 is the true marginal variance of
noise in our data, as defined in Section 3.5.1.2). We repeated the model-wrong
experiment of Section 3.5.3 with pmax = 50 with this slightly informative prior
and obtained similar results to those obtained using our original informative
prior with Σ0 = I: Bayes performs badly roughly between samples 90 and 130
and has some risk spikes before that so that its overall performance is compar-
able to before, while R-log-SafeBayes and I-log-SafeBayes both obtain good
risks. We omit the pictures as they show no surprises.
We also repeated the model-wrong experiment for ridge regression (Sec-
tion 3.5.4). Here the effect of the new prior on Bayes’ performance is similar:
the square-risk now peaks at a larger value, but in a smaller range of sample
sizes. However, the effect of changing the learning rate is different in this ex-
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Figure 5.3: Top two graphs: square-risk for two different ridge experiments. In
both experiments the slightly informative prior of Section 5.1.2 is used. In the
first experiment p = 50, in the second p = 100; otherwise the experiments are
just as the ‘wrongmodel experiment’ of Section 3.5.4, Figure 3.7, butwe also in-
cluded performance of I-square-SafeBayes. Final graph shows self-confidence
for the p = 100 case for Bayes and SafeBayes, on a logarithmic scale because of
the range of values involved.
periment than what we have seen before: here one can take η very small and
still get good results. So in a sense, the problematic behaviour of Bayes has a
trivial solution here: just pick a very small but fixed η. R-log-SafeBayeswas too
conservative in this, I-log-SafeBayes did fine. R-log-SafeBayes became com-
petitive again however, if we used the discounting version described in Sec-
tion 5.2.1 below.
In Figure 5.3 we repeat the pictures for ridge regression (Section 3.5.4) with
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this slightly informative prior, because they give additional insight. Note that
the phenomenon is now much more ‘temporary’. In the beginning, it seems
that there is a sort of cancellation between the influence of the irrelevant vari-
ables and standard Bayes behaves fine. However, if we increase the number of
irrelevant variables, the problem (while starting at a later sample) takes longer
to recover from.
5.1.3 Prior as advised by Raftery et al.
In Raftery et al. (1997), some guidelines for choosing priors in regressionmod-
els are given. Letting β¯0 denote the prior mean, one of their recommendations
is that the prior densities for β = β¯0 and β = β¯0 + 1 should differ by a factor of
at most
√
10. The prior density on βmarginalized over σ2 follows a multivari-
ate t-distribution, and the factor in question varies with the dimensionality of
β, so that models of larger order are given less informative priors. In our case,
we find that the resulting prior is always less informative than our original
prior, and for modelM10 and above (i.e. β of dimension 11 or larger), it be-
comes even less informative than the prior introduced in the previous section.
For the prior on σ2, Raftery et al. advise that the density should vary by no
more than a factor 10 in a region of σ2 from some small value to the sample
variance of y. For our choice of hyperparameters a0 = 1, b0 = 1/40, the mode
of pi(σ2) is at b0/(a0 + 1) = 1/80, and the density is within a factor 10 of this
maximum in the approximate region (0.0037, 0.0941). For the correct model
experiments, the actual variance of Y is 0.065; for the wrong model experi-
ments, it is 0.045 (with a larger variance for ‘good’ points and zero variance
for ‘easy’ points). For both experiments, the factor-10 condition holds between
Var(Y)/12 and Var(Y). We conclude that this prior satisfies the guidelines in
Raftery et al. quite well.
We will refer to the prior described above as Raftery’s prior (even though
it is really a different prior for each model order). Using this prior, we found
the following experimental results.
In the model-wrong setting of Section 3.5.3 (model selection/averaging),
with our original prior replaced by Raftery’s prior, Bayes performs somewhat
better than R-log-SafeBayes (except on very small sample sizes). However, I-
log-SafeBayes performs as well as Bayes, and so does the R-log-SafeBayes vari-
ant that discounts half of the initial sample when choosing the learning rate
(see Section 5.2.1).
This might suggest that Raftery’s prior could be used to accomplish the
same kind of safety against wrong models as SafeBayes provides, at least in a
model selection context. To test this, another experimentwas performedwhere
the fraction of ‘easy’ points was increased to 75%. In this experiment, the mis-
behaviour of Bayes seen in Section 3.5.3 returned worse than before, with risks
a factor 20 larger than before, whereas the SafeBayes methods continued to
work fine. This suggests that Raftery’s prior can not be relied on if the severe-
ness of misspecification is unknown.
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If Raftery’s prior is used for model selection with a correct model, Bayes
and the SafeBayes variants perform well, and very similarly to each other.
For ridge regression, the results with Raftery’s prior for both the correct
and the incorrect model experiment are very similar to those with the slightly
informative prior, except that the peak in the risks is higher for all methods.
5.1.4 The g-prior
Another priorwe experimentedwithwas the g-prior, which is a popular choice
inmodel selection contexts (Zellner, 1986; Liang et al., 2008). For all definitions
we refer to the latter paper. In contrast to all other priors we considered, the g-
prior depends on the design matrix Xn, and hence can only be used in settings
where this matrix, and hence the eventual sample size of interest n, is given
once and for all. For this reason, we decided to depict in Figure 5.4, for each
value of n, the risk obtained when predicting the (n+1)-th data point with the
posterior calculated from the g-prior corresponding to the first n covariates
(x1, . . . , xn) and observed data yn. This is subtly different from our previous
graphs (e.g. Figures 3.3–3.6) that show how the risk evolves as n increases in a
single run of the experiment, averaged over 30 runs.
Figure 5.4: Risk as a function of sample size (starting at the first sample size at
which the g-prior is defined) for model averaging and selection based on the
g-prior in the model-wrong experiment of Figure 3.3 both with g = 100 and
with g chosen by Empirical Bayes at each sample size
The graph is not shown starting at n = 0, because of another difference
between the g-prior and the priors we used in other experiments:
Because of the same design dependence, with the g-prior, the posterior on
β remains a degenerate distribution on an initial segment of outcomes. For
example, withMp for p = 50, the matrix X>nXn is singular until at least 50
different design vectors have been observed. For our model-wrong experiment,
this means that on average, about a 100 observations are required before the
posterior becomes nondegenerate; this explains why Figure 5.4 starts at n a
little over a 100.
The experimental results clearly indicate that the g-prior does not deal with
our data in a satisfactory way, regardless of the value of g. Of the values of g
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we tried (up to 104), g ≈ 100 (shown in the graph) yielded the smallest square-
risk around sample size n = 200; for larger sample sizes, larger values of g
were better, but only slightly. Furthermore (as in fact we expected by analogy
to learning η with Empirical Bayes), the value of g found by Empirical Bayes
is not optimal for dealing with our data and only makes things worse: larger
values of g (which put more weight on the data) would yield smaller risks.
5.2 Experiments on variations on the method
Below we look at a number of other more or less promising alternative ap-
proaches to modifying standard Bayes.
5.2.1 An idea to be explored further: Discounting initial ob-
servations
Just like standard Bayes, all our SafeBayesian methods are, at heart, prequential
(Dawid, 1984). All prequentialmethods suffer to a greater or lesser extent from
the start-up problem (Van Erven et al., 2007; Wong and Clarke, 2004): sequen-
tial predictions based on a modelMp may perform very badly for the first few
samples. While they quickly recoverwhen the sample size gets large, the beha-
viour on the first few samples may dominate their cumulative prediction error
for a while, leading to suboptimal choices for moderate n. We can address this
issue in several ways. A very simple method to ‘discount’ initial observations,
apparently first used (implicitly) to modify standard Bayes factors by Lempers
(1971, Chapter 6), is to only look at the cumulative sequential prediction error
on the second half of the sample, so that the first half of the sample merely
functions as a ‘warming-up’ sample (Catoni, 2012). Without claiming that this
is the ‘right’ method to discount initial observations, we experimented with it
to see whether it can further improve the performance of SafeBayes; for sim-
plicity, we concentrated on R-log-SafeBayes.
We found that in most experiments, this new method for determining η
performed very similarly to the standard method based on the whole sample,
sometimes slightly better and sometimes slightly worse, making it hard to say
whether the new method is an improvement or not. Still, there are two ex-
periments in which the new method performed substantially better, namely
the experiments with less informative priors of Section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. Thus
we cannot just dismiss the idea of fitting η based on only part of the data or
more generally, discounting initial observations, and it would be interesting to
explore this further in future work: of course taking half of the data is rather
arbitrary, and better choices may be possible. In particular, we may try a vari-
ation of switching between η’s analogously to the switch distribution (Van Er-
ven et al., 2007) to counter the start-up problem.
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5.2.2 Other methods for model selection: AIC, BIC, (general-
ized) cross-validation
We tested the performance of several classic model selection methods on the
same data and models as in our main model selection/averaging experiment,
Section 3.5.3. We associated with each modelMp its standard (i.e. η = 1)
Bayes predictive distribution under the prior described in Section 3.5.1 (these
generally perform better than the maximum likelihood distributions based
onMp whose use is more standard here). We then ran leave-one-out cross-
validation, 10-fold cross-validation and GCV based on the predictions (pos-
teriormeans/MAPs β¯i,η) made by these predictive distributions. We also com-
pared the models via AIC and BIC, where for AIC we used the small-sample
correction of Hurvich and Tsai (1989).
Figure 5.5: Square-risk and selected model order for five different model se-
lection methods. The risks in this graph are risks of single models selected by
each method (similar to the MAP risks shown for Bayes and SafeBayes).
We see in Figure 5.5 that AIC and generalized cross-validation have risks
and selected model orders similar to those of standard Bayes, though they do
not recover as well as Bayes when the sample size increases. Of the other three
methods, BIC and 10-fold cross-validation find the optimal model and have
smaller risks towards the end than leave-one-out cross-validation, which con-
tinues to select larger-than-optimal models with substantial probability. Note
that none of the methods can compete with SafeBayes on sample sizes below
150: SafeBayes’s risk goes down immediately after the start of the experiment
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while for all the other methods it goes up first. Also, SafeBayes finds the op-
timal model quickly without first trying much larger models.
5.2.3 Other methods for learning η: Cross-validation on log-
loss and on squared loss
As indicated in the introduction and Section 3.4.2, finding ηˆ by I-square-Safe-
Bayes is somewhat similar to finding ηˆ by leave-one-out cross-validation with
the squared-error loss, the difference being that I-square-SafeBayes finds the
optimal η for predicting each point based on past data data points rather than
the optimal η for predicting each point based on all other data points. Since
the leave-one-out method is often employed in ridge regression, it seemed of
interest to try out here as well. Figure 5.6 shows that LOO-cross validation in-
deed performs very similarly in terms of square-risk to R-log-SafeBayes (and
to I-log- and I-square-SafeBayes, which are not depicted here but are similar to
R-log-SafeBayes). However, LOO-cross validation is consistently a bit worse in
terms of self-confidence; we do not have a clear explanation for this phenom-
enon.
Perhaps more interestingly, in Figure 5.7 we show what happens if we use
LOO-cross validation based on the log-loss of the Bayes predictive distribu-
tion, which may seem a reasonable procedure from a ‘likelihoodist’ perspect-
ive. Here we see dismal behaviour, the reason being the hypercompression
phenomenon of Section 4.1.3: cross-validation will select a model that, at the
given sample size, has small log-risk, but because of hypercompression this
model can sometimes perform very badly in terms of all the associated predic-
tion tasks such as square-risk and reliability.
5.3 Experiments on variations of the truth
Other distributions of covariates In all experiments described in Section 3.5
and the earlier sections of this chapter, the covariates (Xi1,Xi2, . . .) were sam-
pled independently from a 0-mean multivariate Gaussian. We repeated most
of our experiments with Xi1,Xi2, . . . that were sampled independently uni-
formly from [−1, 1], and, as already indicated in the introduction, with polyno-
mials, Xij = Pj(Si) for Pj the Legendre polynomial of degree j and Si ∈ [−1, 1]
uniform. This did not change the results in any substantial way, so we do not
report on it further.
Fewer easy and ‘less-easy’ points If the fraction of ‘easy’ points is reduced,
one would expect the performance of standard Bayes to improve. This is con-
firmed by an experimentwhere each data point had a probability of only 1/4 to
be (0, 0). Here Bayes still has some trouble finding the optimal model, but the
square-risk, MAPmodel order, and time taken to recover are all much reduced
compared to the original experiment in Section 3.5.3 where half the data points
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Figure 5.6: Analogue of Figure 3.3 for determining η by leave-one-out cross-
validation with square-loss with the wrong-model experiment, pmax = 50.
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Figure 5.7: Analogue of Figure 3.3 for determining η by leave-one-out cross-
validation with log-loss.
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were ‘easy’. SafeBayes on the other hand showed the same good performance
as before.
Two points that might be raised against the use of ‘easy’ points in our sim-
ulations are that they are unlikely to occur in practice, and that if they were to
occur, they would be easily detected and dealt with another way. To address
this line of argument to some extent, another experiment was performed with
a smaller contrast between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ points. Rather than being identi-
cally (0, 0), the ‘easy’ points were random but with smaller variance than the
‘hard’ points. To be precise, the covariates and noise were both a factor 5 smal-
ler (so that their variances were 25 times smaller). In this experiment, the same
phenomena as in Section 3.5.3 occurred, albeit again on a smaller scale (though
larger than in the previous, 1/4-easy experiment).
Different optimal regression functions We experimented with a number of
variations of thewrong-model experiment of Section 3.5.3, by changing the un-
derlying ‘true’ distribution P∗. In each variation, we still tossed, at each i, an in-
dependent biased coin to determinewhether iwould be ‘easy’ (still probability
1/2) or ‘regular’ (probability 1/2), but in each case we changed the definition
of either the ‘easy’ or the ‘regular’ instances or both. In all experiments, for the
‘regular’ instances, only P∗(Yi | Xi) was changed; the marginal distribution of
the Xi was still multivariate normal as before. Here is a list of things we tried:
1. For regular instances, set P∗(Yi | Xi) so that Yi = 0+ ei instead of (3.27),
with ei i.i.d. normal as before; easy instances were still set to (0, 0).
2. For regular instances, (3.27) was replaced byYi = Xi1 +Xi2 +Xi3 +Xi4 +
ei, so the optimal coefficients β˜1 . . . β˜4 are ten times as large as in the
original experiment; easy instances were still set to (0, 0).
3. For regular instances, (3.27) was replaced by Yi = .1 · (Xi1 + . . .+ Xi4)−
.04 + ei (so the intercept is not 0), and the easy instances were set to
(Xi,Yi) = (.2, .04), where .2 represents the K-dimensional vector (.2, . . . ,
.2). Note that the easy points are on the optimal regression function.
4. For regular instances, (3.27) was replaced by Yi = .1 · (Xi1 + . . .+ Xi4) +
.5 + ei so the intercept was again not 0; the easy instances were set to
(0, .5).
We explain each in turn. For the first experiment, all the results were compar-
able to the results of Experiment 1 in Section 3.5, so we do not list them. For the
second experiment, the risks obtained by standard Bayes and SafeBayes were
similar to each other. The model order behaviours were similar to what they
were before (with standard Bayes selecting large model orders initially), but
all methods recovered much more quickly, converging on the optimal model
shortly after n = 50; presumably this could happen because now the optimal
coefficients were substantially larger than the standard deviation in the data.
The third experiment was included to see whether there would be an effect
if the ‘easy’ pointswould be placed at an arbitrary point rather than the special,
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fully symmetric (0, 0). We added the intercept −0.04 so as to make sure that,
for the data we actually observe, EX,Y∼P∗ [Yi] = (1/2) · 0.04− (1/2) · 0.04 =
0; thus the Y-values will appear centred around 0, which is standard both in
frequentist and Bayesian approaches to regression (for example, both Raftery
et al. (1997) and Hastie et al. (2001) preprocess the data so that ∑ni=1 Yi = 0).
Again, we discerned no difference in the results so did not include any further
details.
Finally, the fourth experiment was included just to see what happens if,
contrary to standardmethodology, we apply themethod toYi that are not (even
approximately) centred. In this experiment, standard Bayes did not converge
to the optimal model until after n = 150 as in the experiment of Section 3.5.3,
but its risk and selected model orders were both smaller. The versions of Safe-
Bayes worked well as before.
Chapter 6
Worst-Case Optimal
Probability Updating
The final three chapters of this dissertation discuss worst-case optimal prob-
ability updating, an alternative to conditioning that may be used when the
distribution is not fully specified. In Chapter 6, we introduce the problem, and
find how optimal solutions may be recognized for different loss functions; our
main tool is convex analysis. We find that for logarithmic loss, optimality is
characterized by the elegant RCAR (reverse coarsening at random) condition.
In Chapter 7, we analyse the combinatorial aspect of the probability updat-
ing problem, and present some theoretical tools that may help us find worst-
case optimal solutions to a probability updatingproblem, as opposed tomerely
recognizing such solutions. Further, we see that the applicability of the RCAR
condition is not restricted to the cases discovered in Chapter 6, and explore the
consequences.
In Chapter 8, we give algorithms that automate the task of finding worst-
case optimal solutions, for restricted classes of probability updating problems.
A more detailed overview of this first chapter will be provided in Sec-
tion 6.1.2.
6.1 Introduction
There are many situations in which a decision maker receives incomplete data
and still has to reach conclusions about these data. One type of incomplete
data is coarse data: instead of the real outcome of a random event, the decision
maker observes a subset of the possible outcomes, and knows only that the
actual outcome is an element of this subset. An example frequently occurs in
questionnaires, where people may be asked if their date of birth lies between
1950 and 1960 or between 1960 and 1970 et cetera. Their exact year of birth
is unknown to us, but at least we now know for sure in which decade they
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are born. We introduce another instance of coarse data with the following
example.
Example 6.A (Fair die). Suppose I throw a fair die. I get to see the result of the
throw, but you do not. Now I tell you that the result lies in the set {1, 2, 3, 4}.
This is an example of coarse data. You know that I used a fair die and that
what I tell you is true. Now you are asked to give the probability that I rolled a
3. Likely, you would say that the probability of each of the remaining possible
results is 1/4. This is the knee-jerk reaction of someone who studied probabil-
ity theory, since this is standard conditioning. But is this always correct?
Suppose that there is only one alternative set of results I could give you
after rolling the die, namely the set {3, 4, 5, 6}. I can now follow a coarsening
mechanism: a procedure that tells me which subset to reveal given a particular
result of the die roll. If the outcome is 1, 2, 5, or 6, there is nothing for me to
choose. Suppose that if the outcome is 3 or 4, the coarsening mechanism I use
selects set {1, 2, 3, 4} or set {3, 4, 5, 6} at random, each with probability 1/2.
If I throw the die 6000 times, I expect to see the outcome 3 a thousand times.
Therefore I expect to report the set {1, 2, 3, 4} five hundred times after I see the
outcome 3. It is clear that I expect to report the set {1, 2, 3, 4} 3000 times in
total. So for die rolls that I told you resulted in an outcome in {1, 2, 3, 4}, the
probability of the true outcome being 3 is actually 1/6 with this coarsening
mechanism. We see that the prediction in the first paragraph was not correct,
in the sense that the probabilities computed there do not correspond to the
long-run relative frequencies. We conclude that the knee-jerk reaction is not
always correct.
In Example 6.A we have seen that standard conditioning does not always
give the correct answers. Heitjan and Rubin (1991) answer the question un-
der what circumstances standard conditioning of coarse data is correct. They
discovered a necessary and sufficient condition of the coarsening mechanism,
called coarsening at random (CAR). A coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR
condition if, for each subset y of the outcomes, the probability of choosing to
report y is the same no matter which outcome x ∈ y is the true outcome. In
many situations, however, this condition cannot hold, as proved by Grünwald
and Halpern (2003). It depends on the arrangement of possible revealed sub-
sets whether a coarsening mechanism exists that satisfies CAR.
We continuewith an example generatingmuch debate among both the gen-
eral public and professional probabilists: the Monty Hall puzzle, posed by
Selvin (1975) and popularized years later when it appeared in Ask Marilyn, a
weekly column in Parade Magazine by Marilyn vos Savant, in September 1990
(Gill, 2011). In this example, no coarsening mechanism satisfies the CAR con-
dition.
Example 6.B (Monty Hall). Suppose you are on a game show and you may
choose one of three doors. Behind one of the doors a car can be found, but the
other two only hide a goat. Initially the car is equally likely to be behind each
of the doors. After you have picked one of the doors, the hostMontyHall, who
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knows the location of the prize, will open one of the other doors, revealing a
goat. Now you are asked if you would like to switch from the door you chose
to the other unopened door. Is it a good idea to switch?
At this moment we will not answer this question, but we show that the
problem of choosing whether to switch doors is an example of the coarse data
problem. The unknown random value we are interested in is the location of
the car: one of the three doors. When the host opens a door different from the
one you picked, revealing a goat, this is equivalent to reporting a subset. The
subset he reports is the set of the two doors that are still closed. For example,
if he opens door 2, this tells us that the true value, the location of the car, is
in the subset {1, 3}. Note that if you have by chance picked the correct door,
there are two possible doors Monty Hall can open, so also two subsets he can
report. This implies that Monty has a choice in reporting a subset. How does
Monty’s coarsening mechanism influence your prediction of the true location
of the car?
The CAR condition can only be satisfied for very particular distributions of
where the prize is: the probability that the prize is hidden behind the initially
chosen door must be either 0 or 1, otherwise no CAR coarsening mechanism
exists (Grünwald and Halpern, 2003, Example 3.3)1. If the prize is hidden in
any other way, for example uniformly at random as we assume, then CAR can-
not hold, and standard conditioning will result in an incorrect conclusion for
at least one of the two subsets.
Examples 6.A and 6.B are just two instances of a more general problem:
the number of outcomes may be different; the initial distribution of the true
outcome may be any distribution; and the subsets of outcomes that may be re-
ported to the decisionmakermay be any family of sets. Our goal in this chapter
is to define general procedures that tell us how to update the probabilities on
the outcomes after making a coarse observation, in situations where standard
conditioning is not adequate.
These probabilities may be either frequentist or Bayesian probabilities. In
Example 6.A, they were frequentist probabilities: the original distributions
were known, and the updated probabilities we found were again frequencies
over many repetitions of the same experiment. The original distribution of the
outcomes could also express our Bayesian prior belief of how likely each out-
come is. This is the more powerful interpretation in Example 6.B, where the
uniform distribution of the location of the car requires an assumption on the
frequentist’s part, while it is a reasonable choice of prior for a Bayesian (Gill,
2011). In this case, the updated probabilities after a coarse observation take the
role of the Bayesian posterior distribution. In either case, we will refer to the
initial probability of an outcome, regardless of observations, as the marginal
probability.
Without any assumptions on the quizmaster’s strategy (i.e. the coarsening
mechanism), the conditional distributions of outcomes given observationswill
1This uses the weak version of CAR in the terminology of Jaeger (2005a), in which outcomes
with probability 0 are exempt from the equality constraint. A strong CAR coarsening mechanism
does not exist regardless of the probabilities with which the prize is hidden.
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be unknown, and this uncertainty cannot be fully expressed by a single prob-
ability distribution over the outcomes. So to get a single answer to the question
how to update our probabilities, we need tomake some assumption about how
the quizmaster chooses his strategy. Assuming that the coarseningmechanism
satisfies CAR is one such approach, but as we saw in the two examples, there
are scenarios where this assumption cannot hold. We instead take a worst-case
approach, treating the coarsening of the observation and the subsequent prob-
ability update as a game between two players: the quizmaster and the contestant
(named for their roles in the Monty Hall scenario). The subset of outcomes
communicated by the quizmaster to the contestant will be called the message.
In this fictional game, the quizmaster’s goal is the opposite of the contest-
ant’s, namely to make predicting the true outcome as hard as possible for the
contestant. Such situations are rare in practice: The sender of a message might
be motivated by interests other than informing us (for example, a newspaper
may be trying to optimize its sales figures, or a company may want to present
its performance in the best light), but rarely by trying to be as uninformative
as possible. (Though see Section 7.4.3 in the next chapter, where we consider
the case that the players’ goals are not diametrically opposed.) In other situ-
ations, the ‘sender’ might not be a rational being at all, but just some unknown
process. Yet this game is a useful way to look at the problem of updating our
probabilities even ifwe do not believe that the coarseningmechanism is chosen
adversarially: if we simply do not know how ‘nature’ chooses which message
to give us and do not want to make any assumptions about this, then choosing
the worst-case (or minimax) optimal probability update as defined here guar-
antees thatwe get atmost somefixed expected loss, while any other probability
update may lead to a larger expected loss depending on the unknown coars-
ening mechanism.
We will need a loss function to measure how well the quizmaster and the
contestant are doing at this game. Our results apply to a wide variety of loss
functions. For an analysis of the Monty Hall game, 0-1 loss would be appro-
priate, as the contestant must choose a single door; this is the approach used in
Gill (2011); Gnedin (2011). Other loss functions, such as logarithmic loss and
Brier loss, also allow the contestant to formulate their prediction of where the
prize is hidden as an arbitrary probability distribution over the outcomes. For
the Monty Hall game with one of these two loss functions, the worst-case op-
timal answer for the contestant is to put probability 1/3 on his initially chosen
door and 2/3 on the other door. (These probabilities agree with the literat-
ure on the Monty Hall game.) Surprisingly, we will see (in Example 6.D on
page 129) that for similar games, logarithmic and Brier loss may lead to two
different answers!
We will find in this chapter that for finite outcome spaces, both players
in our game have worst-case optimal strategies for many loss functions: the
quizmaster has a strategy that makes the contestant’s prediction task as hard
as possible, and the contestant has a strategy that is guaranteed to give good
predictions no matter what the quizmaster does. We give characterizations
that allow us to recognize such strategies, for different conditions on the loss
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functions. Interestingly, Theorem 6.10 shows that the worst-case optimal pre-
diction under logarithmic loss satisfies a property that has a striking similar-
ity with the CAR condition, but switches the roles of outcome and message.
By Lemma 6.14, if a betting game is played repeatedly and the contestant is
allowed to distribute investments over different outcomes and to reinvest all
capital gained so far in each round, then the same strategy is optimal, regard-
less of the pay-offs!
Example 6.A (continued). For logarithmic loss, the worst-case optimal pre-
diction of the die roll conditional on the revealed subset is found with the
help of Theorem 6.10. The worst-case optimal prediction given that you ob-
serve the set {1, 2, 3, 4} is: predict outcomes 1 and 2 each with probability 1/3,
and predict 3 and 4 each with probability 1/6. Given that you observe the set
{3, 4, 5, 6}, the worst-case optimal prediction is: 3 and 4 with probability 1/6,
and 5 and 6 with probability 1/3.
These probabilities correspond with the coarsening mechanism given ear-
lier. However, it is a good prediction even if you do not knowwhat coarsening
mechanism I am using. An intuitive argument for this is the following: If I
wanted, I could use a very extreme coarsening mechanism, always choosing
to reveal the set {1, 2, 3, 4} when the die comes up 3 or 4. But this is balanced
by the possibility that I might be using the opposite coarsening mechanism,
which always reveals {3, 4, 5, 6} if the result is 3 or 4. The worst-case optimal
prediction given above hedges against both possibilities.
6.1.1 Caveats on the use of the word ‘conditioning’
Since this chapter is concerned with making a worst-case optimal prediction
conditional on a set of outcomes, we want to highlight the use of the word
conditioning. Above, we used the word standard conditioning for using the
conditional information in the standard way: with random variables X the
true outcome and Y the coarse observation (a set of outcomes), computing
P(X = x | Y = y) by P(X = x | X ∈ y) = P(X = x)/P(X ∈ y).
In the two examples, we saw that this does not always give the correct prob-
abilities given a coarse observation. For instance in Example 6.A, P(X | X ∈ y)
is the uniform distribution, while P(X | Y = y) cannot simultaneously be uni-
form for both y = {1, 2, 3, 4} and y = {3, 4, 5, 6}. In such situations, we call
this computation naive conditioning. The formula for conditional probabilities
does give the correct result if instead of on the outcome space, we work in a
larger space: the space of all combinations of an outcome and a set. The prob-
lem we face in this chapter is that we do not know the probabilities of all these
combinations, as they depend on the unknown coarsening mechanism.
In the case of Bayesian probabilities, the question is how to extend our prior
on the outcomes to a prior on the larger space. Theworst-case optimal coarsen-
ing mechanism we characterize in our theorems can be seen as a recommend-
ation for such a prior.
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6.1.2 Contents
In Section 6.2, we will give a precise definition of the ‘conditioning game’ we
described. In Section 6.3, we find general conditions on the loss function under
whichworst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster exist, andwe character-
ize such strategies. Section 6.4 does the same for worst-case optimal strategies
for the contestant. (See Figure 6.4 for a visual illustration of the concepts used
in these sections.) If stronger conditions hold, worst-case optimal strategies for
both players may be easier to recognize. This is explored for two classes of loss
functions in Section 6.5; in particular, we find in Section 6.5.2 that for a class
of loss functions including logarithmic loss, worst-case optimal strategies for
the quizmaster are characterized by a simple condition on their probabilities:
theRCAR (reverse CAR) condition. An overview of the theorems and the condi-
tions underwhich they apply is given in Table 6.1 on page 125. Many examples
are included to illustrate (the limits of) the theoretical results. Section 6.6 gives
some concluding remarks.
All proofs are given in Appendix 6.A at the end of this chapter.
This work is an extension of Feenstra (2012) to loss functions other than
logarithmic loss, and to the case where the worst-case optimal strategy for the
quizmaster assigns probability 0 to some combinations of outcomes x andmes-
sages y with x ∈ y. It can also be seen as a concrete application of the ideas in
Grünwald and Dawid (2004) about minimax optimal decision making and its
relation to entropy.
6.2 Definitions and problem formulation
A (probability updating) game G is defined as a quadruple (X ,Y , p, L), where
X is a finite set, Y is a family of distinct subsets of X with ⋃y∈Y y = X , p is
a nowhere-zero probability mass function on X , and L is a function L : X ×
∆X → [0,∞], where ∆X is the set of all probability mass functions on X . We
call X the outcome space, Y the message structure, p the marginal distribution,
and L the loss function. We shall discuss choices we made in this definition in
Section 6.2.3, and first work out the definition in detail.
Example 6.B (continued). We assume the car is hidden uniformly at random
behind one of the three doors. With this assumption, we can abstract away
the initial choice of a door by the contestant: by symmetry, we can assume
without loss of generality that he always picks door 2. Then the probability
updating game starts with the quizmaster opening door 1 or 3, thereby giving
the message “the car is behind door 2 or 3” or “the car is behind door 1 or 2”,
respectively. This can be expressed as follows in our formalization:
• outcome space X = {x1, x2, x3};
• message space Y = {y1, y2} with y1 = {x1, x2} and y2 = {x2, x3};
• marginal distribution p uniform on X .
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If a loss function L is also given, this fully specifies a game. One example is
randomized 0-1 loss, which is given by L(x,Q) = 1−Q(x). Here x is the true
outcome, and Q is the contestant’s prediction of the true outcome in the form
of a probability distribution. Thus the prediction is awarded a smaller loss if it
assigned a larger probability Q(x) to the outcome that actually obtained. We
will see other examples of loss functions in Section 6.2.2.
A function from some finite set S to R corresponds to an |S|-dimensional
vector when we fix an order on the elements of S. We write RS for the set of
such functions/vectors. Even if no order on S is specified, this allows us to
apply concepts from linear algebra to RS without ambiguity. For example, we
may say that some set is an affine subspace of RS. (This identification and the
resulting notation are also used by Schrijver (2003a).)
Using this correspondence, we identify the elements of ∆X with the |X |-
dimensional vectors in the unit simplex, thoughweuse ordinary function nota-
tion P(x) for its elements. The probability mass function p that is part of a
game’s definition is also a vector in ∆X . Vector notation px will be used to refer
to its elements to set p apart from P, which will denote distributions chosen by
the quizmaster rather than fixed by the game.
For any message y ⊆ X , we define ∆y = {P ∈ ∆X | P(x) = 0 for x 6∈ y}.
Note that these are vectors of the same length as those in∆X , though contained
within a lower-dimensional affine subspace.
A loss function L is called proper if arg minQ∈∆X EX∼P L(X,Q) = P for all
P ∈ ∆X , and strictly proper if this minimizer is unique (this is standard termin-
ology; see for instance Gneiting and Raftery (2007)). Thus if a predicting agent
believes the true distribution of an outcome to be given by some P, such a loss
function will encourage him to report Q = P as his prediction.
6.2.1 Strategies
Strategies for the players are specified by conditional distributions: a strategy P
for the quizmaster consists of distributions on Y , one for each possible x ∈ X ,
and a strategy Q for the contestant consists of distributions on X , one for each
possible y ∈ Y . These strategies define how the two players act in any situ-
ation: the quizmaster’s strategy defines how he chooses a message containing
the true outcome (the coarsening mechanism), and the contestant’s strategy
defines his prediction for each message he might receive.
We write P(· | x) for the distribution on Y the quizmaster plays when the
true outcome is x ∈ X . Because px > 0, this conditional distribution can be
recovered from the joint P(x, y) := P(y | x)px; we will use this joint distribu-
tion to specify a strategy for the quizmaster. If P(y) := ∑x∈y P(x, y) > 0, we
may also write P(· | y) for the vector in ∆y given by P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y).
No such rewrites can be made for Q, as no marginal Q(y) is specified by the
game or by the strategy Q. To shorten notation and to emphasize that Q is not
a joint distribution, we write Q|y rather than Q(· | y) for the distribution that
the contestant plays in response to message y.
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We restrict the quizmaster to conditional distributions P for which P(y |
x) = 0 if x 6∈ y; that is, he may not ‘lie’ to the contestant. We make no similar
requirement on the contestant’s choice of Q, though for proper loss functions,
and in fact all other loss functions we will consider in our examples, the con-
testant can gain nothing from using a strategy Q for which Q|y(x) > 0 where
x 6∈ y.
Example 6.B (continued). The table below specifies all aspects of a game ex-
cept for its loss function: its outcome space (here, for the Monty Hall game,
X = {x1, x2, x3}), message space (Y = {y1, y2} with y1 = {x1, x2} and y2 =
{x2, x3}) and marginal distribution (p uniform on X ).
P x1 x2 x3
y1 1/3 1/6 −
y2 − 1/6 1/3
px 1/3 1/3 1/3
(6.1)
In this table we have filled in a strategy P for the quizmaster in the form of
a joint distribution on pairs of x and y. The cells in the table where x 6∈ y
are marked with a dash to indicate that P may not assign positive probability
there. The probabilities in each column sum to the marginal probabilities at
the bottom, so this joint distribution P has the correct marginal distribution
on the outcomes. For this particular strategy, if the true outcome is x2, the
quizmaster will give message y1 or y2 to the contestant with equal probability.
More formally, writeR(X ,Y) as an abbreviation for the set of pairs {(x, y) |
x ∈ y ∈ Y}. In the case of the Monty Hall game, there are four such pairs:
R(X ,Y) = {(x1, y1), (x2, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y2)}. The notation RR(X ,Y)≥0 repre-
sents the set of all functions fromR(X ,Y) to R≥0. If P is an element of this set
and (x, y) ∈ R(X ,Y), the value of P at (x, y) is denoted by P(x, y). For (x, y)
with x 6∈ y, the notation P(x, y) does not correspond to a value of the function,
but is taken to be 0.
We again identify the elements of RR(X ,Y)≥0 with vectors. Thus the mass
function P shown in (6.1) is identified with a four-element vector (1/3, 1/6, 1/6,
1/3). (We could have chosen a different ordering instead.)
We define the set P of strategies for the quizmaster as {P ∈ R{x∈y}≥0 |
∑y3x P(x, y) = px for all x}; this is a convex set. The set of strategies for the
contestant is Q := ∆YX = {(Q|y)y∈Y | Q|y ∈ ∆X for each y ∈ Y}.
For given strategies P and Q, the expected loss the contestant incurs is
∑
x∈X
px ∑
y:
x∈y∈Y
P(y | x)L(x,Q|y) = EX∼p EY∼P(·|X) L(X,Q|Y)
= E(X,Y)∼P L(X,Q|Y). (6.2)
We allowed L to take the value∞; if this value occurs with positive probability,
then the contestant’s expected loss is infinite. However, for terms where the
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probability is zero, we define 0 ·∞ = 0, as is consistent with measure-theoretic
probability.
We approach this problem as a zero-sum game between two players: the
quizmaster chooses P ∈ P to maximize (6.2), while simultaneously (that is,
without knowing P) the contestant chooses Q ∈ Q to minimize that quantity.
The game (X ,Y , p, L) is common knowledge for the two players.
If the contestant knew the quizmaster’s strategy, he would pick a strategy
Q that for each y minimizes the expected loss of predicting x given y. When
the contestant receives a message and knows the distribution P ∈ ∆X over the
outcomes given that message, this expected loss is written as
HL(P) := inf
Q∈∆X ∑x
P(x)L(x,Q) = inf
Q∈∆X
EX∼P L(X,Q). (6.3)
This is the generalized entropy of P for loss function L (Grünwald and Dawid,
2004). (Note that in the preceding display, P andQ are not strategies but simply
distributions over X .) If the contestant picks his strategy Q this way, (6.2) be-
comes the expected generalized entropy of the quizmaster’s strategy P ∈ P :
∑
y∈Y
P(y)HL(P(· | y)), (6.4)
where we again define terms with P(y) = 0 as 0. We say a strategy P is worst-
case optimal for the quizmaster if it maximizes this expected generalized entropy
over all P ∈ P . We call the version of the game where the quizmaster has
to play first the maximin game, where the order of the words ‘max’ and ‘min’
reflects the order in which they appear in the expression for the value of this
game as well as the order in which the maximizing and minimizing players
take their turns.
Similarly, if the contestant were to play first (the minimax game), his goal
might be to find a strategy Q that minimizes his worst-case expected loss
max
P∈P ∑x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y) = maxP∈P
E(X,Y)∼P L(X,Q|Y). (6.5)
(In this case, the maximum is always achieved so we canwrite max rather than
sup: for each x, the quizmaster can choose P that puts all mass on a y 3 xwith
the maximum loss.) We call a strategy worst-case optimal for the contestant if it
achieves the minimum of (6.5).
It is an elementary result from game theory that if worst-case optimal strat-
egies P∗ and Q∗ exist for the two players, their expected losses are related by
∑
y∈Y
P∗(y)HL(P∗(· | y)) ≤ max
P∈P ∑x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q∗|y) (6.6)
(Rockafellar, 1970, Lemma 36.1: “maximin ≤ minimax”). The inequality ex-
presses that in a sequential game where one of the players knows the other’s
strategy before choosing his own, the player to move second may have an ad-
vantage.
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In the next section, we will see that in many probability updating games,
worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist (but may not be unique),
and the maximum expected generalized entropy equals the minimum worst-
case expected loss:
∑
y∈Y
P∗(y)HL(P∗(· | y)) = max
P∈P ∑x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q∗|y). (6.7)
When this is the case, we say that the minimax theorem holds (von Neumann,
1928; Ferguson, 1967). We remark here that our setting, while a zero-sum
game, differs from the usual setting of zero-sum games in some respects: We
consider possibly infinite loss and (in general) infinite sets of strategies avail-
able to the players, but do not allow the players to randomize over these strat-
egies. Randomizing over P would not give the quizmaster an advantage, as
P is convex and he could just play the corresponding convex combination dir-
ectly; because (6.2) is linear in P, this results in the same expected loss. (An-
other way to view this is that, essentially, the quizmaster is randomizing, over
a finite set of strategies.) For the contestant, Q is also convex, but in general
(depending on L), playing a convex combination of strategies does not corres-
pond to randomizing over those strategies. The two do correspond in the case
of randomized 0-1 loss, where L is linear. If L is convex, then playing the con-
vex combination is at least as good for him as randomizing (and if L is strictly
convex, better), so allowing randomizationwould again not give an advantage.
When (6.7) holds, any pair of worst-case optimal strategies (P∗,Q∗) forms
a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, a concept introduced by Nash (1951): neither
player can benefit from deviating from their worst-case optimal strategy if the
other player leaves his strategy unchanged. This means that the definitions
of worst-case optimality given above are also meaningful in the game we are
actually interested in, where the players move simultaneously in the sense that
neither knows the other’s strategy when choosing his own.
6.2.2 Three standard loss functions
Three commonly used loss functions are logarithmic loss, Brier loss, and ran-
domized 0-1 loss. These are defined as follows (Grünwald and Dawid, 2004):
Logarithmic loss is a strictly proper loss function, given by
L(x,Q) = − logQ(x).
Its entropy is the Shannon entropy HL(P) = ∑x −P(x) log P(x). The functions
L and HL are displayed in Figure 6.1 for the case of a binary prediction (i.e. a
prediction between two possible outcomes). The (three-dimensional) graph of
HL for the case of three outcomes will appear in Figure 6.4 on page 128.
Brier loss is another strictly proper loss function, corresponding to squared
Euclidean distance:
L(x,Q) =∑
x′∈X
(
1x′=x −Q(x′)
)2
= (1−Q(x))2 + ∑
x′∈X ,x′ 6=x
Q(x′)2.
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Figure 6.1: Logarithmic loss and entropy (natural base) on a binary prediction
Figure 6.2: Brier loss and entropy on a binary prediction
Figure 6.3: Randomized 0-1 loss and entropy on a binary prediction
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Its entropy function is HL(P) = 1− ∑x∈X P(x)2; L and HL are displayed in
Figure 6.2 for a binary prediction. Because L is a function of the entire dis-
tribution Q and not only of Q(x), the graph for L does not fully capture the
behaviour of Brier loss on non-binary predictions.
The third loss function we will often refer to is randomized 0-1 loss, given by
L(x,Q) = 1−Q(x).
It is improper: an optimal response Q to some distribution P puts all mass
on outcome(s) with maximum P(x). Its entropy function is HL(P) = 1 −
maxx∈X P(x) (see Figure 6.3). It is related to hard 0-1 loss, which requires the
contestant to pick a single outcome x′ and gives loss 0 if x′ = x and 1 other-
wise. Randomized 0-1 loss essentially allows the contestant to randomize his
prediction: L(x,Q) equals the expected value of hard 0-1 loss when x′ is dis-
tributed according to Q. An important difference between games with hard
and randomized 0-1 loss will be shown later in Example 6.F.
6.2.3 Notes on our definition
Our definition of a game rules out duplicate messages in Y , which would not
meaningfully change the options of either player as the twomessages represent
the samemove for the quizmaster; this will bemade precise in Lemma 6.2. The
definition does allow duplicate outcomes: pairs of outcomes x1, x2 ∈ X such
that x1 ∈ y if and only if x2 ∈ y for all y ∈ Y . Wewill see later (in Example 6.D)
that games with such outcomes cannot generally be solved in terms of games
without, and thus we must analyse them in their own right.
We also ruled out the existence of outcomeswithmarginal probability zero.
A game with such a marginal is equivalent to a game with the corresponding
outcomes removed from the outcome space and from all messages; this mod-
ified game does have positive marginal probability on all outcomes.
6.3 Worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmas-
ter
In this section, we formulate the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strat-
egy for the quizmaster as a convex optimization problem. Worst-case optimal
strategies for the contestant will be discussed in Section 6.4. In order to be
applicable to a wide range of loss functions, these two sections are rather tech-
nical, and the characterizations of worst-case optimal strategies we find here
are not always easy to use (though the abstract results in these sections are
illustrated by concrete examples in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.3). We will find sim-
pler characterizations for smaller classes of loss functions in Section 6.5. An
overview of these results is given in Table 6.1.
For the convex optimization problem we will discuss in this section, it will
prove convenient to allow P to range over RR(X ,Y)≥0 . That is, we allow arbi-
trary vectors of nonnegative reals that may disobey the marginal constraint,
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Table 6.1: Results on worst-case optimal strategies for different loss functions
Conditions on L Results Example
HL finite and continuous P∗ exists and is characterized
by Theorem 6.3
hard 0-1 loss
HL finite and continuous;
all minimal supporting
hyperplanes realizable
Q∗ exists, a Nash equilibrium
exists (Theorem6.5);Q∗ char-
acterized by Theorem 6.7
randomized
0-1 loss
L proper and continuous;
HL finite and continuous
all the above simplified by
Theorem 6.9
Brier loss
L local and proper;
HL finite and continuous
characterization of P∗ simpli-
fied further by Theorem 6.10
(RCAR condition)
logarithmic
loss
and might not even sum to one where we would normally expect a probabil-
ity distribution (though we do still have P(x, y) = 0 for x 6∈ y). However,
when P(y) > 0 for some y, P(· | y) defined by P(x | y) := P(x, y)/P(y) as
in Section 6.2.1 still defines a probability distribution, because the scale factor
cancels out. The constraints in the optimization problemwill then enforce that
our solution P lies in P ; such a P is called a feasible solution.
The following function extends the quizmaster’s objective function (6.4)
(the expected generalized entropy of P ∈ P) to the domain RR(X ,Y)≥0 :
f0(P) := inf
Q∈Q ∑y∈Y ,x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y). (6.8)
Note that while the quizmaster is given more freedom in that we allow P 6∈ P
as argument to f0, the minimization (representing the contestant’s choice) is
still restricted to the set of strategiesQ defined in the previous section. Because
the conditional distributions that make up Q can be chosen independently for
each y, we can rewrite f0 in terms of ordinary generalized entropies as follows:
f0(P) = ∑
y∈Y :
P(y)>0
inf
Q|y∈∆X
∑
x∈y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y) = ∑
y∈Y :
P(y)>0
P(y)HL(P(· | y)).
We will need the following properties of HL throughout our theory:
Lemma 6.1. For all loss functions L, if HL is finite, then it is also concave and lower
semi-continuous. If L is finite everywhere, then HL is finite, concave, and continuous.
(When we talk about (semi-)continuity, this is always with respect to the
extended real line topology of losses, as in Rockafellar (1970, Section 7).)
Using just the concavity of the objective f0 (which is a linear combination
of concave generalized entropies), we can prove the following intuitive result.
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Lemma 6.2 (Message subsumption). Suppose that for P ∈ P there are two mes-
sages y1, y2 ∈ Y such that any outcome x ∈ y2 with P(x, y2) > 0 is also in y1.
Then if HL is concave, the quizmaster can do at least as well without using y2. More
precisely, P′ given by
P′(x, y) =

P(x, y1) + P(x, y2) for y = y1;
0 for y = y2;
P(x, y) otherwise.
is also in P and its expected generalized entropy is at least as large as that of P. In
particular, if P is worst-case optimal, then so is P′.
In particular, if y1 ⊃ y2, any strategy P can be replaced by a strategy P′
with P′(y2) = 0 without making things worse for the quizmaster. Thus the
quizmaster, whowants tomaximize the contestant’s expected loss, never needs
to use a message that is contained in another.
A dominating hyperplane to a function f from D ⊆ RX to R is a hyperplane
inRX ×R that is nowhere below f . A supporting hyperplane to f (at P) is a dom-
inating hyperplane that touches f at some point P.2 A concave function has
at least one supporting hyperplane at every point (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem
11.6), but it may be vertical. A nonvertical hyperplane can be described by a
linear function ` : RX → R: `(P) = α+∑x P(x)λx, where α ∈ R and λ ∈ RX .
While HL is defined as a function of ∆X , we will often need to talk about
supporting hyperplanes to the function HL restricted to ∆y for some message
y ∈ Y . We use the notation HL  ∆y for the restriction of HL to the domain
∆y. (Recall that we defined ∆y as a subset of ∆X .) A supporting hyperplane to
HL  ∆y is not a supporting hyperplane to HL itself if it goes below HL at some
P ∈ ∆X \ ∆y.
A supergradient is a generalization of the gradient: a supergradient of a con-
cave function at a point is the gradient of a supporting hyperplane. If HL  ∆y
is finite and continuous (and thus concave by Lemma 6.1), then for any vector
λ ∈ RX , a unique supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y can be found having that
vector as its gradient, by choosing α appropriately in `(P) = α + ∑x P(x)λx
(Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 27.3). It will often be convenient in our discussion
to talk about supporting hyperplanes rather than supergradients because they
fix this choice of α.
Theorem 6.3 (Existence and characterization of P∗). For HL finite and upper
semi-continuous (thus continuous), a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster
(that is, a P ∈ P maximizing (6.4)) exists, and P∗ is such a strategy if and only if
there exists a λ∗ ∈ RX such that
HL(P′) ≤ ∑
x∈y
P′(x)λ∗x for all y ∈ Y and P′ ∈ ∆y,
2We deviate slightly from standard terminology here: what we call a supporting hyperplane to
a concave function f is usually called a supporting hyperplane to {(u, v) ∈ RX × R | v ≤ f (u)},
the hypograph of f .
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with equality if P∗(y) > 0 and P′ = P∗(· | y). That is, for y with P∗(y) > 0, the
linear function∑x∈y P(x)λ∗x defines a supporting hyperplane toHL  ∆y at P∗(· | y),
and a dominating hyperplane for other y.
A vector λ∗ ∈ RX that satisfies the above for some worst-case optimal P∗ satisfies
it for all worst-case optimal P∗ and is called a Kuhn-Tucker vector (or KT-vector).
Several examples illustrating the application of Theorem 6.3 are given in
Section 6.3.1; a graphical illustration of the theorem is also included there (Fig-
ure 6.4). We will see in Section 6.4 that KT-vectors form the bridge between
worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster and for the contestant.
Note that at any P with P(y) = 0 for some y ∈ Y , the objective function f0
defined in (6.8) is not differentiable for most L, so there may be multiple sup-
porting hyperplanes at P. (This is why to formulate the preceding theoremwe
needed the theory of Rockafellar (1970), where no differentiability is assumed.)
6.3.1 Application to standard loss functions
The generalized entropy for logarithmic loss has only vertical supporting hy-
perplanes at the boundary of ∆y for any y ∈ Y . These hyperplanes do not
correspond to any KT-vector λ∗ ∈ RX , from which it follows that for any y
with P∗(y) > 0, the worst-case optimal strategy will not have P∗(· | y) at the
boundary of ∆y. The same is not generally true: we will see below how for
randomized 0-1 loss (in Example 6.B on page 127, and Example 6.D) and Brier
loss (in Example 6.E), games may have a worst-case optimal strategy for the
quizmaster that has P∗(y) > 0, yet P∗(x | y) = 0 for some x ∈ y ∈ Y .
Of the three loss functions we saw earlier, Brier loss and 0-1 loss are fi-
nite, so by Lemma 6.1, all conditions of Theorem 6.3 are satisfied for them.
Logarithmic loss is infinite when the obtained outcome was predicted to have
probability zero. The generalized entropy is still finite, because for any true
distribution P, there exist predictions Q that give finite expected loss (in par-
ticular, Q = P does this). The entropy is also continuous: −P(x) log P(x) is
continuous as a function of P(x) with our convention that 0 ·∞ = 0, and HL
is the sum of such continuous functions. Thus we can apply Theorem 6.3 to
analyse the Monty Hall problem for each of these three loss functions.
Example 6.B (continued). For Monty Hall, the strategy P∗ of choosing a mes-
sage uniformly when the true outcome is x2 is worst-case optimal for the quiz-
master, for all three loss functions. It is easy to verify that the theorem is satis-
fied by this strategy combined with the appropriate KT-vector:
for logarithmic loss: λ∗ =
(
− log 2
3
,− log 1
3
,− log 2
3
)
;
for Brier loss: λ∗ =
(
2
9
,
8
9
,
2
9
)
;
for randomized 0-1 loss: λ∗ = (0, 1, 0).
The situation for logarithmic loss is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
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λ∗x1
λ∗x2
λ∗x3
P∗(· | y1) P∗(· | y2)
x1
x2
x3
∆y1 ∆y2
∆X
Figure 6.4: The worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster in the Monty
Hall game with logarithmic loss, as characterized by Theorem 6.3. The trian-
gular base is the full simplex ∆X , on which the entropy function HL is defined
(this is the grey dome); the points labelled x1, x2 and x3 are the elements of
this simplex putting all mass on that single outcome; and the line segments
∆y1 and ∆y2 are the subsets of ∆X consisting of all distributions on y1 and y2
respectively. Restricted to the domain ∆y1 , the vector λ∗ defines a linear func-
tion (having height λ∗x at each x ∈ X ) that is a supporting hyperplane to HL at
P∗(· | y1) (and similar for y2). Note that when the linear function defined by
λ∗ is extended to all of ∆X , it may go below HL there, but not in ∆y1 or ∆y2 .
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We also find that for logarithmic loss and Brier loss, P∗ is the unique worst-
case optimal strategy, as the hyperplanes specified by λ∗ touch the generalized
entropy functions at only one point each. For randomized 0-1 loss, on the other
hand, all quizmaster strategies are worst-case optimal, as the hyperplane spe-
cified by λ∗ touches HL  ∆y1 at all P(· | y1) with P(x1 | y1) ≥ 1/2.
Example 6.C (The quizmaster discards a message). Consider a different game,
with X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, Y = {{x1, x2}, {x2, x3}, {x3, x4}}, p given by px4 =
2/5 and px = 1/5 elsewhere, and L logarithmic loss. In the terminology of the
Monty Hall puzzle, there is no initial choice by the contestant that determines
whatmoves are available to the quizmaster, but the quizmasterwill again leave
two doors closed: the one hiding the car, and another adjacent to it. Then one
strategy for the quizmaster is to never give message y2 to the contestant; i.e. to
pick the following strategy P ∈ P with P(y2) = 0:
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/5 1/5 − −
y2 − 0 0 −
y3 − − 1/5 2/5
px 1/5 1/5 1/5 2/5
The depicted strategy P is worst-case optimal: When applying the theorem, we
see that the KT-vector λ∗ = (log 2, log 2, log 3,− log(2/3)) gives supporting
hyperplanes to HL  ∆y1 and HL  ∆y3 , but a non-supporting dominating
hyperplane to HL  ∆y2 . This strategy can be seen to be intuitively reasonable
because when the contestant receives message y3 = {x3, x4}, he knows that
the probability of the true outcome being x4 is at least twice as large as the
probability of it being x3. By always givingmessage y3 when the true outcome
is x3, the quizmaster can keep this difference from becoming larger.
P is also the unique worst-case optimal strategy for Brier loss (as shown
by the same analysis) and for randomized 0-1 loss (where the KT-vector is not
unique: (a, 1− a, 1, 0) for any a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector).
In the previous examples, the worst-case optimal strategies P coincided for
logarithmic and Brier loss. The following example shows that this is not always
the case.
Example 6.D (Dependence on loss function). Consider the family of games
with X = {x1, x2, x3, x4}, Y = {{x1, x2}, {x2, x3, x4}}, px1 = px2 = 1/3, and
px3 = px4 = 1/6:
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/3 1/6 − −
y2 − 1/6 1/6 1/6
px 1/3 1/3 1/6 1/6
This game is also similar to Monty Hall, but now one door has been ‘split in
two’: the quizmaster will either open door 1, or doors 3 and 4. The strategy P
shown above is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss, but not for Brier loss:
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for both loss functions, there is a unique supporting hyperplane for both y
that touches HL  ∆y at P(· | y) for P as shown in the table, but for Brier loss,
these two hyperplanes do not have the same height at the common outcome x2.
(Using Theorem 6.9 from page 136, we can find theworst-case optimal strategy
for the quizmaster under Brier loss by solving a quadratic equation with one
unknown; this strategy has P(x2, y1) = 11/3− 2
√
3 ≈ 0.20 and P(x2, y2) =
2
√
3− 10/3 ≈ 0.13.)
For randomized loss, neither the worst-case optimal strategy nor the KT-
vector are unique: the KT-vectors are (0, 1, a, 1− a) for any a ∈ [0, 1]; the worst-
case optimal strategies are the P given above, the strategy that always gives
message y1 when the true outcome is x2, and all convex combinations of these.
Example 6.E (The quizmaster discards a message-outcome pair). Again con-
sider the game from the previous example, but nowwith a different marginal:
P x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 0.45 0.05 − −
y2 − 0 0.25 0.25
px 0.45 0.05 0.25 0.25
The strategy P is worst-case optimal for Brier loss, with KT-vector
λ∗ = (0.02, 1.62, 0.5, 0.5).
P displays another curious property (that we also saw for randomized 0-1 loss
in the previous example): while the quizmaster uses message y2 for some out-
comes, he does not use it in combination with outcome x2. In the theorem,
the hyperplane on ∆y2 is supporting at P(· | y2), but is not a tangent plane:
compared to the tangent plane, it has been ‘lifted up’ at the opposite vertex of
the simplex ∆y2 (x2) to the same height as the supporting hyperplane on ∆y1 .
This behaviour cannot occur in games with logarithmic loss: as we ob-
served at the beginning of Section 6.3.1, if a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ has
P∗(y) > 0 for some y ∈ Y , then it must assign positive probability to P∗(x | y)
for all x ∈ y.
6.4 Worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant
We now turn our attention to worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
To this end, we look at the relation between the KT-vectors that appeared in
Theorem 6.3 and the set of strategies Q the contestant can choose from.
6.4.1 Realizable hyperplanes
For any y ∈ Y , ∆y is defined in Section 6.2 as a (|y| − 1)-dimensional subset of
RX≥0. Thus a linear function ` : ∆y → R can be extended to a linear function ¯`
on the domain RX≥0 in different ways. Hence many different vectors λ ∈ RX
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representing supporting hyperplanes will correspond to what we can view as
a single supergradient, because the hyperplanes agree on ∆y. We can make
the extension unique by requiring ¯` to be zero at the origin and at the vertices
of the simplex ∆X\y. Because such a normalized function ¯` : RX≥0 → R obeys
¯`(0) = 0, it can be written as ¯`(P) = P>λ for some λ. These functions are thus
uniquely identified by their gradients λ, allowing us to refer to them using ‘the
(supporting) hyperplane λ’. Let Λy be the set of all gradients of such normal-
ized functions that represent dominating hyperplanes to HL  ∆y; in formula,
let
Λy = {λ ∈ RX | λx = 0 for x 6∈ y, and ∀P ∈ ∆y : P>λ ≥ HL(P)}.
For each nonvertical supporting hyperplane of HL  ∆y, clearly the gradi-
ent is in Λy; that is, all finite supergradients of this restricted function have
a normalized representative in Λy. The set also includes vectors λ for which
P>λ > HL(P) for all P ∈ ∆y, which do not correspond to supporting hyper-
planes.
Not all vectors λ ∈ Λy may be available to the contestant as responses to a
play of y ∈ Y by the quizmaster. As a trivial example, consider logarithmic loss
and a vector λwith ∑x∈y e−λx < 1 and λx = 0 for x 6∈ y. Then λ ∈ Λy because
the hyperplane defined by λ is dominating to HL  ∆y (thus the expected loss
from λ is larger than what the contestant could achieve), but clearly there is no
distribution Q ∈ ∆X that results in these losses on x ∈ y. We say that a vector
λ ∈ Λy is realizable on y if there exists a Q ∈ ∆X such that L(x,Q) = λx for all
x ∈ y, and then we say that such a Q realizes λ.
A partial order on vectors λ,λ′ ∈ RX is given by: λ ≤ λ′ if and only if
λx ≤ λ′x for all x ∈ X . We write λ < λ′ when λ ≤ λ′ and λ 6= λ′. For all
y ∈ Y , this partial order has the following property: For λ,λ′ ∈ Λy, we have
λ ≤ λ′ if and only if for all P ∈ ∆y, P>λ ≤ P>λ′. Therefore if Q,Q′ ∈ ∆X
realize λ,λ′ ∈ Λy respectively and λ ≤ λ′, the contestant is never hurt by
using Q instead of Q′ as a prediction given the message y.
Anyminimal elementwith respect to this partial order defines a supporting
hyperplane to HL  ∆y. For P in the relative interior of ∆y, the converse also
holds: all supporting hyperplanes at P are minimal elements. This is not the
case for P at the relative boundary of ∆y, where some supporting hyperplanes
(the ones that ‘tip over’ the boundary) are not minimal.
Lemma 6.4. If HL is finite and continuous on ∆y, then the following hold:
1. If λ ∈ Λy is not a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y, then there exists a sup-
porting hyperplane λ′ ∈ Λy with λ′ < λ;
2. If λ ∈ Λy is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P but is not minimal in
Λy, then there exists a minimal λ′ < λ in Λy;
3. If λ ∈ Λy is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P, then any λ′ ≤ λ inΛy is
a supporting hyperplane at P and obeys λ′x = λx for all x ∈ y with P(x) > 0.
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Thus the contestant never needs to play a Q|y realizing a non-minimal ele-
ment of Λy.
6.4.2 Existence
With the help of Lemma 6.4, we can formulate sufficient conditions for the
existence of a worst-case optimal strategy Q∗ for the contestant that, together
with P∗ for the quizmaster, forms a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.5 (Existence of Q∗). Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 6.3 hold,
and that for all y ∈ Y , all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ Λy to HL  ∆y
are realizable on y. Then there exists a worst-case optimal strategy Q∗ ∈ Q for the
contestant that achieves the same expected loss in the minimax game as P∗ achieves in
the maximin game: (P∗,Q∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
We will see in Theorem 6.9 that a (or rather, at least one) Nash equilibrium
exists for logarithmic loss and Brier loss. The existence of a Nash equilibrium
in games with randomized 0-1 loss is shown by the following consequence of
Theorem 6.5.
Proposition 6.6. In games with randomized 0-1 loss, a Nash equilibrium exists.
The following example shows what may go wrong if some supporting hy-
perplanes are not realizable.
Example 6.F (Hard 0-1 loss).
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/6 1/6 −
y2 − 1/6 1/6
y3 1/6 − 1/6
px 1/3 1/3 1/3
Consider the game with X , Y and p as shown in the table, and with hard 0-1
loss (so that the contestant is not allowed to randomize):
L(x,Q) =
{
0 if Q(x) = 1;
1 otherwise.
This loss function has the same entropy function as randomized 0-1 loss, so
the two loss functions are the same from the quizmaster’s perspective. The
table shows the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster, with
KT-vector λ∗ = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) and expected loss 1/2. For randomized 0-1 loss,
the (as we will see below: unique) worst-case optimal strategy for the contest-
ant would be to respond to any message y with the uniform distribution on y.
However, for all y ∈ Y , λ given by λx = 1x∈yλ∗x is not realizable on y under
hard 0-1 loss, so Theorem 6.5 does not apply. In fact, for any strategy Q the
contestant might use, there exists a strategy P for the quizmaster that gives
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expected loss 2/3 or larger (because for at least two outcomes x, there must
be a y 3 x such that L(x,Q|y) = 1). Thus the inequality (6.6) is strict: there
is no Nash equilibrium, and a worst-case optimal strategy for either player is
optimal only in the minimax/maximin sense.
This example also shows that the condition on existence of supporting hy-
perplanes in Theorem 6.5 cannot be replaced by the weaker condition that the
infimum appearing in the definition (6.3) of HL is always attained.
Games without Nash equilibria We will now briefly go into the situation
seen in the preceding example, where Theorem 6.5 does not apply.
While for some games with hard 0-1 loss, no Nash equilibrium may exist,
worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant do exist, and can be charac-
terized using stable sets of a graph. A stable set is a set of nodes no two of
which are adjacent (Schrijver, 2003b, Chapter 64). Consider the graph with
node set X and with an edge between two nodes if and only if they occur
together in some message. A set S ⊆ X is stable in this graph if and only
if there exists a strategy Q ∈ Q for the contestant such that for all x ∈ S,
maxy:x∈y∈Y L(x,Q|y) = 0, and equal to 1 otherwise. The worst-case loss ob-
tained by this strategy is 1 − ∑x∈S px. Thus finding the worst-case optimal
strategy Q for the contestant is equivalent to finding a stable set S with max-
imum weight. Algorithmically, this is an NP-hard problem in general, though
polynomial-time algorithms exist for certain classes of graphs, including per-
fect (this includes bipartite) graphs and claw-free graphs (Schrijver, 2003b).
With the exception of two examples in Section 6.5.1 illustrating the limits of
our theory, we will not look at games without Nash equilibria any more from
now on.
6.4.3 Characterization and nonuniqueness
The concept of aKT-vector, which helped characterizeworst-case optimal strat-
egies for the quizmaster in Theorem 6.3, now returns for a similar role in the
characterization of worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
Theorem 6.7 (Characterization of Q∗). Under the conditions of Theorems 6.3 and
6.5, a strategy Q∗ ∈ Q is worst-case optimal for the contestant if and only if the vector
given by λx := maxy3x L(x,Q∗|y) is a KT-vector.
If the loss L(x,Q∗|y) equals λx for all x ∈ y, then the worst-case optimal
strategy Q∗ is an equalizer strategy (Ferguson, 1967): the expected loss of Q∗
does not depend on the quizmaster’s strategy. Not all games have an equalizer
strategy as worst-case optimal strategy, as Example 6.H below shows.
When constructing a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant, there
are three points where different options are available, so that a worst-case op-
timal Q is in general not unique. The following examples demonstrate these
three points.
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Example 6.G (λ∗ not unique).
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 ∗ ∗ − −
y2 − ∗ ∗ −
y3 − − ∗ ∗
y4 ∗ − − ∗
px 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
Consider the gamewithX ,Y and p as in the table above, andwith randomized
0-1 loss. For the quizmaster, any P∗ that is uniform given each y is worst-case
optimal, and any λa = (a, 1− a, a, 1− a) with a ∈ [0, 1] is a KT-vector. To each
λa corresponds a unique worst-case optimal Q∗, namely the strategy that puts
conditional probability 1− a on outcome x1 or x3 (whichever is in the given
message), and probability a on x2 or x4.
Note that ifwe replace randomized 0-1 loss by a strictly proper loss function
such as logarithmic or Brier loss, the KT-vector and the worst-case optimal
strategy for the contestant become unique, while the same set of strategies as
before continues to be worst-case optimal for the quizmaster. This shows that
the freedom for the contestant we see here for randomized 0-1 loss is due to
the nonuniqueness of the KT-vector, not due to the nonuniqueness of P∗.
Example 6.H (Minimal λ not unique).
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/5 3/10 −
y2 − 3/10 1/5
y3 0 − 0
px 1/5 3/5 1/5
Consider the game as shown in the table with logarithmic loss; the strategy P∗
shown in this table is the unique worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmas-
ter. Because logarithmic loss is proper, we know that Q∗|y1 = P
∗(· | y1) and
Q∗|y2 = P
∗(· | y2) are optimal responses for the contestant, but this does not
tell us what Q∗|y3 should be in a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant.
We see that P∗ assigns probability zero to message y3, and the KT-vector
λ∗ = (− log 2
5
,− log 3
5
,− log 2
5
)
specifies a hyperplane that does not support HL in ∆y3 . Hence the construc-
tion of Q∗|y3 in the proof of Theorem 6.5 allows freedom in the choice of a min-
imal element λ ∈ Λy3 less than (− log 2/5, 0,− log 2/5): the valid choices are
(− log q, 0,− log(1− q)) for any q ∈ [2/5, 3/5]; each of these is realized on y3
by Q|y3 = (q, 0, 1− q). Using Theorem 6.7, we can verify that these choices of
Q∗|y3 define worst-case optimal strategies: the vector λ defined there equals the
KT-vector λ∗ given above.
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Figure 6.5: Loss and entropy on a binary prediction for the loss function in
Example 6.I, with Brier loss and entropy shown in grey
This also shows that worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant cannot
be characterized simply as ‘optimal responses to P∗’: in this example, P∗(· |
y3) is undefined, yet there is a nontrivial constraint on Q|y3 in the worst-case
optimal strategy Q for the contestant.
Example 6.I (Q realizing λ not unique). Take X = {x1, x2, x3}, Y = {y1 =
{x1, x2}, y2 = {x2, x3}}, and p uniform (as in Monty Hall), with loss function
L(x,Q) =

8
9 for Q(x) <
1
3 ;
LBrier(x,Q) for Q(x) ∈ [ 13 , 23 ];
2
9 for Q(x) >
2
3 ;
(illustrated in Figure 6.5; LBrier denotes the Brier loss function). This loss func-
tion is proper but not strictly proper: Because its generalized entropy is not
strictly concave, a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y1 exists that supports HL
at all P ∈ ∆y1 with P(x1) ≤ 1/3. Any Q in the same interval realizes this
hyperplane and thus minimizes the expected loss.
6.5 Results for well-behaved loss functions
In the preceding sections, we have established characterization results for the
worst-case optimal strategies of both players. While these results are applic-
able to many loss functions, they have the disadvantage of being complicated,
involving supporting hyperplanes. For some common loss functions, simpler
characterizations can be given.
6.5.1 Proper continuous loss functions
Recall from page 119 that for a proper loss function, the contestant’s expected
loss for a given message is minimized if his predicted probabilities equal the
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true probabilities. Such loss functions are natural to consider in our probabil-
ity updating game, as our goal will often be to find these true probabilities.
However, simplifying our theorems requires further restrictions on the class
of loss functions. In this subsection, we consider loss functions that are both
proper and continuous.
Lemma 6.8. If the loss function L(x,Q) is proper and continuous as a function of
Q for all x and HL is finite, then HL is differentiable in the following sense: for all
y ∈ Y and all P ∈ ∆y, there is at most one element ofΛy that is a minimal supporting
hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P; if P is in the relative interior of ∆y, there is exactly one.
If it exists, the minimal supporting hyperplane at P is realized by Q|y = P.
The uniqueness of minimal supporting hyperplanes in Λy is equivalent to
there being exactly one equivalence class of supergradients, where supergradi-
ents are taken to be equivalent if their corresponding supporting hyperplanes
coincide on ∆y. The property shown in the above lemma is then related to dif-
ferentiability by Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 25.1), which says that for a finite,
concave function such as HL, uniqueness of the supergradient at P is equival-
ent to differentiability at P.
Theorem 6.9. For L proper and continuous and HL finite and continuous,
1. worst-case optimal strategies for both players exist and form a Nash equilibrium;
2. there is a unique KT-vector;
3. a strategy P∗ ∈ P for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal if and only if there
exists λ∗ ∈ RX such that
L(x, P∗(· | y)) = λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(x, y) > 0,
L(x, P∗(· | y)) ≤ λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(x, y) = 0, P∗(y) > 0, and
∃Q∗|y : L(x,Q∗|y) ≤ λ∗x for all x ∈ y with P∗(y) = 0;
4. a strategy Q∗ for the contestant is worst-case optimal if and only if there exists
a worst-case optimal P∗ such that for all x,
max
y3x L(x,Q
∗
|y) = maxy3x,
P∗(y)>0
L(x, P∗(· | y)), (6.9)
which holds if and only if (6.9) holds for all worst-case optimal P∗.
Using this theorem, many observations made about logarithmic loss and
Brier loss in the examples we have seen so far can now be more easily veri-
fied. For instance, in the worst-case optimal strategy we saw in Example 6.E
on page 130, we verify that L(x2, P∗(· | y2)) = 1.5 ≤ 1.62 = λ∗x2 = L(x2, P∗(· |
y1)).
The preceding theory requires that L is both proper and continuous. If one
of these conditions is removed, HL may not be differentiable and the conclu-
sions of Theorem 6.9 may fail to hold. This is illustrated by the following two
examples, in which no Nash equilibria exist.
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Figure 6.6: Loss and entropy on ∆y1 for the loss function in Example 6.K. The
functions are the same on ∆y2 except for the value of L at the discontinuities.
The grey lines show the two cases in the definition of L.
Example 6.J (Continuous but improper). The following loss function is con-
tinuous, but not proper:
L(x,Q) = 1−Q(x)2.
This loss function is actually hard 0-1 loss (see Example 6.F) in disguise: both
have the same entropy function as randomized 0-1 loss (which is not differen-
tiable), and for both, the hyperplane realized by Q|y will touch HL on ∆y only
if Q|y puts mass 1 on some x ∈ y, so that only a small number of supporting
hyperplanes is realizable. Example 6.F shows how for these loss functions, a
Nash equilibrium may fail to exist.
(Another example of a continuous but improper loss function is random-
ized 0-1 loss; while a Nash equilibrium does exist there, parts 2, 3 and 4 of
Theorem 6.9 generally do not hold.)
Example 6.K (Strictly proper but not continuous). Take X = {x1, x2, x3} and
Y = {y1 = {x1, x2}, y2 = {x2, x3}} as in Monty Hall, with loss function (we
write LBrier for the Brier loss function and HBrier for its generalized entropy)
L(x,Q) =
LBrier(x,Q) + 38
if Q(x) ∈ (1/4, 3/4), or
Q(x) ∈ [1/4, 3/4] and Q(x1) = 0;
2LBrier(x,Q) otherwise
(illustrated in Figure 6.6). For each P ∈ ∆y (for both y ∈ Y), Q = P realizes a
supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P, so that L is proper. For both y ∈ Y ,
the entropy HL as a function of P ∈ ∆y is the pointwise minimum of 2HBrier
and HBrier + 3/8 (shown in grey in Figure 6.6). These two entropies coincide
when P(x2) ∈ {1/4, 3/4}, where HL  ∆y is not differentiable but has multiple
supporting hyperplanes. Only one of these hyperplanes is realizable. This
means that L is strictly proper, but also that Theorem 6.5 does not apply.
Now consider the game with marginal p = (1/8, 3/4, 1/8). The worst-case
optimal strategy for the quizmaster has P∗(x2 | y1) = P∗(x2 | y2) = 3/4. Be-
cause L is strictly proper, the unique optimal responses Q|y1 and Q|y2 for the
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contestant must coincide with these conditional distributions for (P∗,Q) to be
aNash equilibrium. However, L(x2,Q|y1) < L(x2,Q|y2), so that the quizmaster
can increase the expected loss by choosing to givemessage y2 more oftenwhen
the true outcome is x2. This shows that Q is not a worst-case optimal strategy
for the contestant. The contestant can do better in theminimax game by choos-
ing Q|y2 with Q|y2(x2) = 3/4+ e > 3/4, so that L(x2,Q|y2) < L(x2,Q|y1). The
expected loss of this strategy can bemade arbitrarily close, but not equal to, the
worst-case expected loss achieved by the quizmaster in the maximin game.
While uniqueness of λ∗ was established by the theorem, we do not have
uniqueness of P∗ or Q∗. Multiple worst-case optimal strategies Q∗ for the con-
testant may exist as soon as a message is unused, as in Example 6.H. Mul-
tiple worst-case optimal strategies P∗ for the quizmaster are also possible. For
instance, the loss function in Example 6.I is proper and continuous (though
not strictly proper) and thus HL is differentiable. But if the marginal is p =
(2/5, 1/5, 2/5), all strategies for the quizmaster are worst-case optimal.
6.5.2 Local loss functions
Logarithmic loss is an example of a local loss function: a loss function where
the loss L(x,Q) depends on the probability assigned by the prediction Q to
the obtained outcome x, but not on the probabilities assigned to outcomes
that did not occur. The following theorem shows how for such loss functions,
worst-case optimality of the quizmaster’s strategy can be characterized purely
in terms of probabilities, without converting them to losses.
Among loss functions that are ‘smooth’ for all x, logarithmic loss is, up to
some transformations, the only proper local loss function (Bernardo, 1979). We
do not know what non-smooth local proper loss functions may exist. In par-
ticular, it is conceivable (yet unlikely) that a discontinuous L exists satisfying
the conditions of Theorem 6.10, but not those of Theorem 6.9.
Theorem 6.10 (Characterization of P∗ for local L). For L local and proper and HL
finite and continuous, P∗ ∈ P is worst-case optimal if there exists a vector q ∈ [0, 1]X
such that
qx = P∗(x | y) for all x ∈ y ∈ Y with P∗(y > 0), and
∑
x∈y
qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y . (6.10)
If additionally HL  ∆y is strictly concave for all y ∈ Y , only such P∗ are worst-case
optimal for L.
If additionally L is continuous, then Theorem 6.9 applies, and it follows
that Q∗ ∈ Q is a worst-case optimal strategy for the contestant if Q∗|y(x) ≥ qx
for all x ∈ y ∈ Y . For strictly proper loss functions such as logarithmic loss,
this fully characterizes the worst-case optimal strategies for the contestant.
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Example 6.H (continued). Consider again the following game:
P∗ x1 x2 x3
y1 1/5 3/10 −
y2 − 3/10 1/5
y3 0 − 0
px 1/5 3/5 1/5
with logarithmic loss. The conditionals P∗(x | y) agree with the vector q =
(2/5, 3/5, 2/5). For all y ∈ Y with P∗(y) > 0, this implies that ∑x∈y qx = 1; for
y3, we see that this sum equals 4/5 ≤ 1. Thus P∗ is verified to be worst-case
optimal.
The equality of conditionals P∗(x | y) with the same x in the statement of
Theorem 6.10 is oddly similar to the CAR condition we saw in Section 6.1, but
reversing the roles of outcomes and messages. We may say that a strategy P∗
satisfying (6.10) is RCAR (sometimeswith vector q), for ‘reverse CAR’. Note that
whether a strategy is RCAR does not depend on the loss function.
A vector q is called an RCAR vector if a strategy P∗ ∈ P exists such that P∗
and q satisfy (6.10). This definition is also independent of the loss function.
If q is an RCAR vector, then qx > 0 for all x ∈ X ; otherwise we would get
P∗(x) = 0 < px. Like the KT-vector λ∗ in Theorem 6.9, the RCAR vector is
unique:
Lemma 6.11. Given X ,Y , p, there exists a unique RCAR vector q ∈ [0, 1]X .
If each message in Y contains an outcome x not contained in any other
message, then any strategy P∗ must have P∗(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y . Then the
first line of (6.10) implies that∑x∈y qx = 1 for all y. Thus the second line is now
satisfied automatically, allowing the theorem to be simplified for this case:
Corollary 6.12. A strategy P∗ ∈ P with P∗(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y that satisfies
P∗(x | y) = P∗(x | y′) for all y, y′ 3 x (6.11)
is worst-case optimal for the loss functions covered by Theorem 6.10
In this case, P∗ is an equalizer strategy (Ferguson, 1967).
The symmetry between versions of CAR and RCAR is clearest in Corol-
lary 6.12: the condition (6.11) is the mirror image of the definition of strong
CAR in Jaeger (2005a). Thus wemay call it strong RCAR. Ordinary RCAR (6.10)
imposes an inequality on q for messages with probability 0, which has no ana-
logue in the CAR literature that we know of: the definition of weak CAR in
Jaeger puts no requirement at all on outcomes with probability 0.
Strict concavity of HL occurred as a new condition in Theorem 6.10. The
main loss function of interest here is logarithmic loss, and its entropy is strictly
concave. For other loss functions, the following lemma relates strict concavity
of HL to conditions we have seen before.
Lemma 6.13. If L is strictly proper and all minimal supporting hyperplanes λ ∈ Λy
to HL  ∆y are realizable on y for all y ∈ Y , then HL is strictly concave on HL  ∆y
for all y ∈ Y .
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Affine transformations of the loss function Above, wementioned that loga-
rithmic loss is the only local proper loss function up to some transformations.
The transformations considered in Bernardo (1979) are affine transformations,
of the form
L′(x,Q) = aL(x,Q) + bx (6.12)
for a ∈ R>0 and b ∈ RX . (This transformation can result in a function L′ that
can take negative values, so that it does not satisfy our definition of a loss func-
tion. However, our results can easily be extended to loss functions bounded
from below by an arbitrary real number, so we allow such transformations
here.)
The following lemma shows that, for logarithmic loss as well as for other
loss functions, the transformation (6.12) does not change how the players of
the probability updating game should act.
Lemma 6.14. Let L be a loss function for which HL is finite and continuous, and
let L′ be an affine transformation of L as in (6.12). Then a strategy P∗ is worst-case
optimal for the quizmaster in the game G ′ := (X ,Y , p, L′) if and only if P∗ is worst-
case optimal in G := (X ,Y , p, L). If G also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 6.5,
then the same equivalence holds for worst-case optimal strategiesQ∗ for the contestant.
Lemma 6.14 has highly important implications when applied to the loga-
rithmic loss. While multiplying logarithmic loss by a constant a 6= 1 merely
corresponds to changing the base of the logarithm, adding constants bx allows
the logarithmic loss to become the appropriate loss function for a very wide
class of games. This means that the RCAR characterization of worst-case op-
timal strategies for logarithmic loss is also valid for all these games. We are re-
ferring to so-called Kelly gambling games, also known as horse race games (Cover
and Thomas, 1991) in the literature. In such games (with terminology adapted
to our setting), for any outcome x the contestant can buy a ticket which costs
e 1 and which pays off a positive amount e cx if x actually obtains; if some
x′ 6= x is realized, nothing is paid so the e 1 is lost. The contestant is allowed
to distribute his capital over several tickets (outcomes), and he is also allowed
to buy a fractional nonnegative number of tickets. For example, if X = {1, 2}
and c1 = c2 = 2, then the contestant is guaranteed to neither win nor lose any
money if he splits his capital fifty-fifty over both outcomes.
Now consider a contestant with some initial capital (say, e 1), who faces an
i.i.d. sequence (X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), . . . ∼ P of outcomes in X × Y . At each point
in time i he observes ‘side information’ Yi = yi and he distributes his capital
gained so far over all x ∈ X , putting some fraction Q|yi (x) of his capital on
outcome x. Then he is paid out according to the xi that was actually realized.
Here each Q|y is a probability distribution over X , i.e. for all y ∈ Y , all x ∈ X ,
Q|y(x) ≥ 0 and∑x∈X Q|y(x) = 1. So if his capital wasUi before the i-th round,
it will be Ui · Q|yi (xi)cxi after the i-th round. By the law of large numbers, his
capital will grow (or shrink, depending on the odds on offer) almost surely ex-
ponentially fast, with exponent EX,Y∼P[logQ|Y(X)cX ] = EX,Y∼P[logQ|Y(X)−
bX ], where bx = − log cx (Cover and Thomas, 1991, Chapter 6). Thus, the con-
testant’s capital will grow fastest, among all constant strategies and against
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an adversarial distribution P ∈ P , if he plays a worst-case optimal strategy
for gains logQ(x) − bx, i.e. for loss function L′(x,Q) = − logQ(x) + bx. By
Lemma 6.14 above, this worst-case optimal strategy Q∗ is just the Q∗ that is
also worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss — it does not depend on the pay-offs
(‘odds’ in the horse race interpretation) cx. Clearly, if data are i.i.d. then this
continues to hold even if the pay-offs are allowed to change over time, and even
if the contestant is allowed to use different strategies at different time points:
the worst-case optimal capital growth rate is always achieved by choosing Q∗
at all time points.
The upshot is that whenever the probability updating game is played (a) re-
peatedly, and (b) the contestant is allowed to reinvest and redistribute his cap-
ital over all outcomes at each point in time, then hisworst-case optimal strategy
is equal to the worst-case optimal Q∗ for logarithmic loss irrespective of the pay-
offs. This makes the logarithmic loss, and hence the RCAR characterization,
appropriate for a very wide class of settings.
6.6 Conclusion
We have seen many theorems in the last few subsections showing different
properties of worst-case optimal strategies P∗ and Q∗ for the two players for
different classes of loss functions. A summary of these theorems was given in
Table 6.1 on page 125.
Worst-case optimal probability updating provides a robust new approach
for dealing with underspecified distributions. There are many scenarios in
which our results currently do not apply, but to which they might be exten-
ded. For example, the quizmaster’s hard constraint y 3 x could be replaced by
some soft constraint, so that each message y still carries information about the
true outcome, but no longer in the form of a subset of X . One way to achieve
this might be by affine transformations of the loss function as discussed at the
end of Section 6.5.2, but allowing the constants to depend on both x and y. This
could give a worst-case analogue to Jeffrey conditioning or minimum relative en-
tropy updating (Grünwald and Halpern, 2003).
Another extension would be to infinite outcome and message spaces.
An online version of the probability updating gamemay also be considered
(Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006).
Other questions concern the comparison between different alternative ap-
proaches the contestant might use to update his probabilities. For example,
can we bound the difference in expected loss between worst-case optimal and
naive conditioning? What about ignoring the message and always predicting
with the marginal, or ignoring the constraints imposed on the quizmaster by
the marginal and predicting with the maximum entropy distribution on y?
(Both these strategies are overly pessimistic.) Conversely, we might wonder
how much the contestant loses by playing a worst-case optimal strategy when
the quizmaster is not adversarial, but for instance chooses from the available
messages uniformly at random.
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Appendix 6.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 6.1. For finite HL, concavity of HL is shown byGrünwald and
Dawid (2004, Proposition 3.2), and lower semi-continuity by Rockafellar (1970,
Theorem 10.2) (using that the domain of HL is a simplex). If L is finite, then
picking any Q ∈ ∆X gives an upper bound to HL, so that HL is in particular
finite. Concavity now follows by the first claim, and continuity by Grünwald
andDawid (2004, Corollary 3.3; an important condition is inCorollary 3.2).
Proof of Lemma 6.2. If P(y2) = 0 then P′ = P and the result is trivial; if
P(y2) > 0 but P(y1) = 0, then P(· | y2) = P′(· | y1) so P and P′ have the
same expected generalized entropy. Otherwise P(· | y1) and P(· | y2) are well-
defined, and P′(· | y1) = (P(y1)P(· | y1) + P(y2)P(· | y2))/(P(y1) + P(y2))
is a convex combination of them. By concavity of HL, ∑y P′(y)HL(P′(· | y)) ≥
∑y P(y)HL(P(· | y)).
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 27.3) provides conditions
under which a convex minimization problem has a solution attaining the min-
imum. These are satisfied by P and −HL: P is nonempty, closed, convex, and
bounded (thus has no direction of recession), and−HL is convex (Lemma 6.1),
finite for all P ∈ P (thus proper), and lower semi-continuous (thus closed).
By Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 28.2.2), a KT-vector λ∗ exists, so that for
the remaining claims of the theorem, it suffices to show that P∗ is worst-case
optimal and λ∗ is a KT-vector if and only if the given conditions on (P∗,λ∗)
hold.
We rewrite the maximin problem to
maximize f0(P)
subject to ∑
y3x
P(x, y) = px for all x ∈ X ,
with P ∈ RR(X ,Y)≥0 . By Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 28.3), P∗ ∈ RR(X ,Y)≥0 maxi-
mizes this and λ∗ ∈ RX is a KT-vector if and only if P∗ ∈ P and at P∗, the zero
vector is a supergradient to
f0(P∗)− ∑
x∈X
λ∗x
(
∑
y3x
P∗(x, y)− px
)
. (6.13)
The term being subtracted is linear, with gradient λ¯ ∈ RR(X ,Y) given by
λ¯x,y :=
∂
∂P∗(x, y) ∑x∈X
λ∗x
(
∑
y3x
P∗(x, y)− px
)
= λ∗x. (6.14)
By Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 23.8), 0 is a supergradient to (6.13) if and only
if λ¯ is a supergradient to f0 at P∗.
For any P∗ that is not everywhere zero, we have for all c ≥ 0 that f0(cP∗) =
c f0(P∗), so that a supporting hyperplane to f0 at a feasible P∗ must go through
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the origin. Then the supporting hyperplane with gradient λ¯ has as defining
equation the linear expression ∑x,y P(x, y)λ¯x,y.
If ∑x,y P(x, y)λ¯x,y defines a supporting hyperplane to f0 at P∗, then
1. at every y ∈ Y with P∗(y) > 0, it is a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y
at P∗(· | y), and
2. for every y with P∗(y) = 0, HL(P′) ≤ ∑x P′(x)λ¯x,y for all P′ ∈ ∆y.
The converse also holds: we have for all y ∈ Y and P′ ∈ ∆y that HL(P′) ≤
∑x∈y P′λ¯x,y, with equality if P∗(y) > 0 and P′ = P∗(· | y); taking the con-
vex combination with coefficients P∗(y) shows that the hyperplane defined by
∑x,y P(x, y)λ¯x,y is nowhere below f0 and touches it at P = P∗.
For λ¯ of the required form (6.14), this is in turn equivalent to the character-
ization given in the statement of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 6.4. The function ∑x∈y λxP(x)− HL(P) attains its minimum
d on ∆y at some P (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 27.3). Let λ′ ∈ Λy be given
by λ′x = λx − d for all x ∈ y: this defines a hyperplane to HL  ∆y that is
supporting at the minimizing P, proving the first part of the lemma.
For the third part, let λ, λ′ and P be as described. λ′ ≤ λ implies P>λ′ ≤
P>λ. Neither can be smaller than HL(P), and since the right hand side must
equal HL(P) because λ is supporting at P, so must the left hand side, showing
that λ′ is also supporting at P. If P(x) = 1 for some x ∈ y, then P>λ′′ = λ′′x for
any λ′′, so in particular λ′x = λx = HL(P). For other P ∈ ∆y, we use that two
linear functions obeying an inequality on their domain D := ∆{x∈y|P(x)>0} and
coinciding at a point in the relative interior of Dmust coincide everywhere on
D, so that again λ′x = λx for x ∈ y with P(x) > 0.
It remains to show that given such a λ, a minimal λ′ ≤ λ exists in Λy. Con-
sider the set Λ′ := {λ′ ∈ Λy | λ′ ≤ λ}. The set of supporting hyperplanes to
HL  ∆y at P in Λy is closed (Rockafellar, 1970, Section 23, definition subdiffer-
ential (page 215)); Λ′ is a subset of this set (as we just saw), obtained by adding
further non-strict linear constraints, so it too is closed. It also has the property
that if λ′ ∈ Λ′ is minimal in that set, it is also minimal in Λy. Now fix any P′
in the relative interior of ∆y, and pick some λ′ ∈ Λ′ that minimizes P′>λ′ (this
minimum must be attained because the expression is bounded below and Λ′
is closed). Such a λ′ is also minimal in the partial order, so it is the element we
are looking for.
Proof of Theorem 6.5. Take a worst-case optimal strategy P∗ for the quizmas-
ter and KT-vector λ∗. For each y ∈ Y , define a vector
λ′x =
{
λ∗x for x ∈ y
0 for x 6∈ y.
By the statement of Theorem 6.3, λ′ ∈ Λy. Let λ be a minimal element of Λy
with λ ≤ λ′: such an element exists by parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 6.4. (If λ′ is
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itself minimal, λ = λ′). By assumption, λ is realizable on y. Let Q∗|y be given
by this Q.
By playing this Q∗, the contestant will achieve expected loss (against any
strategy P ∈ P for the quizmaster, for λ∗ any KT-vector)
∑
x,y
P(x, y)L(x,Q∗|y) ≤∑
x,y
P(x, y)λ∗x =∑
x
pxλ∗x.
The right-hand side is the maximum loss the quizmaster can achieve in the
maximin game. By (6.6), the reverse inequality also holds, so we find that the
values of the minimax and maximin games must be equal.
Proof of Proposition 6.6. We first introduce some additional terminology in
order to apply a corollary from Rockafellar (1970).
A nonvertical hyperplane defined by λ ∈ RX is geometrically a subset of
RX × R, namely {(P′, z′) ∈ RX × R | z′ = P′>λ}. This set is the boundary
of the half-space Hλ = {(P′, z′) ∈ RX × R | z′ ≤ P′>λ}. A hyperplane λ
is supporting to a concave function f : RX → R at the point P ∈ RX with
f (P) = P>λ if and only if the hypograph of f is a subset of Hλ.
A column vector (−αλ, α) is called normal to a convex set C at a point (P, z)
∈ C if (P′ − P, z′ − z)>(−αλ, α) ≤ 0 for all (P′, z′) ∈ C (Rockafellar, 1970); that
is, if C ⊆ {(P′, z′) | (P′ − P, z′ − z)>(−αλ, α) ≤ 0}. This latter set is equal to
Hλ if α > 0 and z = P>λ. So if C is the hypograph of f and f (P) = z = P>λ,
then λ is a supporting hyperplane to f at P if and only if (−λ, 1) is normal to
C.
The set of all vectors normal to C at (P, z) is called the normal cone at (P, z).
The normal cone to Hλ at given (P, P>λ) is the half-line {(−αλ, α) | α ∈
[0,∞)}.
For L randomized 0-1 loss, let the function f0 : RX → R be given by f0(P) =
minQ∈∆X ∑x′∈X P(x
′)L(x′,Q); note that f0  ∆X = HL, and that for all y ∈ Y ,
any minimal supporting hyperplane λ ∈ Λy to HL  ∆y can be extended to a
supporting hyperplane λ′ to f0 with λ′x = λx for all x ∈ y.
The hypograph of f0 is C =
⋂
x∈X Hλ(x) , with λ
(x)
x′ = L(x
′, ex) (where ex
is the distribution that puts all mass on x). By Rockafellar (1970, Corollary
23.8.1), for C of this form and (P, z) a point on the boundary of C, the nor-
mal cone of C at (P, z) is the sum of the individual normal cones. The nor-
mal cone of any set at a point in the interior of that set is just {0}, so we can
ignore those halfspaces when determining the normal cone. Then the corol-
lary says that any vector (−λ, 1) normal to f0 at (P, f0(P)) can be written as
∑x∈X :P>λ(x)= f0(P)(−αxλ(x), αx): λ is a convex combination of those λ(x).
Conclusion: any minimal supporting hyperplane λ to HL  ∆y at P ∈ ∆y
with randomized 0-1 loss is a convex combination of the hyperplanes realized
by hard 0-1 loss that are supporting at P. Therefore, randomizing allows the
contestant to realize λ.
Proof of Theorem 6.7. From Theorem 6.5, we know that a strategy exists for
the contestant that achieves loss ∑x pxλ∗x where λ∗ is any KT-vector, and that
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this is worst-case optimal. Hence Q∗ is worst-case optimal if and only if it
achieves the same worst-case expected loss. The worst-case expected loss of a
strategy Q ∈ Q is
max
P∈P ∑x,y
P(x, y)L(x,Q|y) =∑
x
px maxy3x L(x,Q|y).
Therefore if for all x, y with x ∈ y, we have L(x,Q|y) ≤ λ∗x for some KT-vector
λ∗, Q is worst-case optimal.
For the converse, pick any Q ∈ Q and suppose the vector given by λx :=
maxy L(x,Q|y) is not a KT-vector. Then by Theorem 6.3, there is no P ∈ P such
that P and λ satisfy the conditions of that theorem. Equivalently, for all P ∈ P ,
there either is a message y such that the hyperplane defined by λ passes below
HL somewhere in ∆y, or there is a message ywith P(y) > 0 but the hyperplane
lies strictly above HL at P(· | y). The former contradicts the definition of HL,
so for λ not a KT-vector, the latter must be the case. But then against any P ∈ P
(in particular against worst-case optimal P), there is a different strategy Q′ ∈
Q that is equal to Q except for its response to the message y: Q′|y realizes a
supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P(· | y). This strategy Q′ obtains strictly
smaller expected loss than Q, so Q is not worst-case optimal. (In other words:
in a Nash equilibrium (P∗,Q∗), the contestant can only do worse against P∗ by
changing strategy, but here he can do better.)
Proof of Lemma 6.8. For proper loss functions, L and HL are related as fol-
lows: at all y ∈ Y and P ∈ ∆y, if the vector λ = L(·, P) is finite at all x ∈ y,
it describes the nonvertical hyperplane realized by P, which is a supporting
hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P.
Now suppose that at some P ∈ ∆y, there exists a minimal supporting hy-
perplane λ′ ∈ Λy other than λ := L(· | P), the supporting hyperplane realized
by P (here we allow vertical hyperplanes, for which λ may include infinities).
Let x ∈ y be an outcome where λ′x < λx, which exists by minimality of λ′.
Write ex for the probability distribution that puts all mass on this outcome,
and define Pα := (1− α)P + αex for α ∈ (0, 1]. For each of these points Pα,
the hyperplane L(·, Pα) realized by Pα is at most as high as λ′ at Pα (because
L(·, Pα) is supporting there) and at least as high as λ′ at P (where λ′ is sup-
porting), so L(x, Pα) is bounded away from λx by λ′x: L(x, Pα) ≤ λ′x < λx.
Therefore limα↓0 L(x, Pα) 6= L(x, P), and L is not continuous. For L proper and
continuous, this proves the ‘at most one’ part of the lemma.
For the ‘exactly one’ part: by Rockafellar (1970, Theorem23.3), a nonvertical
supporting hyperplane may only fail to exist at P if there is a line segment
through P falling inside ∆y on one side of P and outside on the other; that is,
for P on the relative boundary of ∆y.
Finally, suppose that λ = L(·, P) (the hyperplane realized by P) is finite at
all x ∈ y but not minimal. Then by Lemma 6.4, a different minimal supporting
hyperplane λ′ exists at P, which by the above gives a contradiction. This shows
that if λ is finite, it is the minimal supporting hyperplane.
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Proof of Theorem 6.9. Theorem 6.3 applies, showing existence of a KT-vector
and a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster.
A worst-case optimal Q∗ exists and forms a Nash equilibrium with P∗: For
each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ ∆y, by Lemma 6.8 there is at most one minimal
supporting hyperplane at P which is then realized by Q = P. So all minimal
supporting hyperplanes are realizable on y, and Theorem 6.5 applies.
Next we show that the characterization of P∗ and λ∗ in Theorem 6.3 is equi-
valent to the one in this theorem. We consider ywith P∗(y) > 0 first. If P∗ is a
worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster λ∗ defines a supporting hyper-
plane to HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y), then by Lemma 6.4 there exists aminimal λ′ ∈ Λy
which is also supporting at P∗(· | y) andwhich satisfies λ′x ≤ λx for x ∈ y, with
equality for P∗(x | y) > 0. By Lemma 6.8, λ′x = L(·, P∗(· | y)) for all x ∈ y,
showing that the conditions of this theoremhold. Conversely, if λ∗ satisfies the
equality in this theorem, then ∑x∈y P∗(x | y)L(x, P(· | y)) = HL(P∗(· | y)), so
λ∗ defines a supporting hyperplane at P∗(· | y).
For y with P∗(y) = 0, if the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is nowhere below
HL  ∆y as in Theorem 6.3, then using Lemma 6.4 it can be lowered to become
a minimal supporting hyperplane, for which a realizing Q∗|y exists; conversely,
the existence of a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at Q∗|y that is nowhere
above λ∗ implies that λ∗ is itself nowhere below HL  ∆y.
Uniqueness of the KT-vector: For any worst-case optimal strategy P∗, the
characterization in this theorem puts an equality constraint on λ∗x for each x, so
only one vector can satisfy these conditions. We just saw that these conditions
are equivalent to those in Theorem 6.3, so λ∗ is the unique KT-vector.
Characterization of Q∗: By Theorem 6.7, Q∗ is worst-case optimal for the
contestant if and only if the (unique) KT-vector equals the left-hand side of
(6.9). Similarly, if a strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster, then
the KT-vector equals the right-hand side of (6.9). Therefore: if for given Q∗ a
worst-case optimal P∗ exists for which (6.9) holds, then both sides equal the
KT-vector and Q∗ is worst-case optimal; if Q∗ is worst-case optimal, then (6.9)
holds for allworst-case optimal P∗; and if, for givenQ∗, (6.9) holds for allworst-
case optimal P∗, then it holds for at least one worst-case optimal P∗ by the
existence of worst-case optimal P∗.
Proof of Theorem 6.10. For local L, by definition L(x,Q) = fx(Q(x)) for some
sequence of functions fx : [0, 1] → [0,∞]. Given a point P ∈ ∆y, the vector λ
given by λx = fx(P(x)) defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P,
because L is proper. Each fx is nonincreasing. (To see this, consider moving
the point P along any line that goes through the vertex of the simplex∆X which
puts allmass on some x. BecauseHL is concave along this line, the farther away
P is from that vertex, the higher a supporting hyperplane to HL at P will be at
that vertex.)
Given P∗ and q satisfying the conditions in this theorem, let λ∗x be fx(qx) for
each x ∈ X . We show that P∗ is worst-case optimal by verifying that P∗ and
λ∗ satisfy Theorem 6.3. For each y with P∗(y) > 0, λ∗ defines a supporting
hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y). For each other y, consider a support-
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ing hyperplane to HL  ∆y at Q|y(x) = qx/∑x′∈y qx′ : because Q|y(x) ≥ qx,
fx(Q|y(x)) ≤ fx(qx) = λ∗x, the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is everywhere at
least as high as this supporting hyperplane, as required.
For the converse: For strictly concave HL, fx is strictly decreasing. Define
functions gx as follows: gx(λx) = inf{q ∈ [0, 1] | fx(q) ≤ λx}. If fx is continu-
ous, gx is just the ordinary inverse of fx, but if fx has a jump discontinuity at
q, there will be an interval where gx is constantly equal to q. In either case, gx
satisfies gx( fx(q)) = q for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Take P∗ some worst-case optimal strategy, and λ∗ a KT-vector. Define q ∈
[0, 1]X by qx = gx(λ∗x). We use Theorem 6.3 to show that q satisfies (6.10).
For each y ∈ Y , let λ′ ∈ Λy be a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y
that obeys λ′ ≤ λ∗; such a λ′ exists by Lemma 6.4. Let Q|y be the (unique)
point at which λ′ supports HL  ∆y. It satisfies fx(Q|y(x)) = λ′x, from which it
follows that gx(λ′x) = gx( fx(Q|y(x))) = Q|y(x). Applying gx to both sides of
λ′x ≤ λ∗x, we getQ|y(x) ≥ qx for all x ∈ y, so that∑x∈y qx ≤ ∑x∈y Q|y(x) = 1. If
P∗(y) > 0, then the hyperplane defined by λ∗ is itself a supporting hyperplane
and Q|y is the point where it touches HL  ∆y, namely the point P∗(· | y).
BecauseQ|y(x) also satisfiesQ|y(x) = gx(λ∗x) = qx, the equality qx = Q|y(x) =
P∗(x | y) follows.
Proof of Lemma 6.11. At least one vector q must exist because for the game
with logarithmic loss and X ,Y , p as in the lemma, a worst-case optimal strat-
egy P∗ must exist by Theorem 6.3, and an associated RCAR vector qmust exist
for it by Theorem 6.10 using that HL is strictly concave.
For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q and KT-vector λ∗ are related by
λ∗x = − log qx. By Theorem 6.3, any strategy P ∈ P that does not agree with
the KT-vector λ∗ is not worst-case optimal, showing that q is unique.
Proof of Lemma 6.13. We will show that any nonvertical supporting hyper-
plane λ ∈ Λy is supporting at no more than one point P ∈ ∆y. By Lemma 6.4,
if a supporting hyperplane exists at P, then aminimum supporting hyperplane
also exists at that point, so it suffices to restrict our attention tominimal λ ∈ Λy.
We know that such a λ is realizable on y; let Q be a distribution realizing it.
ThenQminimizes the expected loss against any P atwhichλ supportsHL  ∆y.
For strictly proper L, there can be at most one such P, proving strict concav-
ity.
Proof of Lemma 6.14. The generalized entropy function of L′ is given by
HL′(P) = aHL(P) +∑
x∈X
bxP(x),
where a ∈ R>0 and b ∈ RX are the constants in the affine transformation (6.12).
HL′ is again finite and continuous. If P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmas-
ter in game G, then by Theorem 6.3 there exists a KT-vector λ∗ satisfying that
theorem’s conditions. Define a transformed vector by λ′ = aλ∗ + b. This is a
KT-vector for G ′, showing that P∗ is also worst-case optimal in that game.
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If the conditions of Theorem 6.5 hold for G, then they also holds for G ′: If
λ′ is a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL′  ∆y, then λ = (1/a)(λ′ − b) is
a minimal supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y. By assumption, λ is realizable
on y in game G, say by Q ∈ ∆X . Then the same Q also realizes λ′ in game G ′.
If Q∗ is worst-case optimal for the contestant in G, then by Theorem 6.7,
λ given by λx := maxy3x L(x,Q∗|y) is a KT-vector. The transformed vector
λ′ = aλ + b is then a KT-vector in G ′, so that by Theorem 6.7, Q∗ is worst-
case optimal in that game.
Because the affine transformation from L into L′ can be reversed by a second
affine transformation (with a′ = 1/a and b′ = −(1/a)b), the reverse implica-
tions follow.
Chapter 7
Properties of Message
Structures in Probability
Updating Games
This chapter continues the analysis of probability updating games, whichwere
introduced in Chapter 6. Familiaritywith parts of that chapterwill be assumed
here. In particular, Section 6.2 introduced the problem statement and termin-
ology, and Section 6.5.2 discussed RCAR strategies and RCAR vectors, which
will play a central role in this chapter.
7.1 Introduction
Our results in Chapter 6 have focused on properties of the loss function L.
However, the characterization theorems in the previous chapter tell us how to
recognize worst-case optimal strategies, but not how to find them efficiently. To
progresswith this task, we also need to understand a game’smessage structure
Y . That is the motivation behind this chapter. Though the task remains hard
to solve in general (for example, if the messages in Y have different sizes, we
cannot do much unless we can reduce the game to a simpler one), we find
several interesting results for specific cases.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the loss function and its properties play
a large role in the study of worst-case optimal probability updating strategies.
In particular, different strategies will in general be worst-case optimal under
different loss functions. This is very different for situations where our uncer-
tainty is expressed by a single distribution rather than a set of distributions
(the possible quizmaster strategies / coarsening mechanisms). In those situ-
ations, the only rational approach to probability updating is naive condition-
ing, which requires just the original distribution (p) and the message y ⊂ X
to compute P(X = x | X ∈ y). If however Y is not a partition of X , then
149
150 Chapter 7. Properties of Message Structures
our uncertainty is expressed by a set of many distributions, and in general we
also need to know Y and L to determine worst-case optimal strategies in our
games. However, one of our main results in this chapter shows that for cer-
tain classes of message structures, the choice of loss function does not affect
the quizmaster’s worst-case optimal strategy. In these situations, the proced-
ure of worst-case optimal probability updating becomes more similar to that
of naive conditioning, because now it suffices to know just Y on top of what
naive conditioning requires. For these message structures, the distributions of
outcomes given messages we derive are in a more general sense ‘optimal’, ex-
pressing what a cautious experimenter should believe after receiving new data.
We first show a simple method of simplifying message structures in Sec-
tion 7.2; there we will also see that if Y is a partition of X , naive conditioning
is worst-case optimal. In Section 7.3, we consider symmetry properties that
worst-case optimal strategies must have, provided that the loss function also
obeys a form of symmetry defined in Section 7.3.1. Then in Section 7.4, we
show two classes of message structures for which the worst-case optimal strat-
egy for the quizmaster can be characterized by the RCAR condition (6.10). This
is the condition that also characterizes worst-case optimal strategies for local
loss functions and for Kelly gambling with arbitrary payoffs (by Theorem 6.10
and Lemma 6.14); the results in this chapter show that the same character-
ization sometimes holds for a much more general class of loss functions (as
displayed in Figure 7.1). This leads to an interesting property of those (and
only those) message structures, discussed in Section 7.4.3: the same strategy
P∗ will be optimal for the quizmaster regardless of the loss function.
Motivated by the importance and simplicity of the RCAR condition, in Sec-
tion 7.5 we explore the problem of efficiently computing an RCAR strategy
for the quizmaster. Depending on the messages structure, this may still be a
hard problem, and we fully solve it only for a small class of message structures
Y . We encounter several other classes of messages structures in Sections 7.5.1
and 7.5.3 (also illustrated in Figure 7.1), and find some interesting properties
of these classes. The topic of efficient algorithms will be explored more thor-
oughly in Chapter 8.
We will look at the game from the perspective of the quizmaster, and con-
sider worst-case optimal strategies P∗ for him. In games for which a Nash
equilibrium exists, the contestant’s worst-case optimal strategies can be found
easily once we know P∗ and a KT-vector certifying its optimality as in The-
orem 6.3: given a KT-vector, Q∗ can be constructed message-by-message to
satisfy the condition in Theorem 6.7. This is even easier in the case of proper
loss functions, where for each ywith P∗(y) > 0, an optimal response is simply
Q∗|y = P
∗(· | y). Another advantage of looking at the game from the quizmas-
ter’s side is that our Theorem 6.3 characterizingworst-case optimal P∗ requires
weaker conditions than Theorem 6.7 characterizing worst-case optimal Q∗.
The proofs of all lemmas and theorems can be found in the appendix at the
end of this chapter.
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Figure 7.1: Overview of classes of message structures (compare to Table 6.1).
One of the main results of this chapter is that for two classes of message struc-
tures, regardless of which loss function is used, we have the same RCAR char-
acterization of worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster that we saw in
Theorem 6.10 for a class of loss functions which includes logarithmic loss. Ad-
ditionally, Theorem 7.7 shows that the same is not generally true for games
with other message structures. The other classes shown in this figure are
defined and explored in Section 7.5. (The border around ‘homogeneous in-
duced colouring’ vanishes behind ‘graph’ because any graph with a homoge-
neous induced colouring is also (exchange-)connected.)
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7.2 Decomposition of games
For somemessage structures, regardless of the marginal and loss function, the
problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster can be
solved by considering a smaller message structure instead. It will be useful to
look at such simplifications first, so that in the rest of this chapter we will only
need to deal with message structures that have already been simplified.
We have already seen one example of the type of result we are looking for
earlier, in Lemma 6.2 on page 126, where we saw that if a message is dominated
by another (meaning that it is a subset of the other), then the quizmaster always
has a worst-case optimal strategy that assigns probability 0 to the dominated
message.
7.2.1 Decomposition and connected games
Connectivity is a fundamental concept from graph theory. However, in gen-
eral, our message structures are not graphs, but hypergraphs. Like an ordinary
graph, a hypergraph is defined by a set of nodes and a set of edges, but the
edges are allowed to be arbitrary subsets of the nodes; in a graph, all edges
must contain exactly two nodes. Thus for a probability updating game, we
can talk about the hypergraph (X ,Y), having the outcomes as its nodes and
the messages as its edges.
The terminology of connectivity can be generalized from graphs to hyper-
graphs (Schrijver, 2003a). Wewill say that a game is connected if its underlying
hypergraph is connected. This leads to the following definitions.
If for some game G = (X ,Y , p, L), there is a set ∅ ( S ( X such that for
each message y, either y ⊆ S or y ⊆ X \ S, then the game can be decomposed
into two games G1 = (X1,Y1, p(1), L) and G2 = (X2,Y2, p(2), L) with X1 = S,
X2 = X \ S, Yi = {y ∈ Y | y ⊆ Xi}, and p(i)(x) = p(x)/∑x′∈Xi p(x′). If no
such set S exists, we say the game G is connected.
Lemma 7.1 (Decomposition). If a game G can be decomposed into G1 and G2 as
described above, and its loss function L is such that HL is finite and continuous and
HL(P) = infQ∈∆y ∑x∈y P(x)L(x,Q) for each y ∈ Y and each P ∈ ∆y, then a
strategy P∗ is worst-case optimal for the quizmaster in G if and only if there exist
worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster P∗1 and P
∗
2 in G1 and G2 respectively
such that
P∗(x, y) =
{
P∗1 (x, y) ·∑x′∈X1 p(x′) for x ∈ X1;
P∗2 (x, y) ·∑x′∈X2 p(x′) for x ∈ X2.
(The extra condition on L is necessary to exclude some ‘very improper’ loss
functions: those that reward the contestant for predicting outcomes known to
have probability 0.) In particular, if the messages of G form a partition of X ,
then G can be decomposed into games that each contain only one message. In
a game G of this form, the quizmaster has only one strategy to choose from. If
the loss function is proper, naive conditioning is an optimal response to this
strategy, and thus worst-case optimal.
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Together with Lemma 6.2, this lemma allows us to reduce any game in
which we want to find a worst-case optimal strategy for the quizmaster to a
set of connected games containing no dominated messages. These reduced
games will not contain any messages of size one, unless one of the games con-
sists of only thatmessage: amessage of size one is either dominated, or it forms
a trivial component containing no other messages.
7.2.2 Substitution decomposition and modules
In graph theory, the concept of connected components can be generalized to
modules. A module of a graph is a subset of its nodes such that each node
outside the module is either adjacent to all or to none of the nodes in the
module (Spinrad, 2003). This concept can be generalized to hypergraphs, for
example as in Möhring and Radermacher (1984), by defining a module as a
set ∅ ( X ′ ⊆ X such that for all y1, y2 ∈ Y , both with yi ∩ X ′ 6= ∅, also
(y1 \ X ′) ∪ (y2 ∩ X ′) ∈ Y . The sets consisting of a single outcome and the
set X itself are always modules, and are called trivial modules. Any connected
component of a hypergraph is also a module.
The following lemma applies in particular if X ′ is a nontrivial module, but
also somewhat more generally. However, its application is restricted to loga-
rithmic loss. (It can be extended to other local proper loss functions L with
HL finite and continuous if L is additionally symmetric on X ′, as defined in
Section 7.3.1.) Thus it will not play as big a role in the rest of this text as the
ordinary decomposition lemma.
Lemma 7.2 (Substitution decomposition). Given a game G = (X ,Y , p, L) with
L logarithmic loss, and a set ∅ ( X ′ ( X , define two new games: the ‘inner’ game
G in = (X in,Y in, pin, L), with
X in = X ′;
Y in = {y ∩ X ′ | y ∩ X ′ 6= ∅};
pinx = px/ ∑
x∈X ′
px;
and the ‘outer’ game Gout = (X out,Yout, pout, L), with
X out = X \ X ′ ∪ {x′};
Yout = {y ∈ Y | y ∩ X ′ = ∅} ∪ {y \ X ′ ∪ {x′} | y ∈ Y , y ∩ X ′ 6= ∅};
poutx =
{
px for x 6= x′;
∑x∈X ′ px for x = x′,
where x′ ∈ X ′ is an arbitrary outcome. Let Pin, Pout be worst-case optimal strategies
for these games, with respective RCAR vectors qin, qout. If for all yin ∈ Y in, yout ∈
Yout with Pin(yin) > 0, yout 3 x′ and Pout(yout) > 0 in the new games, we have
yout \ {x′} ∪ yin ∈ Y in the original game, then a worst-case optimal strategy for the
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original game is given by
P∗(y) =
{
Pout(y) for y ∩ X ′ = ∅;
Pout(y \ X ′ ∪ {x′}) · Pin(y ∩ X ′) otherwise;
and RCAR vector
qx =
{
qoutx for x 6∈ X ′;
qoutx′ · qinx for x ∈ X ′.
An example of a nontrivial module appeared in the game in Example 6.D
on page 129, which has message structure Y = {{x1, x2}, {x2, x3, x4}}; there
X ′ = {x3, x4} is a module. (Another nontrivial module is {x1, x3, x4}.) The set
{x3, x4} is the simplest kind of module: there is only one message that inter-
sects it, and so the condition is satisfied trivially. Somewhat more generally, if
in a message structure, all messages y that intersect with X ′ contain all of X ′,
then X ′ is a module. Applying the lemma to this case tells us that for logarith-
mic loss, the game can be simplified bymerging the outcomes in X ′ into a single
outcome; the original game’s worst-case optimal strategy will then distribute
the mass on this single outcome among the outcomes in X proportionally to
their marginals. We also saw in Example 6.D that for loss functions other than
logarithmic loss, the strategy found this way may not be worst-case optimal.
7.3 Outcome symmetry
Sometimes, the problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy is simplified
because certain ‘symmetry’ properties of the message structure and loss func-
tion allow us to conclude that worst-case optimal strategies satisfying an ad-
ditional condition must have the same symmetries.
7.3.1 Symmetry of loss functions
Wenow briefly return to the topic of loss functions to define a property wewill
need next.
For a probability distribution Q ∈ ∆X and x1, x2 distinct elements of X ,
define Qx1↔x2 as
Qx1↔x2(x) =

Q(x2) for x = x1;
Q(x1) for x = x2;
Q(x) otherwise,
and similarly for a contestant’s strategyQ ∈ Q by applying this transformation
to the conditional for each y. We say L is symmetric between x1 and x2 if for all
Q ∈ ∆X , we have L(x1,Q) = L(x2,Qx1↔x2) and L(x,Q) = L(x,Qx1↔x2) for all
x ∈ X \ {x1, x2}. If L is symmetric between x1 and x2 and between x2 and x3,
then it is also symmetric between x1 and x3, because ((Qx1↔x2)x2↔x3)x1↔x2 =
Qx1↔x3 . In words: we can apply the first symmetry, then the second, then the
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first again to find that we have exchanged x1 and x3. We also consider any loss
function to be symmetric between x and x for any x. So this symmetry of L
is an equivalence relation on X , and we are justified in talking about L being
symmetric on sets S ⊆ X , meaning that all pairs of elements of that set can be
exchanged. If L is symmetric on X , we say it is fully symmetric.
The loss functions we have seen so far were fully symmetric with the ex-
ception of the loss function in Example 6.K. The affine transformations of loss
functions discussed at the end of Section 6.5.2 may change the symmetries of a
loss function, while they do not changewhich strategies areworst-case optimal
for the two players. This means that sometimes, an asymmetric loss functions
can be transformed into an essentially equivalent loss functionwith better sym-
metry properties. The loss function from Example 6.K cannot be transformed
this way. Other loss functions that may exhibit this kind of inherent asymmetry
are given in the following two examples.
Example 7.A (Matrix loss). Given a [0,∞)-valued X × X matrix of losses A,
define hard matrix loss by
L(x,Q) =
{
Ax,x′ if Q(x′) = 1 for some x′;
∞ otherwise.
This generalizes hard 0-1 loss, which is obtained for the matrix A with zeroes
on the diagonal and ones elsewhere (except that the definition above may give
infinite loss for some Q, but a rational contestant would never use such Q). It
is symmetric between x1 and x2 if and only if swapping row x1 with x2 and
column x1 with x2 results in matrix A again; that is, if and only if Ax1,x1 =
Ax2,x2 , Ax1,x2 = Ax2,x1 , Ax′ ,x1 = Ax′ ,x2 , and Ax1,x′ = Ax2,x′ , for all x
′ ∈ X \
{x1, x2}.
We can also define randomized matrix loss as an analogous generalization
of randomized 0-1 loss, by taking an expectation over Q in hard matrix loss:
L(x,Q) = ∑
x′∈X
Q(x′)Ax,x′ .
It has the same symmetry properties as hardmatrix loss. The proof of Proposi-
tion 6.6 also applies to randomized matrix loss without modification, showing
that a Nash equilibrium exists in games using this loss function.
Example 7.B (Skewed logarithmic loss). Fix a vector c ∈ RX≥0, and define the
function F : ∆X → R≥0 by
F(P) := − ∑
x∈X
cxP(x) log P(x).
This is a sum of differentiable concave functions, and therefore differentiable
and concave; if c ∈ RX>0, it is strictly concave (in fact, it is also strictly concave if
c contains a single 0). We use the construction of Bregman scores in Grünwald
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and Dawid (2004, Section 3.5.4) to construct a proper loss function L having F
as its generalized entropy, and find
L(x,Q) = F(Q) + (ex −Q) · ∇F(Q) = −cx(1+ logQ(x)) + ∑
x′∈X
cx′Q(x
′),
where ex is the distribution that puts all mass on x. This loss function is strictly
proper if HL is strictly concave. Unlike logarithmic loss and its affine trans-
formations, it is not local for |X | > 2. Also, it is not generally fully symmetric,
but is symmetric between pairs of outcomes x1, x2 ∈ X with cx1 = cx2 .
7.3.2 Symmetry of KT-vectors
Using the definition of symmetry of loss functions introduced in the previous
section, we can now state the following lemma.
Lemma 7.3 (Loss exchange). Consider a game with y1, y2 ∈ Y , y1 \ y2 = {x1},
y2 \ y1 = {x2}, HL finite and continuous and L symmetric between x1 and x2. If a
worst-case optimal strategy P∗ for the quizmaster exists with P∗(x1, y1) > 0, then all
KT-vectors λ∗ satisfy λ∗x1 ≤ λ∗x2 .
When two messages y1, y2 ∈ Y satisfy y1 \ y2 = {x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2},
we say that they differ by the exchange of one outcome.
In order to find worst-case optimal strategies, we would like to be able to
relate λ∗x1 to λ
∗
x2 whenever P
∗(y1) > 0, but the previous lemma requires some-
thing stronger: that P∗(x1, y1) > 0. We call a strategy P degenerate if there
exist y1, y2 ∈ Y , y1 \ y2 = {x1}, y2 \ y1 = {x2} as in the above lemma with
P(y1) > 0 and P(y2) > 0 but P(x1, y1) = 0. Otherwise, P is called nondegener-
ate; then P(y1) > 0, P(y2) > 0 implies P(x1, y1) > 0, P(x2, y2) > 0.
We similarly want a term for the symmetry conditions on L that allow us
to apply Lemma 7.3 to any pair of messages in some set Y ′ ⊆ Y satisfying
the statement of the lemma. We say L is symmetric with respect to exchanges in
Y ′ if L is symmetric between any pair of outcomes x1, x2 such that messages
y1, y2 ∈ Y ′ exist with y1 \ y2 = {x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2}.
Lemma 7.4 (Transfer of λ∗). Consider a game and a worst-case optimal strategy P∗
for the quizmaster such that HL finite and continuous and L symmetric with respect
to exchanges in {y ∈ Y | P∗(y) > 0}. Then we have one of the following:
• If P∗ is nondegenerate, then λ∗x1 = λ
∗
x2 for all x1, x2 such that messages y1, y2 ∈Y exist with y1 \ y2 = {x1}, y2 \ y1 = {x2}, P∗(y1) > 0, and P∗(y2) > 0;
• If P∗ is degenerate, then a nondegenerate worst-case optimal strategy P′ exists
with {y ∈ Y | P′(y) > 0} ( {y ∈ Y | P∗(y) > 0}.
Example 7.C (Degenerate P∗). Consider the game
P∗ x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 1/8 2/8 − 0
y2 − 2/8 1/8 0
y3 0 − 0 2/8
px 1/8 4/8 1/8 2/8
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with loss function
L(x,Q) =
{
1−Q(x) for x 6= x4;
1 for x = x4.
This instance of randomized matrix loss (introduced in Example 7.A; here, the
lossmatrix A has Ax,x = 0 for x ∈ {x1, x2, x3} and equals 1 elsewhere) gives the
contestant no incentive to predict Q(x4) > 0, always assigning him the same
loss if that outcome does occur. It is not fully symmetric, but it is symmetric
between x1, x2 and x3, so symmetric with respect to exchanges in Y . The strat-
egy P∗ given in the table is worst-case optimal, aswitnessed by λ∗ = (1, 0, 1, 1).
Though y1 and y3 differ by the exchange of one outcome (x2 for x3) and have
positive probability, we have λ∗2 6= λ∗3 ; similar for y2 and y3 and λ∗1 6= λ∗2 .
In this example, the quizmaster has worst-case optimal strategies P′ 6= P∗
with P′(y3) = 0, dividing the mass P∗(x4, y3) among P′(x4, y1) and P′(x4, y2).
7.4 The RCAR characterization for general loss
functions
We saw in Theorem 6.10 that for logarithmic loss, worst-case optimal strategies
for the quizmaster can be characterized in terms of a simple condition, the
RCAR condition (6.10). We also saw that sometimes (in Examples 6.B and 6.C
on pages 127 and 129, but not in Example 6.D), those same strategies were also
worst-case optimal for other loss functions. This suggests that even for some
types of games where Theorem 6.10 does not apply, it is possible to recognize
worst-case optimal strategies using the easily verifiable RCAR condition. We
show that there are two classes of message structures in which this is possible
regardless of the marginal, and explore the consequences in Section 7.4.3.
7.4.1 Graph games
The first of these classes consist of all message structures Y for which each
message contains at most two outcomes. After removing singleton messages
(which are either dominated or are decomposable from the rest of the game),
we have |y| = 2 for all y ∈ Y . This corresponds to a simple undirected graph
(that is, a graph containing no loops or multiple edges) with a node for each
outcome in X and an edge for each message in Y . For this reason, a game
where eachmessage in Y contains at most two outcomes is called a graph game.
Many gameswe saw in the examples in Chapter 6 were graph games. Their
underlying graphs are shown in Figure 7.2.
Theorem 7.5 (RCAR for graph games). If each message in Y contains at most
two outcomes and P∗ ∈ P is an RCAR strategy, then P∗ is worst-case optimal for
all L symmetric with respect to exchanges in {y ∈ Y | |y| = 2} with HL finite and
continuous. If additionally HL is strictly concave, only such P∗ are worst-case optimal
for L.
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(a) Example 6.B (Monty Hall)
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 y2 y3
(b) Example 6.C
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(c) Examples 6.F and 6.H
x1 x2
x3x4
y1
y2
y3
y4
(d) Example 6.G
Figure 7.2: Underlying graphs of the graph games seen in Chapter 6
The statement of the theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 6.10 in
Section 6.5.2, and the restrictions on L in the present theorem (except for sym-
metry) were also seen in the previous theorem. Sufficient conditions for these
restrictions to hold were given by Lemma 6.1 in Section 6.3 (HL finite and con-
tinuous) and Lemma 6.13 in Section 6.5.2 (strict concavity of HL).
The intuition behind the proof is that for binary predictions Q, the prob-
ability assigned by Q to one outcome determines the probability Q assigns to
the other outcome. Thus all loss functions are essentially local when used to
assess such predictions, and their behaviour is similar to logarithmic loss.
7.4.2 Matroid games
The other class is that of matroid games. A matroid over a finite ground set X
can be defined by a nonempty family Y of subsets of X (the bases of the ma-
troid) satisfying the basis exchange property (Oxley, 2011, Corollary 1.2.5): for
all y1, y2 ∈ Y and x1 ∈ y1 \ y2,
(y1 \ {x1}) ∪ {x2} ∈ Y for some x2 ∈ y2 \ y1. (7.1)
In words, for any pair of messages, if an outcome that is not in the second
message is removed from the first message, it must be possible to replace it by
an outcome from the second message that is not in the first message, in such a
way that the resulting set of outcomes is again a message.
A matroid game is a game in which Y is the set of bases of a matroid. The
Monty Hall game (Example 6.B) is a matroid game: taking one of the twomes-
sages and replacing the outcome unique to it by the only other outcome will
result in the other message. By our definition of a game, it is required in ad-
dition to (7.1) that each element of the ground set X of the matroid occurs in
some basis.
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Many alternative characterizations of matroids exist. For example, a ma-
troid with ground set X and bases Y can also be represented by its family of
independent sets I = {I ⊆ X | I ⊆ y for some y ∈ Y}, and a different set of
axioms analogous to (7.1) characterizes whether a given set I is the family of
independent sets of some matroid.
The concept of a matroid was introduced by Whitney (1935) to study the
abstract properties of the notion of dependence, as seen for example in lin-
ear algebra and graph theory (explained below). Different characterizations of
the concept, applied to different examples, were given independently by other
authors, but then turned out to be equivalent to matroids. One field where
matroids play an important role is combinatorial optimization. We refer to
Schrijver (2003b, Section 39.10b) for extensive historical notes.
We give two example classes of matroids, taken from Schrijver (2003b, Sec-
tion 39.4):
• Given an m× n matrix A over some vector space, let X = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and I the family of all subsets I of X such that the set of column vectors
with index in I is linearly independent. Then I is the family of inde-
pendent sets of a matroid. A subset that spans the column space of A is
a basis of this matroid.
• Given a simple undirected graph G, letX be its set of edges and I consist
of all acyclic subsets of X . Then I is the family of independent sets of a
matroid. This matroid is called the cycle matroid of G. The bases are the
maximal independent sets; if G is connected, these are its spanning trees.
One interesting class of games for which Y are the bases of a matroid is the
class of negation games. In such a game, each element ofY is of the formX \ {x}
for some x. (Not all sets of this form need to be in Y .) Thus the quizmaster will
tell the contestant, “The true outcome is not x,” as in the original Monty Hall
problemwhere one of the three doors is opened to reveal a goat. A family Y of
this form satisfies (7.1) trivially: for y1, y2 distinct elements of Y , there is only
one choice for each of x1 and x2, and with these choices we get (y1 \ {x1}) ∪
{x2} = y2 ∈ Y .
Another class of matroids is formed by the uniform matroids, in which every
set of some fixed size k is a basis. These also have a natural interpretationwhen
they occur as the message structure of a game: the quizmaster is allowed to
leave any set of k doors shut.
As the following theorem shows, matroid games share with graph games
the property that RCAR strategies are worst-case optimal for a wide variety
of loss functions. Section 7.5 will provide an intuition of why these message
structures have this property, and the proof of the theorem uses some termin-
ology introduced in that section.
Theorem 7.6 (RCAR for matroid games). If Y are the bases of a matroid and P∗ ∈
P is an RCAR strategy, then P∗ is worst-case optimal for all L symmetric with respect
to exchanges inY withHL finite and continuous. If additionallyHL is strictly concave,
only such P∗ are worst-case optimal for L.
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7.4.3 Loss invariance
We saw in the preceding sections that in graph and matroid games, worst-
case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are characterized by the RCARprop-
erty. This property does not depend on what loss function is used in the game
(though the theorems do put some conditions on the loss function, such as
some symmetry requirements). Consequently, in such games, strategies exist
that are worst-case optimal regardless of what loss function is used (at least,
for a large class of loss functions). We call this phenomenon loss invariance.
For such message structures, we can really think of the worst-case optimal
strategies as ‘conditioning’ (as a purely probability-based operation) rather
than as worst-case optimal strategies for some game. This conditioning oper-
ation can be seen as the generalization of naive conditioning to message struc-
tures other than partitions (where naive conditioning gives the right answer).
Unlike naive conditioning, which requires just the distribution p and the mes-
sage y to compute P(x | y), we also need the message structure Y to compute
that conditional probability. But like naive conditioning, we do not need to
fix a loss function in order to talk about the worst-case optimal prediction of x
given a message y.
A subtlety appears when improper loss functions are considered. Our the-
orems show that the worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster are char-
acterized independently of the loss function; however, the worst-case optimal
strategies for the contestant will not necessarily coincide with these if the loss
function is not proper. In this case, loss invariance tells us that the loss function
does not affect what the contestant should believe about the true outcome, but it
may affect how the contestant translates this belief into a prediction.
In the cases of graph andmatroid games, our analysis ofworst-case optimal
strategies becomes more widely applicable in situations where the probability
updating game is really played by two players (as opposed to being a theoret-
ical tool for defining safe updating strategies):
• the same strategies continue to be worst-case optimal if the two players
use different loss functions (so that the game is no longer zero-sum);
• both playerswill be able to play optimallywithout knowing the loss func-
tion(s) in use.
This is true for the Monty Hall game (Example 6.B), which lies in the inter-
section of graph and matroid games. This provides some justification for the
prevailing intuition that the Monty Hall problem should be analysed using
probability theory, without mention of loss functions.
Theorems 7.5 and 7.6 apply only to loss functions that are sufficiently sym-
metric and for which HL is continuous and finite. Wemake no claim about the
question whether RCAR strategies are also worst-case optimal for loss func-
tions that do not satisfy these properties. However, note that by Lemma 6.14,
sometimes affine transformations can be used to convert an asymmetric loss
function into a symmetric one without affecting the players’ strategies.
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Lemma 6.14 also shows that a limited form of loss invariance holds regard-
less of the message structure. If the players are using different affine trans-
formations of the same loss function (for example, of logarithmic loss; this
corresponds to Kelly gambling where the pay-offs for the contestant are dif-
ferent from those for the quizmaster), both players can play optimally without
knowing the transformations in use.
An obvious question that remains is: are there any other classes of message
structure for which we have loss invariance? This is answered in the negative
by the following theorem.
Theorem 7.7. If a connected game containing no dominated messages is neither a
matroid game nor a graph game, then there exists a marginal such that no strategy P
for the quizmaster is worst-case optimal for both logarithmic loss and Brier loss.
7.5 Finding RCAR strategies
We have now seen three situations in which worst-case optimal strategies for
the quizmaster can be characterized using the RCAR condition: if L is local
and proper (such as logarithmic loss; see Theorem 6.10), if Y is a graph (The-
orem 7.5), and if Y is a matroid (Theorem 7.6). Thus in order to find a worst-
case optimal strategy, it would be helpful to be able to find RCAR strategies.
We also saw in Theorem 7.7 that if Y is neither a graph nor a matroid, there
exist pairs of marginals and loss functions for which RCAR strategies are not
worst-case optimal. But this does not hold for all marginals and loss functions,
so even if L is not logarithmic loss and Y is not a graph or a matroid (i.e. if no
RCAR theorem holds), it may be worthwhile to look for an RCAR strategy, and
check if it is optimal using the results of Chapter 6.
In this section, we establish a computational procedure that tries to find
an RCAR strategy given a message structure and a marginal. We do not call
this procedure an ‘algorithm’ because, unless the input satisfies special condi-
tions, it may not be applicable, or give an inconclusive answer. In Chapter 8,
we will see algorithms that efficiently find RCAR strategies. However, these
algorithms are restricted to the cases of graph and matroid games, and un-
derstanding those algorithms does not give an understanding of many of the
problems we may run into when looking for RCAR strategies. To gain such
understanding, the present section is more useful: in the course of developing
our computational procedure, we acquire more insight into why sometimes
the RCAR property characterizes worst-case optimal strategies P∗, and what
makes graph and matroid games special.
7.5.1 Induced colourings
Fix a set Y ′ ⊆ Y with⋃y∈Y ′ y = X , and assume that an RCAR strategy P exists
with support YP := {y ∈ Y | P(y) > 0} equal to Y ′. (For example, we may
in many cases take Y ′ = Y .) It follows from the RCAR property that P(x |
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y) > 0 for all x ∈ y ∈ YP, so in particular that P is nondegenerate. We will
now consider different properties of YP that may help us find P. The classes
of message structures defined by these properties, and the inclusion relations
between them that we establish here, were shown graphically in Figure 7.1 on
page 151, and examples are given in Figure 7.3.
Consider the system of linear equations
∑
x∈y
qx = 1 for all y ∈ Y ′. (7.2)
A positive solution q of this system shows the existence of an RCAR strategy
with support Y ′ and RCAR vector q for some marginal p; the nonexistence
of such a solution implies that no such strategies exist for any positive mar-
ginal. (A similar system is studied in the CAR literature, where it plays a role
in characterizingmessage structures that admit a CAR coarseningmechanism;
see Grünwald and Halpern (2003); Jaeger (2005b); Gill and Grünwald (2008).
Since we study RCAR rather than CAR, the roles of outcomes and messages
are reversed here. We say more about this correspondence in Section 7.6.1,
where we relate some of the classes defined below to classes defined in the
CAR literature.)
Define a colouring as a partition of X . We say a colouring is induced by a set
of messages Y ′ if the system of linear equations (7.2) has at least one solution
q with qx > 0 for all x, and x, x′ are in the same class of the colouring (‘have
the same colour’) if and only if qx = qx′ for all such solutions to that system. If
the system has at least one positive solution, then the colouring induced by Y ′
is unique; otherwise, there is no induced colouring.
We say a colouring is homogeneous on Y ′ if the number of outcomes of each
colour is the same for every message in Y ′ (for example, if each message con-
sists of one ‘red’ and two ‘blue’ outcomes). This is only possible ifY ′ is uniform:
all messages in Y ′ have the same size. We are interested in Y ′ whose induced
colouring is homogeneous. One class of such Y ′ that is easy to recognize con-
sists of those Y ′ that are exchange-connected: for each pair of messages in Y ′,
there is a path of messages in Y ′ (an exchange-path) whose adjacent messages
differ by the exchange of one outcome as in the conditions of Lemma 7.3 and
7.4.
Figure 7.3 illustrates these definitions with a few examples. The tables are
of the same form as those used to display message structures in previous ex-
amples, except that the cells now show a colouring instead of a strategy for the
quizmaster.
The message structure shown in Figure 7.3a has no induced colouring: any
solution of (7.2) must have qx2 = 0, so there is no positive solution, and it
follows that no RCAR strategy P exists with P(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y ′. On the
other hand, any uniform game has an induced colouring, because there is at
least one solution to (7.2):
qx = 1/k for all x ∈ X , (7.3)
where k is the size of the game’s messages.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
y1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − −
y2 − − ∗ ∗ −
y3 − − − ∗ ∗
y4 ∗ − − − ∗
(a) No induced colouring
x1 x2 x3 x4
y1 ∗ ∗ − −
y2 − ∗ ∗ ∗
(b) Induced colouring but not uniform
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
y1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − − −
y2 − − ∗ ∗ ∗ −
y3 ∗ − − − ∗ ∗
(c) Uniform but induced colouring not
homogeneous
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
y1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − − −
y2 − − ∗ ∗ ∗ −
y3 ∗ − − − ∗ ∗
y4 − ∗ − ∗ − ∗
(d) Homogeneous induced colouring but
not exchange-connected
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
y1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − −
y2 − ∗ ∗ ∗ −
y3 − − ∗ ∗ ∗
(e) Exchange-connected but not a matroid
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
y1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − −
y2 ∗ ∗ − ∗ −
y3 ∗ − ∗ ∗ −
y4 ∗ − ∗ − ∗
y5 ∗ − − ∗ ∗
(f) Matroid
Figure 7.3: Examples of messages structures and their induced colourings
Figures 7.3b and 7.3c are examples of message structures that do have an
induced colouring, but one that is not homogeneous. In both these examples,
all outcomes have different colours in the induced colouring, because no pair
of outcomes necessarily has the same value of q in a solution of (7.2). The
message structure shown in Figure 7.3c will be revisited in Example 7.D in the
next section.
The three remaining message structures do have homogeneous induced
colourings. Figure 7.3d shows that it is possible for amessage structure to have
a homogeneous induced colouring without being exchange-connected. In this
message structure, which adds the message y4 to the structure in Figure 7.3c,
it is still the case that each pair of messages differs by two exchanges. Yet the
added message changes the induced colouring: for example, qx1 = qx4 follows
because by the equalities from (7.2) on y1 and y3, 1− qx1 = qx2 + qx3 = qx5 +
qx6 , and by y2 and y4, 1− qx4 = qx3 + qx5 = qx2 + qx6 ; thus 2− 2qx1 = 2−
2qx4 = qx2 + qx3 + qx5 + qx6 .
The message structure shown in Figure 7.3e is exchange-connected. For
such structures, it easy to determine the induced (homogeneous) colouring:
if messages y1, y2 differ by the exchange of one outcome (x1 for x2), then any
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solution of (7.2) must satisfy qx1 = qx2 , so such x1, x2 must be the same colour.
Any vector q that satisfies all these equalities and satisfies ∑x∈y qx = 1 for any
one message y ∈ Y ′ satisfies (7.2) for all messages in Y ′, so this determines
the induced colouring. This colouring is clearly homogeneous on any pair of
message that differ by the exchange of one outcome; because exchange-paths
exist between all pairs of messages, it follows that the induced colouring of an
exchange-connected game is homogeneous.
The structure in Figure 7.3e is not a matroid: there is no outcome in y3 \ y1
that can be added to y1 \ {x2} = {x1, x3} to make a message. If a message
y4 = {x1, x3, x5} is added, the resulting message structure is a matroid.
Finally, the class of matroid games is a subclass of exchange-connected
games: (7.1) requires the existence of not just one, but possibly many different
exchange-paths between any pair of messages. Negation matroids and uni-
form matroids were already described in the previous section as examples of
matroids; Figure 7.3f shows another example.
The following lemma gives two alternate characterizations of the induced
colouring of a matroid. The first of these is in terms of a concept from ma-
troid theory: the colour classes of the induced colouring coincide with the
2-connected components of the matroid. (We refer to Oxley (2011) for the defini-
tion. Inmatroid theory, these components are usually simply called ‘connected
components’, but we keep the 2 to avoid confusion with the notion of connec-
tedness used in Lemma 7.1.) We observed above (when discussing Figure 7.3e)
that if messages exist that differ in the exchange of one outcome, then the out-
comes being exchanged must be the same colour. The second characterization
shows that formatroids, the converse also holds. Finally, the lemma shows that
every colour class of a matroid is a module as defined in Section 7.2.2 (though
not every module is a colour class).
Lemma 7.8 (Matroid colouring). Given a matroid (X ,Y) and two elements x1, x2
∈ X , the following statements are equivalent:
1. x1 and x2 are in the same colour class of the induced colouring of Y ;
2. x1 and x2 are in the same 2-connected component of (X ,Y);
3. There exist y1, y2 ∈ Y such that y1 \ y2 = {x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2}.
Further, if C ⊆ X is a colour class of the induced colouring of Y , then C is a module.
7.5.2 A computational procedure
Consider the case that Y ′ induces a homogeneous colouring, and assume as
before that an RCAR strategy P exists with YP = Y ′. Then the RCAR vector q
must be a solution of the linear system (7.2). Additionally, P (and thus q) must
agree with the game’s marginal p. These constraints allow us to compute the
vector q directly.
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Let S be the set of all outcomes with a particular colour. Then there is some
value qS such that P(x | y) = qx = qS for all x ∈ S, x ∈ y ∈ Y . Let kS = |S ∩ y|
(this is independent of y by homogeneity). We must have
kSqS = kS∑
y
P(y)qS = ∑
x∈S
∑
y3x
P(y)P(x | y) = ∑
x∈S
px,
so that qS can be computed by
qS =
1
kS
∑
x∈S
px. (7.4)
A simple case is when the induced colouring assigns the same colour to all out-
comes: thenwe see that as in (7.3), we get qx = 1/k for all x ∈ X , where k is the
size of themessages. When a colour consists of just one outcome x (whichmust
then be an element of everymessage for the colouring to be homogeneous), we
find qx = px.
If an RCAR strategy P exists with YP = Y ′ where Y ′ induces a homo-
geneous colouring, then P must have the vector q given by (7.4) as its RCAR
vector. However, it may be the case that no such strategy exists. To find P if it
exists, we still need to determine the P(y)’s. We can find a nonnegative solu-
tion or determine that no nonnegative solution exists by solving the following
linear programming problem (which we can do in polynomial time):
maximize ∑
y∈Y
ry
subject to ∑
y3x
ry ≤ pxqx for all x ∈ X ,
(7.5)
with r ∈ RY≥0. If a vector achieving ∑y∈Y ry = 1 is found, we have a strategy P
with r as the marginal on messages (P(x, y) = qxry for all x ∈ y). If no vector
r achieves the value 1, there is no RCAR strategy P satisfying the assumption
YP = Y ′.
Now we may want to apply this procedure in practice to find an RCAR
strategy for a given game. (Note that by Lemma 6.11, such a strategy always
exists.)
When doing so we encounter two problems: we need to provide the pro-
cedure with an Y ′ such that ⋃Y ′ = X , and even if we have an idea about
what Y ′ to take, it may not have a homogeneous induced colouring. Still, let
us investigate what happens if we just guess anY ′. Wewill then encounter one
of the cases 1, 2a-2c which we now describe. Briefly, in case 1, the procedure
cannot be used because q cannot be determined, and in case 2a and 2b it gives
an inconclusive result; in case 2c we have success. We now consider each case
in detail.
1. Y ′ has no homogeneous induced colouring.
In this case, the procedure is not applicable. Indeed, finding an RCAR vector
may be amore difficult type of problem, as illustrated by the following example
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which uses the message structure from Figure 7.3c. (This example is a uniform
game; the class of uniform games is the smallest class among those identified
in the previous section that contains the class of games with a homogeneous
induced colouring.)
Example 7.D (Irrational RCAR vector). Consider. . .
P x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6
y1 1/10 1/10 310 − 110
√
5 − − −
y2 − − 110
√
5− 110 1/5 110
√
5− 110 −
y3 1/10 − − − 310 − 110
√
5 1/10
qx 14 +
1
20
√
5 14 +
1
20
√
5 12 − 110
√
5 15
√
5 12 − 110
√
5 14 +
1
20
√
5
px 1/5 1/10 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/10
. . .with marginal on the messages P(y1) = P(y3) = 12 − 110
√
5, P(y2) = 15
√
5.
The vector q is also shown, so the RCAR property can be easily verified. We
see that the RCAR strategy P and RCAR vector q (both of which are unique)
contain irrational numbers, while the marginal p was rational. The solution
techniques used in this section (the formula (7.4) for q and linear optimization
for (7.5)) do not yield irrational results when given rational inputs, so this ex-
ample shows that these techniques will not suffice in general for games that do
not have a homogeneous induced colouring.
Conclusion: in this case, an RCAR strategy P with YP = Y ′ may exist, but
it may be not be easy to find. So in general, for such Y ′, we do not know how
to efficiently determine if such a P exists.
2. Y ′ does have a homogeneous induced colouring.
In this case, we can use (7.4) to compute a candidate q for the RCAR vector. We
distinguish three subcases:
2a. If Y ′ 6= Y , there may be a message y ∈ Y \ Y ′ for which ∑x∈y qx > 1.
This may happen because the described procedure ignores the existence of
messages not in Y ′. However, the RCAR condition (6.10) puts an inequality
constraint on ∑x∈y qx even for messages y with P(y) = 0. If the vector q com-
puted by (7.4) does not satisfy this constraint, then q is not an RCAR vector: we
chose the wrong Y ′.
2b. No solution r of (7.5) achieves ∑y∈Y ry = 1.
This also means that our choice of Y ′ was incorrect.
2c. Otherwise, q is an RCAR vector, and together with r determines an RCAR strat-
egy P.
In this case, we can report success.
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In cases 2a and 2b, Y ′ has a homogeneous induced colouring but we find
that no RCAR strategy P exists with YP = Y ′. Then we may face two prob-
lems. First, it is not clear how we might choose a different Y ′ on which to try
the procedure next. For small message structures, it may be feasible to try all
candidates. For larger structures, the number of possible choices grows expo-
nentially, and a more efficient way of searching would be needed.
The second problem is that in general, Y ′might not induce a homogeneous
colouring even though Y does. For example, if Y is the message structure
shown in Figure 7.3e, but there is no RCAR strategy P with YP = Y for our
marginal, we have to conclude that the RCAR strategymust haveYP = {y1, y3}
(because this is the only other choice of Y ′ that satisfies ⋃Y ′ = X ). However,
this message structure is no longer exchange-connected, and in fact does not
have a homogeneous induced colouring, so that we end up in case 1.
In Section 7.5.3, we will see a subclass of matroid games for which the
procedure is guaranteed to succeed for the choice Y ′ = Y . So for that class
of inputs, the procedure discussed here is an efficient algorithm for finding
an RCAR strategy (which is worst-case optimal for any loss function by The-
orem 7.6).
In Chapter 8, we will see efficient algorithms for graph games and matroid
games. The two algorithms in Section 8.3.8 (graphs) and Section 8.5 (matroids)
can also be viewed as instances of the computational procedure in this section:
both algorithms essentially compute q and r aswe did here; then, if∑y∈Y r < 1,
they pick a new setY ′, guided by properties of the linear optimization problem
(7.5). The choice of Y ′ is such that each new Y ′ is a subset of the previous Y ′
(i.e. no backtracking is needed), and such that case 2a will never occur.
Case 1 will never occur either for these algorithms: the chosen Y ′ will al-
ways have a homogeneous induced colouring. This happens for different rea-
sons for the two cases of graph and matroid games. These reasons shed light
onwhatmakes graphs andmatroids special as message structures of probabil-
ity updating games, so we conclude this section by giving brief explanations.
For graphs Any connected component of a graph is additionally exchange-
connected, and thus induces a homogeneous colouring. While some choices of
Y ′ may produce a disconnected graph (X ,Y ′), each component of this graph
will have a homogeneous induced colouring, and the algorithm can be applied
to each of these components recursively. (We saw such a decomposition in
Example 6.C on page 129, where Y was exchange-connected, but the strategy
that was worst-case optimal for the three standard loss functions used only
two disjoint messages.)
Formatroids Onamatroid game, for anyRCAR strategy P,YP determines a
homogeneous colouring. (This colouring is not induced in the usual sense, but
is uniquely determined by the equalities on YP combined with inequalities for
Y \ YP; see the proof of Theorem 7.6 for details.) The conditional probabilities
P(x | y) respect this colouring. This property is stronger than that of graph
games, where each component of YP induces a homogeneous colouring, but
YP as a whole might not.
168 Chapter 7. Properties of Message Structures
7.5.3 Subclasses of matroid games
We now describe a class of games for which a worst-case optimal strategy can
be completely computed using the procedure from the previous section, be-
cause regardless of the marginal, no messages will need to be discarded.
A message structure Y is called a partition matroid if X can be partitioned
into nonempty sets S1, . . . , Sk such that Y contains precisely those subsets ofX
that take one element from each of the sets Si (Oxley, 2011). This class forms a
subclass of matroids, so if Y is a partition matroid, it induces a homogeneous
colouring. Using Lemma 7.8, it is easy to see that this colouring is given by the
sets Si. An example of a partition matroid is given in Figure 7.4a; the matroid
we saw in Figure 7.3f is not a partition matroid.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
y1 ∗ − ∗ − −
y2 ∗ − − ∗ −
y3 ∗ − − − ∗
y4 − ∗ ∗ − −
y5 − ∗ − ∗ −
y6 − ∗ − − ∗
(a) Partition matroid but not a sunflower
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
y1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − −
y2 ∗ ∗ − ∗ −
y3 ∗ ∗ − − ∗
(b) Sunflower with singleton petals
Figure 7.4: More examples of messages structures and their induced colour-
ings
Because a partitionmatroid induces a homogeneous colouring, we can per-
form the procedure described in the previous section to find for each x that
qx = ∑x′∈Si px′ , where Si is the set containing x. Now a solution for the P(y)’s
that satisfies ∑y3x P(y)qx = px always exists:
P(y) =∏
x∈y
px
qx
.
In words, this means that given the true outcome x, it is worst-case optimal
for the quizmaster to choose a message by randomly sampling an outcome
from each set Si 63 x according to the marginal probabilities conditioned on
Si, and give the message consisting of x and these outcomes. The existence
of this strategy shows that, for partition matroid games, the procedure always
succeeds in finding a worst-case optimal strategy for the choice Y ′ = Y .
What does a message Y generated by this strategy tell the contestant about
the true (random) outcome X? Clearly, it means that if X ∈ Si for some i, then
X must be the unique outcome in Y ∩ Si. Of course, the contestant does not
know which of these sets contains X. Write I for the (random) index of the
set containing X. Does Y tell the contestant anything about I? The answer
is no: For each index i, regardless of whether I = i, the outcome in Y ∩ Si
will be randomly distributed according to the marginal p conditioned on Si,
independently of Y ∩ Sj for j 6= i. This implies that Y is independent of I.
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Then for each outcome x ∈ Y, the probability that X = x given message Y
equals the probability that I = i, where i is the index of the set containing
x. These are exactly the probabilities that appear in the RCAR vector q. We
know from Theorem 7.6 that the same is true also if the quizmaster is using a
worst-case optimal strategy different from the one described above.
For more general message structures, the quizmaster may have to discard a
message, so that his worst-case optimal strategy cannot be computed so easily:
Theorem 7.9. If a game induces a homogeneous colouring but is not a partition ma-
troid, then there exist a marginal and a message y ∈ Y such that P(y) = 0 for all
RCAR strategies P.
We distinguish one subclass of the class of partition matroid games. A
message structure in which the intersection of any two messages is constant is
called a sunflower (Jukna, 2001). The common intersection is called the core, and
each set difference between amember and the core is called a petal. An example
of a sunflowers with singleton petals is shown in Figure 7.4b. The Monty Hall
game itself (Example 6.B) is another example, and the version of the Monty
Hall game with 100 doors from Section 1.2 is a sunflower with 99 petals.
If a message structure is a sunflower with singleton petals, it is a partition
matroid: each outcome in the core forms a (singleton) class of the partition, and
another class contains all the petals. Among partition matroids, sunflowers
can be recognized by the property that all of its colour classes except one are
singleton outcomes. For this class of games, the strategy P described above is
the unique RCAR strategy: a strategy P′ with P′(y) 6= P(y) for some y ∈ Y
would disagree with the unique RCAR vector.
The message structure shown in Figure 7.4a is a partition matroid, but not
a sunflower. Because at least two of its colour classes are not singletons, such
a message structure contains a cycle of four messages in which neighbouring
messages differ by the exchange of one outcome, but the pairs of messages on
opposite sides of the cycle differ by two outcomes. (Example 6.G on page 134
is the simplest member of this class of message structures, consisting of just
this cycle. In Figure 7.4a, there are three such cycles; one is (y1, y2, y5, y4).) For
this type of game, the strategy P found above can be modified by increasing
P(y) for two messages at opposite sides of the cycle, and decreasing it by the
same amount for the other two, leaving the conditionals unchanged. Thus P
is not the unique RCAR strategy. In fact, RCAR strategies exist with P(y) = 0
for some y ∈ Y . For such a strategy P, we have YP ( Y , but we do still have
∑x∈y qx = 1 even for messages y with P(y) = 0.
7.6 Discussion and conclusion
7.6.1 Connections to CAR
Recall from Section 6.1 the CAR condition, which characterizes the set of coars-
ening mechanisms (i.e. quizmaster strategies) for which naive conditioning is
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optimal for the contestant. Part of the literature on CAR also addresses the
question of whether, for a given message structure, a quizmaster strategy ex-
ists that satisfies the CAR condition. A result of Gill et al. (1997) suggests that
this is always possible, but Grünwald and Halpern (2003) clarify that this is
true only in a very strict sense: for some message structures, a CAR mechan-
ism only exists if some outcomes get probability 0 (so that arguably, we are
really dealing with a different message structure). We saw in Example 6.B on
page 114 that this is the case in the Monty Hall problem. Further results were
found by Jaeger (2005b) and Gill and Grünwald (2008).
Gill and Grünwald introduce the concept of a uniform multicover to charac-
terize rational CAR mechanisms (and they also show that all CAR mechanisms
are finite mixtures of rational CAR mechanisms). This combinatorial struc-
ture is closely related to our uniform games, and to games having an induced
colouring.
A uniform multicover of X is a multiset of nonempty subsets y ⊆ X such
that each x ∈ X is contained in exactly k such sets (counting multiplicities).
Here k is a constant, the same for all outcomes. The translation to our RCAR
case involves switching the roles of outcomes and messages. Define the dual
of a message structure (X ,Y) by X ′ := Y and Y ′ := {y′x | x ∈ X} where
y′x := {y ∈ X ′ | y 3 x}, again allowing multiplicities in Y ′. (This operation
corresponds to taking the transpose of the incidence matrix of Y .)
It is easy to see that the dual of a uniform game is a uniform multicover.
Conversely, if we take the dual of a uniform multicover, respecting its multi-
plicities (i.e. for each distinct message in the uniformmulticover, the dual con-
tains a number of outcomes equal to that message’s multiplicity), we obtain a
uniform game, though one that may have duplicate messages. If we discard
these messages to conform to our usual definition of a game, where multipli-
cities were not allowed in the set of messages, the result is still a uniform game.
But if we then take the dual a second time, we will retrieve a different uniform
multicover from the one we started out with. Thus if we want the operation of
taking the dual to be its own inverse and want to restrict ourselves to games
without duplicate messages, we must also restrict ourselves to uniform mul-
ticovers without duplicate outcomes.
Similarly, wemaywant to forbid duplicate messages on the side of uniform
multicovers. If we take the dual of a uniform multicover but ignore its multi-
plicities, the resulting game may not be uniform, but it will have an induced
colouring: if the multiplicity of each message y ∈ Y in the uniformmulticover
is denoted by ny, then for its dual (X ′,Y ′), the RCAR vector qx′ = qy = ny/k is
a positive solution to (7.2). For example, in the dual of the uniform multicover
shown in Figure 7.5, qwould assign probability 2/3 to the single outcome cor-
responding to both messages y1 and y2, and 1/3 to each of the other three
outcomes.
A different question is under what conditions on the message structure
CAR is guaranteed to hold. Grünwald and Halpern (2003, Proposition 4.1)
show that this class of message structures is much more limited: this is the
case only if Y is a partition of X . For other message structures, the quizmaster
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x1 x2 x3
y1 ∗ ∗ −
y2 ∗ ∗ −
y3 ∗ − ∗
y4 − ∗ ∗
y5 − − ∗
Figure 7.5: A uniform multicover with a multiple message y1 = y2. If we take
the dual and respect multiplicities, we obtain a uniform game; if we ignore
multiplicities, the game obtained is not uniform but does have an induced col-
ouring.
can choose from a nontrivial set of strategies. Among these strategies, the CAR
ones and the worst-case optimal ones will in general not coincide, so that naive
conditioning may not be worst-case optimal. Whether naive conditioning is a
worst-case optimal strategy for given marginal and loss function can easily be
checked using our theorems from the previous chapter.
7.6.2 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seenmany classes ofmessage structures, andwe found
interesting qualitative differences between probability updating games with
message structures fromdifferent classes. An overview of these results is given
in Table 7.1. Possibly the most important of these is the property of loss invari-
ance, shared by graph and matroid games and discussed in Section 7.4.3.
Also, some progress was made in this chapter on the topic of efficiently
finding worst-case optimal strategies. First, the results of Section 7.2 can be
used to simplify some message structures. If the resulting message structures
have homogeneous induced colourings, we may apply the computational pro-
cedure of Section 7.5.2; however, this procedure is not guaranteed to produce
an answer except in the special case of partitionmatroids. In Chapter 8, wewill
see algorithms that efficiently find worst-case optimal strategies for the classes
of games for which loss invariance holds: graph and matroid games.
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Table 7.1: Results for different classes of message structures
Class Results Details
(no induced
colouring)
all RCAR strategiesmust discard ames-
sage
page 162
induced colouring occur as ‘duals’ of uniformmulticovers
when ignoring multiplicities
page 170
uniform duals of uniform multicovers without
duplicate outcomes
page 170
homogeneous
induced colouring
computational procedure to findRCAR
strategy is applicable
Section 7.5.2
exchange-
connected
induced colouring easy to find page 163
matroid RCAR strategies worst-case optimal; Theorem7.6
loss invariance; Section 7.4.3
efficient algorithm exists; Chapter 8
induced colouring very easy to find; Lemma 7.8
YP (with P RCAR) determines a unique
homogeneous colouring
page 167
partition matroid an RCAR strategy exists that does not
discard any messages;
page 168
computational procedure to findRCAR
strategy always succeeds
page 168
sunflower with
singleton petals
there is a unique RCAR strategy (which
does not discard messages)
page 169
graph RCAR strategies worst-case optimal; Theorem7.5
loss invariance; Section 7.4.3
efficient algorithm exists Chapter 8
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Appendix 7.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7.1. For each y ∈ Y , assume without loss of generality that
y ∈ Y1. Then observe that the generalized entropies for G and G1 are identical
on ∆y; P∗(y) > 0 if and only if P∗1 (y) > 0; and P∗(x | y) = P∗1 (x | y) for all
x ∈ y. Now the claim follows from Theorem 6.3.
Proof of Lemma 7.2. We need to show for the P∗ and q constructed in the
proof that ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for each y ∈ Y , with equality if P∗(y) > 0, and that P∗
satisfies the marginal constraints.
For each y ∈ Y ,
∑
x∈y
qx = ∑
x∈y\X ′
qoutx + q
out
x′ ·∑
x∈y∩X ′
qinx ≤ ∑
x∈y
qoutx ≤ 1. (7.6)
If P∗(y) > 0, then one of the following holds: if y ∩ X ′ = ∅, then Pout(y) > 0;
if y ∩ X ′ 6= ∅, then Pin(y ∩ X ′) > 0 and Pout(y \ X ′ ∪ {x′}) > 0. In either
case, both inequalities in (7.6) are equalities because Pin and Pout are RCAR
strategies.
Now we must show qx · ∑y∈Y ,y3x P∗(y) = px for all x. We have for any
x ∈ X ′,
qx · ∑
y∈Y ,y3x
P∗(y) = qoutx′ · qinx · ∑
y∈Y ,y3x
Pout(y \ X ′ ∪ {x′}) · Pin(y ∩ X ′)
=
(
qoutx′ · ∑
yout∈Yout,
yout3x′
Pout(yout)
)
·
(
qinx · ∑
yin∈Y in,
yin3x
Pin(yin)
)
= poutx′ · pinx = px.
For x 6∈ X ′ (using that if Pout(yout) > 0 and x′ ∈ yout for some yout ∈ Yout,
then for each yin ∈ Y in with Pin(yin) > 0, (yout \ {x′}) ∪ yin ∈ Y),
qx · ∑
y∈Y ,y3x
P∗(y) = qoutx
(
∑
y∈Y ,y3x,
y∩X ′=∅
Pout(y) + ∑
y∈Y ,y3x,
y∩X ′ 6=∅
Pout(y \ X ′ ∪ {x′}) · Pin(y∩X ′)
)
= qoutx · ∑
yout∈Yout,
yout3x
Pout(yout) = poutx = px.
This shows that P∗ ∈ P and satisfies the RCAR condition.
Proof of Lemma 7.3. By Theorem 6.3, λ∗ is supporting to HL  ∆y1 at P∗(· |
y1). Define λ1 ∈ Λy1 equal to λ∗ on y1. Then by Lemma 6.4, any λ′ ∈ Λy1 with
λ′ ≤ λ1 obeys λ′x1 = λ1x1 .
Again by Theorem 6.3, λ∗ is dominating to HL  ∆y2 . Define λ2 by λ2x = λ∗x
for x ∈ y1 ∩ y2, λ2x1 = λ∗x2 , and 0 elsewhere. Because L is symmetric between
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x1 and x2, λ2 ∈ Λy1 . For x ∈ y1 ∩ y2, λ1x = λ2x. If λ2x1 ≤ λ1x1 , then λ2 ≤ λ1; then
we must have λ2x1 = λ
1
x1 . So λ
2
x1 < λ
1
x1 is impossible, and we find λ
∗
x1 = λ
1
x1 ≤
λ2x1 = λ
∗
x2 .
Proof of Lemma 7.4. If P∗ is degenerate, then there exist messages y1, y2 such
that y1 \ y2 = {x1} and y2 \ y1 = {x2}, with ∗P(y1) > 0 and P∗(y2) > 0 but
P∗(x2, y2) = 0. Then Lemma 6.2 shows how to construct a worst-case optimal
P′ with P′(y2) = 0, but otherwise using the samemessages that P∗ uses. After
a finite number of applications of this procedure, we must terminate with a
nondegenerate strategy.
Otherwise P∗ is nondegenerate. Then for all x1, x2 and y1, y2 as above with
P∗(y1) > 0 and P∗(y2) > 0, we also have P∗(x1, y1) > 0 and P∗(x2, y2) > 0.
Then we find λ∗x1 = λ
∗
x2 by two applications of Lemma 7.3.
Proof of Theorem 7.5. For graph games, all loss functions are essentially local.
We will make this precise by constructing functions fx, analogous to those in
the proof of Theorem 6.10: they have the property that for all y ∈ Y , a sup-
porting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P ∈ ∆y is given by λ with λx = fx(P(x)) for
all x ∈ y. (Note that we may not get fx(Q(x)) = L(x,Q) as in the case of local
proper loss functions in the proof of Theorem 6.10, because the hyperplane
realized by Qmay not be supporting at Q if L is improper.)
For each x ∈ X , if the only message in which x occurs is {x}, then fx(q)
is only defined for q = 1, where it is fx(1) = HL(ex) (where ex is the unique
element of∆y). For other x, pick anymessage y ∈ Y with y 3 x and |y| = 2. For
all these y, the generalized entropies HL  ∆y are identical copies of the same
function, by symmetry of L. For each q ∈ [0, 1], pick a supporting hyperplane
λ to HL  ∆y at the unique P ∈ ∆y with P(x) = q, and let fx(q) = λx. If
HL is not differentiable at P (including when q ∈ {0, 1}), we can choose a
supporting hyperplane arbitrarily as long as the same one is used to define
fx(q) and fx′(1− q) wherever {x, x′} ∈ Y . (In particular this means that if a
connected component of Y viewed as a graph contains an odd cycle, fx(1/2)
must take the same value for all x in that component.)
As for local L, each fx is nonincreasing because HL is concave, and fx is
strictly decreasing if HL is strictly concave. The rest of the proof is the same as
for Theorem 6.10.
Proof of Theorem 7.6. We know from Theorem 6.10 that a quizmaster strat-
egy P∗ is worst-case optimal for logarithmic loss if and only if it is RCAR, and
from Theorem 6.3 that such a P∗ exists. Take any such P∗. Let λ be the KT-
vector with respect to logarithmic loss, and YP∗ = {y ∈ Y | P∗(y) > 0}. For
any pair y ∈ YP∗ , y′ ∈ Y , we will show that there exists a bijection pi from
y \ y′ to y′ \ y such that λx ≤ λpi(x) for all x ∈ y \ y′. This follows from Schrij-
ver (2003b, Corollary 39.12a), but here we give a direct proof by induction on
|y′ \ y|:
• |y′ \ y| = 1: Apply Lemma 7.3 to y1 = y and y2 = y′, using that P∗ is
nondegenerate, to find the required inequality.
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• |y′ \ y| > 1: Let y′1 = y′ and pick any x1 ∈ y \ y′. Starting with i = 1,
apply the basis exchange property on y \ {xi} and y′i to find x′i (it will be
in y′i \ y ⊆ y′); then apply it again on y′i \ {x′i} and y to find xi+1 ∈ y \ y′i,
defining themessage y′i+1 = y
′
i \ {x′i}∪{xi+1} (whichmaynot be inYP∗ ).
Continue until xi+1 = x1. Now pi defined by pi(x1) = x′1, . . . ,pi(xi) = x′i
is a bijection from {x1, . . . , xi} = (y∩ y′i+1) \ y′ ⊆ y \ y′ to {x′1, . . . , x′i} =
y′ \ y′i+1 ⊆ y′ \ y (to see this, note that an element x′j found in the basis
exchange from y is then removed from y′j+1 so that it will not be found
again; an element xj+1 found in the other basis exchange is added to y′j+1
with the same result), and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ i, applying Lemma 7.3 to y
and y ∪ {x′j} \ {xj} tells us that λxj ≤ λx′j as required. If y
′
i+1 = y, then
this is the bijection we are looking for; otherwise, it can be completed by
combining it with a bijection from y \ y′i+1 to y′i+1 \ y, which exists by the
induction hypothesis.
If also y′ ∈ YP∗ , a bijection pi′ from y′ \ y to y \ y′ such that λx′ ≤ λpi′(x′) is
found by the same argument. Together, pi and pi′ divide the outcomes in the
two sets into disjoint cycles that must all have the same value for λ, defining
a colouring of X that is homogeneous on YP∗ . (Homogeneous colourings are
defined in Section 7.5.1.) For logarithmic loss, the RCAR vector q obeys qx =
e−λx , so it must follow the same colouring. Because HL is strictly concave, the
conditionals of P∗ must agree with q by Theorem 6.10.
Now take an arbitrary loss function L satisfying the conditions in the the-
orem, and the same strategy P∗. At an arbitrary message y with P∗(y) > 0,
choose a supporting hyperplane λ′ ∈ Λy to HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y) with λ′x = λ′x′
wherever x and x′ have the same colour: there P∗(x | y) = P∗(x′ | y) and L is
symmetric between x and x′, so such a supporting hyperplane exists. For all
x, x′ ∈ y with qx > qx′ (equivalently, λx < λx′ ) between which L is symmetric,
this λ′ satisfies λ′x ≤ λ′x′ . (A supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y at P∗(· | y)
with λ′x > λ′x′ would be lower at (P
∗)x1↔x2(· | y) than at P∗(· | y), while by
symmetry HL is the same at those points: a contradiction.)
Because the colouring is homogeneous on YP∗ , the values of λ′x for x ∈ y
can be copied to all outcomes with the same colour, defining λ′ on all of X ; for
each y′ ∈ YP∗ , λ′ defines a supporting hyperplane to HL  ∆y′ at P∗(· | y′).
Also, for each y′ ∈ Y \ YP∗ and y ∈ YP∗ , we have that a bijection pi exists
from y \ y′ to y′ \ y such that for all x ∈ y \ y′, L is symmetric between x and
pi(x), and λx ≤ λpi(x); then also λ′x ≤ λ′pi(x), so λ′ defines a dominating hyper-
plane to HL  ∆y′ . Thus λ′ is a KT-vector certifying that P∗ is also worst-case
optimal for L.
For the converse: If HL is strictly concave, the supporting hyperplanes de-
fined by a KT-vector λ′ each touch HL at only one point, so that any worst-case
optimal strategy P′ for the quizmaster must have P′(x | y) = qx for all x ∈ y
with P′(y) > 0. Therefore any worst-case optimal P′ must be RCAR.
Proof of Theorem 7.7. We will first show how to construct a vector q ∈ RX>0
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that satisfies∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y , and for all x ∈ X , there is amessage x ∈
y ∈ Y with∑x∈y qx = 1. Then we will determine a marginal so that this vector
q is the RCAR vector of the game with that marginal. We will additionally
find two intersecting messages, both having sum 1, such that q represents the
uniform distribution on one, but not on the other.
Two different constructions are given: one for nonuniform and one for uni-
form games.
If the game is not uniform, let k2 be the size of the largest message in Y . By
connectedness, there exists a message of size less than k2 that has nonempty
intersection with a message of size k2. From among such messages, let y1 be
one of maximum size, and let k1 < k2 be that size. Finally, let y2 be a messages
of size k2 that maximizes |y2 ∩ y1|. Set initial values for q as follows:
qx =

1
k1
for x ∈ y1;
|y1\y2|
|y2\y1| ·
1
k1
for x ∈ y2 \ y1;
1
|y2\y1| ·
1
k1
otherwise.
Note that the three cases of qx are listed in nonincreasing order. Now ∑x∈y1 qx
= ∑x∈y2 qx = 1, while ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for general y ∈ Y : maxx qx = 1/k1, so a
message y ∈ Y with |y| ≤ k1 will have sum at most 1; a message with |y| = k2
will share nomore outcomeswith y1 than y2 does and thus cannot have a larger
sum; and because a message with k1 < |y| < k2 has empty intersection with
y2, the k1 − 1 largest elements of (qx)x∈y sum to at most (k1 − 1)/k1, while the
fewer than |y2 \ y1| remaining elements all equal 1/(|y2 \ y1| · k1) and hence
sum to less than 1/k1.
A greedy algorithm that repeatedly increments some qx until none can be
increased further, while maintaining the inequality ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 on each y,
will terminate with a q satisfying the conditions stated at the beginning of the
proof. This q will be unchanged and thus still be uniform on y1, while on the
intersecting message y2, q also still sums to 1 but is not uniform.
For the case of uniform games, the construction is similar. Let k be the size
of the game’s messages. By Oxley (2011, Corollary 2.1.5), a nonempty family
of sets Y is the collection of bases of a matroid if and only if for all y1, y2 ∈ Y
and x2 ∈ y2 \ y1,
y1 ∪ {x2} \ {x1} ∈ Y for some x1 ∈ y1 \ y2. (7.7)
Because our Y is not a matroid, it follows that there exist y1, y2 ∈ Y and
x2 ∈ y2 \ y1 for which no corresponding x1 exists. For k ≥ 3 (which holds be-
cause the gamewe consider is not a graph game), we claim something stronger:
that there exist y1, y2, x2 as above with the additional property that y1 and y2
intersect. The proof of this claim is below.
Using such y1 and x2 and some 0 < e < 1/k, initialize q as follows:
qx =

1
k for x ∈ y1;
1
k + e for x = x2;
1
k − e otherwise.
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Because any message containing x2 also contains at least one other outcome
not in y1, we again have ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y .
For k ≥ 3, the initial q has the property that the set of outcomes x for which
qx cannot be increased further (we call these outcomesmaximized) is connected
by messages y with ∑x∈y x = 1 (that is, the maximized outcomes cannot be
partitioned into two nonempty sets such that each sum-1message is contained
in one of these sets); this is because y1 has sum 1, and any other message with
sum 1 must intersect y1. (For k = 2, this would not be the case: the only
messages having sum 1 would be y1 and all messages that contain x2, but y1
would not intersect any of these.) We can have the greedy algorithm maintain
this as an invariant: Because the game is connected, there is always a message
partially in the set of maximized outcomes and partially outside. We call such
a message a crossing message. Each round, we pick an outcome x that is not
maximized yet and is contained in a crossing message; if x2 is not maximized,
we always pick x = x2 (using that it is contained in the crossing message y2).
The tightest constraint on increasing qx will come from a crossing message,
because for any non-crossing message y 3 x, we have ∑x′∈y\{x} qx′ = (k −
1)(1/k − e), which is the smallest possible value of this sum. So increasing
qx as much as possible will cause a crossing message to get sum equal to 1.
This message connects x to the set of previously maximized outcomes, and
any other outcomes that were maximized by this increment must be contained
in some message that also contains x.
When the greedy algorithm terminates, q will still be uniform on y1, while
there will be anothermessage onwhich q sums to one but is not uniform. (This
may not be y2, whichmay not have sum 1.) Because all outcomes are connected
by sum-1 messages, we can also find a pair of intersecting messages, one of
which is uniform and one of which is not. Use these two messages as y1 and
y2 in the sequel.
Having found, for both nonuniform and uniform games, a vector q and
messages y1 and y2 as described above, we let strategy P be RCAR with vector
q and P(y) uniform on {y | ∑x∈y qx = 1}. This P is a worst-case optimal
strategy for the game with logarithmic loss and marginal px = ∑y3x P(x, y),
and q is its unique RCAR vector.
We will show that P is not worst-case optimal for the game with the same
marginal andBrier loss. Brier loss is proper and continuous, so byTheorem6.9,
L(x, P(· | y1)) = L(x, P(· | y2)) for worst-case optimal P. These are squared
Euclidean distances from a vertex of the simplex to the predicted distribution.
However, the equality will not hold for P:
Among all predictions in ∆yi with Q(x) = qx for each x ∈ y1 ∩ y2 (this set
of predictions is the intersection of ∆yi with an affine subspace), the squared
Euclidean distance L(x,Q) between such Q and given vertex x ∈ y1 ∩ y2 is
uniquely minimized by Q uniform on the outcomes not in y1 ∩ y2 (this is the
orthogonal projection of the vertex onto that subspace). For a uniform game,
P(· | y1) is uniform and thus L(x, P(· | y1)) equals this minimum; P(· | y1)
differs from the uniform distribution at some outcomes not in y1 ∩ y2 and thus
L(x, P(· | y2)) is larger than the minimum.
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For a nonuniform game, P(· | y1) is uniform on y1 \ y2 and P(· | y2)
is uniform on y2 \ y1, so both minimize the distance to the vertex in their
respective subspaces. However, the subspace for y2 is isomorphic to a sub-
space contained in the subspace for y1 and not containing P(· | y1). Therefore
L(x, P(· | y1)) < L(x, P(· | y2)).
Proof of claim. Suppose for a contradiction that any pair of intersecting mes-
sages y, y′ obeys the above exchange property (7.7) for all x′ ∈ y′ \ y. Let y1, y2
be two messages that fail (7.7) for some outcome x2 ∈ y2 \ y1; it follows from
our assumption that they are disjoint. BecauseY is connected, there exists a se-
quence ofmessages startingwith y1 and endingwith y2 inwhich adjacentmes-
sages intersect. Using (7.7), we can extend this sequence to one where adjacent
messages differ by the exchange of one outcome: given intersecting y, y′′ ∈ Y
with d := |y′′ \ y| > 1, we find y′ ∈ Y with |y′ \ y| = 1 and |y′′ \ y′| = d− 1.
Write the entire sequence as y0 = y1, y1, . . . , yn = y2.
We have n ≥ k, because n < k would imply that y1 ∩ y2 6= ∅. If n > k,
we can find a shorter sequence as follows: pick 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n− k for which
yi ∩ yj+1 6= ∅; this holds if j + 1− i < k, so such i, j can always be found if
k ≥ 3. Let x′ be the unique outcome in yj+1 \ yj.
• If x′ 6∈ yj+k (intuitively, adding x′ leads us on a detour that can be avoided
when going to yj+k): In each of the k exchange steps from yj to yj+k, one
outcome was removed. One of those outcomes was x′, which is not in
yj, so at most k − 1 outcomes from yj were removed. Thus yj and yj+k
intersect, and a shorter path between them can be found using (7.7).
• If x′ ∈ yj+k and x′ ∈ yi (removing x′ is the start of a detour): We can use
(7.7) to find a shorter path between yi and yj+k.
• If x′ ∈ yj+k but x′ 6∈ yi (adding x′ is apparently useful, but can be done
sooner): Apply (7.7) to messages yi and yj+1 (which intersect) and out-
come x′ (which is in yj+1 but not in yi) to find a message y′ that is one
step away from yi and contains x′. From y′, we can find a path to yj+k by
(7.7) taking fewer than k steps. Thus we can get from yi to yj+k in at most
k steps.
Thus we can always find a sequence with n = k.
Given such a sequence y0, y1, . . . , yn, wewill now showa contradictionwith
the assumption that y1 = y0 and y2 = yn fail (7.7) by showing that for any
x2 ∈ y2, a message exists that differs from y1 by adding x2 and removing one
other outcome. If x2 ∈ y1, then y1 is such a message and we are done. Oth-
erwise, we can apply (7.7) to y1 and x2 ∈ y2 to find a message y′ containing
x2; because k ≥ 3, this message still intersects y1, so applying (7.7) to y1 and
x2 ∈ y′ gives the message we are looking for. This shows by contradiction that
if a connected uniform game with k ≥ 3 is not a matroid game, there exists a
pair of intersecting messages y1, y2 and an outcome x2 ∈ y2 \ y1 that do not
satisfy (7.7).
7.A. Proofs 179
Proof of Lemma 7.8. (2 ⇐ 3) Two elements x1 6= x2 of X are in the same 2-
connected component if and only if there is a circuit (minimal dependent set)
containing both. Since a basis is a maximal dependent set, y1 ∪ y2 is independ-
ent. Find a circuitC ⊆ y1 ∪ y2; this circuit contains both x1 and x2, as otherwise
it would be contained in a basis and thus independent.
(2 ⇒ 3) Let C be a circuit with {x1, x2} ⊆ C; our goal is to find the bases
y1, y2, which we will do iteratively. Let y1 be a basis containing the inde-
pendent set C \ {x2}, and y2 a basis containing C \ {x1}. While y1 \ {x1} 6=
y2 \ {x2}, pick any x′1 ∈ y1 \ (y2 ∪ {x1}) and use basis exchange to find a basis
y′ = (y1 \ {x′1})∪ {x′2} for some x′2 ∈ y2 \ y1. Note that x′2 6= x2, as that would
result in C ⊆ y′. Replace y1 by y′ and repeat until y1 \ {x1} = y2 \ {x2}. This
process terminates, as the set difference becomes smaller with each step.
(1⇔ 3) For exchange-connected message structures, the colour classes are
the equivalence classes of the transitive reflexive closure of the relation on X
stated in point 3. For matroids, the equivalence of points 2 and 3 shows that
this relation is already transitive. Thus for all x1 6= x2, points 1 and 3 are
equivalent.
Finally, a matroid is equal to the direct sum of its 2-connected components
(Oxley, 2011, Corollary 4.2.9), which shows that the 2-connected components
(or equivalently, the classes of the induced colouring) are modules.
Proof of Theorem 7.9. The proof technique is similar to the one used to prove
Theorem 7.7: we construct a marginal with the required property by first find-
ing a vector q that is the RCAR vector for some game with the given message
structure.
We distinguish two cases. If there exists y′ ⊂ X that is consistent with the
homogeneous induced colouring but y′ 6∈ Y , then pick 0 < e < 1/(k(k− 1))
and set initial values for q as follows:
qx =
{
1
k + e for x ∈ y′;
1
k − (k− 1)e otherwise.
Because each message contains at least one outcome with qx = 1/k− (k− 1)e,
we have ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y .
Otherwise there must exist a colour class C ⊆ X for which the number of
outcomes of this colour occurring in a message is at least two. (If all colours
occur exactly once in each message and all y′ ⊆ X consistent with this col-
ouring are y′ ∈ Y , then Y is a partition matroid.) Then pick any x+ ∈ C and
0 < e < 1/k, and initialize q according to
qx =

1
k + e for x = x
+;
1
k − e for x ∈ C but x 6= x+;
1
k otherwise.
Again we see ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y .
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We apply the same greedy algorithm we used in the proof of Theorem 7.7:
repeatedly increase qx for some x until none can be increased further, main-
taining ∑x∈y qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y . For a vector q obtained by this algorithm,
let P be the joint distribution on x, y with x ∈ y for which the marginal P(y) is
uniform on {y ∈ Y | ∑x∈y qx = 1} and for which P(x | y) = qx for all x ∈ y.
This P is an RCAR strategy for the game with marginal px = ∑y3x P(x, y), and
q is the RCAR vector.
In the first case, there must exist some x− ∈ X with qx− ≤ 1/k. Let C be
the colour class containing x−, and let x+ be the unique outcome in C ∩ y′.
In the second case, there must exist some x− ∈ C with qx− ≤ 1/k. Thus in
either case, we have two outcomes x− and x+ of the same colour C but with
qx− ≤ 1/k < 1/k + e ≤ qx+ . Because this contradicts the definition of an
induced colouring, there must be a message for which q violates the equality
(7.2). Thismessagemust be discarded by any RCAR strategy for this game.
Chapter 8
Algorithms for Probability
Updating Games
In the previous chapters, we saw how worst-case optimal strategies for the
probability updating game can be recognized. We considered the question
of finding such strategies in Section 7.5.2, with limited success: the procedure
described there still required some degree of trial and error (except for the
class of partition matroid games, where it could be guaranteed to succeed). In
this chapter, we give algorithms that are guaranteed to findworst-case optimal
strategies for two other classes of message structures. These algorithms enable
us to solve many more probability updating games (though compared to all
probability updating games, this is still only a small portion).
The general problem of finding a worst-case optimal strategy is a convex
optimization problem. Reasonably efficient algorithms exist for such problems
(Boyd andVandenberghe, 2004), but they approximate the solution rather than
computing it exactly: the larger the desired accuracy, the more running time
is needed. We observed in Section 7.5.2 that for some message structures, if it
is known which of the messages available to the quizmaster receive positive
probability in the quizmaster’s worst-case optimal strategy, this strategy can
be computed exactly using only simple arithmetic operations. If algorithms
can be found that efficiently determine which messages should be used, then
it should be possible to find a worst-case optimal strategy with running time
unaffected by the desired accuracy. However, to competewith general purpose
convex optimization algorithms, we need a clever algorithm for finding the set
of used messages, as trying all candidate sets quickly becomes infeasible.
The algorithms we investigate in this chapter are strongly polynomial (Schrij-
ver, 2003a). A strongly polynomial algorithmfinds the exact solution in a num-
ber of steps polynomial in the number of elements in the input, regardless of
the precision of any numeric elements. We will find such algorithms for the
two classes of message structures for which the trial-and-error procedure ref-
erenced earlier is guaranteed to work for some subset of the messages. These
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are the classes of graph games (where each message contains exactly 2 out-
comes; defined in Section 7.4.1) and matroid games (where the messages sat-
isfy the basis exchange property; see Section 7.4.2). A central result of Chap-
ter 7 was that these are precisely the classes for which loss invariance holds; see
Section 7.4.3 for a discussion of the importance of this concept.
8.1 Introduction
A probability updating game is given by a finite set X , a family Y of subsets of
X with⋃Y = X , a distribution p onX , and a loss function L. Wewill not need
the loss function in this chapter, but assume that it satisfies the conditions in
the theorems of the previous chapter (L is symmetricwith respect to exchanges
in Y , and HL is finite and continuous).
A distribution P on the set of pairs (x, y) ∈ X × Y with x ∈ y is a strategy
for the quizmaster if ∑y3x P(x, y) = px for each x. We saw in the previous
chapters that for certain probability updating games, a strategy is worst-case
optimal for the quizmaster if it satisfies the ‘RCAR’ condition: for logarithmic
loss by Theorem 6.10; for graph games by Theorem 7.5; and for matroid games
by Theorem 7.6. We repeat the RCAR condition here:
There exists a vector q ∈ [0, 1]X such that
qx = P(x | y) for all x ∈ y ∈ Y with P(y > 0), and
∑
x∈y
qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y .
The vector q is called the RCAR vector; it exists and is unique by Lemma 6.11.
As in the previous chapter, we concentrate on finding a worst-case optimal
strategy P for the quizmaster, because once such a strategy is known, worst-
case optimal strategies Q for the contestant are easily determined.
The question is: how do we find such P? That is the problem solved by
the algorithms in this chapter, for different classes of games. We first consider
in Section 8.2 the very limited case of path graph games, where the solution is
given by a surprising and intuitive algorithm. Before we can give an algorithm
for the more general class of games on arbitrary graphs in Section 8.4, we need
to study the properties of a type of network flow, which we do in Section 8.3.
An algorithm formatroid games is presented in Section 8.5. Finally, Section 8.6
concludes. All proofs are in the appendix to this chapter.
8.2 Path graphs and the taut string algorithm
Even though the results in this section will be superseded later when we give
an algorithm for general graph games, we devote this section to the subclass of
graph games whose graph consists of just a single path. The reason is that for
such games, the worst-case optimal strategies for the quizmaster turn out to
be described by taut strings. This provides both an intuitive image for what is
going on, as well as a very efficient (linear time) way of finding these strategies.
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A0 A1
A2
A3
A4
p1 p2 p3 p4
p2
p4
Figure 8.1: The taut string problem corresponding to the path game with X =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, Y = {y1, y2, y3}with yi = {i, i+ 1}, and marginal on the outcomes
p = (1/3, 1/6, 1/6, 1/3). The arrowheads at the points A0, . . . , A4 show on what
side the string must pass. We see that the string, when pulled taut, touches the
point A2; its slope is 1/3 to the left of A2 and 2/3 to the right.
8.2.1 Correspondence
Consider a graph game where the messages form a path: for the n ≥ 2 out-
comes X := {1, 2, . . . , n}, the messages are y1 = {1, 2}, . . . , yn−1 = {n− 1, n}.
(A graph of the form (X ,Y) is called a path graph.) Then the solution corres-
ponds to that of a taut string problem. Imagine a string is constrained to pass
above/below certain points (say, pins on a board). Then the string is pulled
taut. The taut string will follow the shortest allowed path between its end-
points, going in straight line segments between the points it is pushed against.
Taut strings have been considered in the statistics literature before; see for
example Barlow et al. (1972); Mammen and van de Geer (1997); Davies and
Kovac (2001), where taut strings appear as a way of defining simple functions
approximating noisy regression data.
The taut string problem we are interested in uses the constraining points
A0, A1, . . . , An, with A0 = (0, 0) and
Ak =
(
∑
i≤k
pi , ∑
i≤k,
i even
pi
)
(8.1)
for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The string must pass through the points A0 and An; above
points Ak with k odd; and below Ak for k even. See Figure 8.1 for an example.
Theorem 8.1. Given a path game, find the solution of the taut string problem de-
scribed in (8.1). Then a worst-case optimal strategy P for the quizmaster is given by:
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• For 0 < k < n such that the string touches the point Ak, we have P(yk) = 0;
• For 0 < k < n such that the string does not touch Ak, P(yk) = |δk|/(αk(1−
αk)), where δk is the vertical distance between Ak and the string, and αk is the
slope of the string at that point;
• Also for k such that the string does not touch the point Ak (so P(yk) > 0), the
conditional distribution P(· | yk) puts mass on the even outcome in yk equal to
the slope of the string as it passes above or below Ak.
For the path game and corresponding taut string problem shown in Fig-
ure 8.1, we conclude that:
• P(y2) = 0;
• For y1, |δ1| = 1/9 (it is two-thirds of p2 = 1/6) and α1 = 1/3, so P(y1) =
(1/9)/(9/2) = 1/2. In the same way, we find P(y3) = 1/2.
• Using that the slope of the string above A1 equals 1/3, we find P(2 |
y1) = 1/3 (so P(1 | y1 = 2/3). Above A3, the slope equals 2/3, so
P(4 | y3) = 2/3 and P(3 | y3) = 1/3.
A path graph may occur in practice as the message structure of a prob-
ability updating game when, for example, a real-valued quantity of interest is
reported to us as an integer, but we do not know if the value was rounded up
or down. Then outcomes correspond to intervals (ai, ai + 1) (we assume that
the true value is a.s. not an integer), and messages to unions of two adjacent
intervals.
8.2.2 Algorithm
We can now find worst-case optimal strategies for path games efficiently us-
ing the taut string algorithm, in O(n) time (Davies and Kovac, 2001). This is
clearly much more efficient than using a general purpose convex optimization
algorithm. We list the taut string algorithm in Algorithm 8.1; for a more de-
tailed explanation, we refer toDavies andKovac (2001) and Barlow et al. (1972).
The algorithm keeps track of three sequences of points. These represent
piecewise linear functions: K is the solution, G is the greatest convex minorant
(the pointwise maximum convex function respecting the upper bounds) of the
interval of the input that has been read but not added to the solution yet, and
S the smallest concave majorant of that interval. Each of these sequences is a
subsequence of the input points A0, . . . , An. The algorithm operates only on
the beginning and end of each of these sequences, so these operations can be
implemented efficiently without the aid of complex data structures.
We denote the number of elements in a sequence by |K|, use zero-based
indices (so K[0] is the first element of K), and use negative indices to refer to
the end of a sequence: K[−1] is the last element, K[−2] the second-to-last, etc.
We write α(Ai, Aj) for the slope of the line segment from Ai to Aj, with i < j.
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Algorithm 8.1: The taut string algorithm
Input: Points A0, . . . , An constraining the string, sorted from left to right
Output: Sequence of points Kwhere the taut string touches the
constraints
Let the sequences G, S, and K each consist of the single point A0;
for i from 1 to n do
if i is even or i = n then
// Ai is an upper bound
Append Ai to G;
while |G| ≥ 3 and α(G[−3],G[−2]) ≥ α(G[−2],G[−1]) do
Delete second-to-last point from G;
end
// G is now convex
end
if i is odd or i = n then
// Ai is a lower bound
Append Ai to S;
while |S| ≥ 3 and α(S[−3], S[−2]) ≤ α(S[−2], S[−1]) do
Delete second-to-last point from S;
end
// S is now concave
end
while |G| ≥ 2, |S| ≥ 2, and α(G[0],G[1]) < α(S[0], S[1]) do
// No straight path remains between G and S
Remove first point from G and from S;
if (new) first point in G is to the left of first point in S then
Append first point in G to K, and prepend it to S;
else
Append first point in S to K, and prepend it to G;
end
end
end
Append An to K.
For the points (8.1) used in the taut string problem corresponding to a path
game, these slopes are given by α(Ai, Aj) = ∑i<k≤j,k even pk/∑i<k≤j pk.
The same concept (though not the same algorithm) applies to cycle graphs,
but now the string must be drawn taut through an infinite sequence of obs-
tacles. These obstacles are given by A0 = (0, 0) and, for all integers i,
Ai − Ai−1 =
{
(pi, 0) for i even;
(pi, pi) for i odd,
where all indices of p are specified modulo n. The string must pass below
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points Ai with i even, and above points Ai with i odd; there are no points that
the string must pass exactly through as in the finite case.
For an even cycle, it is equivalent to consider a string drawn taut around
a cylinder (on which the axes are tilted so that A0 and An coincide). For an
odd cycle, either we must let the points A0 and A2n coincide, or the string
must be drawn taut in a Möbius strip. We think the second option is far more
intriguing.
8.3 Intermezzo: Proportional flows
The algorithm discussed in the previous section is limited in application to
games for which (X ,Y) is a path graph. Wewish to find an algorithm that can
deal with the much larger class of games where (X ,Y) is an arbitrary graph.
That is, the messages (edges) may be arranged in any way, but each message
must contain exactly two outcomes.
Before we can formulate an algorithm for general graph games and prove
it correct, we require a fair amount of graph theory. The present section is
devoted entirely to introducing this theory. First, in Section 8.3.1, we consider
another physical analogy. This serves as motivation for the definitions studied
in subsequent sections, where the general theory is developed. This section
leads up to an efficient algorithm in Section 8.3.8.
In Section 8.4, we will find that the problem of finding a worst-case optimal
strategy for the probability updating game on a graph can be seen as a special
case of the theory developed in this section. Therefore the algorithm from
Section 8.3.8 can be used to find these strategies.
8.3.1 Motivating example: Electrical circuits
This section is self-contained, and considers the problem of determining the
current flow and voltages in a class of electrical circuits. These circuits con-
sist of a number of resistors in parallel, followed by parallel diodes, followed
again by parallel resistors. In Section 8.3.1.1, we state the necessary physical
theory and introduce the notation we will use, using a single circuit as a run-
ning example. We consider the question of how to go about solving the circuit
in Section 8.3.1.2. In Section 8.3.1.3, we generalize from the example circuit to
other circuits of the same form.
8.3.1.1 Circuit elements and physical quantities
Consider the electrical circuit given in Figure 8.2. Due to the voltage source at
the bottom of the figure, the voltages at s0 and t0 are Us0 = 1V and Ut0 = 0V,
using the ground in the bottom right as the reference point. The circuit also
contains diodes and resistors, which we discuss next.
A diode is an electrical circuit element that admits current in only one dir-
ection (Tooley, 2006). In our circuit, there are three diodes, between the nodes
in S := {s1, s2} and those in T := {t1, t2}. We will assume these diodes are
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S T
s0 t0
s1
s2
t1
t2
1S
1S
2S
1S
1V
Figure 8.2: An electrical circuit containing resistors and diodes. For each re-
sistor, its conductance is given in the unit siemens (S); this is the inverse of
resistance in ohm (W).
ideal. In an ideal diode, the resistance is 0 for current flowing in one direc-
tion (from S to T), but no current may pass in the opposite direction. We write
A = {(s1, t1), (s2, t1), (s2, t2)} to describe which pairs of nodes in S and T are
connected by a diode in the circuit.
If we think of electricity flowing through a circuit as water flowing through
a system of pipes, we can view a diode as a valve that allowswater to pass from
S to T if the pressure is higher in S than in T, but does not allow water to flow
in the backward direction if the pressures are reversed. In the electrical circuit,
this role of pressure will be played by voltages.
Our circuit contains four resistors: one attached to each node in S∪ T, con-
necting each of these nodes to s0 or t0. The voltage drop across a circuit element
is the difference in voltages at its endpoints. The voltage drop ∆U (in volt) and
current I (in ampere) across a resistor with resistance R (in ohm) are related
by Ohm’s law: R = ∆U/I. It will be convenient to work with conductance G
rather than with resistance R. Conductance is the inverse of resistance, and is
measured in the unit siemens. Thus G = I/∆U.
We associate each resistor with the node in S or T it is attached to, omitting
s0 and t0 from the notation. So the physical quantities that describe the resistor
connected to v ∈ S ∪ T are written as ∆Uv, Iv and Gv.
The final quantity we will need is the current through a diode, which we
will denote by I(s,t) for (s, t) ∈ A. Note that due to the diodes, all current flows
from s0 to S, from S to T, and from T to t0. We measure all currents in this
direction, so that the variables we defined all take nonnegative values.
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8.3.1.2 Solving the circuit
We wish to compute the voltages at the nodes S = {s1, s2} and T = {t1, t2}.
Because the resistance of a conducting (ideal) diode is 0, the voltage drop
across such a diode is also 0, and so we have Us = Ut if a positive current
I(s,t) is flowing through the diode on the arc (s, t) ∈ A. A voltage difference
Us 6= Ut can only arise if the diode on (s, t) is not conducting. Then we must
have Us ≤ Ut: through a resistor, this would mean that current was flowing
from t to s, but the diode blocks current from flowing in this direction.
Now consider the resistors in our circuit. The voltage drops across these
resistors are given by ∆Us = 1−Us for s ∈ S and ∆Ut = Ut for t ∈ T.
ApplyingOhm’s law to the circuit, we find that the current flowing through
the resistor at s ∈ S is given by Is = (1−Us)Gs; for sink nodes, the current
through the resistor at t ∈ T is given by It = UtGt.
By Kirchhoff’s current law, the amount of current entering a node must
equal the amount leaving that node. Thus Iv = ∑a3v Ia for v ∈ S ∪ T, where
we write a 3 v to mean that v is one of the endpoints of the arc a ∈ A.
We say C ⊆ S ∪ T is an I-component if it is a connected component of the
graph (S ∪ T, {a ∈ A | Ia > 0}). In other words, each pair of nodes in C
is connected by a path that traverses only those arcs along which a nonzero
current is flowing (but unlike the current, this pathmay traverse an arc in either
direction), and C is a maximal set having this property. An I-component may
be a strict subset of an ordinary connected component of (S∪ T, A) if there are
sufficiently many diodes along which no current flows.
Because the voltages at the endpoints of a conducting diode must be equal,
they must also be constant within every I-component. We write UC for the
common voltage in I-component C. Because no current flows along diodes
that enter or leave C, by Kirchhoff’s current law, the total current flowing into
C (from s0) and the total current flowing out of C (to t0 ) are both equal to the
total current flowing through diodes from C ∩ S to C ∩ T. Using Ohm’s law,
we can express the currents through resistors in terms of the common voltage
UC. Then
∑
(s,t)∈A:s,t∈C
I(s,t) = (1−UC) ∑
s∈C∩S
Gs = UC ∑
t∈C∩T
Gt,
so
UC = ∑
s∈C∩S
Gs
/
∑
v∈C
Gv. (8.2)
The value UC does not depend on the current I, but holds for all currents for
which C is an I-component. With UC known, the currents passing through
the resistors can be computed using Ohm’s law. If the components are chosen
correctly, a way should exist within each component for the current to flow
through the diodes obeying Kirchhoff’s current law, and the inequality Us ≤
Ut should hold between different I-components.
In our example circuit, we find that if we take all of S ∪ T to be a single
component C, we get UC = 0.4V. Then the currents through the resistors are
Is1 = Is2 = Gs1(1−UC) = 0.6A; It1 = Gt1UC = 0.8A; It2 = 0.4A.
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There is a unique solution for the currents through the diodes that satisfies
Kirchhoff’s current law:
I(s1,t1) = 0.6A; I(s2,t1) = 0.2A; I(s2,t2) = 0.4A.
Because there are no other I-components, this demonstrates that this is a cor-
rect solution for the given circuit.
Another partition of S ∪ T we might consider is into the two components
{s1, t1} and {s2, t2}. Then we find U{s1,t1} = 0.33V < U{s2,t2} = 0.5V. But
with these voltages, the diode on the arc (s2, t1) should be conducting, so no
solution corresponds to this partition of S ∪ T.
8.3.1.3 A class of similar circuits
A circuit of the same form as in Figure 8.2 can be constructed for any bipartite
directed graph with nodes S∪ T and all arcs going from nodes in S to nodes in
T, and with a positive real-valued function c on the nodes, which wewill call a
capacity function. To be precise: given such a graphD = (S∪T, A) and capacity
function c, the corresponding electrical circuit has s0, t0, voltage source and
ground the same as the circuit in Figure 8.2; a node s for each s ∈ S connected
to s0 by a resistor with conductance Gs = cs; a node t for each t ∈ T connected
to t0 by a resistor with conductance Gt = ct; and a diode from s to t for each
(s, t) ∈ A.
In such a circuit, a solution of UC and Ia ≥ 0 is characterized by:
Us ≤ Ut for each (s, t) ∈ A, with equality if I(s,t) > 0; (8.3)
Iv = ∆UvGv for all v ∈ S ∪ T; (8.4)
Iv = ∑
a3v
Ia. (8.5)
It is not evident from the mathematics that such a solution exists; this will fol-
low from Corollary 8.8 using the more general concept of proportional flows.
For some circuits, there may be multiple solutions: if a diode is added from s1
to t2 in Figure 8.2, there are several choices for Ia satisfying the above condi-
tions. This happens because the diodes have 0 resistance when conducting; if
the circuit were physically realized and non-ideal diodes were used, the cur-
rent would likely follow some unique solution.
8.3.2 Definitions: Networks and flows
We saw that in order to find the solution of the current in certain electrical
circuits, we need to find the right partition of the nodes in the circuit into com-
ponents in which the voltage is constant. For large circuits, it is clearly com-
putationally infeasible to try out all possible partitions. As a first step towards
finding amore efficient algorithm, we translate the problem from the language
of electrical circuits to that of flow networks. (The algorithm we will find also
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Figure 8.3: The network (D, c) from which the electrical circuit in Figure 8.2
was constructed, and the corresponding augmented flow network (D′, c′).
solves the problem of finding worst-case optimal strategies in the probabil-
ity updating game on a graph, but we will not be able to show this until Sec-
tion 8.4.)
Consider again a directed graph D = (S ∪ T, A) with A ⊆ S× T and ca-
pacities c : S ∪ T → R>0, as were used in Section 8.3.1.3 to construct the class
of electrical circuits similar to the one in Figure 8.2. We will call such a pair
(D, c) a network. Given a network (D, c), define the augmented network (D′, c′)
with D′ = (V′, A′), where V′ = S ∪ T ∪ {s0, t0} and A′ = A ∪ {(s0, s) | s ∈
S} ∪ {(t, t0) | t ∈ T}, and with capacities c′ on the arcs (rather than on the
nodes as in the definition of c) given by
c′(v1, v2) =

cv2 for v1 = s0 and v2 ∈ S;
cv1 for v1 ∈ T and v2 = t0;
∞ otherwise
(see Figure 8.3 for an illustration). The nodes in S are called sources and those
in T sinks; node s0 is the supersource and t0 the supersink. The capacities on the
sources cs = c′(s0, s) are supplies, and the capacities on the sinks ct = c′(t, t0)
demands. The augmented network can be used to model how resources may
be transferred from the set of sources to the set of sinks. The nodes s0 and t0
are added merely because it is technically convenient.
Following Schrijver (2003a), we say a function f : A′ → R≥0 is a flow from
s0 to t0 if it obeys the flow conservation law:
∑
v′∈V′ :(v′ ,v)∈A′
f(v′ ,v) = ∑
v′∈V′ :(v,v′)∈A′
f(v,v′) for all v ∈ V′ \ {s0, t0} = V. (8.6)
That is, except at the supersource and supersink, the amount of resources en-
tering a node must be equal to the amount leaving it. Note that this definition
allows flows that exceed the capacities c; we will indeed also consider some
flows of this kind.
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For an electrical circuit and an augmented flow network based on the same
(D, c), the current I in the electrical circuit can be seen as a function from A′
to R≥0, like the flow f from s0 to t0 on D′. Furthermore, Kirchhoff’s current
law (8.5) is equivalent to (8.6). Thus, a current I in the electrical circuit is also
a flow from s0 to t0.
Given a flow f , we will write fs := f(s0,s) for s ∈ S and ft := f(t,t0) for t ∈ T,
as we did for currents I. If f is a flow from s0 to t0 on the augmented network
(D′, c′), we also say f is a flow on the original network (D, c); this way, we do
not need to refer to the artificial extra nodes s0 and t0 any more.
We see there is a clear correspondence between the flow and the electrical
current. The notion of voltage, on the other hand, is absent in the standard
definition of flow from the literature. We will extend the analogy using the
following new definitions:
utilization uv := fv/cv; (8.7)
supply proportion qC :=
∑s∈S∩C cs
∑v∈C cv
, (8.8)
where C is an f -component: a connected component of the graph (S ∪ T, {a ∈
A | fa > 0}). (This definition is identical to the one for currents in Sec-
tion 8.3.1.2.) We also define qv := qC for v ∈ C. We see that for any network
(D, c), if we take the flow f equal to the current I in the corresponding electrical
circuit, these new quantities are equal to quantities from the electrical circuit:
uv = ∆Uv by (8.4), and qC = UC by (8.2). The correspondence is summarized
in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Relation between electrical circuits and flow networks
Electrical circuit Flow network
Conductance Gv Capacity cv
Current Ia Flow fa
Voltage UC Supply proportion qC
Voltage drop ∆Uv Utilization uv
8.3.3 Definitions: Proportional and maximum flows
It may seem that all we have done in the previous section is assigning new
names to concepts from electrical circuits. However, a crucial difference is in
the relation between flow and capacity. While the conductances in an elec-
trical circuit put very specific requirements on the current, the capacity does
not occur in the general definition of flow. In this section, we define two special
kinds of flows, which are constrained by the capacities. The first of these, the
proportional flow, is a novel definition that generalizes flows corresponding to
electrical currents. The second is the standard definition of maximum flow, in
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which the capacities are hard limits on the flow through an arc. Both defini-
tions will be crucial in the development of the algorithm, which explains the
need to introduce general flows in the previous section. The relations between
currents, proportional flows, and maximum flows will be investigated further
in Section 8.3.4.
Definition 8.1. A flow f on network (D, c) is proportional if
• for each f -component C, there are constants αC, βC such that us = αC for
all s ∈ C ∩ S and ut = βC for all t ∈ C ∩ T;
• for each arc (s, t) ∈ A, the supply proportions (8.8) obey qs ≤ qt.
In this definition, the capacities c play a role of relative weights, not of ab-
solute constraints on the flow. We see that if a flow f is equal to a current in
the electrical circuit corresponding to (D, c), then f is proportional: α and β
are constant within each f -component because U is, and (8.3) implies qs ≤ qt
for (s, t) ∈ A.
Interpreting the flow as an allocation of resources, intuitively, the second
requirement in the definition expresses that if the supply proportion is larger
in f -component C1 than in f -component C2, then it would be ‘unfair’ if an op-
portunity to pass resources from C1 to C2 exists, but goes unused — even if
supply is short (or long) in both components. We will briefly relate propor-
tional flows to some other notions of fairness from the economic literature in
Section 8.3.7.
If an f -component C of a proportional flow f consists of a single node v, we
get qC = 1 if v ∈ S, and qC = 0 if v ∈ T; if C is a nonsingleton f -component,
qC ∈ (0, 1). Due to the second condition in the definition, a proportional flow f
on network (D, c) is not allowed to have nodeswith zero flow leaving/entering
them, unless they are isolated nodes in D.
For a proportional flow, the supply proportion qC defined in (8.8) can be
expressed in terms of αC and βC:
qC =
∑s∈S∩C cs
∑t∈T∩C ct +∑s∈S∩C cs
=
∑t∈T∩C ft
∑t∈T∩C ct
∑s∈S∩C fs
∑s∈S∩C cs +
∑t∈T∩C ft
∑t∈T∩C ct
=
βC
αC + βC
,
using that ∑s∈S∩C fs = ∑t∈T∩C ft.
So far, we have not used the capacity function c′ in its usual role as a hard
upper limit on the amount of flow through each arc. We say f is under c′ if
fa ≤ c′(a) for each arc a ∈ A′. Using our notationwith fs and ft, this constraint
is equivalent to fv ≤ cv for all v ∈ S∪ T, so wewill write it as f is under c. (Note
that no upper bound is imposed on arcs between S and T, where c′ is infinite.)
This condition is equivalent to uv ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ S ∪ T.
A flow is maximum if it is under c, and no other flow under c has larger
∑s∈S fs = ∑t∈T ft = ∑a∈A fa. In general, the concepts of proportional flow
and maximum flow are independent: a flow may be neither, both, or either
one. If a proportional flow is also a maximum flow, then each f -component
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Figure 8.4: Two flow networks with the same underlying directed graph but
different capacities, with their proportional maximum flows
will have max(αC, βC) = 1. With this restriction, the mapping from (αC, βC)
to qC is invertible; its inverse is given by
(αC, βC) =
{
(1, qC1−qC ) if qC ≤ 12 ;
( 1−qCqC , 1) if qC >
1
2 .
(8.9)
We say a node v is saturated by a flow if uv = 1.
Two examples of proportional maximum flows are shown in Figure 8.4.
In Figure 8.4a, the unique proportional maximum flow has one f -component
C = S ∪ T with αC = 1 and βC = 2/3, so qC = 2/5. In Figure 8.4b, the
capacity of the bottom sink has been increased, and a different (again unique)
proportional maximum flow is found. This flow has two f -components. The
maximum flow which does not use the sink with value 4 is not proportional:
that node is a singleton f -component and thus has supply proportion 0, while
the other f -component has supply proportion 1/2; this violates the inequality
on the bottom arc.
8.3.4 Componentwise rescaling of flows
Consider the following operation on a flow f : choose an f -component C, and
multiply the flow along all arcs within C by some positive constant. We can
also perform this operation on several f -components simultaneously, possibly
using different constants for each f -component. The resulting flow (and also
the operation itself) is called a componentwise rescaling of f .
The definition of proportional flows imposes constraints on the utilizations
of the nodes within each f -component of the flow, and on the supply propor-
tions among different f -components. These constraints are preserved by com-
ponentwise rescaling: the componentwise rescaling of a proportional flowwill
again be a proportional flow (but with different α and β). Conversely, if a flow
is not proportional, then neither are its componentwise rescalings.
We saw in the previous section that every current is a proportional flow.
The concept of componentwise rescaling shows that currents take a special
place among a network’s proportional flows: Given a proportional flow f in a
flow network, a solution of the corresponding electrical circuit can be found by
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componentwise rescaling, as follows. Take the current I to be the component-
wise rescaling of f in which each nonsingleton f -component has αC + βC = 1.
The flow conservation law (8.6) is equivalent to Kirchhoff’s current law (8.5),
andwe know from the remarks below equations (8.7) and (8.8) that for this cur-
rent, we must have ∆Uv = uv and UC = qC (these values satisfy (8.4) and the
equality in (8.3)). For the chosen componentwise rescaling, this is consistent
with the definition of voltage drops in terms of voltages: for any source s ∈ S,
it gives ∆Us = 1−Us = αs, and for any sink t ∈ T, it gives ∆Ut = Ut = βt.
Finally, the inequality in (8.3) is now equivalent to the inequality in the defin-
ition of proportional flows. This shows that this componentwise rescaling of
f gives a solution of the electrical circuit. For an example, observe that the
solution for the electrical current found in Section 8.3.1.2 is a componentwise
rescaling of the proportional flow for the same network shown in Figure 8.4a.
Comparing currents to maximum flows, we find that a current is under c,
but is not a maximum flow: in each nonsingleton f -component C, both αC < 1
and βC < 1. The following theorem establishes a relation between maximum
and proportional flows similar to the relation between currents and propor-
tional flows, but more powerful.
Theorem 8.2 (Weighting characterization of proportional flows). Given a flow
f on a network (D, c), that flow is proportional if and only if for allw > 0, the network
(D, c(w)) with modified capacities given by
c(w)v =
{
cv for v ∈ S,
w · cv for v ∈ T,
(8.10)
has a maximum flow that is a componentwise rescaling of f .
In particular (forw = 1), any proportional flow can be rescaled component-
wise to be amaximum flow. Obviously, the (unique) componentwise rescaling
that turns f into a maximum flow is the one that rescales each nonsingleton
f -component C so that it satisfies max(αC, βC) = 1. We call this the maximum
componentwise rescaling of f .
8.3.5 The capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
Now that we are done talking about voltages, it will be useful to use the letter
V for the full set of nodes in the (nonaugmented) network: V := S ∪ T.
Definition 8.2. Given a network (D, c)with D = (V, A), and amaximum flow
f on that network, let (V<,V=,V>) be a partition of V such that:
• V=, V< ∩ S and V> ∩ T contain no unsaturated nodes;
• Nodes in the same f -component are in the same class of the partition;
• There are no arcs in D from (V> ∪ V=) ∩ S to V< ∩ T, and no arcs from
V> ∩ S to (V< ∪V=) ∩ T.
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V<
V=
V>
S T
Figure 8.5: Schematic of the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition. Each
source and sink of a network belongs to one of the six circles in this diagram:
Grey circles contain only saturated nodes, white circles may contain both sat-
urated and unsaturated nodes; solid arrows representwhere positive flowmay
be; and dashed arrows represent that there might be arcs, but with zero flow.
(See Figure 8.5 for an illustration.) Such a partition withV= maximal (i.e. there
is no other such partition (V′<,V′=,V′>) with V′= ) V=) is called a capacitated
Edmonds-Gallai decomposition.
(The subscripts compare the total supplywith the total demandwithin each
part of the decomposition. For instance, within V<, the supply is smaller than
the demand.)
Lemma 8.3. A capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition exists and is unique, and
it is the same for all maximum flows on (D, c).
This allows us to talk about the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
of a network (D, c), without reference to a flow f .
This decomposition can be seen as a version of the Edmonds-Gallai decom-
position for general (i.e. not necessarily bipartite, as we defined our networks
to be) undirected graphs without capacities (Schrijver, 2003a, Section24.4b). A
decomposition similar to the one we defined was used by Bochet et al. (2013).
The decomposition is also related to minimum cuts of the augmented net-
work. Any minimum s0–t0 cut of the augmented network (D′, c′)must cut off
all arcs from s0 to V< ∩ S and from V> ∩ T to t0; nodes in V= may be cut off at
either the source or the sink side. (We will not use this terminology in the rest
of this chapter.)
The proof of Lemma 8.3 shows how the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai de-
composition of a network can be found efficiently given an arbitrarymaximum
flow on that network.
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The capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of a network tells us some-
thing about what a proportional flow on that network must look like, as the
following lemma shows.
Lemma 8.4. If f is a proportional flow on (D, c) with supply proportions q, the ca-
pacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of (D, c) is given by
V< = {v : qv < 1/2};
V= = {v : qv = 1/2};
V> = {v : qv > 1/2}.
By applying this lemma to networks with the same graph D but modified
capacities c(w) as in (8.10), we can show the following uniqueness result.
Theorem 8.5 (Uniqueness of qv for proportional flows). All proportional flows
on (D, c) have the same supply proportions q.
8.3.6 Characterization in terms of lexicographic maximality
We now consider a notion that is at first glance different from the concepts we
have seen: lexicographically maximum flows. Given a flow f on a network
(D, c), let u(i)S be the i-th smallest utilization among the nodes in S (including
duplicate utilizations), and define u(i)T analogously. Then a flow is called lex-
icographically maximum if it is below c and lexicographically maximizes both
(u(i)S )i and (u
(i)
T )i.
In other words, a lexicographically maximum flowmaximizes the smallest
utilization among all sources/sinks. If multiple flows below c exist achieving
the same smallest utilization value, the second-smallest utilization is used as
a tie-breaker, and so on. Of course, the ordering of the utilizations will be
different for different flows.
Megiddo (1974) also studied lexicographically optimal maximum flows,
but he looked at absolute amounts of flow at each source and sink, while we
define utilizations as fractions of available capacity. He showed that the abso-
lute source and sink utilizations may always be lexicographically maximized
by the same flow, a result that also holds for our fractional utilizations.
Lemma 8.6. In any network (D, c), a lexicographically maximum flow exists, and
any such flow is also a maximum flow.
Perhaps surprisingly, lexicographically maximum flows and proportional
flows are intimately related.
Theorem 8.7 (Lex-max characterization of proportional maximum flows). A
flow is lexicographically maximum if and only if it is a proportional maximum flow.
Corollary 8.8. A proportional flow always exists among a network’s maximum flows.
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8.3.7 Proportional flows and economic fairness
Proportionality of a flow can be seen as a notion of fairness when limited re-
sources must be divided among multiple parties. In such a setting, the bipart-
ite network represents a constraint on the pairs of supply and demand nodes
between which the resource can be transferred. Such a network may arise in
practice, for example, when all suppliers offer the same resource but geograph-
ical constraints prohibit the transfer of the resource between some pairs of sup-
pliers and demanders; or when different suppliers offer different ‘types’ of the
resource, and each demander can use only some of these types, while each
demand can be fulfilled by any combination of compatible resource types.
This is the problem studied by Moulin and Sethuraman (2013). However,
the fair resource allocations derived there differ from the allocations assigned
by proportional maximumflows, asMoulin and Sethuraman take a connection-
responsible viewpoint: agents at the nodes are ‘held responsible’ for their con-
nections, so that if a demand node is not connected to some supply node, it will
not be compensated for the resources that might otherwise have been trans-
ferred along the missing connection. Our proportional flows correspond to a
connection-neutral view: we try to allocate the resource as equally as possible
within the limits of the flow constraints, and do not ‘punish’ nodes for lacking
arcs if we can help it.
Two other versions of this problem are addressed by Bochet et al. (2012,
2013). While these papers also adopt our connection-neutral view, the notions
of fairness considered there are egalitarian rather than proportional; in particu-
lar, this means that they are not based on fractions of utilized capacity, but on
absolute utilizations.
Our proportional maximumflows appear closely related to (possibly being
a generalization of) the proportional rule of İlkılıç and Kayı (2014) (published
after the present section was initially written). However, the exact relationship
between these two concepts remains to be investigated.
Another related problem occurs when the resource is not divisible. Eco-
nomic aspects of this problem are studied for example by Roth et al. (2005),
and an efficient algorithm for finding an optimal solution is given by Li et al.
(2014). Because the solution is allowed to randomize over possible matchings,
it appears similar to our proportional flow problem, but this similarity is only
superficial.
8.3.8 Algorithms
Definition 8.3. Proportional Maximum Flow problem: Given a network (D, c),
find a flow that is both maximum and proportional.
We first describe a straightforward algorithm for the proportional max-
imum flow problem; it works by finding a sequence of maximum flows.
First delete any isolated nodes; their supply proportions are given by qs = 1
for sources and qt = 0 for sinks. Then apply the following recursive proced-
ure: Let w = ∑s∈S cs/∑t∈T ct, and compute the modified capacities c(w) as in
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(8.10); with this choice of w, the total demand equals the total supply. Find any
maximum flow, and use it to determine the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai de-
composition. (The proof of Lemma 8.3 shows how to do this efficiently.) If the
decomposition has a nonempty V= part, then for nodes v ∈ V=, we know the
supply proportions qv in the original network (D, c) using Lemma 8.4: they
can be computed using qv/(1− qv) = w. For arcs adjacent to V=, the max-
imum proportional flow f we are looking for is the componentwise rescaling
of the flow in (D, c(w)) that is maximum in (D, c). If the decomposition has
only a V= part, we are done; otherwise, recursively solve the V< and the V>
part. Both parts must then be nonempty for our choice of w, so this algorithm
will eventually terminate.
In theworst case, this algorithmwill requireO(n) levels of recursion, where
n is the number of nodes; this will happen for instance if the graph is a path,
the supplies are all equal and the demands are 1!, 2!, 3!, . . .. Of course, the
total running time will depend on the algorithm used to solve the maximum
flow problem. Many strongly polynomial maximum flow algorithms exist.
Using such an algorithm as a subroutine, our overall algorithm also runs in
polynomial time: in O(n4) if for instance the FIFO push-relabel algorithm of
Goldberg and Tarjan (1988) is used, or in O(n2m log n2m ) with the version of
the algorithm using the dynamic tree structure defined in Sleator and Tarjan
(1983) (this is asymptotically more efficient if m, the number of arcs, is small).
More efficient algorithms are possible. The one we describe below is based
on Gallo et al. (1989), who consider the parametric maximum flow problem. In
this generalization of the maximum flow problem, arc capacities depend on a
real-valuedparameter. Their algorithms extend themaximumflowalgorithms
of Goldberg and Tarjan (1988) referred to above, and have the same running
times: O(n3) if implementedusing a FIFO rule and linked lists, orO(nm log n2m )
with dynamic trees. For bipartite graphs, further improvements are possible:
Let nS and nT denote the number of sources and sinks, respectively. Then
assuming without loss of generality that nS ≤ nT , the dynamic tree algorithm
can be modified to run in O(nS ·m log(n2S/m+ 2)) time (Ahuja et al., 1994).
Gallo et al. list many applications of parametric maximum flows, which in-
cludes (in section 4.1) finding the flow that lexicographically maximizes both
the source and the sink utilizations, each sorted in ascending order. By The-
orem 8.7, this is equivalent to our proportional maximum flow problem. They
also observe that the lexicographically maximum flow maximizes the min-
imum utilization and minimizes the maximum utilization, for both sources
and sinks. This result carries over to proportional maximum flows.
Their algorithm follows the same idea as the straightforward algorithm de-
scribed above (finding the maximum flow in a reweighted graph, then solving
V< and V> recursively), with the following improvements:
• It uses the push-relabel maximum flow algorithm of Goldberg and Tar-
jan. With this algorithm, it is possible to reuse the results from a previ-
ous run to solve a network in which the capacities have been adjusted
in a certain way. A sequence of such runs has the same asymptotic time
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complexity as a single run of the algorithm.
• Two instances of the push-relabel algorithm are run concurrently: one
that pushes flow from the supersource to the supersink, the other work-
ing in the reverse direction (and started from a different earlier result).
When one instance finishes, the other is terminated, unless its results are
needed by another run in the same sequence.
8.4 General graph games
It is time to return to the problem of finding worst-case optimal strategies for
the quizmaster in a probability updating game. In Section 8.4.1, we will give a
relation between proportional flows and worst-case optimal strategies for the
case that (X ,Y) is a bipartite graph. Section 8.4.2 generalizes to the case that
(X ,Y) is an arbitrary graph.
8.4.1 Bipartite graph games
Consider a probability updating game on a bipartite graph (X ,Y), and mar-
ginal distribution p on the outcomes X . We arbitrarily call one of the two col-
our classes of this graph S and the other T, and direct all edges from S to T:
A := {(s, t) | {s, t} ∈ Y , s ∈ S, t ∈ T}. Define capacities c of the nodes as
equal to the marginal probabilities p. Now (D, c) with D = (X , A) is a net-
work as defined in Section 8.3.2. On this network, we can find a proportional
maximum flow, using one the algorithms discussed in Section 8.3.8. We claim
that this gives a worst-case optimal strategy to our game as follows:
Theorem 8.9. A worst-case optimal strategy P for a probability updating game on
a bipartite graph (X ,Y) with marginal p can be computed from a proportional max-
imum flow f on the network (D, c) defined above as follows:
P(x | y) = q′x =

qx for x ∈ y and x ∈ S;
1− qx for x ∈ y and x ∈ T;
0 for x 6∈ y;
P({x1, x2}) = (α−1C + β−1C ) f(x1,x2) for {x1, x2} ∈ Y , x1 ∈ S, x2 ∈ T,
where C is the f -component containing both x1 and x2. The RCAR vector of P is given
by q′.
We see that P(y) is given by another componentwise rescaling of f . The
scale factor α−1C + β
−1
C in each f -component C can also be characterized as the
one that results in (1− α′C)(1− β′C) = 1 for the rescaled flow; compare this
to the rescalings in Section 8.3.4, where we saw that maximum flows could be
found by componentwise rescaling proportional flows to have max(α′C, β
′
C) =
1, and electrical currents could be found by the rescaling such that α′C+ β
′
C = 1.
Note that the RCARvector q′ is the opposite of the voltage drop in the electrical
current: q′x = 1− ∆Ux.
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8.4.2 Extension to general graph games
In a nonbipartite graph, we cannot assign nodes to be sources and sinks in
such a way that each edge can be directed to go from a source to a sink. So
we can no longer speak of a flow along the edges in the same way as before.
Instead, an RCAR strategy on a general graph would correspond to a special
kind of fractional matching (Schrijver, 2003a, Section 30.2: compare (30.4) there
with (7.5) in our Section 7.5.2), similar to how RCAR strategies on bipartite
graphs correspond to proportional flows. However, it turns out thatworst-case
optimal strategies on general graph games can be found using the proportional
maximum flow algorithm on a modified flow network.
For a nonbipartite game, construct a network (D, c)with D = (S∪ T, A) as
follows:
S = {sx | x ∈ X};
T = {tx | x ∈ X};
A = {(sx1 , tx2), (sx2 , tx1) | {x1, x2} ∈ Y},
and capacities csx = ctx = px. This network contains two nodes for each out-
come and two arcs for each message.
Lemma 8.10. A proportional maximum flow on the network (D, c) defined above
must have usx = utx for all x ∈ X .
So we have qsx = 1 − qtx for all x. (In particular, we have that if an f -
component C contains both sx and tx, then qsx = qtx = 1/2.)
Theorem 8.11. A worst-case optimal strategy P for a probability updating game on a
general graph (X ,Y)with marginal p can be computed from a proportional maximum
flow f on the network (D, c) defined above as follows:
P(x | y) = q′x =
{
qsx = 1− qtx for x ∈ y;
0 for x 6∈ y;
P({x1, x2}) = 12 (α
−1
C + β
−1
C )
(
f(sx1 ,tx2 ) + f(sx2 ,tx1 )
)
for {x1, x2} ∈ Y , x1 ∈ S, x2 ∈ T,
where C is the f -component containing sx1 (taking the f -component containing one of
the other three nodes involved yields the same result). The RCAR vector of P is given
by q′.
The following practical improvement on the algorithm is easy to make: If
we first determine the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of the net-
work, V= will contain the sources and sinks of the outcomes that get condi-
tional qv = 1/2, while V< and V> will be bipartite and each other’s mirror
image, so it suffices to solve just one of those. We can reuse the maximum flow
that was used to find the decomposition as a starting point for the parametric
flow algorithm.
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8.5 Matroid games
The other class of message structures besides graphs for which RCAR strat-
egies are worst-case optimal strategies of the probability updating game is
formed by matroids. More precisely, we assume in this section that Y is the
set of bases of a matroid. Since matroids admit many efficient optimization
algorithms (Schrijver, 2003b), one would hope that an efficient algorithm ex-
ists also for our problem of finding worst-case optimal strategies. To this end,
we define the proportional matroid basis packing problem (named in analogy with
proportional flows) as follows: Given a matroid (X ,Y) with ⋃Y equal to the
ground set X and capacities p ∈ RX>0 with ∑x∈X px = 1, find vectors m ∈ RY≥0
and q ∈ RX≥0 such that
qx · ∑
y3x
my = px for all x ∈ X ;
∑
x∈y
qx ≤ 1 for all y ∈ Y ;
∑
x∈y
qx = 1 for all y ∈ Y with my > 0.
(8.11)
(From this, it follows that ∑y my = 1.) Then let P be given by
P(x, y) =
{
qxmy for x ∈ y;
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that P is a worst-case optimal strategy (with RCAR vector q) if
and only if m and q satisfy (8.11).
Algorithm 8.2 solves this problem. Before we give the algorithm, we need
to introduce some of the concepts it builds on.
The algorithmworks by solving a sequence ofmaximum capacitated fractional
matroid basis packing problems (Schrijver, 2003b, Corollary 42.7a): given a ma-
troid and a vector of capacities c ∈ RX≥0, find weights on bases z ∈ RY≥0 with
∑
y3x
zy ≤ cx for all x ∈ X (8.12)
such that ∑y∈Y zy is maximized. We say an element x ∈ X is possibly unsatur-
ated if there is a maximum packing z with ∑y3x zy < cx.
It will follow from our algorithm and its proof that if m, q is a proportional
basis packing, (minx∈X qx) ·m is a maximum fractional basis packing. Simil-
arly, (maxx∈X ·qx)m is a minimum capacitated fractional basis covering (compare
Schrijver, 2003b, Corollary 42.6a): a weight vector of minimal sum satisfying
∑y3x zy ≥ cx for all x ∈ X .
We need a few more definitions from matroid theory (Oxley, 2011). The
rank function r of a matroid is given by r(S) := maxy∈Y |y ∩ S|. The algorithm
repeatedly splits up the matroid into smaller parts: first into the colour classes
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of its induced colouring (defined in Section 7.5.1; recall from Lemma 7.8 that
in matroid theory terms, these classes are exactly the 2-connected components
of the matroid); and second using restrictions and contractions. The restriction
of a matroid to a set S ⊂ X is the matroid with elements S and bases Y|S :=
{y ∩ S | y ∈ Y , |y ∩ S| = r(S)}. The rank function of (S,Y|S) is equal to that
of (X ,Y) for all subsets of S. The contraction of a matroid from a set S ⊂ X
is the matroid with elements X \ S and bases Y/S := {y ⊆ X \ S | y ∪ y′ ∈
Y for some y′ ∈ Y|S}.
When the algorithm takes the restriction of a matroid, it takes the condition-
ing of its capacities (called that because the capacities correspond to marginal
probabilities on outcomes): p·|S ∈ RS≥0 is given by px|S := px/∑x′∈S px′ . To
combine a maximum fractional basis packing z ∈ RY≥0 on a matroid (X ,Y)
with the solution m of a restriction (U,Y|U) of that matroid, we define the
contraction of z from U as the vector z·/U ∈ RY/U≥0 with zy′/U := ∑y∈Y :y\U=y′ zy.
Finally, in the algorithm and its proof, we will write pS for ∑x∈S px.
Algorithm 8.2: Proportional matroid basis packing algorithm
Input: Matroid (X ,Y) with ⋃Y = X ; capacities p ∈ RX>0 with pX = 1
Output: Nonnegative vectors m and q satisfying (8.11)
Determine the induced colouring of Y ;
for each colour class C do
Find a maximum fractional basis packing z ∈ RY|C≥0 for matroid
(C,Y|C) with capacities cx := r(C) · px|C, and write Z := ∑y∈Y|C zy;
if Z = 1 then
// Solution found!
Set qx = pC/r(C) for all x ∈ C;
Set mCy = zy for all y ∈ Y|C;
else
Determine the set of possibly unsaturated elements U ⊂ C;
Recursively find mU , qU for matroid (U,Y|U) with capacities
p·|U ;
Set qx =
{
qUx · pU for x ∈ U,
pC\U/(r(C)− r(U)) for x ∈ C \U;
Set mCy =
{
mUy∩U · z(y\U)/U/Z for y ∈ Y|C with y ∩U ∈ Y|U,
0 for other y ∈ Y|C;
end
end
Set my = ∏C mCy∩C for all y ∈ Y .
Because amatroid on n = |X | elements can have an exponential number of
bases, the complexity analysis of matroid algorithms usually assumes that Y
is presented to the algorithm in the form of an oracle: an efficient function that
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the algorithm can query to answer a particular question about thematroid. We
use here an independence testing oracle, which answers the question whether or
not a set S ⊆ X is an independent set of the matroid (that is, whether or not a
basis y ∈ Y exists with S ⊆ y).
Theorem 8.12. Algorithm 8.2 solves the proportional matroid basis packing problem
in strongly polynomial time given an independence testing oracle.
To improve the running time of the algorithm, we observe that that max-
imum fractional basis packing algorithm works by finding a sequence of sub-
sets of X of increasing rank, until it establishes that is has found the set of
possibly unsaturated elements. Within a recursive call of Algorithm 8.2, these
intermediate results can be reused to find a maximum fractional basis packing
more quickly.
Example 8.A. Consider the graph shown in Figure 8.6a. For this graph, we
can define the cycle matroid as on page 159. This matroid has an element in
its ground set for each edge (not node!) in the graph, and it has a basis for each
spanning tree of the graph. So there are eight bases: all sets of three elements
except for {a, b, d} and {a, c, e}. Wewill runAlgorithm 8.2 on thismatroidwith
capacities p shown in Figure 8.6b. (The edges of the graph are now drawn as
shaded areas, giving us room to display more information in later figures.)
First, we determine the induced colouring of Y , and find that all elements
in the ground set X have the same colour. (Lemma 7.8 may be helpful for this
task.) So C = X and the restriction to C is simply the original matroid, which
has rank r(C) = 3. Next, we must solve a maximum fractional basis packing
problem with capacities given by cx = 3px. The unique solution is shown in
Figure 8.6c; it assigns positive weight to three different bases (spanning trees),
filling elements a, d and e to capacity while leaving b and c unsaturated. (In the
figure, the saturated elements are shown in grey and the unsaturated elements
in white. To see that no packing can do better, observe that each spanning tree
contains at least one of the three saturated edges.) The value Z = ∑y zy of this
packing is only 0.75, so we are not done yet.
The algorithm is called recursively on the matroid with ground set U =
{b, c}, bases Y|U = {U}, and capacities pb|U = 8/15, pc|U = 7/15. (Note that
this matroid game is trivial, containing only one message.) In the recursive
call, we first determine that the the elements inU have different colours in the
induced colouring of Y|U. For each of the two colour classes {b} and {c}, we
find a maximum fractional basis packing on a matroid with one element x,
one basis y, and capacity cx = 1: this packing is given by zy = 1. The solution
returned by the recursive call is qb = 8/15, qc = 7/15, and m{b,c} = 1 · 1 = 1.
Using qU and mU computed by the recursive call, we can now compute the
solution for the original matroid: qb = 8/15 · 0.75 = 0.4, qc = 7/15 · 0.75 =
0.35, qa = qd = qe = 0.25; for the three bases with y ∩ U ∈ Y|U, my =
mCy = 1 · z(y\U)/U/0.75 = zy/0.75. The proportional packing m is shown in
Figure 8.6d. Note that the colours used to show regions of constant q form the
induced colouring of the set of bases having positive weight.
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a
b c
d e
(a) Graph used to define matroid
0.1
0.4 0.35
0.1 0.05
(b) Capacities p
0.3
0.150.3
(c) Maximum fractional packing z
q = 0.4 q = 0.35
q = 0.25
0.4
0.20.4
(d) Proportional packing m, q
Figure 8.6: Steps in the proportional matroid basis packing algorithm for the
matroid game of Example 8.A
0.4
0.1 0.2
0.25 0.05
(a) Capacities p
0.6
0.15
(b) Maximum fractional packing z
qU = 715
qU = 815
5
7
2
7
(c) Proportional packing mU , qU of
subproblem
0.8
0.2
q = 0.35 q = 0.25
q = 0.4
(d) Proportional packing m, q
Figure 8.7: Steps in the algorithm for the matroid game of Example 8.B
8.6. Conclusion 205
Example 8.B. We run the algorithm again on a different input: we use the same
matroid as in Example 8.A, but with the capacities given in Figure 8.7a.
The first step proceeds as before: the induced colouring of Y uses only one
colour. The capacities cx = 3px in the maximum fractional packing problem
are however different, and this time, we find that multiple optimal packings
exist (again with Z = 0.75). The solution displayed in Figure 8.7b saturates
elements c, d and e (shown grey or striped), but other optimal solutions exist
that leave d (the striped element) unsaturated, or that saturate b. Elements c
and e are always saturated, so U = {a, b, d} (the triangle forming the left part
of the graph).
The matroid (U,Y|U) with capacities p·|U is solved in a recursive call; we
omit the details, except to remark that the algorithm requires a further recurs-
ive call on the matroid with ground set {a}. The proportional packing re-
turned by the first recursive call is shown in Figure 8.7c: qUa = 8/15, qUb =
qUd = 7/15, m
U
{a,b} = 2/7, m
U
{a,d} = 5/7 (and m
U
{b,d} = 0).
Finally, a proportional packing for the original problem is computed. This
packing has q as shown in Figure 8.7d. The vector m = mC obeys ∑y my = 1,
and so can be viewed as a probability distribution. By its construction in the
algorithm, this distribution can be sampled from by sampling a basis from
Y|U according to mU , and extending it to a basis in the original matroid by
independently sampling from the contraction Y/U = {{c}, {e}} according to
z·/U/Z; here z·/U is the contraction of z, given by z{c}/U = 0.6 and z{e}/U =
0.15, and Z = 0.75 is a normalizing constant.
This solution puts positive weight on four bases. Other solutions to this
proportional packing problem exist, having the same q but different m; two
such solutions put positive weight on only three bases.
8.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we found efficient algorithms for two important classes of prob-
ability updating games, namely graph and matroid games. These algorithms
can find worst-case optimal strategies exactly, whereas general-purpose al-
gorithms for convex optimization only approximate the solution and require
more running time if a greater accuracy is desired. Also, our algorithms can be
performedwith pencil and paper for small problem instances. This shows that
worst-case optimal probability updating is a computationally feasible way of
dealing with coarsened data in situations where these algorithms are applic-
able.
8.6.1 Future work
While the classes of graph and matroid games are important, many games
remain for which we do not have algorithms with a similar level of efficiency.
Two paths suggest themselves:
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• Theorem 7.7 shows that if Y is neither a graph nor a matroid, then there
exist pairs of marginals and loss functions for which the worst-case op-
timal strategy is not RCAR. However, this may not hold for all pairs of
marginal and loss function, so an algorithm for finding RCAR strategies
that can accept a more general class of message structures as inputs may
sometimes return the worst-case optimal strategy, even if the loss func-
tion is not logarithmic.
• For games with logarithmic loss, the substitution decomposition from
the previous chapter (Lemma 7.2) provides an additional tool for find-
ing worst-case optimal strategies. For what class of message structures
can an efficient algorithm be found that combines the algorithms in this
chapter with the substitution decomposition?
In situations where the marginal is an estimate of some unknown distri-
bution, it may also be useful to know how sensitive the worst-case optimal
strategies are to changes in the marginal. The algorithms in this chapter may
be extended to compute such information.
A different direction for future work concerns the proportional flows we
used to derive an efficient algorithm for graph games. Some of the properties
we found in Section 8.3may also be of interest to economists, butmore research
is needed to evaluate proportional flows from that perspective. We refer to
Section 8.3.7 for details.
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Appendix 8.A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Define q ∈ Rn as follows: for x even, let qx equal the
slope of the string between Ax−1 and Ax; for x odd, let qx equal one minus this
slope. For any outcome and message x ∈ yk ∈ Y such that the string does not
touch Ak, we see that P(x | y) = qx since both are determined by the slope of
the string as it passes above or below Ak. Thus P is RCAR with vector q.
For any message yk with P(yk) = 0, we need to verify that the worst-case
optimal strategy satisfies qk + qk+1 ≤ 1. Note that the string does not touch
A1, because all other points are above the line through A0 and A1. By the same
argument (replacing ‘above’ by ‘below’ if n is odd) the string does not touch
An−1. If k is even, the string may be pushed down at Ak, so the slope to the
left of that point, which equals qk, must be smaller than or equal to the slope
to the right, which equals 1− qk+1. If k is odd, we similarly find 1− qk ≥ qk+1.
In both cases, we conclude qk + qk+1 ≤ 1.
What remains is to show that the marginal of P on the outcomes given in
the theorem agrees with p. We do this by first deriving from p a formula for
the marginal of P on the messages.
Consider two points Aa, Ab with a < b such that the string touches these
points but no points in between (thus the string follows a straight line between
points Aa and Ab). Using the notation pS for∑x∈S px, the slope of this segment
of the string equals
p(a,b],even
p(a,b]
.
This quantity equals qx for any even a < x ≤ b, so we call it qeven, and define
qodd := p(a,b],odd/p(a,b] = 1− qeven.
For a < x ≤ b, the marginal constraints ∑y3x P(y)P(x | y) = px are equi-
valent to∑y3x P(y) = px/qx. By defining P(y0) and P(yn) as 0 (note that there
are no such elements in Y), we can write ∑y3x P(y) = P(yx−1) + P(yx). For
a < k ≤ b, we must have P(yk) = pk/qk − P(yk−1) by the marginal constraint
on x = k. Using P(ya) = 0 and applying this recursion repeatedly, we find that
the following choice of marginal on messages satisfies all marginal constraints
for a < x ≤ b:
P(yk) = (−1)k
( p(a,k],even
qeven
− p(a,k],odd
qodd
)
for a < k ≤ b.
(Note that we get P(yb) = 0 as required.) Meanwhile in string land, the point
Ak is at height p(0,k],even, and the string intersects the vertical line through Ak
at height p(0,a],even + p(a,k]qeven; the (signed) difference is
δk := p(a,k],even − p(a,k]qeven = p(a,k],even − (p(a,k],even + p(a,k],odd)qeven
= p(a,k],evenqodd − p(a,k],oddqeven.
This is positive at even kwhere the string passes below Ak, and negative at odd
k. Thus the choice of marginal we found above equals the choice given in the
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theorem:
P(yk) = (−1)k δkqevenqodd =
|δk|
qevenqodd
.
which is positive for all a < k < b. Because P also satisfies all marginal con-
straints, it follows that P is a probability distribution.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. If f is proportional, multiply the flow in each f -compo-
nent by the largest factor such that the resulting flow is under c(w). This gives
a flow f ′ with the same components as f , and with supply proportions q′v =
qv/(w(1− qv) + qv). This is strictly increasing as a function of qv for all w > 0,
so f ′ is also proportional.
To show that f ′ is maximum, we need the following theory (see Schrijver,
2003a). An augmenting path for a flow f is a path from an unsaturated source s
(i.e. with us < 1) ending at an unsaturated sink t. This path may travel back-
wards along arcs, but only along those that carry positive flow. By increasing
the flow along the path’s (odd-numbered) arcs from S to T and decreasing the
flow along (even-numbered) arcs where the path travels backwards from T to
S, we increase the utilization of s and twithout changing the utilization of the
intermediate nodes, and without rendering any flow negative. Conversely, if
no augmenting path exists for a flow f , then f is a maximum flow.
An augmenting path for f ′ would have to start at a source s with q′s > 1/2
and end at a sink t with q′t < 1/2 (such s and t are unsaturated). Along the
path, by the definition of proportional flow, q′ can decrease only when going
from a node in T to one in S, which must happen on an even-numbered arc
in the path. However, such an arc where q′ changes must cross to a different
f ′-component, so there was no flow on it. We conclude that there is no aug-
menting path, so f ′ is maximum.
If f is not proportional, we are in one of three cases:
• There are arcs (s, t1), (s, t2) with positive flow but ut1 < ut2 . Then take
w < ut2 /us. Now adapt f by multiplying the flow in each f -component
by the largest factor such that the resulting flow f ′ is under c(w) (this is
the only componentwise rescaling that might lead to a maximum flow).
To satisfy the capacity constraint on t2, the modified flow f ′ must leave
s and t1 both unsaturated. So f ′ can be increased along (s, t1), showing
that it is not maximum.
• There are arcs (s1, t), (s2, t) with positive flow but us1 < us2 . Taking w >
ut/us2 and adapting f to Gw as before leaves s1 and t unsaturated.
• The utilization of f is constant within each f -component, but there is
an arc (s, t) with zero flow and qs > qt. If we take qs/(1− qs) > w >
qt/(1− qt), we get q′s > 1/2 > q′t in the flow adapted to Gw: both s and
t are unsaturated, so this flow is not maximum.
Proof of Lemma 8.3. The decomposition can be constructed as follows given
an arbitrary maximum flow (showing existence and uniqueness): Start with
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V< consisting of all unsaturated nodes in T and V> consisting of all unsatur-
ated nodes in S. Then add a node v to V< (V>) if it is adjacent to a node u in
V< (V>) with either positive flow, or with u ∈ T (u ∈ S). When no more nodes
can be added to V< or V>, let V= = V \ (V< ∪ V>). Note that V< ∩ V> = ∅:
if it is not, the construction shows an augmenting path (as seen in the proof
of Theorem 8.2). Because the above construction only adds nodes to V< or V>
when they must necessarily be there, we see that a decomposition with max-
imal V= is obtained this way; because the order of operations does not change
the result, this decomposition is unique.
We also need to show that the initial choice ofmaximumflowwill not affect
the result. Different maximum flows must be related by a (sequence of) cycles
or (even-length) paths that flow could be alternately added/subtracted along.
Wewill show that there are no such alternating paths or cycles thatwould cause
V< to change; the proof for V> is analogous.
For a new node to be added to V<, an alternating path or cycle would have
to add flow to an arc leaving V<, or cause a node in T \ V< to become unsat-
urated. Either can only be done by an alternating path or cycle with nodes
both in V< and outside V<. However, an alternating path with one endpoint
in V< and the other outside would have to have its endpoints in T (because it
needs to increase the flow along the arc leaving V<, but nodes in V< ∩ S are
saturated), and could only increase the utilization of nodes in T \ V<. Other
border-crossing paths or cycles have both odd- and even-numbered arcs with
zero flow, so they are not alternating. Hence all alternating paths and cycles
that have one node in V< are completely in V<.
We still need to show that alternating paths and cycles contained in V<
cannot cause a node to disappear from V<. After applying an alternating path
withinV<, at least one of its endpoints (in T)will be unsaturated, and following
the path from there, we find that each of its nodesmust still be inV<. Applying
an alternating cycle within V< does not change the set of nodes that are added
to V< due to not being saturated or due to (sequences of) arcs not in the cycle:
this set must have been nonempty, and must still be so. Again, by following
the cycle from such a node, we find that all its nodes must still be in V<.
Proof of Lemma 8.4. Let f ′ be the maximum componentwise rescaling of f
(which has the same components and supply proportions as f ). An f ′-compo-
nentC has qC < 1/2 if and only if its nodes in T are unsaturated by f ′, qC > 1/2
if and only if its nodes in S are unsaturated by f ′, and qC = 1/2 if and only if all
its nodes are saturated by f ′. By the inequality in the definition of proportional
flows, D will have no arcs disallowed by the decomposition.
Proof of Theorem 8.5. Consider a proportional maximum flow f on (D, c).
An isolated node v of D has qv = 1 if it is a source and qv = 0 if it is a sink, re-
gardless of f . For each nonisolated v ∈ V, let w = qv/(1− qv) according to f ,
and determine c(w) (the modified capacities as in (8.10), with demands multi-
plied by w), f (w) (the maximum componentwise rescaling of f ), q(w) (the sup-
ply proportions of f (w)), and V(w)= (the fully saturated part of the capacitated
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Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of (D, c(w))). Then for node v, q(w)v = 1/2, so
v ∈ V(w)= . Another proportional flow f ′ on (D, c) has to be a componentwise
rescaling of a proportional flow on (D, c(w)), but by Lemma 8.4, all propor-
tional flows on (D, c(w)) have q(w)v = 1/2. Thus like f , f ′ has q′v/(1− q′v) = w.
This determines q′v uniquely for any proportional flow f ′ on (D, c).
Proof of Lemma 8.6. A flow that is not maximum is also not lexicographically
maximum: by increasing the flow along an augmenting path, two utilizations
(one source, one sink) are increased, so the resulting flow is also lexicograph-
ically larger than the original. Thus a lexicographically maximum flow is also
a maximum flow.
Let (V<,V=,V>) be the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition of V.
All nodes in V= have uv = 1 for any maximum flow. Within V<, all sources
have us = 1 and within V>, all sinks have ut = 1. Hence u
(i)
S depends only on
the flow in V> and u
(i)
T only on the flow in V<, so that both can be optimized
independently. Thus a lexicographically maximum flow always exists.
Proof of Theorem 8.7. Let (V<,V=,V>) be the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai
decomposition of V. For lexicographically maximum f , consider nodes s ∈
S ∩ V< and t, t′ ∈ T ∩ V< with ut < ut′ and (s, t), (s, t′) ∈ A. If f(s,t′) > 0,
there is an alternating path that increases ut without decreasing the utilization
of any sink with utilization smaller that ut; this contradicts the lexicographic
maximality, so f(s,t′) = 0. So each source in V< is connected by f only to sinks
whose utilization is the same (and is connected to at least one sink, because all
sources participate in the flow). ThusV< decomposes into f -components with
constant qC within each f -component, and any arcs with zero flow between
the components of the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition go from
s ∈ S ∩V< to t ∈ T ∩V< with qs < qt < 1/2.
Analogously, V> decomposes into f -components with constant qC > 1/2,
and all f -components of V= have qC = 1/2. By its definition, there are no
arcs across the components of the capacitated Edmonds-Gallai decomposition
with qs > qt. So the decomposition of V into f -components obtained this way
satisfies all properties of a proportional flow. With Lemma 8.6, this shows that
any lexicographically maximum flow is a proportional maximum flow.
For the converse: Lemma 8.6 tells us that a lexicographically maximum
flow exists, and that it is a maximum flow. Other maximum flows with the
same utilizations on each node are also lexicographically maximum. As we
just saw, these flows are proportional. There are no other proportional max-
imum flows, because all proportional maximum flows have these utilizations
by Theorem 8.5. Thus all proportional maximum flows are lexicographically
maximum.
Proof of Theorem 8.9. It is immediate that P is a distribution over pairs (x, y)
∈ X × Y with x ∈ y, and that it satisfies the equality on q′x imposed by the
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RCAR condition. For the inequality we have, for each arc (s, t) ∈ A,
qs ≤ qt ⇐⇒ q′s ≤ 1− q′t ⇐⇒ q′s + q′t ≤ 1.
Finally we show that P agrees with the marginal p for a source x ∈ S (the case
for sinks is analogous):
∑
y3x
P(x | y)P(y) = βC
αC + βC
∑
y3x
P(y) =
βC
αC + βC
αC + βC
αCβC
fx
=
1
αC
αC · cx = px
using α−1C + β
−1
C = (αC + βC)/(αCβC). Thus P is a strategy for the quizmaster,
and is RCAR with vector q′. It follows from Theorem 7.5 that P is worst-case
optimal.
Proof of Lemma 8.10. First note that the network is skew symmetric: we get the
same network when we rename each sx to tx and vice versa and reverse the
direction of all arcs.
Now suppose the claim of the lemma is false and there exists a proportional
maximum flow with usx 6= utx for some outcome x. By the skew symmetry of
the network, this gives another proportional maximum flow on the original
network which has utilizations u′sx = utx 6= usx . If two maximum flows on
the same network have different utilizations, this implies that they have dif-
ferent supply proportions (by the invertibility demonstrated in (8.9)). But this
contradicts the uniqueness result of Theorem 8.5.
Proof of Theorem 8.11. We show that this satisfies the marginal constraint.
We take C to be the f -component containing sx (a proof centred around tx
would have been analogous):
∑
y3x
P(x | y)P(y) = βC
αC + βC
∑
y3x
P(y) =
βC
αC + βC
αC + βC
2αCβC
( fsx + ftx )
=
1
2αC
2 fsx =
1
αC
αCcsx = px.
The other properties of worst-case optimal strategies in our game are verified
as for Theorem 8.9.
Proof of Theorem 8.12. Wefirst show the correctness of a constructionwewill
use several times to define a packing on a matroid (X ,Y) from packings on its
restriction and contraction. Given amatroid (X ,Y) and a set S ⊆ X , each basis
y ∈ Y with |y∩ S| = r(S) has representatives in the restriction and contraction:
y ∩ S ∈ Y|S and y \ S ∈ Y/S. We now show that the converse also holds: for
each basis y1 ∈ Y|S and each basis y2 ∈ Y/S, we have y1 ∪ y2 ∈ Y .
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To prove this claim, let M = (X ,Y) and M′ = M|S⊕M/S (the direct sum
of the restriction to S and the contraction from S: its bases are exactly the sets
y = y1 ∪ y2 for y1 ∈ Y|S and y2 ∈ Y/S). For any set T ⊆ X ,
rM′(T) = rM|S(T ∩ S) + rM/S(T \ S)
= rM(T ∩ S) + rM(T ∪ S)− rM(S) ≤ rM(T),
where we used the rank function of a contraction as given in Oxley (2011, Pro-
position 3.1.6), and the submodularity of the rank function. Because rM(X ) =
rM′(X ), it follows that any basis of M′ is also a basis of M, proving our claim.
Consider now the construction that takes vectors zS ∈ RY|S≥0 and z ∈ RY≥0
to define a vector z′ ∈ RY≥0 as follows: z′y = zSy∩S · z(y\S)/S for y ∈ Y with
y ∩ S ∈ Y|S and z′y = 0 for other y ∈ Y . If z obeys zy = 0 for y ∩ S 6∈ Y|S
(equivalently, for |y ∩ S| 6= r(S)), z′ has the following properties: For x ∈ S,
∑
y∈Y ,y3x
z′y =
 ∑
y1∈Y|S,y13x
zSy1
 · [ ∑
y2∈Y/S
zy2/S
]
=
 ∑
y1∈Y|S,y13x
zSy1
 · Z (8.13)
where Z = ∑y∈Y zy, and for x ∈ X \ S,
∑
y∈Y ,y3x
z′y =
 ∑
y1∈Y|S
zSy1
 · [ ∑
y2∈Y/S,y23x
zy2/S
]
= ZS ·
[
∑
y∈Y ,y3x
zy
]
(8.14)
where ZS = ∑y∈Y|S zSy .
Pick a colour class C of the input matroid, and consider the algorithm de-
scribed in Schrijver (2003b, Theorem 42.7) (this algorithm does the real work in
determining a maximum fractional basis packing). Let U be the last set found
during the execution of this algorithm for which r(U)− x(U) < r(C)− x(C)
(where x equals the capacity vector multiplied by some constant). It follows
from the operation of the algorithm that this U minimizes
r(C)
λ
· pC\S|C + r(S) (8.15)
over all S ⊆ C for λ equal to the optimal value Z as well as for some other
Z′ > Z. Furthermore, the optimal Z found by the algorithm satisfies
r(C)
Z
· pC\U|C + r(U) =
r(C)
Z
· pC\C|C + r(C),
so Z = pC\U|C · r(C)/(r(C)− r(U)).
Any z satisfying the basis packing constraint (8.12) obeys
r(C) ·∑
y
zy = ∑
x∈C\U
∑
y3x
zy + ∑
x∈U
∑
y3x
zy ≤ ∑
x∈C\U
r(C) · px|C + r(U) ·∑
y
zy,
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where the first sum is bounded by the capacities and the second by the fact
that every basis y ∈ Y|C contains at most r(U) elements from U. To achieve
the optimal value ∑y zy = Z, both bounds must hold with equality, meaning
that z fills all elements in C \U to capacity, and zy > 0 only for y ∈ Y|C with
|y ∩U| = r(U) (and thus |y \U| = r(C)− r(U)).
We claim that the set U considered here is the set of possibly unsaturated
elements; to prove this, we still need to show that for each x ∈ U, a maximum
fractional basis packing z exists that leaves x unsaturated. In fact, wewill show
a single z′′ leaving all ofU unsaturated. BecauseUminimizes (8.15) at λ = Z′,
by Schrijver (2003b, Corollary 40.2f), the vector (1/Z′)(c)x∈U is in the spanning
set polytope of the matroid (U,Y|U). Then by Schrijver, Corollary 42.7a, a
vector z′ ∈ RY|U≥0 with ∑y∈Y|U z′y = Z′ > Z exists that is a fractional basis
packing for thematroid (U,Y|U)with capacities (c)x∈U . Nowgiven this z′ and
an arbitrary maximum fractional basis packing z on (C,Y|C), let z′′ be given
by z′′y = z′y∩U · z(y\U)/U/Z′ for |y∩U| = r(U), and z′′y = 0 otherwise. We have
∑y3x z′′y ≤ cx · Z/Z′ < cx for x ∈ U by (8.13) and ∑y3x z′′y = Z′ · cx/Z′ = cx for
x ∈ C \U by (8.14); also,
∑
y∈Y|C
z′′y =
(
∑
y∈Y|U
z′y
)
·
(
∑
y∈Y|C/U
zy
)/
Z′ = Z,
so z′′ is a maximum fractional basis packing that leaves all elements of U un-
saturated, proving the claim.
Because U minimizes (8.15) at λ = Z, we have for any S ⊆ C
r(C)
Z
· pC\U|C + r(U) ≤
r(C)
Z
· pC\S|C + r(S);
filling in Z, this becomes
r(C) ≤ r(C)− r(U)
pC\U
· pC\S + r(S). (8.16)
(It follows that r(U) < r(C), otherwise S = ∅ would violate this inequality.)
Using the above, we show that qx for x ∈ C\ (qx is the same for all such x)
equals minx′∈C qx′ . We do this by induction. The base case when a fractional
basis packing with Z = 1 exists in C: then qx is the same for all x ∈ C. For
the inductive step, let U 6= ∅ be the possibly unsaturated part of C, let C′ be
a colour class within U found in the recursive call (possibly C′ = U), and let
U′ be its possibly unsaturated part (U′ = ∅ if C′ is a base case). Then for any
x ∈ C \U and any x′ ∈ C′ \U′,
qx =
pC\U
r(C)− r(U) =
pC\U
r(C)− r(C′)− r(U \ C′)
≤ pC\U + pC′\U′
r(C)− r ((U \ C′) ∪U′) =
pC\U + pC′\U′
r(C)− r(U \ C′)− r(U′)
≤ pC′\U′
r(C′)− r(U′) =
pC′\U′ |U
r(C′)− r(U′) · pU = q
U
x′ · pU = qx′ .
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The second and third equalities use that for a 2-connected component C′ of the
matroid (U,Y|U), r(U) = r(C′) + r(U \ C′) (Oxley, 2011, Proposition 4.2.1).
The first inequality is a rewriting of (8.16), using r((U \ C′) ∪U′) ≤ r(U) <
r(C). The other inequality follows because the quantity on the middle line is a
weighted average of the quantities on the first and third lines.
We are now ready to show that the output of the algorithm satisfies (8.11).
We will again proceed by induction, but first show that for each colour class
C, ∑x∈y qx ≤ pC for all y ∈ Y|C with equality if mCy > 0, and that mC satisfies
qx ·∑y3x mCy = px for all x ∈ C.
For the base case, ∑x∈y qx = pC for all y ∈ Y|C, and Z = 1 implies that all
elements are saturated by z, so that qx ·∑y3x mCy = qx · cx = pC · px|C = px.
For the induction step, first consider y ∈ Y|C with mCy > 0. For such y,
y ∩U ∈ Y|U, so
∑
x∈y
qx = ∑
x∈y∩U
qUx · pU + (r(C)− r(U)) · pC\U/(r(C)− r(U)) = pU + pC\U = pC,
where we also used that mUy∩U > 0, so that ∑x∈y∩U q
U
x = 1 by the induction
hypothesis. For other y ∈ Y|C, we have ∑x∈y∩U qUx ≤ 1, and such y may have
more than r(C)− r(U) elements in C \U. As we saw, these elements have the
smallest qx among x ∈ C, so ∑x∈y qx ≤ pC.
Finally, mC satisfies the marginal constraints: For x ∈ U,
qx · ∑
y3x
mCy = pU · qUx · ∑
y′∈Y|U,y13x
mUy′ · Z/Z = pU · px|U = px
using (8.13), and for x ∈ C \U
qx · ∑
y3x
mCy =
pC\U
r(C)− r(U) · 1 · cx/Z = pC\U ·
px|C
pC\U|C
= px
using (8.14).
Having established this for each colour class C, we conclude that∑x∈y qx ≤
1 for all y ∈ Y , with equality if mCy∩C > 0 for all C. For all colour classes C and
all x ∈ C, we have qx · ∑y3x my = qx · ∑y′∈Y|C,y′3x mCy′ = px using that the
colour classes are 2-connected components of (X ,Y) by Lemma 7.8, and thus
the matroid is the direct sum of its colour classes. This completes the proof of
correctness.
To see that the algorithm terminates, observe that the sum of ranks of the
matroids appearing as arguments in recursive calls is strictly smaller than the
rank of the original matroid (as r(U) < r(C) for each colour class C). Even-
tually, we must encounter the case r(U) = 0, meaning that all elements are
saturated by z, so Z = 1: the base case.
It remains to prove our claim that the algorithm runs in strongly polyno-
mial time given an independence testing oracle. Krogdahl (1977) shows how
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the colour classes of the matroid can be determined in (strongly) polynomial
time using an independence testing oracle. An algorithm that finds a max-
imum fractional packing z in strongly polynomial time using an independence
testing oracle is given in Schrijver (2003b, Corollary 42.7a); the set of possibly
unsaturated elements U is found by the same algorithm as we described ear-
lier.
The independence testing oracle of (X ,Y) also gives an independence test-
ing oracle on the restrictions of (X ,Y) considered in the algorithm. The re-
maining operations of the algorithm can also be performed in strongly poly-
nomial time, assuming thatmCy andmy are not stored explicitly as sequences of
numbers, but using a suitable data structure that can represent them in terms
of other vectors.
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Samenvatting
Betere voorspellingen uit verkeerde en ondergespecificeerde modellen
Statistiek en machine learning behandelen de vraag wat we te weten kunnen
komen over een onbekend proces, door te kijken naar de data (gegevens) die
door het proces zijn voortgebracht. Zo wil een onderzoeker bijvoorbeeld iets te
weten komen over de werking van een nieuw medicijn, op basis van gegevens
over patiënten die dit medicijn eerder gebruikten. Met zulke kennis kunnen
we dan voorspellen hoe het proces zich in de toekomst zal gedragen.
Voor de analyse van data worden vaak statistische modellen gebruikt. Een
model is een verzameling hypothesen: mogelijke beschrijvingen van het onbe-
kende proces. In veel realistische situaties is ieder beschikbaar model echter:
• verkeerd — geen enkele beschrijving in het model klopt precies met de
werkelijkheid; of
• ondergespecificeerd — de beschrijvingen zijn niet volledig.
Toch willen we van data leren en goede voorspellingen doen, óók als er geen
beter model voorhanden is. In dit proefschrift presenterenwemethodenwaar-
mee dit gedaan kan worden.
In hoofdstuk 2 kijken we naar Akaike’s informatiecriterium (AIC), in 1973 ge-
introduceerd door de Japanse statisticus Hirotugu Akaike. Dit is een methode
voor modelselectie, waarbij met een eenvoudige formule wordt bepaald welk
van een aantal modellen naar verwachting het best in staat zal zijn om nieuwe
data te voorspellen. Deze methode wordt in de praktijk vaak toegepast op een
bepaald type ondergespecificeerde modellen: de datapunten bestaan uit twee
delen, x en y, maar de modellen beschrijven alleen hoe y zich gedraagt als x al
bekend is, en niet waar x vandaan komt. Toegepast op zulke modellen, blijkt
AIC echter niet precies te doen wat we zouden willen. De formule geeft dan
namelijk niet een inschatting vande voorspelfout op een níéuwdatapunt,maar
op een datapunt dat slechts gedeeltelijk nieuw is: een oude x met een nieuwe
y. In hoofdstuk 2 latenwe zien dat het ookmogelijk is om de voorspelfout voor
een volledig nieuw datapunt in te schatten, namelijk met de nieuwe methode
XAIC. Ook zien we dat door XAIC te gebruiken in plaats van AIC, de kwaliteit
van voorspellingen in veel gevallen aanzienlijk beter wordt.
Een andere manier om een voorspeltaak aan te pakken, is Bayesiaanse sta-
tistiek, vernoemd naar dominee Thomas Bayes, een Engelse wiskundige die
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leefde van 1702 tot 1761. In deze tak van statistiek wordt het begrip kans niet
alleen gebruikt voor toevallige gebeurtenissen (zoals de kans om zes te gooien
met een dobbelsteen), maar ook om onze onzekerheid uit te drukken (zoals
de kans dat een bepaald model correct is). Als we onze onzekerheid over een
onbekend proces in een kansverdeling hebben uitgedrukt en daarna nieuwe
data uit dat proces observeren, dan volgt uit de wetten van de kansrekening
een nieuwe kansverdeling, die uitdrukt hoe onze onzekerheid over het onbe-
kende proces is veranderd nu we de data gezien hebben. Op basis van deze
kansverdeling kunnen we vervolgens voorspellingen doen.
Wat gebeurt er echter als geen van de modellen correct is? In veel gevallen
blijkt dezemethode dan nog steeds goede voorspellingen op te leveren, hoewel
ook bekend is dat het in zulke gevallen mis kan gaan. In hoofdstukken 3 tot
en met 5 zien we een voorbeeld van een situatie waar de modellen allemaal
verkeerd zijn (hoewel het verschil op het eerste gezicht niet problematisch lijkt),
en waar Bayesiaanse methoden tot heel slechte voorspellingen leiden.
Deze problemen treden niet op als we een lagere leersnelheid kiezen. Een la-
gere leersnelheid betekent dat we onze kansverdeling minder sterk aanpassen
wanneer we nieuwe data zien. Het nadeel hiervan is, dat we minder efficiënt
gebruikmaken van de data. Daaromwillenwe de grootste leersnelheid gebrui-
ken die nog veilig is voor onze data. De juiste snelheid is echter moeilijk te be-
palen: in onze experimenten blijkt, dat veel voor de hand liggende methoden
hier niet in slagen. We zien echter dat onze nieuwe methode SafeBayes er wel
in slaagt een goede leersnelheid te kiezen, en daardoor betrouwbare voorspel-
lingen blijft doen.
De laatste drie hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift behandelen een andere
voorspeltaak, namelijk een generalisatie van het Monty Hall-probleem (in het
Nederlands ook bekend als het driedeurenprobleem). In het spelprogramma Let’s
make a deal, met presentator Monty Hall, krijgt de deelnemer de keus uit drie
gesloten deuren. Achter één van deze deuren staat een dure auto, achter de
twee andere staan (relatief) waardeloze geiten. Nadat de deelnemer een keuze
gemaakt heeft, wordt hij onderbroken doorMonty, die één van de andere twee
deuren opent en een geit laat zien. Verrassend genoeg kan de deelnemer zijn
kans op de auto vergroten door nu van deur te veranderen!
Een algemener probleem is het volgende. Een uitkomst wordt willekeurig
getrokken; we kennen de kansverdeling waarmee dit gebeurt, maar krijgen de
uitkomst nog niet te zien. Vervolgens ontvangen we nieuwe informatie, waar-
door sommige mogelijke uitkomsten afvallen. We weten dat deze informatie
klopt, maarweweten niet door wat voormechanisme de informatie is gekozen
(zoals de deelnemer in hetMontyHall-probleem niet weet opwat voormanier
de presentator kiest welke deur hij openmaakt).
De Bayesiaanse manier om kansverdelingen bij te werken, vertelt ons niet
hoe we met zulke informatie om moeten gaan. Daarom pakken we dit pro-
bleemop een anderemanier aan.Wewillen goede voorspellingen over deware
uitkomst kunnen doen, wát het mechanisme ook is dat ons de informatie gaf.
We willen het dus zelfs goed doen als het mechanisme ontworpen is om het
ons zo moeilijk mogelijk te maken. Met andere woorden: we kijken naar de
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worst case (het slechtste geval).
Om verschillende voorspelstrategieën te vergelijken, hebben we getallen
nodig die beschrijven hoe ‘ver’ een voorspelling ernaast zat. Zo’n toekenning
van getallen aan voorspellingen heet een verliesfunctie. Omdat er oneindig veel
verschillende manieren zijn om die getallen toe te kennen, moeten we een
keuze maken.
In hoofdstuk 6 bekijken we hoe worst-case optimale strategieën voor al-
lerlei verliesfuncties eruit zien. In het algemeen blijkt dat een voorspelstrategie
die volgens de ene verliesfunctie optimaal is, dit volgens andere verliesfuncties
niet hoeft te zijn. Het belangrijkste theoretische resultaat in hoofdstuk 7 is, dat
er ook situaties zijn waarin de optimale strategie níét op deze manier afhanke-
lijk is van de keuze van een verliesfunctie. Dit geldt in twee gevallen: als door
iedere boodschap die hetmechanisme ons zou kunnen geven, precies twee van
de uitkomsten niet afvallen (de boodschappen vormen dan een graaf ); of als de
boodschappen op een specifieke manier met elkaar samenhangen (ze vormen
eenmatroïde). HetMontyHall-probleem heeft deze eigenschappen, en daarom
is de optimale strategie daar niet afhankelijk van de verliesfunctie.
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 6 beschrijven hoe worst-case optimale stra-
tegieën voor allerlei verliesfuncties eruit zien, maar niet hoe je ze kunt vin-
den. Dit probleem wordt gedeeltelijk opgelost in de rest van hoofdstuk 7 en in
hoofdstuk 8. In het bijzonder worden in dit laatste hoofdstuk efficiënte algo-
ritmen voor grafen en matroïden gegeven: precieze stappenplannen die geheel
automatisch uitgevoerd kunnen worden en na een eindig aantal stappen een
worst-case optimale strategie hebben berekend.
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